Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-04T09:29:23.288Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Felix Schwarzenberg, Military Diplomat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2009

Kenneth W. Rock
Kenneth W. Rock
Affiliation:
Colorado State University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

At nine o'clock in the evening of March 13, 1848, Prince Clemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar von Metternich resigned as imperial chancellor. With the “coachman” in absentia, Central Europe's peoples struggled to gain more freedom in that remarkable revolutionary movement of 1848. The Habsburg monarchy, although teetering on the verge of dissolution, survived the mid-century's most tumultuous year. Despite weakness at the helm of government, improvement of dynastic fortunes had gathered momentum by mid-summer as the imperial army under Prince Alfred Ferdinand zu Windischgrätz, Count Joseph Wenzel Radetzky, and Count Josip Jelačić od Bužima advanced irregularly but steadily on the peripheries of the realm. By autumn provision of a coherent Habsburg policy to be applied throughout the far-flung empire became mandatory. To provide a strong man to enforce the policies, Field Marshal Windischgrätz recommended for minister-president his forty-eight-year-old brother-in-law, Prince Felix Ludwig zu Schwarzenberg, an individual who possessed both the confidence of the army and considerable diplomatic experience.

Type
Diplomatic History
Information
Austrian History Yearbook , Volume 11 , January 1975 , pp. 85 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For more information on Schwarzenberg's life and career, see Berger, Adolph, Felix Fürst zu Schwarzenberg, ein biographisches Denkmal (Leipzig: Otto Spamer, 1853)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heller, Eduard. Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, Mitteleuropas Vorkämpfer (Vienna: Militär Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1933)Google Scholar; Kiszling, Rudolf, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, der Erzieher Kaiser Franz Josephs (Graz: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1952)Google Scholar; Schwarzenberg, Adolf, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946)Google Scholar; von Zeissberg, Heinrich, “Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg,” Allgemeine Deutsche Biographiw. Vol. XXXIII (1891). pp. 266–290Google Scholar. Friedjung, Heinrich, Öslerreich von 1848 bis 1860 (2 vols., Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1908–1912)Google Scholar; and von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, Deutsche Einheit, Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz (4 vols., Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1935–1942)Google Scholar, also provide important information.

2 Schwarzenberg did not have Metternich's title of “chancellor.” The 1848 revolutions brought about a reorganization of the Habsburg government in the interests of modernization and efficiency. As minister-president from November 21, 1848, to April 5, 1852. Schwarzenberg presided over a “responsible” council of ministers. On the domestic changes, see Rath, R. John, The Viennese Revolution of 1848 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1957)Google Scholar; Macartney, C. A., The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918 (New York: Macmillan. 1969), pp. 322–425Google Scholar; and Redlich, Josef, Das Ösierreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem (2 vols., Leipzig: P. Reinhold, 1920–1926)Google Scholar. For the latest study of the domestic program of the Schwarzenberg ministry, see Walter, Friedrich, Die Ösierreichische Zentralverwaltung, Pt. 3 (2 vols., Vienna: Adolf Holzhausens Nachf., 1964).Google Scholar

3 von Hübner, Joseph Alexander, Une année de ma vie 1848–1849 (Paris: Hachette, 1891), pp. 318–319Google Scholar. See also Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, Der Freiherr von Hübner 1811–1892. Eine Gestalt aus dem Österreich Kaiser Franz Josephs (Innsbruck: Universitäts-Verlag Wagner, 1933), pp. 62–63.Google Scholar

4 Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 11. The emperor made this remark in an audience with Sektionsrat Schlitter in 1907.

5 Jelavich, Barbara, The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814–1918 (Chicago, III.: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 59.Google Scholar

6 Metternich to Kübeck, Brussels, December 31, 1849, Metternich-Winneburg, Prince Richard and von Klinkowström, Alfons (eds.), Aus Melternichs nachgelassenen Papieren (8 vols., Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1880–1884), Vol. VIII, pp. 286–291.Google Scholar

7 von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, Metternich, der Staalsmann und der Mensch (3 vols., Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1925, 1954), Vol. II, p. 397.Google Scholar

