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Elaborating the role of reflection and individual differences in the study of folk-economic beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

Kevin Arceneaux
Kevin Arceneaux*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Behavioral Foundations Lab, and Institute for Public Affairs, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122. [email protected]/arceneaux/
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Abstract

Intuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e161
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

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