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Silent War and Bitter Peace: The Revolution of 1918 in Austria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2009

John W. Boyer
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My Subject Today is the Austrian Revolution of 1918 and its aftermath, a staple subject in the general history of the empire and the republic, but one that has not seen vigorous historiographical discussion for a number of years. In a recent review of new historiography on the French Revolution, Jeremy Popkin has argued that recent neoliberal and even neo-Jacobin scholarship about that momentous event has confirmed the position of the revolution in the “genealogy of modern liberalism and democracy.” The endless fascination engendered by the French Revolution is owing to its protean nature, one that assayed the possibilities of reconciling liberty and equality and one that still inspires those who would search for a “usable liberal past.”1 After all, it was not only a watershed of liberal ideas, if not always liberal institutions and civic practices, but it was also a testing ground for the possibility of giving practical meaning to new categories of human rights.

Type
Eighteenth Annual Robert A. Kann Memorial Lecture
Information
Austrian History Yearbook , Volume 34 , January 2003 , pp. 1 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 2003

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References

1 Popkin, Jeremy D., “Not Over After All: The French Revolution's Third Century,” Journal of Modern History 74 (2002): 801–21. For assistance and advice on various aspects of this essay, I would like to thank Jonathan Gumz, John Deak, Thomas Grischany, Lothar Höbelt, Derek Hastings, Margarete Grandner, and Siegfried Weichlein.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Gerhard, Botz, “Handlungsspielräume der Sozialdemokratie während der ‘Österreichischen Revolution’,” in Festschrift Mélanges Felix Kreissler, ed. Rudolf, Altmüller et al. (Vienna, 1985), 16.Google Scholar In contrast, Reinhard Owerdieck suggests that the key players could not escape from the imperial milieu in which they had worked so assiduously, boldly stating that “die Parlamentarier der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung fühlten sich zunächst als Reichsratsabgeordnete und sahen in Deutschösterreich eine Art Fortleben des alten Staates.” Reinhard, Owerdieck, Parteien und Verfassungsfrage in Österreich. Die Enstehung des Verfassungsprovisoriums der Ersten Republik 1918–1920 (Munich, 1987), 38.Google Scholar

3 Margarete, Grandner, Kooperative Gewerkschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft. Die freien Gewerkschaften Österreichs im ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1992), 441–42, as well as 394.Google Scholar

4 Mayer, Arno J., The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions (Princeton, 2000), 4, 23.Google Scholar

5 Jan, Křen, Die Konfliktgemeinschaft. Tschechen und Deutsche 1780–1918 (Munich, 1996), 395.Google Scholar

6 On Hanusch and his legislation, see Otto, Staininger, ed., Ferdinand Hanusch (1866–1923). Ein Leben für den sozialen Aufstieg (Vienna, 1973).Google Scholar

7 Klemens von, Klemperer, “Die Revolution von 1918–1920 und der österreichische Konsens. Oder: Der pragmatische Stil in der österreichischen Politik,” in Studien zur Zeitgeschichte der österreichischen Länder, vol. 1, Demokratisierung und Verfassung in den Ländem 1918–1920 (St. Polten, 1983), 13–14;Google ScholarLothar, Höbelt, “Deutschösterreich und die Sudetendeutschen 1918–1919,” in Das Jahr 1919 in der Tschechoslowakei und in Ostmitteleuropa, ed. Hans, Lemberg and Peter, Heumos (Munich, 1993), 160–61. Höbelt believes that real power was quickly drained off into the Crownlands, whose regional parties became “Gründerväter der Republik” (161).Google ScholarSee also Ernst, Hanisch,“Einleitung,” in Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs. Erste Republik 1918–1933, ed. Emmerich, Tálos et al. (Vienna, 1995), 6.Google Scholar

8 See Hans, Mommsen, “Victor Adler und die Erste Republik Österreich,” in Österreich. November 1918. Die Entstehung der Ersten Republik. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 24. und 25. Oktober 1978, ed. Isabella, Ackerl and Rudolf, Neck (Munich, 1986), 21, 24–25;Google Scholar as well as Mommsen's comments on pp. 191–92. Hans Hautmann has suggested that revolution in Austria may have accomplished more than its bigger counterpart in Germany, in part because the Arbeiterräte movement in Austria began earlier, had a stronger class identity, and was less open to the political influence of the errant bourgeoisie. By this line of reasoning, the Austrian revolution may have enjoyed a more radical character. Hans, Hautmann, Geschichte der Rätebewegung in Österreich 1918–1924 (Vienna, 1987), 227.Google Scholar

9 See Hans, Kelsen, “Die Verfassung Deutschösterreichs,” Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechtes der Gegenwart 9 (1920): 248–49; and Karl Renner's comment on Kelsen's findings about the new state's international status in “Staatsrat. Protokoll der Sitzung vom 9. November 1918,” Archiv der Republik, hereafter cited respectively as SR and AdR.Google Scholar

10 Hans, Loewenfeld-Russ, Im Kampf gegen den Hunger. Aus den Erinnerungen des Staatssekretärs für Volksernährung 1918–1920, ed. Isabella, Ackerl (Vienna, 1986), 137. These observations date from the period after 1938, but were published only in 1986.Google Scholar

11 Ibid., 119.

12 Reprinted in Richard, Schober, Die Tiroler Frage auf der Friedenskonferenz von Saint Germain (Innsbruck, 1982), 480.Google Scholar

13 Neck, , “Das Jahr 1918—Einleitende Bemerkungen,” in November 1918, 13.Google Scholar

14 Brügel, J.W., ed., Friedrich Adler vor dem Ausnahmegericht. 18 und 19. Mai 1917 (Vienna, 1967), 85; see also 71, 84, 129.Google Scholar

15 Richard Georg, Plaschka, Horst, Haselsteiner, and Arnold, Suppan, eds., Innere Front. Militärassistenz, Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918, 2 vols. (Munich, 1974);Google ScholarMark, Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (New York, 2000);Google ScholarManfried, Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg (Graz, 1993).Google Scholar

16 With distrust between war front and home front growing more acute, Cornwall has shown how desperate the army leadership was by early 1918. See Mark, Cornwall, “Morale and Patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914–1918,” in State, Society, and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War, ed. John, Horne (Cambridge, 1997), 174;Google Scholar and idem., The Undermining of Austria-Hungary, 405–15.Google Scholar

17 Maureen, Healy, “Vienna Falling: Total War and Everyday Life, 1914–1918” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2000).Google Scholar

18 One example of this process was the confused, inept way in which the government implemented the Minister of Internal Affairs Friedrich Toggenburg's plea in late 1917 that censorship of foreign reading materials should be eased for responsible opinion shapers. See Z. 23147, Nov. 24, 1917; Z. 515, Jan. 8, 1918; Z. 2140, Jan. 23, 1918; Z. 6688, Mar. 19, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1668, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, hereafter cited as AVA.

19 See Z. 19327, Mar. 29, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1889, AVA, commenting on how “in den letzten Monaten die Einbruchsdiebstähle ausserordentlich gehäuft haben.” Franz, Exner, Krieg und Kriminalität in Österreich (Vienna, 1927), 18–21, reports that total crimes cited before first-level criminal courts doubled between 1916 and 1918.Google Scholar

20 Z. 6356, Mar. 16, 1918, Carton 2131; Z. 9724, Apr. 25, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1889, AVA. In his memoirs, Richard Schüller recalled that by the late summer of 1918, Austria's food production had seriously decreased and that the harvest of 1918 was less than half of that of 1913. Given import restrictions from Hungary and elsewhere, Schüller estimated that Austria had only about 25 percent of the necessary basic food supplies for 1918–19. Jürgen, Nautz, ed., Unterhändler des Vertrauens. Aus den nachgelassenen Schrifien von Sektionschef Dr. Richard Schüller (Vienna, 1990), 219.Google Scholar

21 A local Christian Social leader, Johann Körber, spoke for many of his fellow citizens when he complained at a political rally in late June 1918 that in its helplessness to secure its needed provisions, the city of Vienna was being treated by the government as if it were some obscure town. Z. 15784, June 26, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1648.

22 The story of Josef Tuttnauer illustrated the grief experienced by many common people. An unemployed clerical worker with a wife and two small children, Tuttnauer was hospitalized in a municipal hospital for a respiratory infection. In April 1918, he wrote a letter to the Statthalter of Lower Austria, Oktavian Regner von Bleyleben, accusing the government of intentionally murdering millions of people, warning Bleyleben and Mayor Weiskirchner that what happened to Karl Srürgkh would happen to them, and threatening to kill his children rather than let them “die a thousand times” by starvation. See the police memorandum on the case, May 25, 1918, St. series 1918, Carton 16, Archiv der Bundespolizeidirektion Wien, hereafter cited as AdPDW.

23 For the history of rumors in the war, see Healy, , “Vienna Falling,” 164–73;Google Scholar and Gustav, Spann, “Zensur in Österreich während des I. Weltkrieges 1914–1918” (Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna, 1972), 360–68. Healy notes that one difference between rumors in the first years of the war as opposed to those of 1918 was that the latter gained much more attention from governmental agencies (170). Surely this may have reflected the relative weakening and worsening of the situation of the government in general and the dynasty in particular.Google Scholar

24 Z. 15231, July 4, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 2078. For commentaries on the rumors, see Franz, Brandl, Kaiser, Politiker und Menschen. Erinnerungen eines Wiener Polizeipräsidenten (Leipzig, 1936), 248–50;Google ScholarFritz, Fellner, ed., Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908–1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, 2 vols. (Graz, 1953-1954), 2:284;Google ScholarPeter, Broucek, ed., Ein General im Zwielicht. Die Erinnerungen Edmund daises von Horstenau, vol. 1, K.u.k. Generalstabsoffizier und Historiker (Vienna, 1980), 472.Google Scholar

25 Glaise von, Horstenau, Ein General im Zwielicht, 477. On the battle and its aftermath,Google Scholarsee Peter, Fiala, Die letzte Offensive Altösterreichs. Führungsprobleme und Führerverantwortlichkeit bei der öst.-ung. Offensive in Venetien, Juni 1918 (Boppard am Rhein, 1967), 121–43;Google ScholarÖsterreich-Ungams letzter Krieg 1914–1918, vol. 7, Das Kriegsjahr 1918 (Vienna, 1938), 184–86, 235–364;Google ScholarRauchensteiner, , Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 553–77;Google ScholarKarel, Pichlík, “Der militärische Zusammenbruch der Mittelmächte im Jahre 1918,” in Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches. Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum, ed. Richard Georg, Plaschka and Karlheinz, Mack (Vienna, 1970), 254–56;Google Scholar and Lawrence, Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, 2000), 208–11.Google Scholar

26 Leuthner warned: “Meine Herren! Wir stehen leider nicht vor dem Ende des Krieges, aber wir stehen zweifellos vor dem Zusammenbruch eines Systems. In alien Fugen kracht es, überall wird fuhlbar, dass es so nicht weitergeht, dass so oder anders das Ende herannaht.” Protokoll über die geheimen Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Reichsrates am Dienstag den 23., Mittwoch den 24. und Donnerstag den 25. Juli 1918, Session 81, p. 55. For the background, see Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 578–81.Google Scholar

27 Protokoll, Session 82, p. 4. I am grateful to John Deak and Thomas Grischany for their transcriptions of these speeches. These harsh criticisms of the army and the cabinet were reconfirmed in testimony before the National Assembly in December 1918 by Christian Social and Social Democratic politicians such as Niedrist and Leuthner when legislation was enacted to create an investigative commission on the military failures during the war.Google ScholarSee the Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich, 1918 und 1919 (Vienna, 1919), 380–93, hereafter cited as PNV.Google Scholar

28 Josef, Redlich reports that by the early summer of 1918, the emperor had “schon in diesem Zeitpunkte das Vertrauen der breiten Massen Deutschösterreichs verloren.” Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege (Vienna, 1925), 279.Google ScholarSee also Rauchensteiner, , Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 581.Google Scholar

29 In an unpublished account written in August 1919, Seipel later reflected that Karl was more interested in maintaining his dynastic status than in seriously reforming his state, and that this led to equivocation and lack of fundamental change. See “Rückblick auf die Politik vom Umsturz bis zum Friedensvertrag,” Aug.31, 1919,Google Scholar reprinted in Friedrich, Rennhofer, Ignaz Seipel. Mensch und Staatsmann. Eine biographische Dokumentation (Vienna, 1978), 764–65; see also 76, 115–16, 135, 137.Google Scholar

30 A45541, Oct. 26, 1918, Oest. 103/Bd. 9, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, hereafter cited as PAAA.

