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The Movement toward Parliamentary Government in Austria since 1900: Rudolf Sieghart's Memoir of June 28,1903

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2009

Alfred Ableitinger
Alfred Ableitinger
Affiliation:
University of Graz
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Extract

Among the many difficult problems which Minister-president Kasimir Felix Badeni's government (1895–97) bequeathed to all the regimes which followed it the most serious arose from the fact that, as a consequence of the confusion caused by his policies, the tradition that the imperial-royal government in Austria had to collaborate with parliament broke down. The filibustering tactics practiced in the representative bodies of the Austrian half of the empire during the brief period of the Badeni ministry, though they were certainly not unprecedented, nevertheless, assumed a proportion and form hitherto unknown. The obstructionists succeeded in destroying the most fundamental principle of parliamentarianism—the idea that the will of the majority must prevail in the legislative body—and in overthrowing the only constitutional system which had existed in Austria since the laws dealing with ministerial responsibility and imperial representation were passed in 1867. Any government selected by the sovereign without formal consideration of the political opinions of the members of parliament in the long run could operate effectively only if a majority of the members of that body at least tolerated it—provided, of course, that the state was not to surrender to a barely concealed absolutism. Apart from the political tensions which a resort to absolutism would have engendered in Austria and the fact that it would have endangered the rather tenuous relations which Austria had with Hungary, paragraphs 10 and 14 of the law on imperial representation were so worded as to create an effective legal barrier against such a hazardous step in the direction of absolutism.1

Type
Articles
Information
Austrian History Yearbook , Volume 2 , January 1966 , pp. 111 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1966

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References

1 Paragraph 14 dealt with the emperor's right to issue emergency decrees for which the ministry bore the responsibility. This power was to be exercised only if the necessity for such a decree “became apparent at a time” when parliament was not in session. Such an emergency decree was to be submitted to the next parliament for approval (first of all, to the chamber of deputies) within four weeks. Paragraph 10 prescribed that parliament was to be convened annually. See also Bernatzik, E., Die österreichischen Verfaseungageaetze (Vienna, 1911), pp. 394 and 399.Google Scholar

2 Sutter, B., Die Badeniachen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897 (2 vols., Graz, 1960–1965), Vol. I, p. 128.Google Scholar

3 Compare this with the argument of the Germans during the Taaffe era that the government itself could decide what language or languages were to be used in each office, since, not article 19 of the law dealing with the general rights of the citizen, but the law on the powers of the government and the executive appertained to this question.

4 See R. Sieghart's criticism of the well-known article 19 dealing with the equality of national rights: “In the December, 1867, constitution the nationality problem only seemed to involve the speaking of many languages by the citizens of the state.” See his Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht. Menachen, Völker, Probleme dea Hababurger-Reichs (Berlin, 1932), p. 387Google Scholar. See also ibid., p. 379.

5 On this often discussed theme, see, among other works, Rothfels, H., “Grundsätzliches zum Problem der Nationalität,” Historiache Zeitsehrift, Vol. CLXXIV (1952)Google Scholar; Rothfels, H., “Die Nationsidee in westlicher und östlicher Sicht,” in his Osteuropa und der deutache Osten (Cologne, 1956)Google Scholar; Wittram, R., Das Nationale als europäiaches Problem. In Beiträge zur Geachichte des Nationalitätsprinzips vornehmlich im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1954)Google Scholar; Lemberg, E., “Volksbegriff und Staatsideologie der Tschechen,” Zeitachrift für Ostforschung, Vol. VIII (1959)Google Scholar; and Viefhaus, E., Die Minderheitenfrage und die Entatehung der Minderheiten-schutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919. Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Nationalitätenproblems im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. In Marburger Oatforschungen, Vol. XI (Würzburg, 1960).Google Scholar

6 Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Groaamacht, p. 36.Google Scholar

7 The regrettable loss of extremely important sources on Austrian political history unfortunately makes it possible only occasionally to discuss the government's policies adequately. Fortunately a few interesting documents that throw new light on the subject to which this paper is devoted have been found in the Viennese archives. However, it is quite possible that other important sources dealing with this subject were destroyed or lost.

