Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T22:49:12.991Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Paradox of Chinese Investments in Sri Lanka: Between Investment Treaty Protection and Commercial Diplomacy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2020

Dilini PATHIRANA
Dilini PATHIRANA*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The politically sensitive nature of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka has made investment protection by the China-Sri Lanka BIT highly relevant. However, the treaty has a pro-state orientation, with limited protection for investors. This gives rise to a modern paradox in which China has become the top investor in Sri Lanka, despite the absence of an international protective framework for their activities. Chinese investors are apparently managing this paradox mainly through commercial diplomacy. As an alternative to a rights-based approach, this may signal a return to a power-based approach to settling investment disputes, with the Chinese government a leading actor therein. This will be particularly prominent in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. While win-win co-operation is a stated principle of Chinese investment policy, whether mutually beneficial outcomes can be sustained with the asymmetrical power dynamics between China and BRI states remains to be seen.

Type
Articles
Information
Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , July 2020 , pp. 375 - 408
Copyright
Copyright © Asian Journal of International Law, 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Attorney-at-Law (Sri Lanka). Lecturer. I wish to thank anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. Further thanks are due to Mark McLaughlin for his editorial comments on this draft. Any errors remain the responsibility of the author.

References

1. For detailed discussions on the China-Sri Lanka economic relationship, see Saman KELEGAMA, “China-Sri Lanka Economic Relations: An Overview” (2014) 50 China Reports 131; Ravindra DEYSHAPPRIYA, “Sri Lanka-China Economic Relations in Comparative Perspective: Ample Room to Grow”, Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies of Sri Lanka, Working Paper Series, 2016. For a discussion on China-Sri Lanka relations in general, see CAMPBELL, Ivan et al. , China and Conflict-affected States: Between Principle and Pragmatism (London: Saferworld, 2012) at 25–61Google Scholar. For a discussion on China-Sri Lanka relations focusing on the BRI, see Dushani WEERAKOON and Janaka WIJAYASIRI, “Belt and Road Initiative, Debt and Diplomacy”, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, Occasional Paper No. 200, June 2019.

2. For a detailed discussion on the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road, see WANG, Rong and ZHU, Cuiping, eds., Annual Report on the Development of the Indian Ocean Region (2015): 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Singapore: Springer, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a general discussion on the BRI, see Gisela GRIEGER, “One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's Regional Integration Initiative”, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament Briefing, July 2016; DU, Michael M., “China's ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications” (2016) 2 Chinese Journal of Global Governance 30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; CHAISSE, Julien and MATSUSHITA, Mitsuo, “China's ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Mapping the World Trade Normative and Strategic Implications” (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 163Google Scholar; CAO Honghui and GONG Ting, “Building a Shared Vision for the Belt and Road Initiative and the Sustainable Development Goals”, High-Level Policy Forum on Global Governance “Belt And Road”: A New Path to Regional Development, Scoping Paper 2, 2016; Diane DESIERTO, “China's ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: Can A Bilaterally-Negotiated ‘Globalization 2.0’ Internalize Human Rights, Labor, and Environmental Standards?” EJIL:Talk! (16 May 2017), online: EJIL: Talk! < https://www.ejiltalk.org/chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-can-a-bilaterally-negotiated-globalization-2-0-internalize-human-rights-labor-and-environmental-standards/>; Andrew CHATZKY and James MCBRIDE, “China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative” Council on Foreign Relations (21 May 2019), online: Council on Foreign Relations <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.

3. For a critical discussion on the Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, see MENDIS, Patrick, “Destiny of the Pearl–How Sri Lanka's Colombo Consensus Trumped Beijing and Washington in the Indian Ocean” (2012) 7 Yale Journal of Intentional Affairs 68Google Scholar; Patrick MENDIS, “The Sri Lankan Silk Road: The Potential War between China and the United States” (2012) 34 Harvard International Review 54.