31 Karl Renner informed the Social Democratic Party leadership in early July that Austria was now wholly dependent upon imports from Hungary and Rumania, that these shipments would now be priced much higher than domestic production, and that the Ernährungsamt had decided to pass the costs along to consumers, which meant a substantial increase in bread and cereal prices. Sugar prices were also about to double. Renner feared great unrest on the part of the working class. See Renner to the Parteivorstand, July 6, 1918, S.D. Parteistellen, Carton 117, Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, hereafter cited as VGA.

32 For Social Democratic strategy in the spring and summer of 1918 see Hautmann, , Geschichte, 210–24;Google ScholarBerthold, Unfried, “Arbeiterprotest und Arbeiterbewegung in Österreich während des Ersten Weltkrieges” (Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna, 1990), 206–7, 232–36;Google Scholar and Hans, Mommsen, “Victor Adler und die Politik der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Politik und Gesellschaft im Alten und Neuen Österreich. Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Isabella, Ackerl, Walter, Hummelberger, AND Hans, Mommsen, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1981), 1:402–7.Google Scholar

33 Hautmann, , Geschichte, 216, 219. See also Schober's report on the city council meeting of June 18, 1918,Google Scholar in Neck, , ed., Arbeiterschaft und Staat im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1918, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1964-1968), 2:616–20.Google Scholar

34 See, for example, the detailed police report on his speech given in Währing on June 3, 1918 to an audience of 500 officials, Z. 13462, MI Präs., Carton 1648. A comment on this report, written within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, suggested “Vom Standpunkte der Aufrechthaltung der Disziplin in den Wachekorps u. der Fernhaltung politischer Einflüsse von diesen Korps ist diese Tätigkeit des Abg. Dr. Waber bedenklich, wenngleich er bestrebt ist, loyal vorzugehen.”

35 For Schober's early career see Rainer, Hubert, Schober. ‘Arbeitermörder’ und ‘Hort der Republik.’ Biographie ernes Gestrigen (Vienna, 1990).Google Scholar

36 Schober's ire was especially directed at two police officials, Otto Minich and Anton Lissner, who helped Waber recruit members. Schober officially sanctioned both men by bringing them before disciplinary commissions, which found them guilty and recommended their dismissal from the force. In protesting what he considered to be Schober's autocratic behavior to the Lower Austrian Statthalter, Waber argued that Schober's attempts to prevent the police from attending his rallies were the best possible publicity. See Z. 20556, Sept. 7, 1918; and Z. 21690, Sept. 22, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1889. It was a double irony of the history of the First Republic that Leopold Waber ended up representing the Grossdeutschen in Schober's first cabinet as Minister of Internal Affairs and Education, having been appointed in June 1921, and that, later in his life, Schober would be accused of the same kind of politicization that he so caustically imputed to Waber.Google ScholarSee Hubert, , Schober, 370–72, as well as 78, 80–81,166.Google Scholar

37 Z. 9852, Apr. 27, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 2131. Nor were the police the only Mittelstand group that became involved in social protests. In late April 1918, a protest gathering of public school teachers from all districts of the city took place at the Rathaus. Approximately 1,000 teachers showed up outside the offices of Mayor Richard Weiskirchner, angry that an extra salary allowance that had been promised them had not yet been paid out. Urgently summoned Christian Social ward leaders were able to disperse the crowd, but in a city where teachers were a welloiled part of the political machine, this was an insurgent event. Z. 9701, Apr. 23, 1918, Carton 2131.Google Scholar

38 Z. 9660, Apr. 12, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1588.

39 See Z. 14005, June 12, 1918, Carton 1648. See also Z. 13461, June 5, 1918; Z. 13462, June 7, 1918; Z. 14099, June 14, 1918; Z. 15784, July 5, 1918; Z. 16160, July 6, 1918; Z. 16241, July 7, 1918, Carton 1648; as well as Z. 22014, Sept. 20, 1918, and Z. 20118, Sept. 1, 1918, Carton 1649.

40 Calls for unionization of the state officials, for example, were heard. See, for example, Z. 16160, July 6, 1918, Carton 1648.

41 See the reports of his speeches in Z. 9852, Apr. 27, 1918, Carton 2131; Z. 9699, Apr. 20, 1918, Carton, 1647; Z. 13461, June 5, 1918 and Z. 14099, June 13, 1918, Carton 1648.

42 Z. 18239, July 29, 1918, Carton 2079. Six months earlier, Leopold Kunschak had insisted that anti-Semitism was not just a principle of his party's ideology, but that it was also widespread in the general population, waiting to be articulated: “Der heutige Antisemitismus sei nicht das Produkt einer Hetze, der Presse, oder reiner Parteiarbeit, sondern er wachse aus den Verhältnissen heraus.” Z. 24621, Dec. 11, 1917, Carton 1646. Police reports on the mood of the populace noted this revival of popular anti-Semitism in the spring and summer of 1918, reporting that popular anti-Semitism was evident in the emotions of angry consumers and wage earners standing for hours in long lines waiting hopelessly for small bits of food. See Z. 6356, Mar. 16, 1918; Z. 8687, Apr. 13, 1918, Z. 10444, May 4, 1918, Carton 213.

43 Schober, , Tiroler Frage, 140–41.Google Scholar

44 Redlich, , Schicksalsjahre, 2:305.Google Scholar Ernest von Koerber went further in an interview with a German journalist on October 4, who reported that: “Wir sprachen dann noch über die allgemeinen Zerfallserscheinungen. Es wurden festgestellt: die Staatsfeindschaft der Slaven, aber auch die Gleichgültigkeit der Deutschen, so dass der Staatsgedanke völlig verdunkelt erscheint und niemand sich mehr um das staatliche Sein oder Nichtsein kümmert. Die Menschheit in Österreich ist physisch und seelisch so zermürbt, dass sie nur den Frieden will und alles andere der Zukunft, und wenn sie auch dunkel und ungewiss ist, überlassen will… Das alles ist Verfall… Wir [the Austrians] haben garnichts, keinen Staat, keinen festen Grund und keine Richtlinien. Ich wundere mich, wie die Herren an der Spitze so ruhig den Ereignissen gegenüber stehen.” “Unterredung mit Excellenz von Koerber 4.10.18,” in Wedel to Max von Baden, A42096, Oct. 6, 1918, Oest. 70/Bd. 53, PAAA.

45 See Jurij, Křížek, “Die Kriegswirtschaft und das Ende der Monarchie,”Google Scholar and Péter, Hanak, “Die Volksmeinung während des letzten Kriegsjahres in Österreich-Ungarn” in Die Auflösung, 43–52, 58–66;Google ScholarKřen, , Konfliktgemeinschaft, 353ff.;Google Scholar and Cornwall, , “The Dissolution of Austria-Hungary,” in The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: Essays in Political and Military History 1908–1918, ed. Cornwall, (Exeter, 1990), 117–42, esp. 140.Google Scholar This was certainly confirmed by paranoid evaluations of the Austrian High Command. See Cornwall, , The Undermining of Austria-Hungary, 372–73 and passim.Google Scholar

46 The reports of German ambassador Botho Wedel are surprisingly candid on this issue. In early July 1918, Wedel reported a general sense of hopelessness among the political elites: “Die schwankende, unsichere Politik an Höchster Stelle, die wirtschaftliche Not, die inneren Wirren und vor allem die misslungene Offensive haben eine Stimmung erzeugt, die als ‘apathische Hoffnungslosigkeit’ am treffendsten bezeichnet wird…. Man rechnet nur noch mit zwei Möglichkeiten: Rettung durch Deutschland oder Untergang.” A29780, July 11, 1918, Oest. 70/Bd. 53, PAAA.

47 Z. 24181, Oct. 29, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 1912.

48 This implosion meant that the valence of the state ceased to exist. Hans von Voltelini, the Austrian jurist and legal historian, had asserted in 1901 that “In dem österreichischen Staate allein finden sich die einzelnen Nationen zusammen.” Voltelini's proposition was meant to justify the study of Reichsgeschichte as the universal study of the public law of the Austrian state, but his insight may be adapted to explain the outcome of 1918 as well—it was not so much that the individual nations had destroyed the state, as that the state had destroyed itself, thus releasing the individual nations from its orbit.Google ScholarHans von, Voltelini, “Die österreichische Reichsgeschichte, ihre Aufgaben und Ziele,” Deutsche Geschichtsblätter. Monatsschrift zur Förderung der landesgeschichtlichen Forschung 2 (1901): 107.Google Scholar

49 The reports, in rough handwritten copies, are in the AdPDW, “Stimmungsberichte 1918.” See especially the reports of October 17, 1918 from Josefstadt, Landstrasse, Wieden, and Floridsdorf.

50 The police noted that the imperial badges and medals worn by discharged officers and soldiers generated great popular hostility. At the same time, most of the regular troops under General Johann Mossig's command had deserted their posts. By November 1, Mossig had four companies of men left under his command. Brandl, , Kaiser, 255–58;Google ScholarPlaschka, et al. ., Innere Front, 2:320–28. See also Z. 24513, Nov. 1, 1918; Z. 24514, Nov. 1, 1918; and Z. 24515, Nov. 2, 1918, MI Präs., Carton 2131.Google Scholar

51 Loewenfeld-Russ, , Im Kampf, 120–21.Google Scholar In late October, a typical adult received, per week, 25 kilo of flour, 5 kilo of potatoes, 2 dkg of margarine, and 12.5 dkg of meat, as well as .75 kilo of sugar per month. Ibid., 110. This meant that the daily caloric level for adults in Vienna, as provided for by basic rationed food, was down to approximately 700 per day. Arnold, Durig, “Physiologie als Unterrichtsgegenstand. Erhebungen über die Ernährung der Wiener Bevölkerung,” Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift, Nov. 2,1918, p. 1940.Google Scholar

52 For the medical situation, see Neue Freie Presse, Oct. 20,1918 (M), p. 8;Google Scholar and Arbeiter-Zeitung, Oct. 20, 1918, pp. 6–7; Oct. 25, 1918, p. 6, hereafter cited as NFP and AZ. Deaths owing to influenza rose from 364 in the week of September 29-October 5 to 814 in the week of October 6–12, to 1,468 in the week of October 13–19.Google Scholar

53 See, for example, Klaus, Berchtold, Verfassungsgeschichte der Republik Österreich, vol. 1, 1918-1933. Fünfzehn Jahre Verfassungskampf (Vienna, 1998), 14,16.Google Scholar

54 It has been suggested that the willingness of Heinrich Lammasch to cede authority to the new government on October 30 enabled a smooth, and thus peaceful transition in power. For example, see Berchtold, , Verfassungsgeschichte, 23.Google ScholarCertainly, Lammasch saw it as his responsibility to assist in a smooth transition, but this was not an option, and Lammasch admitted to Seitz that the capacity of public officials to be able to serve the new state was a foregone conclusion (a Selbstverständlichkeit). Three days later, Seitz reported that he, Dinghofer, and Renner had had a long conversation with Lammasch on the night of November 1 about transferring control of the ministries during which Lammasch noted that many of the k.k. ministers found their position “untenable,” and the idea emerged to send the state secretaries immediately into the ministries. SR, Oct. 31, and Nov. 2,1918.Google Scholar

55 See letters of Oct. 10, Oct. 20, Oct. 21, and Oct. 23,1918, in Loewenfeld-Russ, , Im Kampf, 105, 108–12.Google Scholar For a description of the lack of reality of members of the Herrenhaus in these days, see Robert, Freissler, Vom Zerfall Oesterreichs bis zum tschechoslowakischen Staate (Zoppot-Berlin, 1921), 60–61.Google Scholar

56 “Man hat die Empfindung, im luftleeren Raum zu amtieren, den Boden unter den Füssen zu verlieren. Jede Arbeit scheint einem überflüssig, weil durch den Gang der Ereignisse überholt. Österreich scheint durch eine russische Elendszeit durch zu müssen, es wird ihm nicht erspart bleiben, wenn auch später der Staat in anderer Form wieder aufstehen wird. Diejenigen aber, die diese schreckliche Zeit jetzt mitmachen müssen, und wir stehen erst am Beginn, fiebern jede Stunde, die der Tag bringt…. Ich habe nur die Sehnsucht: fort, wenn es ginge.” Letter of Oct. 20,1918, Loewenfeld-Russ, , Im Kampf, 109.Google Scholar