8 Kramář rightly places much emphasis on these proceedings—proceedings which effectively prevented the carrying out of a constructive program for some time afterwards. See his Anmerkungen zur böhmiachen Politik, translated by Penížek, J. (Vienna, 1906), p. 30.Google Scholar

9 Their Whitsuntide program of 1899 was certainly a one-sided and non-committal declaration.

10 Among other works, see Baernreither, J. M., Der Verfall des Habsburgerreiches und die Deutschen. Fragmente einea politiachen Tagebuches 1897–1917, edited by von Mitis, O. (Vienna, 1939), pp. 115 ff.Google Scholar; Friedjung, H., “Ernest von Koerber,” in Neue Österreichische Biographie 1815–1918, Vol. I (Vienna, 1923), pp. 23 ffGoogle Scholar; Redlich, J., Kaiaer Franz Joaeph von Öaterreich: Eine Biographie (Berlin, 1928), pp. 394 ff.Google Scholar; Hantsch, H., Die Geachichte Österreichs, Vol. II (Graz, 1953), pp. 476 f.Google Scholar; Zöllner, E., Geachichte Öaterreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Vienna, 1961), p. 432Google Scholar; Charmatz, R., Öaterreichs innere Geachichte von 1848–1907, Vol. II (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 141 ff.Google Scholar; Charmatz, R., Lebenabilder ana der Geschichte Österreichs (Vienna, 1947)Google Scholar; and Novotny, A., “Ministerpräsident Ernest von Koerber (1850– 1919),” in Gestalter der Geachicke Öaterreichs, edited by Hantsch, H. (Innsbruck, 1962).Google Scholar

11 On the basis of new sources the author hopes in the near future to be able to give a more exact and detailed account of this program, about which so very little is known, as well as about its significance and limitations, the most important steps taken to try to realize it, and the reasons for its failure.

12 According to K. Kramář, under Koerber the ordinances issued in accordance with paragraph 14 were always directed against the obstructionist Czechs. See his Anmerkungen zur böhmiachen Politik, p. 71.

13 Ibid., p. 48.

14 See Eduard Beneš' series of articles in 1925–26 on “Die Probleme der slawischen Politik” which are discussed in Schieche, E., “Eduard Beneš und die slawischen Ideen,” Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, Vol. IV (1955), pp. 201 ff.Google Scholar

15 Through the so-called “Szell formula,” which was formulated in a decree issued on September 21, 1899, in accord with the terms of paragraph 14. See Reichsgeaetzblatt, 1899, No. 176. The formula is given in Ch. I, Pt. 1, Arts. 1–3.

16 At the very least, in return for allowing the Ausgleich to be put through by means of using paragraph 14, the Hungarians demanded enormous economic and apparently also constitutional sacrifices which would have made Koerber's position wholly untenable. This is contrary to what Kramář says, K. in his Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik, p. 53Google Scholar. See Beck, M. V. to Archduke Francis Ferdinand, June 28, 1903, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, G 77.Google Scholar

17 The Ausgleich laws were submitted to the chamber of deputies on January 28, 1903. Stenographwche Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Reichsrates, Session XVII, p. 17,535. See also Nos. 1621–1626 of the supplement.

18 Kramář, K., Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik, p. 52.Google Scholar

19 Ibid., pp. 54 f. “Parliamentarianization” meant that the emperor would nominate members of parliament to ministerial posts.

20 Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, p. 61.Google Scholar

21 The letter of resignation is in Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as “St. A. [Vienna]”), Kabinetts-Archiv, Karton 41 B 8 c–1903. See also Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, p. 62.Google Scholar

22 In regard to Koerber's nervousness see, among others, Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, pp. 49 f and 63.Google Scholar

23 See Redlich, J., “Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege,” in Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges, published by the Carnegie Foundation (New Haven and Vienna: Carnegie Foundation, 1925), p. 77.Google Scholar

24 Sieghart's father-in-law, the well-known Viennese commercial lawyer, Karl Samuel Grünhut (1844–1929), had been Schiessl's classmate in the Viennese academic gymnasium.

