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The Austrian Presidency, 1918–19581

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2009

Eric C. Kollman
Eric C. Kollman
Affiliation:
Cornell College
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Extract

The student of twentieth century European history who looks for a good example of the contrast and interplay of continuity and change will hardly find a better case than the story of the First and Second Austrian Republics. In the First Republic the various political camps operated in a potential and actual civil war atmosphere; in the Second Republic there has been genuine cooperation between the two major political parties. In the First Republic economic difficulties were so staggering that they proved insurmountable; the Second Republic has had remarkable economic stability and prosperity. The First Republic was to a considerable degree “ein Staat wider Willen”—a country whose sovereignty and independence were largely imposed upon the populace from the outside. Since they felt that their country could not stand on its own feet, the Austrians looked for salvation, first, in union with Germany or a Danubian federation and then in some kind of political combination with Italy and Hungary.

Type
Articles
Information
Austrian History Yearbook , Volume 1 , January 1965 , pp. 90 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1965

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References

2 On the political concepts and history of the three political groups, see the excellent account by Adam, Wandruszka, “Österreichs politische Struktur,” in Heinrich, Benedikt (ed.), Geschichte der Republik Öslerreich (Vienna: Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, 1954), pp. 289–485.Google Scholar

3 Benedikt, , Geschichte der Republik Österrekh, p. 40.Google Scholar

4 For Max Weber's influence on the inclusion of a provision for a strong, popularly elected president in the Weimar constitution, see the most recent analysis in Mommsen, Wolfgang J., Max Weber und die deutsche Politik (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1939). Chapter IX.Google Scholar

5 On the Austrian constitution, see especially Hans, Kelsen's four major articles in the Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts. Vols. XI (1922). XII (1923/24), XV (1927), and XVIII (1930)Google Scholar. See also Mary, Macdonald, The Republic of Austria. 1918–1934: A Study in the Failure of Democratic Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1946)Google Scholar; and Brita, Skottsberg, Der österreichische Parlamentarismus (Coteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolaget, 1940).Google Scholar

6 Gulick, Charles A.. Austria from Habshurg to Hitler (2 vols.. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1948), Vol. I, p. 108 and n. 25.Google Scholar

7 See article 60 of the Austrian constitution of October 1, 1920.

8 On Hainisch, see Österreichisches biographisches Lexikon, 1815–1950, Vol. II (Graz: Böhlau, 1957).Google Scholar

9 Benedikt, , Ceschichte der Republik Osterreich, pp. 120–121.Google Scholar

10 On Seipel, see the recent article by von Klemperer, Klemens, “Chancellor Seipel and the Crisis of Democracy in Austria,” Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (January, 1963), pp. 468–478Google Scholar. See also Alfred, Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 256–264Google Scholar; and Ignaz, Seipel, Der Kampf um die österreichische Verfassung (Vienna: Wilhelm Braümuller, 1930).Google Scholar

11 Gulick, , Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, Vol. II, p. 805.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., pp. 807–808.

13 On the 1929 constitutional reforms, in addition to the references given in n. 5, see Kurt, Strele, Rechtsstaat und Demokratie im neuen österreich (Vienna, 1931).Google Scholar

14 The model for all these changes was, of course, the Weimar constitution in Germany. Seipel, the driving force for constitutional reform, probably thought of himself as a potential candidate for the now much more powerful presidential office.

15 On this point see the instructive article by Karl, Loewenstein, “The Presidency outside the United States: a Study in Comparative Political Institutions,” in The Journal of Politics, Vol. XI, No. 3 (August, 1949), especially p. 476.Google Scholar

16 Carl, Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1931)Google Scholar. On Schmitt's position and general role, see Mommsen, , Max Weber und die deutsche Politik, pp. 379–386Google Scholar. See also Georg, Lukacs, Die Zerstdrung der Vernunft (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962), pp. 567–576.Google Scholar

17 See also a much more favorable evaluation of Miklas by Trude, Schmitz in Die österreichischen Bundespräsidenten (Vienna: Bergland Verlag, 1963), pp. 39–61.Google Scholar

18 Gulick, , Austria from Hahsburg to Hitler, Vol. II, p. 906.Google Scholar

19 See also Walter, Goldinger, Geschichte der Repuhlik Österreich (Vienna: Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, 1962), p. 156Google Scholar. Goldinger maintains that a popular election of Mikias would have made it much more difficult for Dollfuss and later Schuschnigg to push the president aside so easily after 1933 and to govern in so flagrant contradiction to Mikias real wishes.

