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The case for general mechanisms in concept formation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1998

Kenneth R. Livingston
Kenneth R. Livingston
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Program in Cognitive Science, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604-0479 [email protected] depts.vassar.edu/~cogsci/livingston.html
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Abstract

Reasons are given for believing that it is premature to abandon the idea that domain-general models of concept learning can explain how human beings understand the biological world. Questions are raised about whether the evidence for domain specificity is convincing, and it is suggested that two constraints on domain-general concept learning models may be sufficient to account for the available data.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , August 1998 , pp. 581 - 582
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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