8 Friedjung, , Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, Vol. II, p. 148.Google Scholar

9 See Bell, Herbert C. F., Lord Palmerston (2 vols., Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1966), Vol. II pp. 15–19Google Scholar; Seton-Watson, R. W., Britain in Europe, 1789–1914 (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1955), pp. 259–263Google Scholar; and Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 175–191. The Saxon chargé d'affaires in Vienna noted that the “diplomatic duel between Felix Schwarzenberg and Palmerston, which echoes here in Rome, there in Venice, again in Constantinople,” was a fact of mid-century international politics. Vitzthum von Eckstädt to his mother, Vienna, September 24, 1849, von Eckstädt, Carl Friedrich Vitzthum, Berlin und Wien in den Jahren 1845–1852. Politische Privatbriefe (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1886), p. 244.Google Scholar

10 von Bismarck, Otto, Reflections & Reminiscences, edited by Hamerow, Theodore S. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 66Google Scholar. For Bismarck's opinions on passions in politics, see Craig, Gordon A., From Bismarck to Adenauer (New York: Harper& Row, 1965), p. 12.Google Scholar

11 Queen Victoria wrote to King Leopold 1 of Belgium: “All the admirers of Austria consider Prince Schwartzenberg [sic] a madman, and the Emperor Nicholas said that he was ‘Lord Palmerston in a white uniform.’” Leopold replied: “I must say that in Austria, at least Schwartzenberg [sic], they are very much intoxicated. I hope they will grow sober again soon.” The Letters of Queen Victoria. A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence between the Years 1837 and 1861, edited by Benson, Arthur Christopher and Esher, Viscount, Vol. II (London: John Murray, 1908), pp. 378–379.Google Scholar

12 Kraehe, Enno E., “Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1800–1867,” Austrian History Yearbook. Vol. III (1967), Pt. 3, p. 22.Google Scholar

13 Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit. Vol. II, p. 137.Google Scholar

14 Schwarzenberg, “held the belief, not uncommon among men of dry intellectual power, that force was everything and ideas nothing. He had served with Radetzky in Italy and, taking the war of 1848 as a serious affair, had a faith in the Austrian army, unusual for an Austrian statesman.” Taylor, A. J. P., The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p. 77.Google Scholar

15 Kiszling, Schwarzenberg, p. 35; Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 20.

16 Schwarzenberg to Radetzky, Olmütz, October 22, 1848 (secret), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as “Staatsarchiv [Vienna]”), Kabinensarchiv, Geheimakten, Nachlaβ Schwarzenberg, Carton IX, Fasc. 2, No. 59.

17 Franz Grillparzer's famous 1848 ode to Field Marshal Radetzky, stressing “in thy camp alone is Austria,” and King Frederick William IV's reputed exclamation, “Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten!” help place this attitude in proper historical perspective.

18 As for Schwarzenberg's “unique” reliance upon rule by bayonets, it is interesting to note that on June 20, 1833, Count Franz Anton Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky criticized Metternich for deploying “a forest of bayonets” and adhering rigidly “to the status quo.” Kübeck, Max (ed.), Tagebucher des Carl Friedrich Freiherrn Kübeck von Kübau (2 vols. in 3, Vienna: Gerold & Co., 1909), Vol. I, p. 626.Google Scholar

19 Schroeder, Paul W., “Austria as an Obstacle to Italian Unification and Freedom, 1814–1861,” Austrian History News Letter, No. 3 (1962), p. 6Google Scholar. On Schwarzenberg's Italian policies, see also Taylor, A. J. P., The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy 1847–1849 (Manchester: University Press, 1934).Google Scholar

20 Memorandum enclosed in Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, February 25, 1849, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Botschaftsarchiv St. Petersburg, Section X, Carton CLXI, Fasc. 1.

21 The tone of Schwarzenberg's diplomacy can be illustrated by his famous circular of December 4. 1848. in which he wrote the following about Palmerston: “Palmerston regards himself too much as the arbiter of Europe. For our part we are not disposed to accord him the role of Providence. We never impose our advice on him in relation to Ireland: let him spare himself the trouble of advising us on the subject of Lombardy.” As cited in Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, p. 262. Or note the letter from Schwarzenberg to Hübner, then Austrian envoy to France, dated July 10, 1849: “Do me the favor of explaining to me this species of sympathy which still exists at Paris for Piedmont, for this government without honesty or law, for this frog in the fable, for these men dear to the revolution and abhorred by the rest of Italy, for this country which corrupts everything it touches and is incapable of making either war or peace.” As cited in Schroeder, “Austria as an Obstacle to Italian Unification and Freedom,” p. 19.

22 Schwarzenberg to Buol, Olmütz, March 25, 1849 (private), Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton XXVIII.