20 See the report printed in Gulick, , Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, Vol. II, pp. 1024–1025Google Scholar. See also Pertinax, [Otto Leichter], Österreich 1934 (Zurich, 1935).Google Scholar

21 This is the considered opinion of Dr. Edwin Loebenstein, the constitutional expert of the Austrian Federal Chancellery. See Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im Geschichtsunterricht (Vienna: Österraichischer Bundesverlag, 1961), pp. 94–97.

22 See article 29 of the Austrian constitution.

23 Gulick, , Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, Vol. II, p. 1037Google Scholar. See also the pertinent debates in the Bundesrat (Federal Council) on the same day, March 17, 1933. For a short time, the upper chamber assumed an importance which it had never had prior to the dissolution of the lower house. The official records of its meetings and debates for the period from March, 1933, to February, 1934, are, therefore, of some significance. On Miklas' attitude and activities, or better, passivity, during the critical March days of 1933, see also Mikoletzky, Hans Leo, Österreichische Zeitgeschichte vom Ende der Monarchie bis zum Abschluss des Staatsvertrages 1955 (Vienna: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1962), pp. 236Google Scholar and 242. Miklas maintained that only a presidential emergency decree could restore all former powers and attributes to parliament, and that he could issue such a decree only if the federal government initiated such a move. Since he had reappointed Dollfuss without conditions, he could do nothing without the consent of the government. This is why he could not carry out the demand of the Federal Council to dismiss the government.

24 Gulick, , Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, Vol. II, p. 1071Google Scholar. The articles in question are 52 and 75. The former assures both houses of parliament of the right to investigate the conduct of the government and to question its members. Article 75 pertains to the right of the two houses of parliament, meeting separately or jointly, to request the presence of the members of the cabinet at the debates. Chancellor Dollfuss refused to appear before the Bundesrat.

25 Alexander, Spitzmüller, Und hat auch Ursach', es zu lieben (Munich: Wilhelm Frick, 1955), pp. 384–393Google Scholar. During the Schuschnigg regime, when Spitzmüller once again called on Miklas, the latter agreed with Spitanüller' criticism of Schuschnigg's government. “One does what is possible,' sighed Miklas. It sounded like a plea for indulgence.” Ibid., p. 393.

26 From a report by Körner himself, written at the request of Dr. Adolf Schärf, who kindly put a copy at the author's disposal.

27 Adolf, Schärf, Österreichs Erneuerung 1945–1955 (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1955), p. 87.Google Scholar

28 Although it is not as objective as it seems, the most detailed and best account of the Anschluss is Ulrich, Eichstädt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler. Geschichte des Anschlusses Östenekhs 1933–1938 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1955). About Miklas, see especially pp. 386–407.Google Scholar

29 According to Schärf, Renner wanted a new constitution but was persuaded by Schärf to have the old one restored. See Schärf, , Österreichs Erneuerung, pp. 47–57Google Scholar. See also his Österreichs Wiederaulrichtung im Jahre 1945 (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1960), pp. 112–122.

30 In 1945 the Social Democratic Party changed its name to Socialist Party.

31 SpitzmulIer, , Und hat auch Ursach', es zu lieben, pp. 416–418.Google Scholar

32 Alexander, Vodopivec, Wer regiert in Österreich (Vienna: Verlag fur Geschichte und Politik, 1960), p. 131Google Scholar. This was only one of the numerous times when Renner disappointed the expectations of the Soviet leaders who had first put him in office. According to a story by Anastas Mikoyan, as told by Vodopivec in ibid., p. 73, when informed in April, 1945, that some of his officers had run into Renner, Stalin exclaimed: “What, the old traitor is still alive? He is exactly the man whom we need.” See also Dallin, David J., “Stalin, Renner, und Tito. Österreich zwischen drohender Sowfetisierung und den jugoslawischen Gebietsanspriichen im Frühjahr 1945,” Europa Archiv, Vol. XIII (August-September, 1958), p. 11 030. The Russians found out how widely their judgment of Renner had missed its mark when it was much too late. They also vastly overestimated the prospective electoral strength of the Communist Party in Austria. In actual fact, of the 165 seats in the Nationalrat, the Communists never held more than 5 (in 1945). They have not won a single seat since 1959.Google Scholar