57 Letters of Oct. 21,1918, Oct. 23,1918, and Nov. 5,1918; Ibid., 110–12,120–21.Robert, Freissler, who was present at the Staatsrat meeting on November 11, later recalled that “jeder war sich klar darüber, dass die einzige Möglichkeit, den Staat und seine Einrichtungen vor Zertrümmerung zu bewahren, in dem augenblicklichen Bekenntnisse zur Republik lag.” Vom Zerfall, 71.Google Scholar

58 Compare Boog's “Feierliche Angelobung” in SR, Nov. 8, 1918, with the comments of Karl, Vaugoin in Reichspost, Nov. 17,1919 (M), p. 3,Google Scholar hereafter cited as Rp. See also Julius, Deutsch, Aus Österreichs Revolution. Militärpolitische Erinnerungen (Vienna, 1921), 14–33;Google ScholarLudwig, Jedlicka, Ein Heer im Schatten der Parteien. Die militärpolitische Lage Österreichs 1918–1938 (Vienna, 1955), 12–30;Google Scholar and especially Carsten, F. L., Revolution in Central Europe, 1918–1919 (Berkeley, 1972), 78–107.Google Scholar

59 See Anton, Staudinger, “Christlichsoziale Partei und Heimwehren bis 1927,” in Die Ereignisse des 15. Juli 1927. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 15. Juni 1977, ed. Rudolf, Neck and Adam, Wandruszka (Vienna, 1979), 110–36, esp. 114–19;Google Scholar and Norbert, Leser, “Der Bruch der Koalition 1920—Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen,” in Koalitionsregierungen in Österreich. Ihr Ende 1920 und 1966. Protokoll des Symposiums ‘Bruch der Koalition’ in Wien am 28. April 1980, ed. Neck, and Wandruszka, (Munich, 1985), 40.Google Scholar

60 “Klub-Sitzung am 1. Okt. 1918,” Christlichsozialer Parlamentsklub, AdR.

61 “Protokoll der Sitzung der Reichsparteivertretung vom 20. September 1918,” VGA.

62 Redlich reported in his diary that the court lost all hope in the days that followed. Redlich, , Schicksalsjahre, 2:306.Google Scholar Wedel reported to Berlin that in the days after Wilson's response, talk of an Anschluss had escalated considerably. A44949, Oct. 22,1918, Oest. 95/Bd. 25, PAAA. He also reported hearing favorable comments about a republic in bürgerlich circles, as well as among the Social Democrats, the former thinking that this would position Austria well at the peace conference, given Wilson's views.Google Scholar

63 See NFP, Oct. 18,1918 (M), p. 2: “Von den deutschen Abgeordneten wird hiezu ausdrücklich bemerkt, dass diese Nationalversammlung unabhängig von dem kaiserlichen Manifest erfolgt. Die Deutschen konstituieren sich auf Grund ihres Selbstbestimmungsrechtes als Nation und warten alles übrige ab.” Wedel saw these claims of sovereignty as reflecting a push by the Social Democratic leadership led by Renner between October 18 and 20 that was, in turn, pushed by its own left wing and by the Czech Social Democrats. A44305, Oct. 20,1918, Oest. 103/Bd. 8, PAAA. Wedel subsequently (A 44539, Oct. 21,1918, Oest. 103/Bd. 8) insisted that the one positive value of the Manifesto—which was otherwise considered ridiculous in Vienna—was that it legitimated the National Assembly by lending it a cover of respectability (“Die Revolution ist durch das Manifest legitimiert.”) Loewenfeld-Russ pointed out, however, that some basic instititutional overlaps wereexpected, since while the Lammasch cabinet was viewed as a liquidation regime, it was hoped that Lammasch would coordinate the devolution process between and among the new states. This quickly proved, however, to be an impossibility (142).Google Scholar

64 See Neck, , “Das Jahr 1918—Einleitende Bemerkungen,” 15;Google ScholarWalter, Goldinger, “Der geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Österreich von 1918 bis 1945," in Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich, Benedikt (Vienna, 1954), 27, 32–33.Google Scholar

65 See AZ, Nov. 2,1918, p. 1. This congress also provided fascinating examples of “instant” history, with Otto Bauer, Max Adler, and Karl Seitz addressing the faithful to give meaning to the chaos in which the party found itself. Whereas most of the delegates probably sought to learn about the future socialist society, Seitz and Bauer seemed preoccupied with new understandings of the Austrian political past and, in Bauer's case, with the urgency of an Anschluss with Germany. Seitz, in turn, sketched a fascinating reimagining of Austrian history that now saw the empire as having been destined to fail from the very beginnings of its existence. See Stenographisches Protokoll, Parteitag 1918, 90–176, VGA.Google Scholar

66 Bauer to Friedrich Adler, Oct. 24,1918, in Otto, Bauer, Werkausgabe, 9 vols. (Vienna, 1975-1980), 9:1045–47.Google Scholar

67 Hans, Mommsen, “Victor Adler und die Erste Republik Österreich,” 17; SR, Nov. 9,1918.Google Scholar

68 SR, Nov. 11, 1918. Renner: “Es haben sich in Deutschland die zwei Fraktionen der Sozialdemokratie, die Rechte und die Linke, vereinigt und die Regierung gemeinsam übernommen.Die Folge dieser Ereignisse bei uns ist, dass das ganze Proletariat einmütig dieselbe Politik von uns fordern wird. Dadurch ist unsere Stellung hier auf das Äusserste bedroht. Es liegen polizeiliche Berichte vor, welche die Existenz dieses Staatsrates berühren…. Der Staatsrat beruht auf einer Koalition des Bürgertums, des Bauernstandes und der Arbeiterschaft, um uns aus der Katastrophe herauszuführen. Da in Deutschland alle sozialdemokratischen Parteien sich vereinigt und die Regierung übernommen haben, ist die erste Forderung, die vom Proletariat an uns gerichtet werden wird, dass wir hier das Gleiche tun. Sie wissen, wie stark die Tendenzen der Arbeiterschaft dahin gerichtet sind, eine Koalition mit bürgerlichen Parteien nicht zuzulassen. Meine Partei hat heute früh eine dringende Beratung abgehalten, und ist zu dem Beschlusse gekommen, dass diese Koalition so lange als möglich aufrechtzuerhalten ist, weil sie die einzige Garantie ist, uns vor der Anarchie zu bewahren.”.

69 Jacob, Ahrer, Erlebte Zeitgeschichte (Vienna, 1930), 47.Google Scholar

70 “Protokoll der Sitzung des deutschen Parteivorstandes am 17. Oktober 1918,” VGA. Victor Adler made it clear on October 21 that what was being formed was a government with full sovereign powers, which also included taking power over the Verwaltung. PNV,7.Google Scholar

71 The Provisional National Assembly consisted of 210 members, all German-based deputies elected in 1911. It determined that it would be both the originator and the executor of its own legislation, but entrusted day-to-day governmental authority to the Vollzugsausschuss (which was renamed the Staatsrat on October 30), to be chaired by three rotating presidents, each drawn from one of the political parties. The origins of this structure are embedded in the murky history of Social Democratic leadership in late October 1918. On October 17, the party Executive (at which Renner was present) commissioned Otto Bauer to draft a proposal to organize the transitional government that would be voted on by the National Assembly on October 21. See “Protokoll der Sitzung des deutschen Parteivorstandes am 17. Oktober 1918,” VGA. Bauer then formulated the proposals that were adopted on October 21. This has led historians to the conclusion that Bauer was implementing his own ideas. But if Georg Schmitz is correct that Karl Renner had already begun work on his constitutional Entwurf by October 16, a document that also contains the idea of an executive committee or Staatsrat (especially Sections 18 and 40–41), it is possible that Bauer in fact took this idea from Renner. See note 92, below.Google Scholar

72 Twenty-five years ago, Rudolf Neck called for a study of the origins and details of Renner's Koalitionspolitik (Neck, “Das Jahr 1918—Einleitende Bemerkungen,” 15), a desideratum that is still outstanding.Google Scholar

73 For example, Loewenfeld-Russ commented to his parents in early December that “‘d’ie Verhältnisse bringen es sich mit, dass die Sozialdemokraten, die auf die Massen den grössten Einfluss haben, eine Art führende Stellung einnehmen. Dies kommt auch dadurch zum Ausdrucke, dass Renner als Kanzler den Vorsitz im Kabinett (=Ministerpräsident) inne hat. Er ist von einer bewundernswerten Arbeitsintensität.” Letter of Dec. 1,1918, Im Kampf, 132. Walter Goldinger has also insisted that Renner did not scheme to get the job he ended up with, but that a simple “force of circumstances” led him to become the equivalent of a German-Austrian ministerpresident.Google ScholarSee Goldinger, , “Der Staatsrat 1918/19,” in November 1918, 57.Google ScholarEduard, März and Fritz, Weber also argue for a kind of natural Social Democratic superiority in October 1918, in “Sozialdemokratie und Sozialisierung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” in November 1918,102.Google Scholar In contrast, Ernst Victor Zenker accused Renner of having schemed his way into a position that was never authorized by the National Assembly. See his Ein Mann im sterbenden Österreich. Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben (Reichenberg, 1935),141.Google Scholar

74 “Mutwilliger Streit oder politischer Gegensatz?” Der Kampf 9 (1916): 149, n. 1.Google Scholar

75 Friedrich, Adler's famous attack on Renner during his murder trial in May 1917 (Renner as “einen Lueger in der Sozialdemokratie”) was notable in this regard. See Friedrich Adler vor dem Ausnahmegericht, 96. But see also Z. 14004, June 11,1918, Carton 2131. Renner had temporarily withdrawn from politics after the Adler murder trial to concentrate on the cooperative movement. He was deeply involved, however, in controlling the potential radicalism of the Arbeiterräte movement that emerged in early 1918.Google ScholarSee Hautmann, , Geschichte, 120–21, 172–73, 203, 206–7, 209, 215, 217;Google Scholar and Jacques, Hannak, Karl Renner und seine Zeit. Versuch einer Biographie (Vienna, 1965), 311.Google Scholar

76 AZ, Nov. 3,1918, p. 5. Adler's comments came in the form of a correction to the abbreviated coverage that the AZ devoted to his speech at the party congress.

77 Georg, Schmitz, Karl Renners Briefe aus Saint Germain und ihre rechtspolitischen Folgen (Vienna, 1991), 133–35.Google Scholar

78 “Protokoll der Sitzung des Deutschen Parteivorstandes am 21. Juni 1917,” VGA. Clam's successor, Ernst von Seidler, then approached Victor Adler directly in early August, twice visiting him at a local sanatorium to gain Socialist participation in a new cabinet. Adler flatly rejected the offer. See “Protokoll der Sitzung des Deutschen Parteivorstandes am 8. August 1917.” The Saxon legate Alfred Nostitz reported to Dresden in May 1917 that Renner was “einer der klügsten politischen Köpfe Österreichs” and that “es ist nicht unmöglich, dass man ihn eines schönen Tages sogar noch als österreichischen Minister sieht.” See Alfred, Opitz and Franz, Adlgasser, eds., “Der Zerfall der europäischen Mitte.” Staatenrevolution im Donauraum. Berichte der Sächsischen Gesandtschaft in Wien 1917–1919 (Graz, 1990), 34–35.Google Scholar

79 Glaise von, Horstenau, Ein General im Zwielicht, 499.Google Scholar For rumors about Social Democratic participation in the cabinet in mid October, see also Loewenfeld-Russ, , Im Kampf, 105.Google Scholar

80 Josef, Polišenský, “Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches im Herbst 1918 nach den Briefen des Ackerbauministers Silva-Tarouca,” in Die Auflösung, 134. A third instance involved Alexander Spitzmüller. Commissioned by the emperor in a parallel action to canvass political leaders, Spitzmüller recounted that he considered Renner as a possible minister-president, along with Prince Friedrich Schwarzenberg, but Spitzmüller gives no indication that the emperor acted or did not act on this proposalGoogle Scholar. See Alexander, Spitzmüller-Harmersbach, “… und hat auch Ursach, es zu lieben” (Vienna, 1955), 263–64.Google Scholar According to Spitzmüller, he had been asked on October 11 and agreed on October 13 to try to negotiate a new cabinet to replace Hussarek. The idea collapsed after Cardinal Piffl intervened with the emperor on October 15.

