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Vae Victis! The Austro-Hungarian Armeeoberkommando and the Armistice of Villa Giusti
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
Extract
In terms of lessons to be learned from history, World War I remains a nearly unparalleled example of how not to do things. The origins and conduct of the war, as well as the major peace treaties ending the conflict, have become monuments to ineptitude. The circumstances surrounding the end of the war on the Austro-Italian front can take their rightful place in this panoply of bungling. Neither the Austrians in defeat nor the Italians in victory displayed attributes worthy of emulation, and, if anything is to be learned from these events, it is that haste to extricate oneself from a war can be as dangerous as haste to enter a war and that, contrary to popular belief, it takes two sides to make a peace.
- Type
- War and Society: The Impact of War on Politics, Diplomacy, and Social Change
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1978
References
1 Fiala, Peter, Die letzte Offensive Altösierreichs. Führungsprobleme und Führerveranlwontlichkeil bei der öst.-ung. Offensive in Venetien, Juni 1918. In Militärgeschichtliche Studien, Vol.III (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1967), is a good study of the June Battles.Google Scholar Another viewpoint is presented in Hanks, Ronald W., “The End of an Institution: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Italy, 1918” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rice University, 1977), pp. 78–263Google Scholar. See also Falls, Cyril, Caporello 1917 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 146–167.Google Scholar
2 Conversations in Spa on August 14, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 1848, pp. 788–790.
3 Ibid., p. 790.
4 Ibid., pp. 790–791. In his My War Memories, 1914–1918 (2 vols., London: Hutchinson & Co., 1919), Vol. II, pp. 579–602Google Scholar, General Erich Ludendorff gives a more blasé and self-satisfied version of the views presented by himself and Hindenburg.
5 Few events are more indicative of the German High Command's unawareness of the serious situation confronting Austria-Hungary than Ludendorff's request on October 24 that the Austrians send several brigades of mountain troops to the Western Front at a time when units of the Austro-Hungarian army were in outright revolt and an Entente offensive had been scheduled to begin the next day. See Generaloberst [Artur] Arz. Zur Ceschichie des grossen Krieges 1914–1918 (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1924), p. 328.Google Scholar
6 In the meantime, the military situation in Italy had deteriorated seriously. See Hecht, Rudolf, “Fragen zur Heeresergänzung der Gesamten Bewaffneten Macht Österreich-Ungarns während des ersten Weltkrieg” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Vienna, 1969), p. 597;Google Scholar and General Berndt, Otto, Letzter Kampf und Endeder 29. Infanteriedivision. Meine Erinnerungen aus der Zeit des Zusammenbruchs (Reichenberg: Verlag der “Heimatsöhne im Weltkrieg,” 1918), p. 34.Google Scholar Both Hecht and Berndt concern themselves with the green cadres of deserters, whose numbers at this time were estimated to be about 100,000 men. See also the note from Arz to Hindenburg in Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, p. 298, in which he estimates that the total Austro-Hungarian rifle strength on the Italian front as of September 20, 1918, amounted to only 280,000 men.
7 Captain Kamillo Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand, 1918,” Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Manuskripten, Weltkrieg, 1918, ser. “J” (Italy), No. 19, p. 1. See also Austria, , Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, Österreich-Ungarns lelzter Krieg, 1914–1918 (7 vols., Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1928-1938), Vol. VII, p. 577Google Scholar. Besides Weber, the other members of the commission included Colonel Karl Schneller, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Seiler, Lieutenant Colonel Franz Nyekhegyl, Captain Kamillo Ruggera, and two naval officers.
8 Military attaché in Stockholm to Arz, October 9, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations Order No. 1962, p. 786. See also KlepschKloth to Armeeoberkommando, October 9, 1918, ibid., p. 783.
9 Klepsch-Kloth to Arz, October 10, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 1963, Res. 1730/1010/2, p. 788; Klepsch-Kloth to Arz, October 10, 1918, ibid., Res. 1730/10/10/3, p. 788.
10 Count Burián to Count Trauttmansdorff, October 9, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 1962, Telegram No. 364, p. 775.
11 Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, pp. 308–309.
12 Armeeoberkommando to Army Group Command Archduke Joseph, October 12, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Fasc. LXV (Army Group Command Archduke Joseph Enemy Intelligence Group), Armeeoberkommando Operations No. 148906. The lack of an enemy intelligence group file number on this document and the fact that it is dated as having been received on October 11 leads me to believe that the document was misfiled by the army on receipt.
13 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, Vol. VII, p. 577.