33 This criticism was voiced in a 14-page essay entitled “Der Bundesprasident,” which Schärf wrote for Renner, probably in 1948, and of which he later also gave a copy to Körner when he became president. Dr. Schärf kindly put a copy of the essay at the disposal of the author, who was also able to compare it with Korner's heavily marked copy.

34 Gerald, Stourzh, “Zur Geschichte der österreichischen Neutralitat,” Osterreich in Geschichte und Literatur, Vol. V, No. 6 (June, 1961), pp. 273–288.Google Scholar

35 Robert, Kann, “Karl Renner,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (September, 1951), p. 248.Google Scholar

36 Schärf, , Österrekhs Erneuertmg, pp. 265–268Google Scholar. See also Vodopivec, , Wer regiart in Östtrreich, pp. 130–135.Google Scholar

37 Oskar, Helmer, 50 jahre erlebte Geschichte (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, n. d. [1958?], pp. 360–361.Google Scholar

38 Apart. from Helmer, the minister of. communications and nationalized enterprises, Karl. Waldbrunner, then a very influential member of the inner circle of the Socialist Party, also came out strongly in favor of Korner's candidacy.

39 According to Schärf, Körner was looked upon as the best “vote-getter” in the Socialist Party. Interview of the author with the Austrian president in July, 1959.

40 See Scharf, , Österreichs Erneuerung, p. 268.Google Scholar

41 The sordid details of the campaign are well reflected in various articles in the leading periodicals of the different parties during the period from May 7 to May 26, 1951: Die Volksstimme (Communist), Das klcine Volksblatt (People's Party), and the Arbeiter Zeitung (Socialist). A broadside by the People's Party in Lower Austria denounced Korner as a “Civil War General,” while a Catholic weekly, Das Olfene Wort, questioned the sincerity of his religious convictions. The editor-in-chief of the Communist Volksstimme publicly insisted at a reception given by the Czechoslovak minister in Vienna that the People's Party had given him propaganda material to use against Komer on at least three different occasions. For a sharp personal attack on Gleissner made by Scharf during the campaign, see Schärf, , Österreichs Erneuerung, p. 271.Google Scholar

42 The actual number of votes was as follows: Gleissner, 2,006,322; Körner, 2,178,631.

43 On these Communist strikes, see the Viennese dailies from September 24 to October 9, 1951. The days of October 4–6 were the most crucial. On October 5 Körner went to one district where Communists had started halting and overthrowing streetcars and removing rails and stopped some of these actions. See Oskar, Helrrter, “Als Osterreichs Kommunisten putschten,” Forum, Vol. VII, No. 81 (September, 1960), pp. 322–325.Google Scholar

44 In addition to Körner's numerous statements on this point in his speeches and articles, see also Thea, Leitner, Körnsr aus der Nähe (Vienna: Danubia Verlag, [1953-1954?]), pp. 44–60.Google Scholar

45 Julius, Deutsch, Ein Weiter Weg (Vienna: Amalthea-Verlag, 1960), pp. 135–136.Google Scholar

46 On the trials and tribulations of the Austrian army during the First Republic, see especially Ludwig, Jedlicka, Ein Hear im Schatten der Parteien (Graz: Hermann Bohlaus Nachf., 1955), pp. 64–71.Google Scholar

47 Most of the details about this quarrel have still not been published. The issues were partly personal in nature, since Körner and the chief of staff of the Republican Defense League Major Alexander Eifler were hardly on speaking terms, and partly a matter of principle. After 1927 Körner considered the whole policy of the Defense League as a dangerous game of playing with fire which coula lead only to disaster and civil war—an estimate which proved to be only too correct. There is ample material about the conflict between Korner and the League in the Korner Trial Act, GZ26, Vr 1724/34, deposited in the Wiener Landesgericht I, which the author has been able to use. There are also some relevant documents in the archives of the Austrian Socialist Party in Vienna (Fascicles 28 and 46). These archives are at present practically inaccessible to scholars and are still in the process of being organized.

