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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2015
This essay begins in a way that may seem self-indulgent and selfserving, but one that I hope readers will see as actually selfexamination and self-criticism, and more important, as a useful way to introduce a topic and idea whose meaning is not obvious from the title. For years I have been arguing that more attention should be paid to smaller states in international history, in particular not just their role in power politics and the so-called balance of power, but their roles and functions as intermediary bodies (a term defined later), as well. In three articles in historical and political science journals and a recent book I have particularly made the case for this in different ways.
1 Schroeder, Paul W., “The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System,” International History Review 6, no.1 (02. 1984): 1–27;CrossRefGoogle Scholaridem, “The Nineteenth-Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” World Politics 39, no. 1 (10. 1986): 1–25;CrossRefGoogle Scholaridem, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” International Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 108–48;CrossRefGoogle Scholaridem, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (Oxford, 1994).Google Scholar
2 Colin, Elman and Miriam Fendius, Elman, with a reply by Schroeder, Paul W., “History vs. Neo-Realism: A Second Look,” International Security 20, no.1 (Summer 1995): 183–95.Google Scholar
3 Philippe, Levillain and Rainer, Riemenschneider, eds., La Guerre de 1870/71 et ses conséquences (Bonn, 1990).Google Scholar
4 The classic modern statement on balancing is Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass., 1979).Google Scholar A revised version, stressing that powers in general, including smaller ones, balance against threats rather than excessive power, is Stephen, Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y., 1987).Google Scholar For various discussions of bandwagoning, see Jack, Snyder and Robert, Jervis, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons (New York, 1991).Google Scholar
5 This is a prominent theme of both Karl Otmar, von Aretin'sDas alte Reich, vol. 1: Föderalistische oder Hierarchische Ordnung 1648–1684 (Stuttgart, 1993)Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Aretin, Altes Reich), and his essays collected in Aretin, , Das Reich, Friedensgarantie und europäisches Gieichgewicht(Stuttgart, 1986).Google Scholar For a brief summary of the Reich's role in European politics, see his essay, “Das Heilige Römische Reich im Konzert der europäischen Mächte im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert,” in Stände und Gesellschaft im Alten Reich, ed. Georg, Schmidt (Stuttgart, 1989), 81–91.Google Scholar For the origins of the Permanent Reichstag, see Anton, Schindling, Die Anfänge des Immerwährenden Reichstag zu Regensburg (Mainz, 1991).Google Scholar
6 Recent examples include Georg, Schmidt, “Einleitung,” in Stände und Gesellschaft, ed. Schmidt, , 8–11;Google ScholarHartmut, Lehmann's review of Anton Schindling's book on the Permanent Reichstag (see note 5) in the Journal of Modern History 66, no. 2 (06 1994): 421–23;Google Scholar and Heinz, Duchhardt, “International Relations, the Law of Nations, and the Germanies,” in State and Society in Early Modern Austria, ed. Ingrao, Charles W. (West Lafayette, Ind., 1994), 286–97.Google Scholar
7 Aretin, , Altes Reich, 298–309;Google ScholarBaxter, Stephen B., William III and the Defense of European Liberty, 1650–1702 (New York, 1966), 190–91;Google ScholarAndrew, Lossky, Louis XW and the French Monarchy (New Brunswick, N.J., 1994), 174–77.Google Scholar
8 Karl Otmar von, Aretin, Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776–1806, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1967);Google ScholarRose, Carol M., “Empire and Territories at the End of the Old Reich,” in The Old Reich, ed. Vann, James A. andRowan, Steven L. (Brussels, 1974), 59–75.Google Scholar
9 Besides the other works by Aretin cited earlier, see various essays in Karl Otmar von, Aretin, ed., Der Kurfürst von Mainz und die Kreisassoziation 1648–1746 (Wiesbaden, 1975),Google Scholar especially Notker, Hammerstein, “Zur Geschichte der Kreis-Assoziationen und der Assoziationsversuche zwischen 1714 und 1746, ” 79–120;Google Scholar and Vann, James A., The Swabian Kreis: Institutional Growth in the Holy Roman Empire, 1648–1715 (Brussels, 1975).Google Scholar
10 On Hanover, see Birke, Adolf M. and Kurt, Kluxen, eds., England und Hannover (Munich, 1986),Google Scholar especially the essays by Ragnhild, Hatton and Heinz, Duchhardt; Jeremy, Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985), 27–35, 40–43;Google Scholar and Uriel, Dann, Hanover and Great Britain, 1740–1760 (Leicester, 1991).Google Scholar On ecclesiastical states, see, for example, Hermann, Weber, Frankreich, Kurtrier, der Rhein und das Reich (Bonn, 1969).Google Scholar On the elector of Mainz, see Heinz, Duchhardt, Studien zur Friedensvermittlung in der frühen Neuzeit (Wiesbaden, 1979), 2–5, 20–23.Google Scholar On the margrave of Baden Baden, see Christian, Greiner, “Der ‘Schild des Reiches’. Markgraf Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden-Baden (1655–1707) und die ‘Reichsbarriere’ am Oberrhein,” in Expansion und Gleichgewicht. Studien zur europäischen Mächtepolitik des ancien regime, ed. Johannes, Kunisch (Berlin, 1986), 31–67.Google Scholar On Archduke Max Franz, see Max, Braubach, Maria Theresias jüngster Sohn Max Franz (Vienna, 1961).Google Scholar