81 For Renner, a combination of imperial Statthaltereien, historic Crownlands, and regional political parties weakened Austria by delegitimizing the state in the name of national particularism and national discord.Google ScholarSee his Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Oesterreich (Leipzig, 1918), 202–3, 234, 238, 244–48.Google ScholarRenner felt that this system was also undergirded by a backward, unintellectual Kleinbürgertum that did not even represent the true interests of the modern bourgeoisie.Google ScholarSee his comments in the Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Deutschen sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Oesterreich. Abgehalten in Wien vom 19. bis 24. Oktober 1917 (Vienna, 1917), 225–26;Google Scholar and Selbstbestimmungsrecht, 243–44.Google Scholar

82 Ibid., 81, 244–48.

83 Ibid., 245,102.

84 Ibid., 69,107–8,118,150.

85 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages, 231.Google Scholar For Renner, freedom for the working class could come not only through the factory workplace and the unions; it had to come also through the democratization of administration and government. The war had made the bureaucratic state even stronger (in an interventionist sense), and yet simultaneously it demonstrated the state's profound structural and operational inadequacies. Renner was certain that the strong state would endure long after the peace, and it was essential that it be infused with democracy, so as to transform it into a state congenial to all of society.

86 Selbstbestimmungsrecht, 170.Google Scholar

87 See, especially, Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages, 230–31,Google Scholar and Selbstbestimmungsrecht,168–70, 203, 251–52.Google Scholar Even before the revolution, Renner realized that this way of conceiving of state authority would lead to accusations that he was a strong centralist (ibid., 213). Hans, Kelsen later framed this issue in the similar way. See his Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin, 1925), 184.Google Scholar

88 Renner to Austerlitz, July 25,1918, S. D. Parteistellen, Carton 17, VGA.

89 See Schmitz, , Renners Briefe, 33–49;Google ScholarBrauneder, , “Karl Renners ‘Entwurf einer provisorischen Verfassung’: ein vorläufiger Bericht,” in Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis. Festschrift Robert Walter zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Heinz, Mayer (Vienna, 1991), 63–95;Google Scholar and idem., Deutsch-Österreich 1918. Die Republik entsteht (Vienna, 2000), 40–41.Google Scholar Renner's protoconstitution provided for a bicameral legislature, with an elected lower house and an advisory and appointed upper house. The central government was to exercise considerable legislative and norm-setting power over the Länder. Renner clearly understood the regional governments to be subordinate to the central government, not autonomous entities unto themselves. See Brauneder, , “Karl Renners ‘Entwurf einer provisorischen Verfassung,’” 78–80.Google Scholar

90 Schmitz argues that Renner began work on the Entwurf on October 16, Brauneder on October 21–22.Google Scholar See Schmitz, , Renners Briefe, 45; and Brauneder, , “Karl Renners ‘Entwurf einer provisorischen Verfassung,’” 68, 71.Google Scholar Personally, I find an earlier date more plausible for the reason that Renner was traveling to Berlin on October 23–27, and on the evening of the 23rd he had a conversation with Hans Loewenfeld-Russ on a train to Berlin that clearly referenced his constitutional plans (see Im Kampf, 112–13, 116–17). Siegfried Nasko and Johannes Reichl are correct when they surmise that Renner's informal comments to Loewenfeld-Russ were in fact a verbal dress rehearsal for the constitution that Renner would draft on October 28, but the fact that his comments to Loewenfeld-Russ came at the very beginning of their joint journey suggested that Renner had been pondering these issues even before he left for Berlin.Google ScholarSee Siegfried, Nasko and Johannes, Reichl, Karl Renner. Zwischen Anschluss und Europa (Vienna, 2000), 35–36.Google Scholar

91 The Staatsrat was the legal successor to the Vollzugsausschuss, which had been created by the Provisional National Assembly on October 21.Google ScholarSee PNV, 5; and Staatsgesetzblatt, 1918, Nr. 1, section 3.Google Scholar

92 Owerdieck, , Parteien, 65–76, esp. 71–72.Google Scholar

93 In fact, an agreement was reached to divide the thirteen state secretaryships by party lines, which meant two went to Socialists, four to the Christian Socials, and five to the German Nationals, with two ending up occupied by senior civil servants. See AZ, Nov. 1,1918, p.3. Shortly after the meeting of the Staatsrat opened on October 30, Josef Seliger on behalf of the Social Democrats submitted a formal statement insisting on a number of conditions for their participation in the government. One of them was substantial influence in foreign affairs, internal affairs, and military affairs, with the provision that if the party did not gain control of these portfolios, it insisted on representation on the level of undersecretary, so as to provide for its interests.Google Scholar

94 “Klubsitzung am 29. Okt. 1918,” Christlichsozialer Parlamentsklub, AdR.

95 “Klubsitzung, 30.10.1918,” Klub, S. D. Parl, VGA. The handwritten protocols reported that “Unser Wunsch in der Besetzung. Einfluss im Äusseres, Krieg, Inneres, Soz. Fürsorge. Vorschlag Inneres, Renner. Äusseres Unterstaatssekretär. Krieg Unterstaatssekretär. Soz. Fürsorge (Gewerkschaftskomm. bestimmen).” They then cryptically reported that “Einz. Nationale wünschen Adler f. Äusseres.”Google Scholar

96 Gustav Stolper was apparently among the liberals who sought to have Victor Adler appointed foreign secretary. See Gustav Stolper's diary entry of October 29,1918, reprinted in Toni, Stolper, Ein Leben in Brennpunkten unserer Zeit. Wien, Berlin, New York. Gustav Stolper 1888–1947 (Tübingen, 1960), 123–24.Google Scholar The date of the entry is slightly misleading, but the meaning of the passage is clear. Karl Seitz subsequently told Stolper that “Christlichsoziale in gestriger Vollzugs-Aussschusssitzung mit erschreckendem Nachdruck Min. d. Äusseren für sich verlangt hätten.” Stolper records having approached German Ambassador Wedel, seeking his support for Adler's nomination, which was apparently given.

97 See AZ, Nov. 1,1918, p. 3. By November 5, Loewenfeld-Russ was describing in a letter to his father Renner's chairmanship of the cabinet as a political given, with Renner functioning “als Ministerpräsident.” 1m Kampf, 120.Google ScholarSee also Nasko, and Reichl, , Karl Renner, 37–38.Google Scholar

98 Already on October 31 the minutes of the Staatsrat used the title “Staatskanzler” (as opposed to the clumsy title of “Leiter der Staatskanzlei”) to refer to Renner, but they seemed to do so in the restricted sense of naming someone who was literally running an administrative chancellery. Wilhelm Miklas, for example, moved that Renner—in his role as Staatskanzler qua director of theoffice—should provide the Staatsrat with the appropriate draft of an oath that might be administered to high officials guaranteeing their confidentiality. This restricted understanding of the title soon gave way to Renner's invoking his office to provide clear-cut policy guidelines and policy suggestions to the Staatsrat. Lothar Höbelt has rightly observed that Renner was a “Staatskanzler ohne rechte Exekutivgewalt,” but what was important was that someone emerged who understood the workings of government, who could assert his authority with plausibility, and who was not overwhelmed by the mass of unfamiliar material.Google ScholarSee Höbelt, , “Deutschösterreich,” 161, n. 7.Google Scholar Both Loewenfeld-Russ and Spitzmüller both observed in their memoirs that many of the new revolutionary leaders were unfamiliar with government, and were sometimes uncertain about how to deal with the challenges they faced. Im Kampf, 120, 124, 133; “… und hat auch Ursach,” 312.Google Scholar

99 See Staatsgesetzblatt, 1918, Nr. 139, and 1919, Nr. 180. This evolution was immediately noted by contemporary jurists.Google ScholarSee Hans, Nawiasky, Der Aufbau der Regierungs- und Vollzugsgewalt Deutschösterreichs nach der Gesetzgebung der provisorischen Nationalversammlung, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 1 (1919-1920): 38,Google Scholar and Leo, Wittmayer, “Zu den Voraussetzungen und Grundproblemen der provisorischen Verfassung von Deutschösterreich,”Google Scholaribid., 87–88.

100 Once Adler had been selected for the foreign secretaryship, he immediately chose Otto Bauer to be his deputy (Vorstand des Präsidialbüros) on October 31. Bauer then succeeded Victor Adler as foreign minister after November 11. See SR, Oct. 31,1918 and Nov. 2,1918; as well as AZ, Nov. 3,1918, p. 2.Google Scholar It is, of course, part of the remarkable contingencies that marked the events of October 30–31 that Bauer ended up in this position, and thus (after Adler's death) in a position to push Austrian foreign policy in the direction of the Anschluss in late 1918 and 1919. Had the original plan of the Social Democratic parliamentary club been executed—Renner appointed to Internal Affairs, with the party receiving only undersecretaryships in Foreign Affairs and War—the whole history of the early Austrian Republic might have thus looked quite different.

101 See Loewenfeld, Russ's comparison in this regard in Im Kampf, 112. Certainly, even among his fellow party compatriots, such as Karl, Seitz, there was an uneasiness at Renner's ambitions, but the only Social Democrat who could have controlled these impulses was Victor, Adler.Google ScholarSee Siegfried, Nasko's interview with Amalia Strauss-Ferneböck about Seitz's views, cited in Nasko and Reichl, Karl Renner, 39.Google Scholar

102 Leon, Trotsky, My Life: The Rise and Fall of a Dictator (London, 1930), 180.Google Scholar

103 SR, Nov. 9,1918; as well as Max, Ermers, Victor Adler. Aufstieg und Gösse einer Sozialistischen Partei (Vienna, 1932), 362–63.Google Scholar

104 In fact, on November 1, the Reichspostrejected the idea of any single individual assuming a permanent leadership position, arguing that “[a]n der Spitze der Regierung steht nicht ein Ministerpräsident, sondern einer der Staatssekretäre, wie die Minister nun heissen, wird vom Staatsrate mit dem Vorsitze in der Regierung betraut; hierüber ist bisher noch nicht entschieden worden.” Rp, Nov. 1,1918 (M), p. 3.Google Scholar

105 Anton, Staudinger has rightly argued that the Christian Social parliamentary club's leadership was reasonably united and represented the opinions of the party in these days. See his comments in November 1918, 271Google Scholar

106 Loewenfeld-Russ, , Im Kampf, 141. Renner was assisted by Stefan Licht in preparing some of the legislation passed in late October and early November.Google Scholar

107 PNV, 31–34.Google Scholar

108 PNV, 32,66,69. See also the interview published in the NFP, Feb. 28,1919 (A), p. 3, in which Renner suggested that the workers and peasants would now dominate Austria via their two large parties, thus giving the “arbeitenden Klassen” control of the state. The German Nationals, in contrast, were a party in decline, sinking in numbers and representing a fragmented bourgeoisie.Google Scholar

109 Unfried, “Arbeiterprotest und Arbeiterbewegung,” 437, 450; Selbstbestimmungsrecht, 271–72, 278.Google ScholarSee also Hans, Mommsen's comments on Renner's, rationalism in analyzing the nationality problem in Arbeiterbewegung und Nationale Frage. Ausgewählte Aufsätze (Göttingen, 1979), 198–200.Google Scholar

110 “Kabinettsprotokoll Nr. 9 vom 12. November 1918,” AdR.