23 ln April, 1849, Baron Carl Friedrich von Kübeck characterized the Hungarian scene in Metternichian terms as “no longer a war of armies but a war of peoples, a war in which the European Revolution had concentrated itself in Hungary and which directed its energies against the prevailing order.” Protocol of the Ministerrat, Vienna, April 13,1849, as published in Kerchnawe, Hugo, “Feldmarschall Alfred First Windisch-Graetz und die Russenhilfe 1849,” Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung, Vol. XLIII (1929), pp. 365–367.Google Scholar

24 For Schwarzenberg's Hungarian policies, see Andics, Erzsébet, Das Bündnis Habsburg-Romanow. Vorgeschichte der zaristischen Intervention in Ungarn im Jahre 1849 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1963)Google Scholar; and her richly documented original study, A Habsburgok és Romanovok szövetsége. Az 1849. évi Magyarországi cári intervenció diplomáciai elotörtente (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1961)Google Scholar. See also the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Rock, Kenneth W., “Reaction Triumphant: The Diplomacy of Felix Schwarzenberg and Nicholas I in Mastering the Hungarian Insurrection 1848–1850. A Study in Dynastic Power, Principles, and Politics in Revolutionary Times” (Stanford University, 1969).Google Scholar

25 For Palmerston's views on the Hungarian revolution, see Sproxton, Charles, Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1919)Google Scholar; and Craig, Gordon, “The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power,” The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1960), p. 264.Google Scholar

26 For Nicholas I's Hungarian policies, see Andics, Das Bündnis Habsburg-Romanow, pp. 19–58 and 185–191; Andics, A Habsburgok és Romanovok szövetsége, pp. 21–60 and 168–174; and Rock, “Reaction Triumphant,” pp. 13–61. See also Rebekka Averbukh, “Avstriiskaia revoliutsiia 1848 g. i Nikolai 1” [The Austrian Revolution of 1848 and Nicholas I], Krasnyii Arkhiv, Vol. LXXXIX-XC(1938), pp. 156–207Google Scholar; Averbukh, Rebekka, “Nikolai li evropeiskaia reaktsiia 1848–49 gg.” [Nicholas I and the European Reaction, 1848–1849], Krasnyii Arkhiv. Vol. XLVIII (1931), pp. 3–49Google Scholar; Nifontov, A. S., Russland im Jahre 1848 (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1954)Google Scholar; and Schiemann, Theodor, Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I (4 vols., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1919), Vol. IV.Google Scholar

27 Nicholas I to Paskevich, Tsarskoe Selo, November 16, 1848, Shcherbatov, Aleksandr Petrovich, General' Fel'dmarschal' Kniaz' Paskevich', ego zhizn' i dieiatel'nost'[General Field Marshal Prince Paskevich, His Life and Works] (7 vols., St. Petersburg: V. A. Berezovskii, 1888–1904), Vol. VI, pp. 261–262Google Scholar. I cannot help but agree with Enno Krache when he states that “Nicholas had intervened morally in Austria long before he sent troops.” Krache, “Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1800–1867,” p. 25.

28 Schwarzenberg to Buol, Olmütz, December 31, 1848 (private), Staatsarchiv(Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton XXVII.

29 When Francis Joseph succeeded Emperor Ferdinand on December 2, 1848, the two sovereigns emphasized dynastic sentiment, friendship, and trust in Tsar Nicholas in their personal correspondence with the tsar, while Archduchess Sophie wrote passionately about the Münchengrätz pledge of 1833. These sentiments were, of course, inspired by the minister-president. Ferdinand I, Francis Joseph I, and Archduchess Sophie to Nicholas I, Olmütz, December 2, 1848, and Nicholas I to Ferdinand I, Francis Joseph I, and Archduchess Sophie, St. Petersburg, December 18, 1848, Andics, A Habsburgok és Romanovok szövetsége, pp. 291–299.

30 Medem to Nesselrode, Olmütz, December 17, 1848, ibid., pp. 295–296.

31 See Andics, Das Bündnis Habsburg-Romanow, pp. 106–127; and Rock, “Reaction Triumphant,” pp. 137–153.

32 For example, on March 25 he wrote: “The impious faction which has sworn to sacrifice the repose of the world to its insatiable cupidity and to its enormous pride as the ‘happiness of peoples’ has chosen unfortunate Hungary at this moment to be its theater of activity. It is from there that adventurers without honor and without country, the scum of all nations, have made their rendezvous in order to establish the triumph of a detestable cause. Opposition to such a triumph is at this time a project worthy of the solicitude of all enlightened governments.” Schwarzenberg to Buol, Olmütz, March 25, 1849 (private), Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton XXVIII.