11 On Württemberg, see Vann, James A., The Making of a State: Württemberg, 1593–1793 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984),Google Scholar and Wilson, Peter H., War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793(Cambridge, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 On Dutch policy before 1672, see Herbert, Rowen, “ John de Witt and the Triple Alliance,” Journal of Modern History 26 (1954): 1–14;Google ScholarHerbert, Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War: The Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne (The Hague, 1957), 18–40, 58–75, 92–93;Google Scholar and Werner, Hahlweg, “Barrière—Gleichgewicht—Sicherheit. Eine Srudie über die Gleichgewichtspolitik und die Strukturwandlung des Staatensystems in Europa 1646–1715,” Historische Zeitschrift 187 (1959): 60–65.Google Scholar On William III in general, see Baxter, , William III;Google Scholar on his actions in 1697–98, see Werner, Hahlweg, “Wilhelm III, Prinz von Oranien. Untersuchungen zur Barrierepolitik Wilhelms III von Oranien und der Generalstaaten im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert,” Westfälische Forschungen 14 (1961): 60–65;Google ScholarRagnhild, Hatton, “Guillaume III et la succession d'Espagne,” in Les Relations Franco-Autrichiennes sous Louis XIV, ed. Jean, Bérenger (Paris, 1983),Google Scholar not paginated; andLinda, and Marsha, Frey, A Question of Empire: Leopold I and the War of Spanish Succession, 1701–1705 (Boulder, Colo., 1983), 17–23.Google ScholarOn Dutch policy after 1702, see Ragnhild, Hatton, DiplomaticRelations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, 1714–1721 (London, 1950), 88–93,122–25Google Scholar; Carter, Alice C., The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (London, 1971), 2–5;Google Scholar and Richard, Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy (London, 1930), 128–31.Google Scholar
13 Duchhardt, , Friedensvermittlung, 24–88;Google ScholarJones, J. R., Charles II: Royal Politician (Boston, 1987), 111–16, 188.Google Scholar
14 For various examples, see Klaus, Zernack, Studien zu den schwedisch-russischen Beziehungen in der 2. Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Giessen, 1958), 96–99,134–139;Google ScholarCarsten, Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State (Oxford, 1991), 1–15;Google ScholarStefan, Hartmann, Die Beziehungen Preussens zu Dänemark von 1688 bis 1789 (Cologne, 1983), 316–37;Google ScholarRagnhild, Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (London, 1968), 60–63;Google Scholar and Michael, Roberts, British Diplomacy and Swedish Politics, 1758–1773 (Minneapolis, Minn., 1980).Google Scholar
15 For two periods in which Poland was, so to speak, an intermediary-victim, see Frost, Robert I., After the Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War (Cambridge, 1993),CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Tadeusz, Cegielski, Das alte Reich und die erste Teilung Polens (Wiesbaden, 1988).Google Scholar
16 Philippe, Gern, ed., Aspects des relations franco-suisses au temps de Louis XVI (Neuchâtel, 1970);Google ScholarNorbert, Huber, Österreich und der Heilige Stuhl vom Ende des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges bis zum Tode Papst Klemens XI1714–21 (Graz, 1967), 122–27, 140–43;Google ScholarJohannes, Burkhardt, Abschied vom Religionskrieg. Der Siebenjährige Krieg und die päpstliche Diplomatie (Tübingen, 1985), 283–301.Google Scholar
17 Schroeder, ,Transformation of European Politics, passim, especially 517–93;Google Scholaridem, ”Nineteenth-Century International System.”
18 Enno, Kraehe, Metternich's German Policy, vol. 2: The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815 (Princeton, N.J., 1983);Google ScholarPeter, Burg, Der Wiener Kongress. Der Deutsche Bund im europäischen Staatensystem (Munich, 1984).Google Scholar
19 For all the foregoing, see Schroeder, , Transformation of European Politics, 666–804.Google Scholar
20 Echard, William E., Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe (Baton Rouge, La., 1983);Google ScholarBush, John W., Venetia Redeemed: Franco-Italian Relations, 1864–1866 (Syracuse, N.Y., 1967).Google Scholar
21 Schreuder, D. M., “Gladstone and Italian Unification, 1848–1870: The Making of a Liberal?” English Historical Review 75 (1970): 475–501.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an analysis of how these and other moralistic Gladstonian notions actually translated into everyday politics as helpful to British interests and harmful to those of others, see Schroeder, Paul W., “Gladstone as Bismarck,” Canadian Journal of History 15 (1980): 163–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Bridge, F. R., The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815–1918 (New York, 1990), 150–287.Google Scholar
23 An example: in July 1914 the government of Austria-Hungary saw it as in its vital interest to risk war with imperial Russia by its ultimatum to Serbia, and Russia's government considered it equally in its vital interest to start a general war in response to the perceived Austro- Hungarian challenge. But had the Balkan region and its several countries still been considered by both countries as a useful buffer zone rather than as an arena of all-out competition and conflict, both powers would presumably have defined their self-interest in a very different way.
24 For an instance of this line of argument, supposedly based on history but applied to the present day, see Christopher, Layne, “The Uni-Polar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no.4 (Summer 1993): 5–51.Google Scholar See my reply in “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” (see note 1).