111 Unterhändler des Vertrauens, 252. For a similar appreciation by a German National political leader, see Freissler, Vom Zerfall, 82–83.Google Scholar

112 PNV, 66.Google Scholar

113 If the constitution as a permanent ordering of power relations was the ultimate telos of the revolution, many of the decisions that the multiparty coalition government took between November 1918 and February 1919, and again between March 1919 and July 1920, not only shaped the outcome of the final constitutional deliberations, but they slowly began to make claims about what kind of society Austria aspired to become. A common denominator among many of these issues was the question of civil and political rights. For Austrian invocations of the rights of self-determination under the guise of “Wilsonianism” in November, 1918, seeHarms, Haas, “Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und die Alliierte Lebensmittelversorgung Österreichs im Winter 1918/19,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 32 (1979): 240.Google Scholar

114 A46524, Nov. 2,1918, Oest. 103/Bd. 9, PAAA. Similarly, Loewenfeld-Russ wrote to his parents on November 11 that the new state was living day to day, and he did not foreclose the possibility that, within a few days, it might too collapse. Im Kampf, 123.Google Scholar

115 For the array of illusions among Europeans that Wilson, generated, see Mommsen, Wolfgang J., “Die europäische Reaktion auf Woodrow Wilsons ‘New Diplomacy,’” in Rivalitiit und Partnerschaft. Studien zu den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Ritter, Gerhard A. and Peter, Wende (Paderborn, 1999), 145-62.Google Scholar

116 Rudolf, Jaworski, Vorposten oder Minderheit? Der sudetendeutsche Volkstumskampf in den Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und der ČSR (Stuttgart, 1977), 15–22.Google ScholarSee also the “Comment of the Austrian Delegation on the June 2 Draft of the Conditions of the Peace with Austria,” in The Treaty of St. Germain: A Documentary History of its Territorial and Political Clauses, ed. Nina, Almond and Ralph Haswell, Lutz (Stanford, 1935), 205–9, 448–52.Google Scholar By June and July 1919, Renner was most interested in trying to save the areas of southern Bohemia and southern Moravia that were directly adjacent to Upper and Lower Austria. See Ibid., 205–6, 277–78, 282–84, 311–12.

117 See Maria, Theresa to Zinzendorf, Apr. 15,1761, in Friedrich, Walter, ed., Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung, vol. 3, bk. 2 (Vienna, 1934), 165;Google Scholar as well as Ingrao, Charles W., The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2000), 64;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Grete, Klingenstein, “The Meanings of ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrian’ in the Eighteenth Century,” in Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Memory ofRagnhild Hatton, ed. Robert, Oresko, Gibbs, G. C., and Scott, H. M. (Cambridge, 1997), 433, 444, 448, 471.Google ScholarSee also Renner's note of June 16,1919, in Almond and Lutz, , eds., The Treaty of St. Germain, 276.Google Scholar

118 See Gerald, Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Osterreichs 1848–1918 (Vienna, 1985), 53–57, 74–75, 244–46;Google Scholar and idem, “Die dualistische Reichsstruktur. Österreichbegriff und Österreichbewusstsein 1867–1918,” in Innere Staatsbildung und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Österreich und Deutschland 1867/71 bis 1914, ed. Helmut, Rumpler (Munich, 1991),65–166.Google Scholar

119 As Jan Křen has pointed out, the poisonous atmosphere between the two national groups that grew up during the war, as well as the shock with which the empire's demise arrived, pushed any consciousness of having a common history and any possibility of compromise and conciliation into irrelevance. Křen, , Die Konfliktgemeinschaft, 393.Google Scholar

120 Helmut Rumpler has shown how, in the last days of the Hussarek Ministry, both Kaiser, Karl and Hussarek, himself were unwilling to send a clear signal as to how a Wilsonian Selbstbestimmungsrechtmight be applied in Bohemia—which side would be favored. Rumpler, Das Völkermanifest Kaiser Karls vom 16. Oktober 1918. Letzter Versuch zur Rettung des Habsburgerreiches (Vienna, 1966), 58–60.Google Scholar The events of late October 1918 had strong precedents in the last year of the war, since on January 22,1918, Rafael Pacher, on behalf of the Deutschböhmische Vereinigung, had proposed the creation of an independent Crownland of Deutsch-Böhmen. See Stenographische Protokolle des Hauses der Abgeordneten, 1918, pp. 2805–6;Google Scholar and Helmut, Slapnicka, “Die Stellungnahme des Deutschtums der Sudetenlander zum ‘Historischen Staatsrecht,’” Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 8 (1959):34.Google Scholar

121 See Emil, Strauss, Die Entstehungder Tschechoslowakischen Republik (Prague, 1934), 291–93.Google Scholar At the same time, Upper Austria and Lower Austriawere awarded the additions of (respectively) the Kreis Deutsch-Südböhmen and the Kreis Deutsch-Südmähren. See also Paul, Molisch, Diesudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den Jahren 1918–1919 (Vienna, 1932), 18–21;Google ScholarPNV, 15–17, 92ff.; NFP, Oct. 30,1918 (M), pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

122 For the general context, see Campbell, F. Gregory, Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia (Chicago, 1975), 47–74;Google Scholar and Carsten, , Revolution in Central Europe, 287–94.Google Scholar For the events as they played out in one Bohemian town, see Jeremy, King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948 (Princeton, 2002), 153–61.Google Scholar

123 See, for example, the reports in Manfred, Alexander, ed., Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Teil 1. Von der Staatsgründung bis zum ersten Kabinett Beneš, 1918–1921 (Munich, 1983), 72–74, 106–8, 110–13, 115–20.Google Scholar

124 Local German-Austrian officials who tried to maintain a semblance of credibility found themselves presiding over administrative sand castles. And, as Hieronymus Oldofredi experienced in Nikolsburg insouthern Moravia, such local German “defense” forces as did exist coul d prove problematic, given their lack of discipline: “Von Arbeit, von Dienst wollten die Leute, die ihr [the local Volkswehr] angehörten, nichts wissen; selbst artschaffen, kommandieren, diktieren, diktieren auch der zivilen Verwalrung, das allein war nach ihrem Geschmack. Es bedurfte aller Gewandtheit, aller Festigkeit des Leiters des Nikolsburger Amtes und seines militärischen Beraters, sich der täglichen Übergriffe dieser Leute zu erwehren.” Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Erinnerungen von Hieronymus Oldofredi (Zurich, n.d.), 53. For a graphic description of the disorganization of the local German forces in the Sudetenland,Google Scholarsee Ferdinand, Zeller, “Die Provinz Sudetenland. Der Umsrturz in Nordmahren und Westschlesien 1918” (Ph.D. diss., University of Vienna, 1971), 105-22.Google Scholar

125 See Deutsch, , Aus Österreichs Revolution, 68–69; Jedlicka, Ein Heer, 33–34; Strauss, Die Entstehung,302–3.Google Scholar

126 Molisch, , Freiheitsbewegung, 36; Freissler, Vom Zerfall, 118–32, 141–42.Google Scholar What local administration that could be jerryrigged was further compromised by political feuds among local leaders, including the local Social Democrats. See Harms, Haas, “Die deutschböhmische Frage 1918–1919 und das österreichisch-tschechoslowakische Verhältnis. Teil I,” Bohemia 13(1972): 354–60.Google Scholar As the Czechs moved forward, local Germans became even more demoralized and intragroup rivalries emerged. Some leaders remained in situ, quietly trying to agitate for their cause and to stay out of the scrutiny of the Czechs, while others fled to Vienna. Josef, Mayer, a German National Agrarian and member of the Staatsrat, argued in the Prager Tagblatt that the industrialists tended to be prointegration, the lower middle classes and the workers anti-Czech, and the peasants “completely indifferent.”Google Scholar“Eine Unterredung mit Staatssekretar Mayer,” Prager Tagblatt, 03. 7, 1919, p. 2.Google ScholarVictor Adler told the Saxon legate in Vienna, Erich Benndorf, on November 8that he was certain that the majority of the local German population didnot want to join the Czech state, but to the extent that some Mittelstand types did want to join, Adler thought it reflected the terrible food crisis.Google ScholarSee “Der Zerfall,” 200.Google Scholar

127 The two issues often collided. For example, when Hans Loewenfeld-Russ reported to the Staatsrat on November 8 on the chroniclack of sugar in Austria, he noted that the Czechs’ willingness to provide sugar deliveries to Austria hinged on whether Austrians would acknowledge the right of authorities in Prague to coordinate all distribution activities, including factories that were located in German-Bohemian territory. SR, Nov. 8,1918.

128 SR, Nov. 26,1918. Bauer comes off rather well in these exchanges—hard-nosed, pragmatic, ruthless—but also acutely conscious of the broader political landscape—a slightly different Bauer from the received literature about him in the later 1920s.Google Scholar

129 SR, Dec. 11, and Dec. 13,1918. As early as November 15, Wedel reported to Berlin that “Es scheint ferner auch zweifelhaft, ob der deutschösterreichische Staat den deutschen Teil Böhmens für sich wird retten können.” A49755, Nov. 15, 1918, Oest. 103/Bd. 10, PAAA. Molisch confirms that many German industrialists supported coming to terms with the Czech state. Freiheitsbewegung, 35–36, 60.

130 “Denkschrift,” Dec. 25,1918, in Aussenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918–1938 (ADO), ed. Klaus, Koch, Walter, Rauscher, and Arnold, Suppan, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1993), 316–28; and Wedel's, report in A335, Dec. 25,1918, Oest. 103/Bd. 10, PAAA.Google Scholar

131 ADÖ,1:371–74; and Low, Alfred D., The Anschluss Movement 1918–1919 and the Paris Peace Conference (Philadelphia, 1974), 324–26.Google ScholarSee also Harms, Haas, “Österreich und die Alliierten, 1918–1919,” in Saint-Germain 1919. Protokoll des Symposiums am 29. und 30. Mai 1979 in Wien, ed. Ackerl, and Neck, (Munich, 1989), 29.Google Scholar For the confidential views of the Czech cabinet in early January 1919, see Hans, Lemberg, “Die Tschechoslowakei im Jahr 1. Der Staatsaufbau, die Liquidierung der Revolution und die Alternativen 1919,” in Das Jahr 1919, 228–30.Google Scholar

132 “Daher müssten wir, den Grundsätze Wilsons entsprechend, auf dem vollen Selbstbestimmungsrecht fur Deutschöhmen beharren.” Bauer to Medinger, Jan. 25,1919, NPA Präs., Carton 233. To Berta Zuckerkandl in late December he was similarly determined:“Ohne Deutschböhmen muss Deutschosterreich ungefähr ein Drittel seines Brotgetreidebedarfes, mehr als die Hälfte seines Bedarfs an Futtergetreide und beinahe den ganzen Bedarf an Kohle, Fett und Zucker aus dem Ausland decken. Womit soil es das bezahlen, wenn man ihm mit Deutschböhmen alle seine Exportindustrien nimmt?” Bauer to Zuckerkandl, Dec. 27,1918, ibid.

133 “Wir werden in St. Germain, narürlich für Selbstbestimmungsrecht Deutschböhmens kämpfen, haben aber wenig Hoffnung auf Gelingen.”Google Scholar Bauer to Renner, May 24,1919,ibid. This comment was made in the context of a conversation that Bauer had with Vlastimil Tusar, but no doubt represented Bauer's own views as well. Ironically, as early as March 1919, Rudolf Lodgman had informed the members of the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei that, in his personal view, it was now impossible to conceive of the northern lands as ending up with Austria (“weil dagegen geographische und administrative Gründe sprechen”). Among the options remaining for the Bohemian Germans, the most attractive possibility remained their joining the German Reich as a separate federal state. See “5. Verhandlungsschrift über die Sitzung der Grossdeutschen Vereinigung vom 5. März 1919,” in Grossdeutsche Vblkspartei, Carton 1, AdR.

134 Eighty-five unfilled seats in Bohemia and Moravia were involved. See A6452, Feb. 26,1919, Oest. 103/Bd. 11.

135 SR, Feb. 20, and Feb. 26,1919. Another explanation given by the party was that the German-Bohemian delegation had recommended that the emergency appointments not be made for two reasons: out of respect for the electoral process; and because the appointments would be unfair to the Social Democrats, since the formulas for distributing the appointments would be based on the ratios that existed in the 1911 national elections. See Josef, Seliger's statement, presented to the parliamentary club, as Beilage 3 of the “Protokoll der Verbandsitzung vom 19. II. 1919,” VGA. Seliger's statement was plausible, but the larger question as to why the central party leadership deferred to it is still unanswered. For the political background,Google Scholarsee Klaus, Zessner, Josef Seliger und die nationale Frage in Böhmen. Eine Untersuchung über die nationale Politik der deutschböhmischen Sozialdemokratie 1898–1920 (Stuttgart, 1976), 126–31.Google Scholar

136 Molisch, , Freiheitsbewegung, 158. Later scholars have taken more balanced views. Lothar Höbelt has suggested that Social Democrats were motivated by a genuine fear of the lack of credibility that such new appointees would suffer, and they also doubted if such a step would actually enhance legitimacy of Austria's claim to Sudetenland.Google Scholar Hanns Haas too believes the Social Democrats acted (at least in part) from conviction. Höbelt, “Deutschösterreich,” 165; Haas, “Die deutschböhmische Frage,” 370–72.

