Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 June 2016
The judicialization of politics in Taiwan is particularly evident in three domains: the expansion of judicial power, a shift in political equilibrium, and litigation for social change. Yet it is not altogether clear why politicians and social groups are willing to transfer decision-making powers from the political branches to the judiciary, particularly the Constitutional Court. This paper endeavours to fill this academic lacuna by suggesting that the judicialization of politics occurs in Taiwan because both politicians and citizens choose the judiciary as another agent to implement their preferred policies. Nevertheless, Taiwan does not become a juristocracy and, indeed, the pace of the judicialization has slowed down since the second party turnover. The development of the judicialization of politics in Taiwan may shed new light on many old topics, such as judicial supremacy and the relationship between judicial power and political uncertainty.
I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful review opinions. This article is adapted from part of my dissertation with major revisions. I would like to thank Professor Wen-Chen Chang, Professor Tom Ginsburg, Professor Jau-Yuan Hwang, Professor Gerald Rosenberg, Shao-Man Lee, and Yi-Li Lee for their comments and suggestions on the draft of this article. Of course all mistakes are mine. Correspondence to Chien-Chih Lin, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. E-mail address: [email protected].