33 Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, March 13, 1849, ibid., Carton XXVII. The italics are my own.

34 As quoted in Müller, Paul, Feldmarschall Fürst Windischgrätz. Revolution und Gegenrevolulion in Österreich (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1934), p. 227 n.Google Scholar

35 In fairness to Schwarzenberg. it must be admitted that Nicholas I had already made up his mind to engage in counterrevolutionary activity in Galicia at least before the Habsburgs had appealed to him for assistance. He was not enthusiastic about a Hungarian campaign as such. As he wrote his generalissimo, Prince Ivan Feodorovich Paskevich, “I must admit that I have no burning desire to intervene in the whole affair. I foresee only envy, malice, and ingratitude, and I really would not interfere if the shirt were not closer to me than the coat;… if I did not see in Bern and the other rascals in Hungary not only the enemies of Austria but also the enemies of order and tranquillity in the entire world, the personification of villains, scoundrels, and destroyers, whom we must destroy for the sake of our own tranquillity.” Nicholas I to Paskevich, Moscow, April 20, 1849, Shcherbatov, , Paskevich, Vol. VI, pp. 281–282.Google Scholar

36 Announcement in the Wiener Zeitung (Vienna), May 1, 1849.

37 Schwarzenberg's attitude in 1849 was roughly the same as Metternich's in 1821 after the suppression of the Neapolitan and Sardinian revolutions by an Austro-Russian martial tour de force. Metternich's proud boast, “If I were not master of making [the Russian troops] retreat just as I made them advance, do you think I should ever have set them in motion?” could have been echoed by Schwarzenberg in 1849. As quoted in Kissinger, Henry A., A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), p. 280.Google Scholar

38 On September 9, 1849, Palmerston instructed his envoy in Vienna to express “openly and decidedly the disgust” which Austrian “atrocities in Italy, Galicia, Hungary, and Transylvania” had excited among the public in Great Britain. He officially referred to the Austrians as “really the greatest brutes that ever called themselves by the undeserved name of civilised men.” (The italics are in the original.) As quoted in Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, p. 259. In May, 1849, tsarist officers in Warsaw were openly joking that so many Austrian officials were parading in full uniform in the city that no Russian invasion of Hungary but rather an Austrian invasion of Poland was imminent! Schiemann, , Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I, Vol. IV, pp. 193–194Google Scholar. For Austro-Russian bitterness in the autumn of 1849, see Curtiss, John S., The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825–1855 (Durham, N. C: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 304–313Google Scholar; Nifontov, Russland im Jahre 1848, pp. 329–334; and Rock, “Reaction Triumphant,” pp. 252–316.

39 Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, October 28, 1849 (private and secret), Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton XXVII; Buol to Schwarzenberg, St. Petersburg, November 7, 1849 (private), ibid. Buol was to assure Nesselrode that Austria “valued its solidarity with the Court of Russia as highly as it is humanly possible to do.” Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, December 2,1849, ibid. To pacify an angry tsar and Field Marshal Paskevich, Schwarzenberg also ordered a petulant General Baron Julius Haynau to issue a proclamation giving due appreciation to the valiant deeds performed by the Russian army in Hungary.

40 Schwarzenberg to Buol, Vienna, December 2, 1849, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv. Section X, Carton XXVII.

41 The best work on Schwarzenberg's German policy is Eduard Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg. See also Kiszling, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 107–166; Friedjung, , Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, Vol. II, pp. 1–134Google Scholar; Friedjung, Heinrich, “Fürst Felix Schwarzenberg und Graf Albrecht Bernstorff,” in his Historische Aufsätze (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta Nachf., 1919), pp. 90–125Google Scholar; Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 112–173; and Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, Vol. I, pp. 385–456; and Vol. II, pp. 9–142. Srbik contrasts the German policies of Metternich with those of Schwarzenberg in his Deutsche Einheit. Vol. I, pp. 385–389; and Vol. II, pp. 138–141; and in his Metternich, Vol. II, pp. 391–392.