137 This was Botho Wedel's view, who reported to Berlin that Social Democrats did not want to make emergency appointments from Bohemia because they wanted to minimize the influence of the German Radicals in Austrian parliamentary life. Wedel argued that they especially wanted to eliminate Wolf, Karl H.. See A6363, Feb. 24, 1919 and A6452, Feb. 26, 1919, Oest. 103/Bd. 10, PAAA. Such an explanation might also make sense in light of the failure of the German Nationals, especially those from German Bohemia, to support the Social Democrats in a key vote in the National Assembly a month earlier on marriage law reform. A proposal to authorize some circumstances under which Catholics could divorce and remarry collapsed when a large number of Nationalists failed to turn up for the vote, leaving the Social Democrats embittered and the Arbeiter-Zeitung speculating that any börgerlich appointees from Bohemia and Moravia would likely be hacks with no connections to the people. See AZ, Jan. 25, pp. 1–2; Feb. 19, 1919, p. 4; Rp, Jan. 25, 1919 (M), pp. 1–2; and PNV, Beilage Nr. 145.Google Scholar If this legislation had passed, would the Social Democrats have been so casual in jettisoning the German Nationals a month later? Certainly, the Social Democrats had long memories about this incident, for as late as December 1920, they were still complaining about it. See the comments of Ernst Hampel in the “Verhandlungsschrift. 11. Sitzung des Verbandes der Abgeordneten der Grossdeutschen Volkspartei am 14. Dezember 1920,” Grossdeutsche Volkspartei, Carton 1, AdR. For the background tothis dispute, see Ulrike, Harmat, Ehe auf Widerruf? Der Konflikt urn das Eherecht in Österreich 1918–1938 (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 73–9Google Scholar

138 Fittingly, as if to symbolize the new east-west, Alpine-Vienna dyarchy, the Social Democrats and Christian Socials agreed to nominate 8 replacement deputies from German South Tirol and 3 from Lower Styria, in addition to the 159 who were regularly elected on February 16,1919, but they refused to go along with appeals from the Nationalists to include at least some token deputies from the areas of southern Bohemia and southern Moravia that directly adjoined Austria. See Leopold, Waber's proposal in “9. Verhandlungsschrift der Sitzung der Grossdeutschen Vereinigung am 27. 3. 1919,” and the outcome in “12. Verhandlungsschrift der Sitzung der Grossdeutschen Vereinigung am 4. April 1919,” Grossdeutsche Volkspartei, Carton 1.Google Scholar

139 Stourzh, , “Die dualistische Reichsstruktur,” 66.Google Scholar

140 Walter, Goldinger has rightly called attention to the invocation of the right of self-determination on the part of the Länder in several key constitutional drafts generated in 1919 and 1920.Google ScholarSee his “Das Werden der osterreichischen Bundesverfassung aus der Sicht des Historikers,” in 60 Jahre Bundesverfassung, ed. Heinz, Schäffer (Salzburg, 1980), 31.Google Scholar

141 Rp, Oct. 23,1918 (M), p. 2; AZ, Oct. 23,1918, p. 3; PNV, 17–18. The origins of this meeting are uncertain, but Christian Socials clearly played a major role in orchestrating it, since Prince Alois Liechtenstein was the host.Google Scholar

142 On October 25, the Vollzugsausschuss approved a decree submitted by Karl Seitz at the suggestion of Stefan Licht and Julius Ofner regulating the convocation of provisional regional assemblies in which all the major parties would be represented on a democratic basis. This decree was generated before the constitutional laws of October 30 were even adopted. The reason for this decree was the fear that the new government might face competing claims as to who would represent the Länder and how such representation should be organized. See SR, Oct. 25, 1918; Georg, Schmitz, Die Vorentwürfe Hans Kelsens für die österreichische Bundesverfassung (Vienna, 1981), 18.Google Scholar

143 Schmitz, , Vorentwürfe, 19;Google Scholaridem,Renners Briefe, 18;Google ScholarGottfried, Köfner, “Eine oder wieviele Revolutionen? Das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Ländern in Deutschösterreich im Oktober und November 1918,” Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte 2 (1979): 137.Google Scholar Renner's strategy for encouragin these declarations related back to hisunderstanding of self-administration, as developed in his previous work. For Renner, the power of the state could and had to be devolved to subordinate, self-representative institutions, controlled by the people. But in so doing the stateliness of the law did not diminish, and the ultimate uniformity of the law had to be sustained. Renner thus sanctioned structural subordination, but only coupled with policy coordination and legal homogeneity. Toinvite the Länder to accept the state by recognizing the Nationalversammlung “als derzeit ge oberste staatliche Gewalt” (as the declaration of Styria of November 6,1918 put it) was a first tentative step to remedy the structural feudalism that Renner had so strongly condemned as late as 1917.Google Scholar

144 PNV, 77–80. Lower Austria and Tirol never officially responded, whereas Upper Austria responded only after the fact. The texts of the Länder responses are reprinted inGoogle ScholarHans, Kelsen, ed., Die Verfassungsgesetze der Republik Deutschosterreich, 5 vols. (Vienna, 1919-1922), 3:181–232.Google Scholar

145 See Berchtold, , Verfassungsgeschichte, 40–41; Schmitz, Vorentwürfe, 18–23; Brauneder, Deutsch-Österreich 1918, 98–106; Köfner, “Eine oder wieviele Revolutionen?” 137–42; Owerdieck, Parteien, 91–96.Google Scholar

146 For the latter, see Kelsen, , “Die Verfassung,” 258–61.Google Scholar For the former view, see Gottfried, Köfner,Hunger, , Not und Korruption. Der Übergang Österreichs von der Monarchie zur Republik am Beispiel Salzburgs (Salzburg, 1980), 158–65;Google Scholar and idem., “Eine oder wieviele Revolutionen?” 131–66. Köfner offers a shrewd critique of the ahistorical views of a number of past and present constitutional historians, but his revisionist arguments fail to keep Renner's strong hostility against the Crownlands in mind when interpreting Renner's rhetoric and actions in late October 1918. This creates, in turn, a different kind of ahistoricism.

147 For a clear contemporary statement of the pro-Länder position,Google Scholarsee Ahrer, , ErlebteZeitgeschichte, 34–36. For the theoretical debate, see Kelsen, , “Die Verfassung,” 257–59; Köfner “Eine oder wieviele Revolutionen?”131–34;Google ScholarPeter, Pernthaler, Die Staatsgründungsakte der österreichischen Bundesländer. Eine staatsrechtliche Untersuchung über die Entstehung des Bundesstaates (Vienna, 1979), 25–27;Google Scholar and Theo, Öhlinger, “Die Entstehung des Bundesstaates und ihre juristische Bedeutung,” in 60 Jahre Bundesverfassung, 41–15.Google Scholar

148 He called this collision “ein Geburtsfehler, dessen verhäangnisvolle Wirkungen die Existenz dieses Gemeinwesens ständig bedrohen.” Kelsen, , “Die Verfassung,” 260.Google Scholar

149 Klingenstein, , “The Meanings of ‘Austria,’” 435–36,439.Google Scholar

150 Gerald, Stourzh, “Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte,” in Probleme der Geschichte Österreichs und ihrer Darstellung, ed. Herwig, Wolfram and Walter, Pohl (Vienna, 1991), 4.Google Scholar

151 See, in general, Boyer, John W., Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918 (Chicago, 1995), chapter 7.Google Scholar

152 See Selbstbestimmungsrecht, 188–213, 228–32, 245–48, 254–62.Google Scholar

153 See Hermann, Bielohlawek's comments in Z. 20687, Oct. 5, 1917, MI Präs., Carton 1646.Czech leaders reacted in the same way. Molisch, Freiheitsbewegung, 15–16. Tellingly, Heinrich Lammasch's draft for a major constitutional reform of the monarchy in September 1918 went so far as to create four large kingdoms that would completely suppress the original CrownlandsGoogle Scholar. See Stephan, Verosta, “Heinrich Lammasch' Verfassungsentwurf für das Kaisertum Österreich vom September 1918,” in Politik und Gesellschaft im Alten und Neuen Österreich, 1:365–77, esp. 372.Google Scholar

154 That tensions were in play from the earliest days of the revolution is likely from the controversy surrounding the Law on the Assumption of State Authority in the Lander, which the National Assembly adopted on November 14 (Staatsgesetzblatt, 1918, Nr. 24). This legislation ended the dual-track administrative structure that existed underthe empire. In section 10 of Renner's original draft for this legislation, which has survived in his Nachlass, he inserted a provision whereby “governmental commissars” representing the central government would supervise and participate in the work of Land-level administrative authorities.Google ScholarSee “Übernahme der Staatsgewalti n den Ländern,” NL Renner, E/1731: 298, AdR. It is likely that the Christian Socials opposed this idea, since the final version passed on November 14 eliminated it entirely. The draft also contained other semidisciplinary provisions, including the requirement that all Land-level legislation was to be submitted to the Staatsrat for approval before being implemented. This too was also dropped in the final version. See Schmitz, Vorentwürfe, 23–24, as well as Seipel's comments to Lammasch in his letter of November 9Google Scholar in Stephan, Verosta, “Ignaz Seipels Weg von der Monarchie zur Republik (1917–1919),” in Die österreichische Verfassung von 1918 bis 1938. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 19. Oktober 1977, ed. Neck, and Wandruszka, (Munich, 1980), 23.Google Scholar

155 See the discussions at the “Klubsitzung am 8. Nov. 1918,” Christlichsozialer Parlamentsklub, where Athanas von Guggenberg argued “Staatsrat[.] Eindruck, dass nur Sozi zu reden haben.Immer der Seitz, der hervortritt, hat ausschliesslich die Leitung. Wenn sonst noch jemand zu tun hat, ist es der Renner. Das nach aussen ein peinlicher Eindruck.” Jodok Fink urged that “Unsere Herren sollen sich im Staatsrat ruhren!”

156 Loewenfeld-Russ finally went public with a denunciation of these practices in the Staatsrat in January 1919. Im Kampf, 168–78. Gottfried Köfner argues that disputes over food were one of the primary reasons the Länder turned against Vienna in late November.Google ScholarSee Hunger, Not und Korruption, 165ff., and “Eine oder wieviele Revolutionen?” 153–56.Google Scholar

157 On this point, see the fascinating conversation between Loewenfeld-Russ and Renner in April 1920, in Im Kampf, 302.Google Scholar

158 Renner to Bauer, May 26,1919, NPA Präs., Carton 233.

159 A49869, Nov. 22,1918, Oest. 103\Bd. 10, PAAA.

160 “ “Die Stellung der Länder in der künftigen Verfassung Deutschösterreichs,” in Felix Ermacora, Die Entstehung der Bundesverfassung 1920. Dokumente der Staatskanzleiüber allgemeine Fragen der Verfassungsreform (Vienna, 1989),13.

161 The extent to which the Social Democrats were deeply frustrated by the centrifugal pressures generated by the Länder was evident in the several conferences that the party organized to bring regional Social Democrats together with their Viennese brethren. In July 1919, Matthias Eldersch spoke for many of his Viennese colleagues when he complained that “der Kampf um die Existenz der Länder ein Kampf gegen die Arbeiterklasse im einzelnen Lande seih…. Die Genossen in den Provinzen, die auch nur durch Passivität diese Bestrebungen unterstützen, helfen mit zur Zertrümmerung der Partei.” “Protokoll der ersten Konferenz sozialdemokratischer Landeshauptleute vom 19. Juli 1919 in Wien,” S. D. Parl. Klub, Carton 80, VGA.Google Scholar

162 Fritz, Klein, “Between Compiégne and Versailles: The Germans on the Way from a Misunderstood Defeat to an Unwanted Peace,” in The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years, ed. Boemeke, Manfred. F., Feldman, Gerald D., and Elisabeth, Glaser (Cambridge, 1998), 205.Google Scholar

163 For a good review of the context, see Hanns, Haas, “Henry Allizé und die österreichische Unabhängigkeit,” in Deuxfois I'Autriche, après 1918 et après 1945 (Actes du Colloque de Rouen 8–12 novembre 1977). Austriaca. Cahiers Universitaires d'Information sur I'Autriche, November 1979, 241–84; and Lajos Kerekes, “Zur Anschlusspolitik Otto Bauers 1918/1919. Die ‘Alternative’ zwischen Anschlusspolitik und Donaukonfoderarion,” in Vierteljahrshefte fü Zeitgeschichte 22 (1974): 18–45Google Scholar. See also the insightful observations in Ernst, üller, Nation Österreich. Sozialhistorische Aspekte ihrer Enturicklung (Vienna, 1984), 24,151–52.Google Scholar

164 “[S]o war dieses [Section 2 of the law of November 12] einem grossen Teile der Bevölkerung etwas überraschend gekommene Bekenntnis zum Deutschen Reich zunächst der furchtbaren sozialen Notlage des neuen Staates entsprungen,” a situation that did not correspond to “einer einheitlichen nationalen Einstellung.” Loewenfeld-Russ, Im Kampf, 155.Google Scholar

165 “Protokoll der Sitzung des deutschen Parteivorstandes am 11. Oktober 1918,& VGA; Bauer to Friedrich Adler, Oct. 24,1918.” VGA; Bauer to Friedrich Adler, Oct 24,1918.

