Article contents
Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in Austria-Hungary, 1867–19141
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
Extract
The theories on foreign policy and international relations which have emerged in the last decade stress the interaction between foreign policy and internal social structure. Contemporary analysis of this interaction has benefited from refined social science methods and concepts developed since the end of the Second World War, but awareness of the connection between foreign policy and internal policy is not new. For instance, as long ago as the eve of the First World War Rudolf Goldscheid wrote that “nothing is more Utopian than the belief that substantial alterations in internal policy can be realized without simultaneous corresponding changes in foreign [policy] and vice versa.” The interaction between Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and the nationality problem in the monarchy from 1867 until 1914 is a striking example of Goldscheid's general thesis.
- Type
- Foreign Policy
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1967
References
2 I am indebted to the following for new ideas and new approaches to the subject of this article: Hinsley, Francis H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Modelski, George, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962)Google Scholar; Rosecrance, Richard N., Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1963)Google Scholar; Liska, George, “Continuity and Change in International Systems,” World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963), pp. 118–136CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosenau, James, National Leadership and Foreign Policy: a Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mayer, Arno J., Wilson vs. Lenin: The Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918 (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1964)Google Scholar.
3 Goldscheid, Rudolf, Das Verhdltnis der Äussern Politik zur Innern. Ein Bcitrag zur Soziologie des Weltkrieges und Weltfriedens (2nd ed., Vienna: Anzengruber, 1915), pp. 19–20Google Scholar.
4 For the sake of simplicity, the term “Austria” is used throughout this article instead of the more accurate but awkward phrase “those kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat.”
5 Kálnoky is usually regarded as a Magyar, but he was born in Moravia, had more Austro-German than Magyar ancestors, and, according to a recent account, never really felt himself to be a Magyar. See Rutkowski, Ernst R., “Gustav Graf Kálnoky. Eine biographische Skizze,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Vol. XIV (1961), pp. 330–343Google Scholar.
6 Gustav Graf Kálnoky, Memorandum. Die Nationalitätenfrage in Oesterreich-Ungarn in ihrer Rückwirkung auf die aeussere Politik der Monarchie, p. 9. The above is an undated memorandum in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as “Staatsarchiv [Vienna]”), Politisches Archiv, Fasz. XL (Interna 1848–1918), Fasz. CCCXVI (Kopien von Denkeschriften 1871–1911). In a letter to Count Franz Thun on June 7, 1898, Baron Aloys Lexa von Aehrenthal, at that time the Austro-Hungarian minister to Rumania, stated that the memorandum was prepared sometime in the 1880's for the purpose of attacking the reputed anti-German policy of the Count Eduard von Taaffe government in Austria. Aehrenthal had a copy of the memorandum sent to Thun, who was Austrian minister-president at that time, since he believed that Thun was pursuing an anti-German policy in dealing with the language question in Bohemia. The letter and a copy of the memorandum are among the private papers of Prince Franz Thun-Hohenstein deposited in Czechoslovakia at the Státní Archiv Děčin (Tetschen), A-3 XXIII/C, III/Ia-388A. The copy in the Staatsarchiv (Vienna) was sent to Emperor Francis Joseph and has marginal comments by him dated July, 1898.
7 Kálnoky, Memorandum, p. 22.
8 As quoted in Diószegi, István, “Der Gemeinsame Ministerrat vom 18. Juli 1870,” Ada Historica, Vol. IX, No. 3–4 (1963), p. 366Google Scholar.
9 Fuchs, Albert, among others, has pointed this out in his Geistige Stromungen in Österreich 1867–1918 (Vienna: Globus, 1949), pp. 11–14 and 169–176Google Scholar. See also Wank, Solomon, “Zwei Dokumente Aehrenthals aus den Jahren 1898–99 zur Lösung der inneren Krise in Österreich-Ungarn,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Vol. XIX (1966), pp. 339–362Google Scholar.
10 It should be noted that, although this represents the prevailing attitude towards Baernreither, a number of unflattering remarks about him can be found in Sutter, Berthold, Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897 (2 vols., Graz: Böhlau, 1960–1965), Vol. I, p. 135Google Scholar.
11 Baernreither, to Beck, , September 28, 1915, Verwaltungsarchiv (Vienna), Nachlass Beck, Fasz. XXXIIIGoogle Scholar. The italicized word is in the original. The letter was attached to a memorandum on internal reform which Baernreither sent to Beck.
12 See his Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz (Vienna: Styria, 1963), p. 9Google Scholar.
13 It might be pointed out that the Hungarian Law of 1867 stipulated that the foreign minister had to carry out his duties in conformity with, and with the consent of, the two governments. He was, therefore, obligated continually to inform both prime ministers about the progress of foreign policy. See Bittner, Ludwig, “Das österreichisch-ungarische Ministerium des Äussern. Seine Geschichte und seine Organisation,” Berliner Monatshefte, Vol. XV (October, 1937), pp. 826–827Google Scholar.