25 St. A. (Vienna), Kabinetts-Archiv, Karton 41 B 8 c-1903. Perhaps at the same time Sieghart drew up a proposal for a statement of imperial confidence which differed from Koerber's and which did not touch upon the army question.

26 St. A. (Vienna), Kabinetts-Archiv, Direktionsakten, 23–1903.

27 Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, p. 63Google Scholar. See also Beck's, M. V. letter to Archduke Francis Ferdinand on July 3, 1903, in Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, G 79Google Scholar. It appears that Koerber also expressed himself in a similar manner. Neither Sieghart nor Beck shared his expectations or agreed with his argument that, on account of the patriotic enthusiasm which existed, it would be easy to form a new government.

28 For Baron Karl von Chiari, see Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950, Vol. I, pp. 142 f.; for Gustav Gross, see Ibid., Vol. II, p. 73. Johann Začek was a member of the chamber of deputies since 1885. He was regarded as an especially serious person and an opponent of Bohemian Staatsrecht. See Beck, M. V. to Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, January 21, 1903, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, G 58.Google Scholar

29 The word “ministerial post” is underlined in Sieghart's original manuscript. For Julius Derschatta, see Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon, Vol. I, p. 179. Bedřich Pačak (1846–1914) had been chairman of the Czech Club since 1901.

30 Minister of Education von Hartel to Johann von Chlumecky (either orally or in writing), July 12, 1903, Chlumecky, L., Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen (Berlin, 1929), pp. 302 f.Google Scholar

31 Marked by the emperor with three vertical lines in the margin as if to indicate approval.

32 Among other reasons, which should become evident in the pages which follow, the date of the memoir definitely indicates that it was not. It would hardly have been possible for Koerber to continue the discussions with the emperor with such asperity as late as July 5 or 7 in case he had already permitted the preparation of such circumscribed general instructions on June 28. See Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, pp. 64 f.Google Scholar; and Chlumecky, , Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen, p. 303.Google Scholar

33 The idea that Koerber was “a middle class minister, at least in form and style,” was first voiced by Sieghart, in his Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, p. 66.Google Scholar

34 Kolmer, G., Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich, Vol. VIII (1900–1904) (Vienna and Leipzig, 1914), p. 382.Google Scholar

35 Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, pp. 73 f.Google Scholar

36 Markert, W., “Der Osten zwischen Nationaldemokratie und Sowjetföderation,” in Deutscher Osten und Slawischer Westen, edited by Rothfels, H. and Markert, W.. In Tübinger Studien zur Geschichte und Politik (Tübingen, 1955), pp. 68 f.Google Scholar

37 Lemberg, E., “Volksbegriff und Staatsideologie der Tschechen,” Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, Vol. VIII (1959), passim.Google Scholar

38 Stökl, G., Russische Geschichte. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 603 f.Google Scholar; Sutter, , Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897, Vol. II, pp. 418 f.Google Scholar; von Rauch, G., Russland: Staatliche Einheit und nationale Vielfalt (1953)Google Scholar; Gribowski, W., Das Staatsrecht des Russischen Reiches (1912)Google Scholar; and Markert, “Der Osten zwischen Nationaldemokratie und Sowjetföderation,” pp. 71 f.

39 Kramář, Awmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik.

40 In a letter to M. V. Beck written on December 30, 1907, Sieghart wrote about Kramář's “policy of catastrophe” to which the Czech agrarian Prašek referred as “Sprachgotik” and in which the other Czechs no longer wanted to participate. See Nachlass Beck.

41 See Schieche, “Eduard Beneš und die slawischen Ideen,” pp. 209 f.

42 On the problems described above, see also Hantsch, H., “Pan-Slavism, Austro-Slavism, Neo-Slavism: The AllSlav Congresses and the Nationality Problems of Austria-Hungary,” Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. I (1965), pp. 28 ff.Google Scholar

43 See Beck's memorandum of 1908 as cited in Allmayer-Beck, J. C., Ministerpräsident Baron Beck. Ein Staatsmann des alten Osterreich (Vienna, 1956), p. 230Google Scholar; and Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, pp. 130 f. and 144.Google Scholar

44 M. V. Beck to Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, March 29, 1901, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand.