14 War Ministry Präs. No. 37,679, October 14, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 1985, p. 25.
15 Weber to Armeeoberkommando, October 14, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 1978, p. 946.
16 Instructions to General of the Infantry Weber and Brigadier General von Laxa, October 15, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 1981. The gesture of returning the Italian prisoners of war seemed very generous, but ulterior motives existed. Because of food shortages in the monarchy, the continued feeding of Italian prisoners would have been difficult. Furthermore, Austria-Hungary lacked the transport to move its own army back to the hinterland, much less Italian prisoners. The simplest solution was to wash her hands of the problem while giving the appearance of being generous.
17 Peter Feldl maintains that it is “incomprehensible that men who had held leading political positions for years could have composed a document that could precipitate into chaos overnight a whole empire in which the governmental apparatus was still entirely functional.” See his Reich, Das verspielte. Die letzten Tage Österreich- Ungarns (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 1968), p. 311.Google Scholar There are few works in English that deal adequately with the manifesto. Several of the articles in Plaschka, Richard and Mack, Karlheinz (eds.). Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1970),Google Scholar discuss the manifesto and are perhaps the best source of information. See also Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, The Last Habsburg (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), pp. 171–179.Google Scholar
18 Arz, Zur Geschkhte des grossen Krieges, p. 345.
19 Armeeoberkommando to General Weber, October 28, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2052. See also Ruggera, , “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” p. 2. The effect of the final statement was to throw the whole blame onto Weber's shoulders if something went wrong.Google Scholar
20 Österrekh-Ungarns letzter Krieg, Vol. VII, pp. 632–633.Google Scholar
21 Ibid., p. 634.
22 Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, p. 346.
23 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 3–4.
24 Copy of text of broadcast at 8.55 P. M. on October 27, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2062, p. 322. See also Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” p. 5, in which a slightly different text is given.
25 Supreme Command of the Italian army to Weber, October 30, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2068, p. 343. See also Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 6–7. Although the Hughes-wire copy in the Armeeoberkommando files is dated October 30, Ruggera says that it was actually sent at 10.00 P. M. on October 29.
26 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” p. 8.
27 Ibid., p. 10.
28 Ibid. There is, of course, an alternative interpretation of the reasons for all of these delays, and that is that the Italians were really caught off guard and unprepared by the Austrian request for an armistice. While it is true that the Entente Powers seem to have given little thought to a possible Austrian collapse, it was merely because they had been concentrating on the problem of Germany. This second theory, however, seems highly unlikely for several reasons. First of all, it invalidates much of the mythology that the Italians have built around their reasons for the Vittorio Veneto campaign. Moreover, the various Austrian and German overtures during September and October could not have gone completely unnoticed by them. Furthermore, a similar plea for an armistice in the Balkans had been quickly dealt with.
29 Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, pp. 361–362.
30 From the point of view of Austria-Hungary, the worst aspect of the demands was the right of free passage. Arz and Emperor Charles had promised the Germans that under no circumstances would they agree to such a demand, whose primary purpose would be to allow the Entente Powers to attack Germany's southern border. The fears expressed by the Central Powers over this clause were probably overstated. It is highly doubtful that the Entente Powers could have moved a sufficient force through a hostile Austria and kept it supplied for such an offensive before 1919 at the earliest, and Germany had no intention of continuing the war that long. Still, it became a point of honor. The Habsburg emperor sent a special message to William II assuring him that if he had no other choice he would place himself “at the head” of those of his troops who remained loyal and personally prevent such free passage. William's answer must be somewhat suspect as a sarcastic masterpiece, if, indeed, he was capable of showing a sense of humor: “I was very moved to read your telegram with the news of an armistice proposal to Italy. I am confident that your German-Austrian soldiers, with your imperial highness at their head, will rise up as one man against ignominious conditions, and I thank you for explicitly assuring me that this will be the case. In true friendship. Wilhelm.” Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2091. Unfortunately, William was probably serious, but his was probably the only possible reply to Charles' theatrical promise. In any event, the German-Austrians of the monarchy were probably much more worried about their own borders and the fate of the Tirol than about what would happen to Germany.
31 The Hughes wire was an early form of the teletype.
32 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 11–12.
33 The possibility exists, of course, that Charles was merely trying to live up to his newly proclaimed status as the ruler of a federated state, but his later actions (i. e., resigning rather than signing the armistice) tend to indicate that he was merely trying to avoid responsibility.