42 Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, “A Struggle for Austria in Berlin and Frankfort, 1849–1855,” Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. II (1942), No. I, p. 39.Google Scholar

43 Kraehe, “Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1800–1867,” p. 26. See also Kraehe, Enno E., “Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation, 1851–1863,” The American Historical Review, Vol. LVI (1951), pp. 276–294Google Scholar. Heller, Scharff, and Srbik all cite the meeting of the Austrian council of ministers on December 12, 1848, where Schwarzenberg outlined his “gesamtösterreichisch-mitteleuropäisches” program: (1) the indivisible unity of Gesamtösterreich; (2) no union of only Austria's German-speaking provinces with Germany; (3) the admission of Gesamtösterreich into the German Confederation “in its own interest as well as in the interests of Germany itself;” and (4) the amalgamation of the smaller German states into larger units (imperial districts). See Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 32 and 230; Scharff, Alexander, Die europäischen Grossmächte und die deutsche Revolution. Deutsche Einheit und europäische Ordnung 1848–1851 (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1942), p. 98Google Scholar; and Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. 1, pp. 390–391.Google Scholar

44 The authorship of the “Mitteleuropa” concept has been disputed. Taylor and Friedjung maintain that Baron Karl Ludwig von Bruck, Schwarzenberg's minister of commerce and economic advisor, was the principal author. See Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 86 and 90–91; and Friedjung, , Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, Vol. 1, pp. 293–296Google Scholar. Srbik argues that the creative and directing brain of Schwarzenberg's German policy was the minister-president himself and that Bruck's visionary idea of a Central European customs and commercial union merely complemented Schwarzenberg's own plans. See his Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, pp. 94–95Google Scholar. Heller, who searched all available documents, concluded: “The mitteleuropäische idea, exactly like the kleindeutsch idea, was not the intellectual property of any one man. Schwarzenberg and Bruck advocated it from the beginning of their joint efforts in complete agreement and with frank determination.” See his Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 100–107. It appears that Schwarzenberg's first written plans date from December 12, 1848, while Bruck's written proposals are dated October 26, 1849, December 30, 1849, and May 30, 1850. Bruck's memoranda thus appeared exactly at the time when Schwarzenberg was pushing his German policy. See also Meyer, Henry Cord, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815–1945 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 8–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45 Srbik, , Metternich. Vol. II, pp. 390–391.Google Scholar

46 Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 122.

47 Schwarzenberg had engaged in diplomatic activities at Berlin, Frankfurt, and the lesser German courts and had made two pilgrimages to Warsaw in May and October, 1850. The tsar's warning to Berlin that any changes in European treaties made without the approval of the co-signatories would be considered by Russia as acts of aggression tipped the scales in Austria's favor. In addition to the sources cited in footnotes 41 and 43, see also Hoffmann, Joachim, Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten 1849–1852 (Berlin: Ernst Reuter, 1959)Google Scholar; and Mosse, W. E., The European Powers and the German Question 1848–71, with Special Reference to England and Russia (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1958), pp. 32–40.Google Scholar

48 Srbik, , Metternich, Vol. II, p. 392.Google Scholar

49 Craig, “The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power,” p. 265.

50 On the “punctation” of Olmütz, see Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 119–129; Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 155–162; and Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, pp. 80–91Google Scholar. The Prussians felt “humiliated” because they lost prestige in retreating from the strong stand they had taken in the Holstein and Hessian issues. The Austrians were jubilant mainly because the monarchy had been able to avoid war. Technically, Berlin abandoned the “union project” on November 2–3, when its author, General Joseph Maria von Radowitz, resigned and Baron Otto von Manteuffel became Prussian foreign minister. On November 10 Frederick Willian IV told Schwarzenberg's envoy, Baron Anton Prokesch von Osten: “Austria is the first, Prussia is the second state in Germany.” We “will come to an understanding within a short time over the question of the Confederation,” he added. As quoted in Engel-Janosi, “A Struggle for Austria in Berlin and Frankfort, 1849–1855,” p. 45.

51 Friedjung argued that Schwarzenberg went unwillingly to Olmütz and made the wrong decisions. See his Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, Vol. II, pp. 117–124. Hoffmann and Srbik contend that Schwarzenberg went willingly. Motivated by the desire for peace in Vienna, Berlin, and Warsaw, he compromised with Manteuffel, thus avoiding a German civil war, secure in the knowledge that both the Prussian war party and a Radowitz-style revolution had been defeated. In effect, Schwarzenberg settled for Metternich's principles of cooperation with a conservative, not a revolutionary, Prussia. Heller argues that Schwarzenberg had always recognized that only Austria and Prussia in conjunction could defeat the “revolution” and create an externally strong and internally well-ordered Mitteleuropa. Yet he supports Friedjung's view that on account of his moderation at Olmütz Schwarzenberg let pass the opportunity to create a Habsburg-led Mitteleuropa. I agree. See Heller, F¨rst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 119–120; Hoffmann, Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten, pp. 64–67; and Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, pp. 80–81.Google Scholar