4. See generally LIM, Darren J. and MUKHERJEE, Rohan, “What Money Can't Buy: The Security Externalities of Chinese Economic Statecraft in Post-War Sri Lanka” (2019) 15 Asian Security 73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; HENÖKL, Thomas and WEBERSIK, Christian, “Power Politics or Transnational Public Policy? European and Chinese Development Cooperation with Sri Lanka and Myanmar” (2016) 14 Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies 1Google Scholar; Smruti S. PATTANAIK, “Controversy over Chinese investment in Sri Lanka” East Asia Forum (5 June 2015), online: East Asia Forum <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=46434>.

5. “Sale of Hambantota Port–A Fair Deal?” Daily FT (16 November 2016), online: Daily FT <http://www.ft.lk/article/580215/Sale-of-Hambantota-Port-%E2%80%93-A-fair-deal>; “China and Sri Lanka: Between a Dream and a Nightmare” The Diplomat (18 November 2016), online: The Diplomat <https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/china-and-sri-lanka-between-a-dream-and-a-nightmare>; Wade SHEPARD, “The Story Behind the World's Emptiest International Airport” Forbes (28 May 2016), online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/05/28/the-story-behind-the-worlds-emptiest-international-airport-sri-lankas-mattala-rajapaksa/#24d85c2e7cea>; Brook LARMER, “What the World's Emptiest International Airport Says about China's Influence” The New York Times (13 September 2017), online: The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/what-the-worlds-emptiest-international-airport-says-about-chinas-influence.html>.

6. See, for example, Kamanthi WICKRAMASINGHE,"Lakvijaya Coal Power Plant Spewing Controversy and More Pollution" Daily Mirror (25 April 2018), online: Daily Mirror <http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Lakvijaya-Coal-Power-Plant-Spewing-controversy-and-more-pollution-149046.html>.

7. For brief discussions on the Colombo Lotus Tower Project, see “Govt. to Review Chinese-funded Lotus Tower Project” Daily FT (16 March 2015), online: Daily FT <http://www.ft.lk/article/397249/Govt--to-review-Chinese-funded-Lotus-Tower-project>; “Lotus Tower Construction to Continue” Daily Mirror (4 April 2015), online: Daily Mirror <http://www.dailymirror.lk/69515/lotus-tower-construction-to-continue>.

8. For a detailed discussion on the Colombo Port City project, see “Supplementary Environmental Impact Assessment Report on proposed Colombo port City Development Project” (December 2015), online: <https://ejustice.lk/2017/10/21/port-city-suplimentory-eia-report/>. See further, Vositha WIJENAYAKE, “Colombo Port City Project: A Threat to Sustainable Development?” Daily Mirror (6 March 2015), online: Daily Mirror <http://www.dailymirror.lk/65601/colombo-port-city-project-a-threat-to-sustainable-development>; Dulip JAYAWARDANE, “Critical Analyses of Colombo Port City Project” NAFCO (January 2017), online: NAFCO <http://www.nafso-online.org>. For a discussion on the Grant Skyline Hotel project, see “CATIC Causes Chaos!” Daily FT (7 July 2011), online: Daily FT <http://www.ft.lk/article/38300/CATIC-causes-chaos>; Thomas WHEELER, China and Conflict-affected States Between Principle and Pragmatism, Sri Lankan Case Study (Safeworld, 2012) at 13–14.

9. Weerakoon and Wijayasiri, supra note 1 at 6; Pattanaik, supra note 4 at 1.

10. For a discussion on the pro-China stance of Rajapaksha administration, see Mendis, supra note 3. See further Iromi DHARMAWARDHANE, “Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy Under the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe Government”, Institute of South Asian Studies, ISAS Working Paper No. 250, 23 December 2016.

11. Art. 24 1.1 of the Concession Agreement signed between Sri Lanka Port Authority and the CHEC Port City Colombo (Private) Ltd (now replaced with a new agreement). The Article stated that the Project Company shall be entitled to twenty hectares of the marketable and as freehold lands with the ownership registered in the name of the project company.