34 Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, p. 364. It was possibly unfair to blame Charles for starting the war, but considering the later events in the Weimar Republic, Adler was correct in refusing to have anything to do with the armistice. The Austrian army could not accuse the new civilian government of a “stab in the back.”
35 Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2090, p. 402. See n. 37 for a discussion of the dating problem.
36 Arz, Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, p. 363.
37 There appears to be some confusion about when this message from Linder arrived in Italy. According to Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2090, it was sent on November 1, 1918. Österreich- Ungarns letzter Krieg, Vol. VII, p. 667, indicates that it was received on November 2, 1918. Arz's memoirs (Zur Geschichte des grossen Krieges, p. 363) refer to the message in a manner implying that it was received by Arz on November 2, 1918. Brigadier General Anton Ritter von Pitreich refers to having received a dispatch from Arz indicating that the Linder telegram was issued on November 1, 1918. See his “Die k. u. k. Piavefront,” Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Manuskripten, Weltkrieg, 1918, ser. “J” (Italy), No. 18, Pt. 3, p. 144. Sources dealing with events in Hungary during this period seem to believe that neither of the above dates is correct. Peter Urbach is of the opinion that Linder took office on Ocrober 31, and that since he was a confirmed pacifist his first action was to order the Hungarian troops to throw down their arms, and his second was to order the dissolution of the army. See his “Der Umsturz in Budapest. Unter besondere Berücksichtigung der militärischen Ereignisse” (unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Vienna, 1968), p. 149. In his Die Ungarn in Zusammenbruch 1918. Feldheer/Hinterland. Ein Beitrag zu Österreich-Ungarns letzter Geschichtsepoche auf Grund unveröffentlichen Archivakten und Personalquellen dargestellt (Oldenburg: Schulzesche Hofbuchdruckerei und Verlagsbuchhandlung R. Schwartz, 1931), p. 97Google Scholar, Zoltan Szende states that Linder sent the telegram to Army Group Kövess, in the Balkans, on October 31. Gunther Rothenberg believes that the message was sent by Linder on November I, but he maintains that Arz got it stopped and as a result it was not officially disseminated until the 2nd. See his The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1975), p. 217.Google Scholar All of this is merely indicative of the confusion that existed during the last days of the war. The most probable chain of events is that Linder composed and dispatched the message late on the 31st of October and that Army Group Kövess (in Hungary) received the telegram immediately. The message was received in Vienna (or Baden) but was not officially logged until the early hours of November 1st. Although it appears that the message, or at least the gist of it, was passed along to some commands on the 1st, Arz's intervention kept it from becoming an official notice until the 2nd.
38 Pitreich, “Die k. u. k. Piavefront,” Pt. 3, p. 144.
39 Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2094, pp. 466 and 464.
40 Ibid., p. 463.
41 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” p. 15.
42 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
43 Ibid., p. 24.
44 Armeeoberkommando to all army group commands, November 3, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2101, p. 482. Various accounts indicate a time discrepancy concerning this message. A notation on the message in Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2101 indicates that it was sent at 3.35 A. M. Captain Ruggera's detailed chronology states that it was transmitted between 1.00 A. M. and 2.00 A. M. See “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” p. 26. When a number of the other events of the night and the timing of several of the other messages are taken into consideration it appears that Captain Ruggera's chronology and account of events is probably the most accurate, particularly since accepting the time indicated in the Armeeoberkommando's report as correct would require one to believe that the army groups replied to the message before it was actually sent.
45 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 26–28.
46 Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2195, p. 850. This document is rather interesting since it was composed after the war as the Armeeoberkommando's official answer to the defense minister's questions concerning the activities of the Armeeoberkommando in regard to the armistice. The Austrian parliament had initiated an enquiry into the course of events, and the Armeeoberkommando's reply indicates that the Austro-Hungarian army has “avoided” battle after approximately 4.00 P. M. on November 3.
47 Arz. Zur Geschichte des grussen Krieges, p. 368.
48 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” p. 38.
49 Throughout the negotiations Weber was plagued with intermittent communications difficulties. A critical observer might note that while Weber was never able to achieve quick contact with the Armeeoberkommando when it was necessary to do so, routine messages and replies flitted back and forth with little or no problem.
50 Ruggera. “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 39–40. See also Edmonds, James E. and Davies, H. R., Military Operations Italy. 1915–1919. Unnumbered volume in the History of the Great War series (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), pp. 426–434, which contains the complete text of the armistice and the attached protocols.Google Scholar
51 Edmonds and Davies, Military Operations Italy, p. 378.
52 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 15–16.