48 For a while Körner found a position working with his former comrades in the Austrian War Archives, where he, among other things, translated some Russian works on military strategy. In 1942, however, he was forbidden to enter the War Archives by the personal order of Hitler's deputy, Ernst Kaltenbrunner.

49 For details, see Schärf, , Österreicht Wiederaufrichtung im Jahre 1945, pp. 43–51Google Scholar; and Leitner, , Körner aus der Ntihe, pp. 94–108.Google Scholar

50 At regular intervals Körner sent unofficial letters to the members of the city government criticizing their work, complaining about red tape, and making constructive suggestions.

51 See ante, n. 43.

52 Apart from the numerous accounts, see Leitner, , Körner ous der Nähe, pp. 124–125.Google Scholar

53 I am quoting from the official copy of the transcript of the press conference which was put at my disposal by the office of the Austrian federal president.

54 Interview of the author with Dr. Franz Toldt, head of the presidential chancellery during most of Korner's tenure of office. There are also several references to various incidents in the private correspondence between Korner and Schärf which the latter kindly permitted me to read and make notes on. See especially the letter from Schärf to Körner, dated August 4, 1951.

55 Exchange of letters between Körner and Chancellor Leopold Figl, dated November 28, 1952, and December 4, 1952. Included in the private collection of letters reFerred to in n. 54.

56 Interview of the author with President Körner on November 12, 1951.

57 See Stourzh, “Zur Geschichte der österreichischen Neutralitat,” p. 277. See also Bruno, Kreisky, Die österreichische Neutralität (Vienna: Verlag des osterreichisahen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1960), p. 6.Google Scholar

58 Concerning Körner's contribution to achieving the state treaty, see Chancellor Julius Raab's speech on the occasion of the five year anniversary celebration of Austrian independence, Wiener Zeitung, May 15, 1960.

59 See the Körner-Schärf correspondence referred to in ante, n. 54.

60 The so-called Kapuzinerpredigt, March 16, 1954.

61 See Bundeszesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, 1955, No. 48 (September 21, 1955).

62 Körner-Schärf correspondence, especially Schärf to Körner, August 31, 1955; Körner to Schärf, October 13, 1955; and Schärf to Körner, October 13 and October 22, 1955.

63 See article 70 of the federal constitution.

64 Vodopivec, , Wer rezitrt in Österreich, p. 131Google Scholar. See also newspaper accounts, like those in Die Presse and in the Wiener Zeitung, on October 29, 1952, and the days immediately following.

65 See the issue of February 27, 1953.

66 Körner made his position clear in a speech which he gave when the UNESCO exhibition was opened on March 27, 1953. Because the occasion was so very unpolitical and the speech so pointedly political, the public and press reaction to it was correspondingly strong.

67 The fact that Renner wanted a funeral without any Church service aroused many comments in the Catholic camp and led to a most unpleasant slander campaign against Scharf. See the latter's account in his Österreichs Erneuerung, pp. 260–265.

68 Vodopivec, , Wer regiert in Osterreich, p. 132.Google Scholar

69 Schärf's majority was approximately 660,000 votes. This was all the more remarkable since in the recent elections for parliament the Socialists had lost two seats to the People's Party. Compared to the November, 1962, election for parliament, the People's Party lost over 210,000 votes, while the Socialists gained more than 377,000 over what they and the Communists had received in November, 1962. Percentage-wise Scharf received 55.4% and Raab 40.6% of the votes. For details, see the Austrian daily newspapers for April 30, 1963, especially the Arbeiter Zeitung and the official Wiener Zeitung.