45 See Kramář, , Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik, pp. 94 ffGoogle Scholar. For the anxieties which farsighted Czechs had about their suicidal internal policies, see Ibid., p. 95. The breakdown of the imperial idea in 1903 was bound to bring with it a closer union of Austria with the German realm—an action which would have meant the worst possible prospects for the future of the Czechs.

46 See ante, pp. 119–120.

47 It should be mentioned here that the timely restrictions on the government planned in the second part of the memoir were perhaps also thought of in the first part.

48 What happened after the autumn of 1908 does not prove much to the contrary. One had to tax one's energies to destroy Beck's government and the influence which its fundamental principles might exert on those which followed. Allmayer-Beck, , Baron Beck, pp. 203 ff.Google Scholar

49 St. A. (Vienna), Kabinetts-Archiv, Direktionsakten, 23–1903. Sieghart underlined the words “structure of a new government.”

50 The other candidates were Schwegel and Baernreither. About the latter it was said that he was “very talented, clever, versatile, and experienced, but also that he was utterly unreliable, that he always thought only of himself, that he was inclined to be an intriguer, and that he was saddled with many opponents.”

51 Sieghart, , Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, pp. 357, 361, and 427.Google Scholar

52 See Ibid., pp. 361 ff. and especially pp. 412 ff.

53 See the “very incomplete summary” of these views in Austria– Hungary as given in Viefhaus, , Die Minderheitenfrage und die Entstehung der Minderheitsschutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedemkonferenz, pp. 7 ffGoogle Scholar. He begins with Springer's, Anton H. österreich nach der Revolution (Leipzig, 1850), includes Eötvös and Fischhof, and ends with Georg Jellinek, who in 1898, at a time of especially intense emotions, gave a lecture in Vienna on “The Rights of the Minorities.”Google Scholar

54 Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, p. 18. In this vein he went so far as to call the Germans who supported or organized the governments of the 1860's and 70's an “overworked horse” whose political character was damaged in the shadow of the Hofburg and who assumed a “governmental” attitude. See Ibid., p. 289.

55 See ante, n. 4.

56 Concerning the hunger of the Christian Socials for ministerial posts, which Karl Lueger was unable to curb, see Sieghart to Beck, August 13, 1907, in Nachlass Beck. On the illusionary political policies of the Liberals, the “friends of freedom,” see Sieghart to Beck, August 5, 1907, Ibid. The conclusion which he drew from Victor Adler's respectful words about Beck reads: “It's the same old story. The Reds are Blacks who have still not reached their goal!” Sieghart to Beck, December 30, 1907, Ibid.

57 Ehrhart, R., Im Dienste des alten Österreich (Vienna, 1958), p. 131.Google Scholar

58 Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, p. 151.

59 See Max, Egon Fürstenberg to Ernst Plener, March 3, 1912, Nachlass Plener, Karton 19, Fos. 1389 ff. In the Plener Nachlass there are also copies of a telegram in which Sieghart notified Fürstenberg, the head of the club, of his entrance into it and of the latter's reply to him.Google Scholar

60 See Sieghart, Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht, pp. 61 ff. In the only place where Sieghart speaks of it he describes Stürgkh to Schiessl as a “ministerial” man. See Ibid., p. 161. As for the accuracy of the report, among other things, the exact similarity of the text proposed by Sieghart with p. 62 of the above-mentioned text, see footnote 26. For the exact reproduction of the draft by Koerber, which agrees fully with the one in St. A. (Vienna), Kabinetts-Archiv, Karton 41 B 8 c-1903, see p. 63. Goluchowski's intervention with Koerber, which had to take place before July 4 and which, as Beck confirmed in a letter to Archduke Francis Ferdinand on July 3, 1903 (Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, G 79), took place on the 3rd, is mentioned on p. 63. In addition, note the almost literal congruence of the two sources mentioned in footnote 32 with Koerber's further behavior. Basing their discussions on Hartel's reports to Johann Chlumecky, Sieghart (see Ibid., p. 64) and Chlumecky (see his Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen, p. 302) make the same reports as Koerber in regard to Francis Joseph's apologies. Of the two different dates, the one given by Sieghart is the correct one.