53 Villari, Luigi, The War on the Italian Front (London: Cobden-Sanderson, 1932) pp. 288–291.Google Scholar
54 Ruggera states in his “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 15–16, that only 38 hours elapsed between the time Weber crossed the Italian lines and the moment he met the deputy chief of the Italian general staff, and that there had been only an 103-hour interval between the time he made his first attempt to cross the Italian lines and the receipt of the text of the armistice from Versailles. He also points out that the Austri- ans were able to pass the cease-fire order on to the lowest command post in less than six hours even though their communications were broken and their army was on the verge of disintegration. The Italian reasons for the delay, he argues, are therefore highly questionable.
55 Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Armeeoberkommando Secret Operations No. 2107. See also Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand, 1918,” pp. 41–42.
56 Ruggera, “Der Waffenstillstand 1918,” pp. 44–45.
57 Generalleutnant A[ugustus] von Cramon, Unset Ösierreich-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg. Erinnerungen aus meiner vierjährigen Taiigkeit als bevollmächtigter deutscher General beim k. u. k. Armeeoberkommando (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Miltler und Sohn, 1920), p. 196
58 Ernst WiBhaupt, Die 52. Landwehr-Infunteriebrigade (Landwehrinfanterieregimenten 9 und 10) im Wehkrieg 1914–1918 (Reichenberg: Die Heimat Sönne im Welt-krieg, 1928), p. 449.
59 “Ereignisse an der Südwestfront 24./X.–4./XI. 1918,” Isonzo Army, October 25, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Manuskhpten, Weltkrieg, 1918, ser. “J” (Italy), No. 20, pp. 2–3. See also Berndt, Letzter Kampf und Ende der 29. Infanteriedivision, p. 72, for a description of the plundering.
60 “Ereignisse an der Südwestfront 24./X.–4/XI. 1918,” Isonzo Army, October 30, 1918, p. 8.
61 Pitmen, “Die k. u. k. Piavefront,” Pt. 3, pp. 137–138.
62 See especially Berndt, Letzter Kampf und Ende der 29. Infanieriedivision, p. 68; von Glaise-Horstenau, Edmund, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1930), p. 298;Google ScholarMichel, Robert and Wohl, Viktor, Das Vierundachtzigerbuch (Vienna: Adolf Holzhausen, 1919), pp. 252–254;Google Scholar and Rost, Alfred, Geschichte des k. u. k. FeldjägerbataiUons Kopal Nr. 10, 1914–1918 (Vienna: Selbstverlag des Bundes der Kopaljäger, 1938), pp. 408–413.Google Scholar
63 Captain Kleiner, “Die letzten Tage des III. Korps. Der Zusammenbruch,” November 3, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Manuskripten, Welikrieg, 1918, ser. “J” (Italy), No. 9, p. 15. See also “Ereignisse an der Südwestfront 24./X–4./XI. 1918,” lsonzo Army, October 30, 1918, p. 1. The 44th Schützen division allowed several enemy patrols to pass through their lines unhindered.
64 Kleiner. “Die letzten Tage des III. Korps,” November 3, 1918, p. 16
65 “Ereignisse an der S¨dwestfront 24./X.–4/XI. 1918,” llth Army, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna). Manuskripten, Weltkrieg. 1918, ser. “J” (Italy), No. 20, pp. 5 and 6; “Ereignisse an der Südwestfront 24./X.–4./XI. 1918,” 10th Army. ibid., p. 2.
66 Schramm-Schiessl, Ferdinandvon Perstorff, , Die Geschichle des k. u. k. Mährischen Dragonerregimentes Friedrich Franz IV. Grossherzog von Mecklenburg Schwerin Nr. 6, 1906–1918 (Vienna: Militärwissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1933), pp. 1,076–1,077.Google Scholar
67 Szende, Die Ungarn in Zusammenbruch 1918, pp. 212–214.
68 “Ereignisse an der Südwestfront 24./X–4./XI. 1918,” 6th Army. November 4, 1918, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Manuskripien, Weltkrieg. 1918, ser. “J” (Italy), No. 20, pp. 2–3. See also Szende, Die Ungarn in Zusammenbruch 1918, pp. 208–210; and Bergman, Am Niemandslande. Fronterleben bei einem Sucietendeutschen Regimeme (Reichenberg: Verlag der Heimatsöhne, 1930), p. 412. There were numerous similar tales. As a general rule, those units that kept their artillery and machine guns were the most fortunate; often they were not even halted.
69 Österrekh-Ungarm letzter Krieg, Vol. VII, p. 758.