165 Stenographisches Protokoll, Parteitag 1918, 65–65a, 170–71, VGA.Google Scholar

167 “Der Zerfall,” 254–55, 257. German diplomatic reports in the winter and spring of 1919 reflected these inconsistencies. By late January 1919, Wedel was arguing that the Social Democrats in the Staatsrat had overplayed their hand in November, and had given the opponents of Anschluss ammunition to prove that Austrian economic interests would be damaged. A2621, Jan. 27,1919, Oest. 95/Bd. 26, PAAA. Then, two weeks later, Wedel reported a change in public sympathy as a result of the outcome of German elections for the National Assembly in Weimar: anti-Anschluss forces were “[]ekanntlich nur in bürgerlichen, speziell in klerikalen Kreisen zu Hause.” A3993, Feb. 6,1919, Oest. 95“ “Henry Allizé,” 250,255, 263–64.Google Scholar Otto Bauer himself admitted to Ludo Hartmann in early January that “[w]ir sehen jetzt schon, wie der allergrösste Teil der Bourgeoisie insbesondere die Industriellen aus purer Furcht vor dem Anschluss sich den Christlich-Sozialen zuwenden. Selbst die jüdischen Fabrikanten erkläen, diesmal müsse man die Christlich-Sozialen untersrutzen.” Bauer to Hartmann, Jan. 3,1919, NPA Präs., Carton 233.

168 See ADÖ, 1:472–84, 487–99; Low, The Anschluss Movement, 187–206; Haas, , “Henry Allizé,” 247, 253–55,263, 279;Google Scholaridem,“Otto Bauer und der Anschluss 1918” in Sozialdemokratie und Anschluss: Historische Wurzeln. Anschluss 1918 und 1938. Nachwirkungen, ed. Helmut, Konrad (Vienna, 1978), 36–38, 40–41.Google Scholar

169 See the report of May 21,1919, “Stimmungsberichte 1919,” AdPDW. As for the later spring, Harms Haas has argued that pro-Anschluss sentiment fell in April and May, but bounced back in June. Haas, “Henry Alliz” 264. Yet, even in mid July, Otto Bauer was disdainful of Ludo Hartmann's claims to German parliamentary leaders in Weimar that 90 percent of the Austrians supported the Anschluss, telling him that this was most certainly not the case. Bauer to Hartmann, July 15,1919, NPA Prä., Carton 233.

170 Haas, , “Otto Bauer,” 38–41. Haas also suggests that early Anschluss rhetoric in Vienna was pan-party, and that it was driven by economic need and by a need to secure liberal-democratic order. Haas, “Österreich und die Alliierten,” 14–16.Google Scholar

171 Bauer openly assimilated older ideas of a grossdeutsch nationalism, cleansed by a joint German and Austrian socialism, to create a new German nationhood in a top-down manner, via Austria's immediate assimilation into the Reich. Hence his open reference to the “Sieg von Königgrätz”Google Scholar in 1866 as a “geschichtliche[r] Zufall.” See Bauer's, “Acht Monate auswärtiger Politik,” Werkausgabe, 2:189. Bauer was also convinced that this new Reich would be qualitatively different from the old Reich, that in the long run it would protect Austrian industry and the welfare of the working class, and that it was the quickest and surest route to a socialist society, but many of his critics were clearly uncertain.Google Scholar

172 Georg, Günther, Lebenserinnerungen (Vienna, 1936), 204.Google Scholar

173 For Seipel and the Anschluss, see Rennhofer, , Seipel, 165–68, 172–73, 182–85, 192–93Google Scholar; Klemens von, Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis (Princeton, 1972), 114–17, 301–6Google Scholar; and Low, Anschluss Movement, 208–14. The German Nationals, who were to become the erstwhile coalition partners of theChristian Socials for much of the postwar period, knew exactly where the latter under Seipel's leadership stood on these matters. As Leopold Waber put it succinctly in late 1920, “Die Ch.S. betreiben eine anschlussfeindliche Politik. Sie wollen den Wiederaufbau unter Preisgabe Österreichs an die Entente ermöglichen. Unsere tragische Lage zwingt uns, mit den Ch. S. eine Mehrheit zu bilden.” “8. Sitzung d. Verb. d. Abg. der Grossdeutschen Volkspartei am 4. Dezember [1920],” Grossdeutsche Volkspartei, Carton 1.Google Scholar

174 For the idea of a priori rhetoric in 1919, see Schmid, Georg E., “Selbstbestimmung 1919. Anmerkungen zur historischen Dimension und Relevanz eines politischen Schlagwortes,” in Versailles-St.Cermain-Trianon. Umbruch in Europa vor fönfzig Jahren, ed. Karl, Bosl (Munich, 1971), 134.Google Scholar

175 Perhaps not surprisingly, recent scholarship has tended to view the issue of self-determination at the peace conference(s) from the perspective of the remainder of the twentieth century, acknowledging the inconsistency with which the Allies applied Wilson's ideas, but also implying that “national self-determination” itself is not possible in all cases and that more recent attempts to resolve the issue ofethnic freedoms in multiethnic contexts have also had very mixed success. See the comments by Ronald, Steel, “Prologue: 1918–1945-1989;”Google Scholar and Keylor, William R., in “Versailles and International Diplomacy,” in The Treaty of Versailles, 34, 496, 504–5Google Scholar; and by Zara, Steiner, “The Treaty of Versailles Revisited,” in The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory? ed. Michael, Dockrill and John, Fisher (Basingstoke, 2001), 24–29.Google Scholar

176 For the problematic use of the word Selbstbestimmungsrecht in 1918–19, see Schmid, , “Selbstbestimmung 1919,” passim.Google Scholar

177 In mid December 1918, the National Assembly determined that the new Constituent Assembly would be elected for a two-year term. According to existing parliamentary procedure, the new constitution would require a two-thirds vote in the assembly. In November 1918, Karl Rennerappointed a young legal expert from the University of Vienna, Hans, Kelsen, to assist his staff on legislative and constitutional issues. Initial work in drafting the constitution itself was hindered by the government's preoccupation with the peace settlement, but Kelsen produced six drafts of apossible constitution in the summer and autumn of 1919. In October 1919, the Christian Social politician and historian from Tirol, Michael, Mayr, was appointed as a special state secretary to coordinate the process of constitutional drafting, which in large part meant coordinating Christian Social opinions and then reconciling them with those of the Social Democrats. Mayr selected one of Kelsen's drafts and, with Kelsen's and others's assistance, generated a new draft, subsequently called the Privatentwurf Mayr. This draft, in turn, after additional revisions, became known as the Linzer Entwurf of April 1920.Google Scholar See Rp, Feb. 10, pp. 1–4, and Apr. 14,1920, pp. 1–2. For Mayr's work, see Schmitz, , Rentiers Briefe, 102–16; and Kuprian, Hermann J. W., “Zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik. Die politische Entwicklung Michael Mayrs von1907 bis 1922” (Ph.D. diss., University of Innsbruck, 1985), 361–94.Google Scholar

178 Moreover, the Christian Social Party that approved the Constitution of 1920 was a slightly different party than that of late 1918, if only because in the two years between 1918 and 1920, Seipel and his Viennese clerical colleagues had begun to ascend to key leadership roles in the party. Before Lueger's death in 1910 the party had been an uneasy but effective amalgam of regional and centralist forces. This was lost in 1911, but it was restored, in a circuitous way, as a result of the role of Seipel, Mataja, Schmitz, and Kienböck in the early and mid 1920s.

179 See Paul, Silverman, “Law and Economics in Interwar Vienna: Kelsen, Mises, and the Regeneration of Austrian Liberalism.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1984), 653.Google Scholar

180 Silverman, , “Law and Economics,” 660. Silverman insists that the introductory article of the constitution “is the final statement of the ideals of earlier generations of Austrian liberals, this time stripped of all decoration and simply affirming that the boundaries of politics and society were made up of their highest practical ideal, the law” (670). A key element of the constitution was its reliance on the logic of the law, rather than on invocations of force, to attain its aims. AsSilverman has pointed out, the preamble refers to law as deriving from the people, not power from the people, as in the Weimar ConstitutionGoogle Scholar. See Silverman, , 668–70,676–77. And, unlike the Weimar document, it did notcontain any a priori claims about competencies, since it avoided the Social Democratic-favored prescription that “Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht” (Christian Social delegates were opposed to the phrase, and it was dropped in the final version). Instead, the constitution relied on the Verfassungsgerichtshof to settle possible conflicts.Google Scholar See Georg, Froehlich, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung in der Republik Österreich,” in 10 Jahre Wiederaufbau. Die staatliche, kulturelle und luirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Republik Österreich 1918–1928, ed. Wilhelm, Exner (Vienna, 1928), 47, 52Google Scholar; Schmitz, , Vorentwurfe, 66, 99;Google Scholaridem, Rennets Briefe, 101,107.

181 Koalitionsregierungen in Österreich, 92;Google ScholarHasiba, Gernot D., Die Zweite Bundes-Verfassungsnovelle von 1929. Ihr Werdegang und wesentliche verfassungspolitische Ereignisse seit 1918 (Vienna, 1976), 19Google Scholar.At the same time, although the constitution sanctioned a parliamentary democracy with a weak presidential executive in place of the dynast, it also contained strong federalist provisions by balancing the prerogatives of the Länder against the central government, thus perhaps disappointing those who preferred a more centralized state, including Hans, Kelsen himself. As Robert Kann has noted, Kelsen was gratuitously negative about the Austrian Länder while idealizing the Prussian provinces.Google ScholarSee Kann, Robert A., “Die österreichische Bundesverfassung und der Anschluss im Lichte der Anschauungen von Hans Kelsen,” in November 1918, esp. pp. 36, 39.Google Scholar

182 Schmitz, , Renners Briefe, 79. For surveys of the deliberations of fundamental rights in 1918–20,Google Scholarsee Felix, Ermacora and Christiane, Wirth, Die österreichische Bundesverfassung und Hans Kelsen. Analysen und Materialien. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Hans Kelsen (Vienna, 1982), 21–38;Google Scholar and Wilhelm, Brauneder,“Die Gesetzgebungsgeschichte der österreichischen Grundrechte,” in Grund- und Menschenrechte in Österreich, ed. Rudolf, Machacek, Pahr, Willibald P., and Gerhard, Stadler, 3 vols. (Kehl am Rhein, 1991-1997), 1:304–26.Google Scholar Brauneder seems to minimize the intent of the parties to regulate these issues (309, 321–22) which, in my view, does not do justice to the sense of political urgency that the Social Democrats brought to this problem. This is clear from Otto Bauer's comments to the party executive in May 1920, where he insisted that even though it would be difficult to secure final approval for the Grundrechte by October, “[e⁝in” parlamentarischer Kampf um die Grundrechte vor den Neuwahlen liegt jedoch im Parteiinteresse. Die Einbeziehung der Grundrechte in den Regierungsentwurf ist daher anzustreben.” Confidential statement, attached to “Protokoll der Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 20. Mai 1920,” VGA. Similarly, Karl Seitz stressed in February 1920 the need for a general public debate on this question. See the “Protokoll der dritten Konferenz von Vertretern sozialdemokratischer Landesregierungen, der Gemeinde Wien und des Parteivorstandes vom 12. Feber 1920 im Parlament, Präsidialbüro,” in S. D. Parl. Klub, Carton 80, VGA.