61 See Ehrhart, Im Dienste des alten Österreich, p. 137. Also see the judgment on Sieghart in this.

62 See entry of June 29, 1914, Redlich, J., Schicksalsjahre Österreich 1909–1918. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, edited by Fritz, Fellner. In Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs, Vols. XXXIX and XL (2 vols., Vienna, 1953–1954), Vol. I, p. 235.Google Scholar

63 Nacklass Franz Ferdinand, G 78.

64 Beck to Archduke Francis Ferdinand, June 28, 1903, Ibid., G 77.

65 See Allmayer–Beck, Ministerpräsident Baron Beck, pp. 41 ff. Beck's letters to the archduke verify the fact that he spoke with Sieghart about this matter on April 16, 17, 21, 26, 28, and 29 and May 8, 11, 12, 16, and 21, 1900. It is highly possible that he also conferred with him on April 20 and 30 and on May 9 and 18. A conference planned for May 22 never took place.

66 See Beck to Archduke Francis Ferdinand, March 29 and April 20, 1901, as well as (although here the evidence is not quite as definite) April 18 and December 25, 1901, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, G 68, 69, 59a, and 66.

67 For example, when the archduke made a speech in April, 1901, on the occasion of taking over the protectorate of the Catholic School Society which created great difficulties for Koerber. See Beck to Archduke Francis Ferdinand, April 18, 20, and 29, and May 6, 1901, Ibid., G 59, 59a, 60, and 61. Also worthy of note is Beck's letter to Archduke Francis Ferdinand on January 21, 1903 (Ibid., G 76) which deals with a secret audience which Kramář had with the successor to the throne. See also his letter to the archduke on December 25, 1901 (Ibid., G 68). After then Beck believed that he was able to detect a conciliatory attitude among the Young Czechs and particularly in their newspaper in Prague, Národní listy, which was always creating difficulties for the Czech group in Vienna (see Kramář, Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik, pp. 13 f.) and which at that time opposed a policy of reconciliation. Beck recommended that “the action which had been started should be terminated” and gave Paćak and Zaćek's dates for the next audiences.

68 Sieghart to Beck, August 14, 1906, Nachlass Beck.

69 Sieghart to Beck, August 12, 1907, Ibid.

70 Beck to Archduke Francis Ferdinand, June 29, 1903, Nachlass Franz Ferdinand, G 78.

71 See Aehrenthal's report of April 20, 1908, on a conversation with Koerber, in St. A. (Vienna), Kabinetts-Archiv, Direktionsakten, 28–1908. Koerber said that Beck's system to keep all 516 representatives in good humor “threatened to lead the constitutional system into absurdity.” As a consequence of the composition of his government, however, Beck was forced to proceed in such a manner. Demoralization was the result. As an antidote Koerber recommended “a clearly circumscribed coalition.” For a characterization of Koerber's policies, see his remarks to J. Redlich as given in the entry of October 15, 1917, Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, Vol. II, p. 238: His aim was to shield the throne from daily politics.

72 St. A. (Vienna), Baernreither Nachlass, Karton 5, Tagebuch VIII, pp. 6 ff. The conversations began with Chiari, Derschatta, and Pačak.

73 On the German side, Prade was consulted. For the Czechs, Začek's advice was sought.

74 It appears that the negotiations actually miscarried because the more radical Germans demanded that Derschatta officially deny arrangements with Pačak which had been made public. This is also what happened. See Neue Freie Presse, January 23, 1906. On this Pačak broke off the conversations.

75 See Allmayer-Beck, Ministerpräsident Baron Beck, p. 136.

76 Gustav Marchet to Gustav Gross, June 3, 1906, St. A. (Vienna), Nachlass Gross, Karton 1, File 1905–1912, Pos. 30 f.

77 It should be noted that questions have been raised about whether Berlin actually exerted an influence on the policy of the German parties in Austria. See Frauendienst, W., “Zur Reichskrise Österreich-Ungarns,” Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft. Jahrbuch des Ostdeutschen Kulturrates, Vol. V (1958), pp. 377–399.Google Scholar

78 Allmayer-Beck, Ministerpräsident Baron Beck, p. 136.