14 Kálnoky, Memorandum, p. 22.
15 The account below of the positions of the different groups which were influential in determining Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in the summer of 1870 is based chiefly on Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, “Austria in the Summer of 1870,” Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. V, No. 4 (January, 1946), pp. 335–353Google Scholar; Diószegi, “Der Gemeinsame Ministerrat vom 18. Juli 1870,” pp. 361–401; and Diószegi, István, “Das Problem dei aussenpolitischen Tendenz in Österreich-Ungarn im August 1870,” Annales Universitatis Scientarium, Vol. V (1963), pp. 99–116Google Scholar. Schmitt's, Hans A. article “Count Beust and Germany, 1866–1870: Reconquest, Realignment or Resignation?”, Central European History, Vol. I, No. 1 (March, 1968), pp. 20–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, appeared after the present article was written. Prof. Schmitt's article provides a corrective to the prevailing picture of Beust as an unqualified revanchist, but it does not substantially change the standard description of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy from 1866 until 1870 as hostile to Prussia and aimed at regaining an influential position for the Habsburgs in Germany.
16 As quoted in Diószegi, “Der Gemeinsame Ministerrat vom 18. Juli 1870,” p. 363.
17 Diószegi, “Das Problem der aussenpolitischen Tendenz in Österreich- Ungarn im August 1870,” p. 114.
18 Mémoire des Freiherrn von Aehrenthal über die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Russland 1872–1894, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Allgemeines Politisches Arehiv I, Red Karton CDLXIX (Geheim Liasse, Fasz. XXIII/a)Google Scholar.
19 Denkschrift des Freiherrn von Aehrenthal, September, 1895, ibid., Red Karton CDLXI (Geheim Liasse, Fasz. XXV).
20 Andrássy's prognosis of the course of Austro-Russian relations was more fatalistic than Kálnoky's. In 1877 Andrássy observed that Austria and Russia “are immediate neighbors and must live with one another, either on terms of peace or of war. A war between the two Empires … would probably only end with the destruction or collapse of one of the belligerents. Before embarking on such a struggle there must be reasons of an absolutely binding character, reasons which make a death struggle inevitable.” As quoted in May, Arthur J., The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 91Google Scholar.
21 Kálnoky, Memorandum, p. 6.
22 ibid., p. 9.
23 ibid., pp. 6 and 17. The recommendation of a policy of reconciliation between the nationalities was meant more for Austria than for Hungary and was related to the Czech-German conflict. Despite his plea for reconciliation, Kalnoky warned against a settlement that would significantly weaken the position of the Germans in Austria.
24 Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, “Das Niveau der Industrie Ungarns zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts im Vergleich zu dem Europas,” in Studien zur Geschichte der Österreichiech-Vngarischen Monarchie, edited by Sándor, Vilmas and Hanák, Péter. In Studia Historica Acadeiniae Scientiarum Hungaricac, No. 51 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1961), pp. 267–286Google Scholar.
25 See May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914, pp. 118–143 and 270–304.
26 Vucinich, Wayne S., Serbia between East and West (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 168–174Google Scholar.
27 This has been pointed out by Burian, Peter in his Die Nationalitäten in Cisleithanien und das Wahlrecht der Marzrevolution 1848–49 (Graz: Bohlau, 1962), pp. 215–219Google Scholar.
28 On the economic and social factors involved in the nationalities conflict see Mommsen, Hans, Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat (Vienna: Europa, 1963), pp. 17–45Google Scholar; and Horváth, Zoltan, “The Rise of Nationalism and the Nationality Problem in Hungary in the last Decades of Dualism,” Acta Historica, Vol. IX, No. 1–2 (1963), pp. 1–37Google Scholar. The following works proved helpful in a conceptual way: Weber, Max, “Class, Status, Party,” in Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 180–196Google Scholar; and Neumann, Franz, “Anxiety and Politics,” in The Democratic and the Authoritarian State, edited by Marcuse, Herbert (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 270–300Google Scholar.
29 Dehio, Ludwig, Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960)Google Scholar; Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik dea kaiaerlichen Deutschland 1914–1918 (3rd rev'd. ed., Düsseldorf: Droste, 1964)Google Scholar.
30 Dehio, Germany and World Polities in the Twentieth Century, p. 15.
31 ibid.
32 See Wank, Solomon, “Aehrenthal and the Sanjak of Novibazar Railway Project: a Reappraisal,” The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. XLII, No. 99 (June, 1964), pp. 357–358 and 361Google Scholar; Klein, Fritz, “Die Rivalität zwischen Deutschland und Österreich in der Türkei am Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges,” in Klein, Fritz (ed.), Politik itn Krieg 1914–1918 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1964), pp. 1–21Google Scholar.
33 Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, pp. 125–132.
34 Carlgren, Wilhelm M., Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1955), pp. 39–40Google Scholar.
35 Fischer-Galati, Stephen, “The Habsburg Monarchy and Balkan Revolution,” Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. II (1966), pp. 9–10Google Scholar; Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, pp. 128–129; Schmitt, Bernadotte, The Annexation of Bosnia (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1937), p. 235Google Scholar; Benna, Anna Hedwig, “Studien zum Kulturprotektorat Österreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888–1918),” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Vol. VII (1954), pp. 12–46Google Scholar.
36 Rumpler, Helmut, “Die Kriegsziele Österreich-Ungarns auf dem Balkan 1915–16,” in Ssterreich und Europa. Festgabe für Hugo Hantseh zum 70. Geburtstag (Vienna: Styria, 1965), p. 477Google Scholar.
37 Namier, Lewis B., “The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy,” in Vanished Supremacies: Essays on European History, 1812–1918 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 138Google Scholar.
- 4
- Cited by