183 Felix, Ermacora, Materialien zur österreichischen Bundesverfassung (I). Die Länderkonferenzen 1919/20 und die Verfassungsfrage (Vienna, 1989), 280.Google Scholar In response, speaking for the Christian Socials, Leopold Kunschak agreed that the Grundrechte were in fact large political subjects, but he immediately concluded that the leadership of the political parties only could deal with them directly. Ibid., 290.

184 For this comparison, I used the version of the so-called Linzer Entwurf that was presented to the Linz Länderkonferenz,Google Scholar as reprinted by Felix, Ermacora in Die Entstehung der Bundesverfassung 1920. Die Sammlung der Entwürfe zur Stoats- bzw. Bundesverfassung (Vienna, 1990), 378–401Google Scholar (listed under the title “Vorentwurf einer Bundesstaatsverfassung. Zweite Fassung”), with the text of the Grund- undFreiheitsrechte proposed by Robert, Danneberg at the linz Länderkonferenz on April 23, 1920, as reprinted in Materialien, 283–89. The comparison is justified by the fact that Danneberg cited this particular draft as the point of his comparative analysis.Google Scholar

185 At the same time, Danneberg insisted that the Social Democrats found themselves forced to play the role of protector of nineteenth-century liberal-democratic political rights, since the current Bürgertum was now indifferent to them. Materialien, 281.Google Scholar

186 See Ermacora, , “Menschenrechte im Staatsgrundgesetz 1867 und Parteienvorschläge 1918,” in November 1918, 51–53; and Ermacora's detailed review in Die österreichische Bundesverfassung und Hans Kelsen, 21–38;Google Scholar as well as idem., Die Entstehung der Bundesverfassung 1920. Die Sammlung der Entwürfe zur Staats- bzw. Bundesverfassung, 29.Google Scholar

187 For the phrase, see Rennhofer, , Seipel, 156.Google Scholar

188 Robert Musil caught this temptation well when he wrote in 1912 about the Austrian Church that “modernism is enormously significant as the final outcome of the fateful struggle of Catholicism against the state, a struggle that began with the church allowing itself to be misled into wanting to rule the state in the state's way, and ended with the church being dominated by the state in the church's way, that of invisible spiritual penetration. Out of the church-state there emerged the state-church.” Robert, Musil, Precision and Soul: Essays and Addresses, ed. and trans, by Burton, Pike and Luft, David S. (Chicago, 1990), 21.Google Scholar

189 Later, other observers argued that Seipel's insistence on foregoing parliamentary consideration of the domain of fundamental rights came out of fear of what an ad hoc, blue-red coalition might have imposed on the Christian Socials. Certainly, such fears may have been present, but it must also be remembered that constitutional laws had to gain a two-thirds majority, and his party had the votes necessary to prevent a revived Kulturkampf.Google Scholar See Seipel's comments in Rp, Sept. 29 (M), p. 3; Oct. 1,1920 (M), p. 1; and Richard, Schmitz, “Österreichs Bundesverfassung. Eine Antwort an das ‘Neue Reich,’” in Volkswohl 11 (1920): 362.Google Scholar

190 Leser, , “Der Bruch der Koalition 1920—Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen,” 35–36;Google Scholaridem, Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus. Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis (Vienna, 1968), 310–11, 318–20.Google Scholar

191 For example, one sees this process in the Social Democratic municipal dub's debates about the strategy they should pursue against the Christian Socials. As early as December 10, 1918, Georg Emmerling urged the club to develop a coherent strategy to provoke serious political debates in the city council against Christian Socials, and urged careful preparation be given to selection of issues, so that the process was credible and not based on reactive provocations. “Dritte Sitzung des Gemeinderatsklubs am 10. Dezember 1918,” S.D. Parteistellen, Carton 77, VGA.

192 Hans Hautmann has rightly insisted that, at their high point, Hanusch's laws were characterized by “ein für kapitalistische Staaten damals geradezu unglaublicher Radikalismus.” See Staininger, , ed., Ferdinand Hanusch, 83.Google Scholar On the fate of the socialization project, see Rudolf, Gerlich, Die gescheiterte Alternative. Sozialisierung in Österreich nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna, 1980);Google Scholar and Erwin, Weissel, Die Ohnmacht des Sieges. Arbeiterschaft und Sozialisierung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in Österreich (Vienna, 1976).Google Scholar However, the success of Bauer's socialization strategy was premised, as Eduard März and Fritz Weber have argued, on getting the Anschluss and on the new, larger Germany having a real social revolution. Both failed to occur by late 1919, and the local Social Democrats found themselves left with a “two-stage” revolutionary strategy that was backfiring. See “Sozialdemokratie und Sozialisierung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” 117.

193 Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich 1 (1920):2–4;Google Scholar and ibid., 2 (1921): 2–5. In October 1920, eleven other political groups (including various German National factions, Communists, and Viennese Czechs) collected an addtional 212,796 votes, for a total of 928,228 valid votes cast.

194 The loss of control of the administration of the city of Vienna in May 1919 was a bitter blow to local Catholics, and the strident anticoalitionism manifested by the Viennese Christian Socials is attributable to this disaster. Renner's press secretary, Ludwig Brügel, reported in August 1919 that “[i]n der Christlichsozialen Partei ist man jetzt mutiger und angriffslustiger gegen die ‘soz[ialisrische] Reg[ierun]g’ geworden u[nd] Fink und Hauser werden kaum länger mehr imstande sein, die Morgenluft witternden Elemente zurückzuhalten.” Quoted in Schmitz, , Renners Briefe, 73, as well as 65–66.Google Scholar See also Friedrich, Funder, Vom Gestern ins Heute. Aus dem Kaiserreich in die Republik (Vienna, 1953), 641–42.Google Scholar

195 Renner himself was not above trying to drive a wedge between Christian Social leaders in Vienna and their counterparts in the provinces, arguing in February 1919 that the coalition demonstrated that the Christian Socials, seen now as a modern peasant party, were capable of cooperation with a modern workers' party. As Schmitz points out, this drew strong rebuke from the Catholics in Vienna, who rejected this stylizarion. Renners Briefe, 68.Google Scholar

196 Reports of Feb. 5 and Feb. 12, 1919, “Stimmungsberichte 1919,” AdPDW.

197 Reports of Apr. 9, esp. Apr. 24, 1919, ibid. For the background, see Gerhard, Botz, Gewalt in der Politik. Attentate, Zussamenstösse, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918 bis 1938, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1983), 22–86.Google Scholar

198 In his commentary on the Renner-Mayr draft of the constitution in early July 1920, Rentier himself acknowledged that the leaders of the parties themselves were influenced by “ganz chaotische Auffassungen” and “zahlreichen primitiven Missverständnisse und Vorurteile” against each other. If this was true of the leaders, how much more relevant must it have been for the general electorate. See Felix, Ermacora, ed., Quellen zum Österreichischen Verfassungsrecht (1920) (Vienna, 1967), 191.Google Scholar

199 Rennhofer, , Seipel, 169, 188–90, 199, 220.Google Scholar See also “Statt Klassenkampf—Klassenausgleich,” Rp, Dec. 7,1919 (M), p. 6; “Die unpolitischen und politischen Vereine in der christlichen Volksbewegung,” Rp, Jan. 5,1920 (M), pp. 1–2; “Das Entscheidungsjahr,“ Rp, Jan. 7, 1920 (M), pp. 2–3.

200 “Die Kulturpolitik der Christlichsozialen,” Rp, Sept. 23, 1920 (M), pp. 1–2. Although he did not make this explicit, such a way of looking at the world was bound to be deeply unsympathetic to unmediated conceptions of individual rights.Google Scholar

201 See Marin, Seliger and Karl, Ucakar, Wien. Politische Geschichte 1740–1934. Entwicklung und Bestimmungskräfte grosstädtischer Politik, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1985), 2:1136–10, 1153–57;Google Scholar AZ, Oct. 22, 1920, p. 4. Women voters constituted 53 percent of actual voters. The Christian Socials polled 111,644 male voters, but 167,647 female voters, whereas the Social Democrats won 218,402 male voters and 216,665 female voters. For an insightful survey of the implications of gender in the national elections in Linz in 1923, see Merith, Niehuss, “Die Nationalratswahlen in Linz 1923. Eine Analyse der Wahlbeteiligung,” Zeitgeschichte 9 (1982): 378–89.Google Scholar

202 See Otto, Bauer, Die österreichische Revolution,′ in Werkausgabe, 2:766, 772–73, 780;Google Scholar as well as Robert, Hoffmann, “The British Military Representative in Vienna, 1919,” Slavonic and East European Review 52 (1974): 271,Google Scholar on Sir Thomas Cuninghame's view of the “steady growth of selfconfidence among the middle classes” in Austria as early as June and July 1919. The Viennese business leader Georg Günther reported in his memoirs (Lebenserinnerungen, 206) that he became close to Seipel in 1918–19, and that they had a common cause in defense of business interests against Social Democratic socialization projects.Google Scholar

203 Klaus Amann has called attention to the pervasive and explicit antidemocratic attitudes of many of the most popular writers and other literary figures enjoyed by bürgerlich readers of interwar Austria.Google Scholar See his “Zum Republikverständnis österreichischer Autoren der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Staatsgründungen 1918, ed. Wilhelm, Brauneder and Norbert, Leser (Frankfurt, 1999), 183–200, esp. 193–94.Google Scholar

204 Rp, Oct. 16, 1920 (M), p.1.Google Scholar

205 Rp, Oct. 20, 1920 (M), p. 1. Albert Sever was a Social Democratic politician who was elected governor (Landeshauptmann) of the province of Lower Austria from 1919 to 1921.Google Scholar During his tenure he approved many dispensations that permitted separated Catholics to remarry. These marriages became known as “Sever marriages.” See Harmat, , Ehe auf Widerruf? 164–68.Google Scholar

206 Rp, Oct. 24, 1920 (M), p. 1.Google Scholar

207 See Macartney, C.A., The Social Revolution in Austria (Cambridge, 1926), 141–42, 144;Google Scholar and Rp, Oct. 19, 1920 (M), p. 1. In his “Memorandum” on Austria of June 3, 1919, Sir Francis Oppenheimer observed that “[t]he fact that so far Vienna, devoid of coal, food, and clothing, has escaped a revolution, would be inexplicable but for the presence of a large bourgeoisie with old traditions, braced in its misery by an extraordinary love of its home and the hope of succour from generous foes.” Notwithstanding his sentimentality, Oppenheimer hit upon an important social fact. Vienna did have a large Kleinbürgertum, as well as masses of workers, and the former clearly began to have second thoughts about the revolution in the summer and fall of 1920.Google ScholarSee Oppenheimer's, Stranger Within: Autobiographical Pages (London, 1960), 379.Google Scholar

208 Friedrich, Austerlitz, “Wahrheit und Illusion,” Der Kampf 13 (1920): 396–97.Google Scholar

209 Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen der Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung der Republik Österreich, 1920, p. 3421.Google Scholar Mayr's comments are on p. 3384. For a similar observation by Karl Seitz, see Walter, Goldinger's comments in Die österreichische Verfassung von 1918 bis 1938, 239.Google Scholar

210 Silverman, , “Law and Economics,” 598–603.Google Scholar

211 See the comments of António Costa Pinto and Pedro Tavares de Almeida, “On Liberalism and the Emergence of Civil Society in Portugal,” 16–17; and Klaus, Tenfelde, “Civil Society and the Middle Classes in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” 100–103,Google Scholar both in Civil Society Before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. Nancy, Bermeo and Philip, Nord (Lanham, 2000).Google Scholar

212 Grandner, , Gewerkschaftspolitik, 441–42.Google Scholar

213 “Abschied vom Herrenhause,” Oct. 26,1918, S.D. Parteistellen, Carton 117, VGA. See the speeches given in the Herrenhaus on October 23 and 24 in Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses, 1918, 1190–268.Google Scholar

214 Karl, Renner, Österrekh von der Ersten zur Zweiten Republik (Vienna, 1953), 17–18.Google Scholar

215 Siegfried, Nasko, ed., Karl Renner in Dokumenten und Erinnerungen (Vienna, 1982), 150–51.Google Scholar

216 Kann, , “Karl Renner (December 14, 1870-December 31, 1950),” Journal of Modern History 23 (1951): 246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

217 Kann, , “Das demokratische Prinzip im Widerstreit des Zusammenbruches Österreich-Ungarns und des Aufbruchs der Nachfolgestaaten,” in Die Auflösung, 335–36.Google Scholar