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Pareto-optimal Contracts in an Insurance Market

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 April 2015

A.Y. Golubin
A.Y. Golubin*
Affiliation:
Dep. of Operations Research, Moscow Institute of Electronics and Mathematics, B. Trechsvjatitelsky per., 3/12, Moscow, 109028, Russia, E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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In distinction to the Borch’s model of a reinsurance market, this paper treats the problem of optimal risk exchange in an insurance market where treaties are allowed between the insurer and each insured only, not among insureds themselves. A characterization of the Pareto-optimal contract is found. It is shown that the indemnity function in the contract is of a coinsurance kind. We also present a way of finding Pareto-optimal contracts under individual rationality constraints. The obtained results are compared with those of the known model of risk exchange in a reinsurance market.

Keywords

Insurance contractPremiumIndemnity functionPareto optimalityIndividual rationality
Type
Articles
Information
ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , November 2005 , pp. 363 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © ASTIN Bulletin 2005

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