52 On the Dresden conference see Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 131–143; Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, pp. 40–42; Scharff, Die europäischen Grossmächte, pp. 267–295; Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 162–169; and Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. 11, pp. 103–122.Google Scholar

53 As A. J. P. Taylor has written, “Schwarzenberg devised a new policy; his failure was in not conducting it with new weapons. A policy of adventure could not be based solely on the Habsburg army; it needed demagogy, the appeal to German nationalism. Ten years later Bismarck solved the problem which had baffled Schwarzenberg: with the assistance of German nationalism he gave Germany, and the Habsburg monarchy too, security against both Russia and France, and yet tied German liberalism to the service of the Prussian King. Schwarzenberg had Bismarck's daring and freedom from prejudice; he lacked Bismarck's master-weapon, the call to popular enthusiasm.” Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 90.

54 As quoted in Engel-Janosi, “A Struggle for Austria in Berlin and Frankfort, 1849–1855.” p. 46. “We had hoped for better things,” Schwarzenberg wrote Manteuffel on April 9. 1851, “and have honestly striven for them. I confess that the malicious and inept allusions of the press which see in the restoration of the old Confederation a triumph of Austrian reactionary policy anger and nauseate me.” As quoted in Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg. p. 143.

55 As quoted in Srbik, , Metternich, Vol. 11, pp. 408–409.Google Scholar

56 See Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II. pp. 94–95 and 188–191Google Scholar. Austria signed a twelve-year trade treaty with the Zollverein on February 19. 1853, in which it was stipulated that after six years Austria might resume negotiations about joining it.

57 The treaty remained in force from 1851–1857. Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, p. 121.Google Scholar

59 To the dismay of Austrian conservatives, Schwarzenberg had looked favorably upon Louis Napoleon ever since his election to the French presidency in December, 1848. On January 5, 1849, he wrote to Windischgrä tz: “Our relations with France must be conceived realistically and should not be adjusted to the principle of legitimacy or that of the juste milieu… The little nephew of the great uncle gives us no reason to sulk, least of all out of regard for the Elder and Younger Bourbons who have always been hostile to us.” As quoted in Müller, Feldmarschall Fürst Windischgrätz. p. 164.

59 Memorandum dated December 29, 1851, enclosed in Schwarzenberg to Lebzeltern, Vienna, December 29, 1851, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton XXXIII. Although Schwarzenberg was no Anglophobe, his personal feud with Palmerston was so acrimonious that, unlike Metternich, he never found a person in the British foreign office with whom he could cooperate effectively. After Palmerston's fall from power in December, 1851, Schwarzenberg, on Metternich's urging, however, agreed to follow a more moderate policy in dealing with Great Britain. See Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren, Vol. VIII, pp. 120–121.Google Scholar

60 Rumors of a Franco-Austrian alliance directed against Switzerland, Sardinia, and Belgium were circulated early in 1852. Bismarck told the British chargé d'affaires at Frankfurt that Schwarzenberg intended to move against Prussia and that Belgium was to be France's prize for assisting him in such a venture. Friedjung, , Österreich von 1848 bis 1860, Vol. II, pp. 145–148Google Scholar. Srbik argues that Schwarzenberg hoped to win France over to Austria's side and to the conservative cause by insisting that the three eastern courts adopt a policy of solidarity and nonintervention, while at the same time keeping a careful eye on the fluid French situation. He had not abandoned his Mitteleuropa ideas but had merely postponed them. Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. II, p. 134Google Scholar. Heller denies that Schwarzenberg was seeking to manufacture a coalition to subdue Prussia. He sought only to deny France any room for maneuver in Mitteleuropa—a policy consistent with his previously expressed attitude toward Great Britain and Russia that Central Europe was an Austrian, or at best an Austro-Prussian, sphere of influence. See his Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, pp. 157–167.

61 Heller, Fürst Felix zu Schwarzenberg, p. 166.

62 Craig, , “The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power,” p. 259Google Scholar. See also Taylor, , The Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 54–55.Google Scholar

63 As quoted in Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, Vol. 1, p. 386.Google Scholar

64 Burckhardt, Carl J. (ed.), Briefe des Staatskanzlers F¨rsten Metternich- Winneburg an den österreichischen Minister des Allerhöchsten Hauses und des Äussern, Grafen Buol-Schauenstein aus den Jahren 1852–1859 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1934), p. 4.Google Scholar

65 As quoted in Srbik, , Metternich, Vol. II, p. 409.Google Scholar