12. See, for example, Centre for Environmental Justice (Guarantee) Limited v. Sri Lanka Port Authority and Five Others. No. CA 112/2015 Writ.

13. “New Tripartite Agreement Signed on Colombo Port City Project” Colombo Gazette (12 August 2016), online: Colombo Gazette <http://colombogazette.com/2016/08/12/new-tripartite-agreement-signed-on-colombo-port-city-project/>.

14. See generally Karl P. SAUVANT and Michael D. NOLAN, “China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International Investment Law” (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 893; for a discussion on the concerns over investments by Chinese SOEs and how they differ from investments by private companies, see Bashar H. MALKAWI, “Chinese SOE Investment: An Economic Statecraft” OpinioJuris (7 February 2019), online: OpinioJuris <http://opiniojuris.org/2019/02/07/chinese-soe-investment-an-economic-statecraft/>. See further Alessia AMIGHINI, Roberta RABELLOTTI, and Marco SANFILIPPO, “Do Chinese SOEs and Private Companies Differ in their Foreign Location Strategies?”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, EUI Working Paper, 2012.

15. JING Li and JUN Xia, “State-Owned Enterprises Face Challenges in Foreign Acquisitions” (2017) 205 Columbia FDI Perspectives 1.

16. See, for example, Malkawi, supra note 14. See further Jiangyu WANG, “The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China's State-owned Enterprises” (2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 631; Qingjiang KONG, “Emerging Rules in International Investment Instruments and China's Reform of State-owned Enterprises” (2017) 3 Chinese Journal of Global Governance 57. For a discussion on concerns regarding China's SOEs, see FAN Gang and Nicholas HOPE, “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy”, online: <https://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf>. For a discussion on the policy responses to the challenge of FDI by state-controlled enterprises, with a particular focus on Chinese firms, see Peter ENDERWICK, “International Investment by State-Controlled Enterprises: A Source for Concern?” (2017) 26 Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance 261.

17. See, for example, Malkawi, supra note 14. See further “How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China's Interests?” China Power, online: China Power <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/>.

18. For a detailed discussion on the ISDS cases in which Chinese SOEs recourse to ISDS mechanism, see Anran ZHANG, “The Standing of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in Investor-State Arbitration: The First Two Cases” (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 1147.

19. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co Ltd v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 31 May 2017.

20. China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., et al. v. Mongolia, PCA Case No. 2010-20, Award, 30 June 2017. For a discussion on this case, see Zhang, supra note 18.

21. See generally Vivienne BATH, “‘One Belt, One Road’ and Chinese Investment”, Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/98, November 2016; Julien CHAISSE and Jamieson KIRKWOOD, “Chinese Puzzle: Anatomy of the (Invisible) Belt and Road Investment Treaty” (2020) Journal of International Economic Law 245.

22. Both Sri Lanka and China are Contracting Parties to the Framework Agreement on the Promotion, Protection and Liberalization of Investment in APTA Participating states. Yet, this Agreement does not provide for investment treatment standards. It is reported that China and Sri Lanka are currently negotiating a Free Trade Agreement which is planned to include a separate chapter on investment. For a discussion on this Agreement, see Verité Research, “Sri Lanka-China FTA: Challenges and Opportunities: Insights from Analysing China's Existing FTAs” (April 2018), online: BOI <http://investsrilanka.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/BOI-Investment-Guide-2019-July.pdf>; Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, “Study on China-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement” (2014), online: <http://www.ips.lk/images/docs/research/highlights/Executive%20Summary.pdf>.

23. For a discussion on Sri Lanka's domestic law and policy on foreign investment, see Board of Investment of Sri Lanka, “Sri Lanka Investment Guide 2019” (2019), online: BOI <http://www.investsrilanka.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/BOI-Investment-Guide-2019-Feb_2.pdf>.

24. For a discussion on legal implications of investment contracts, see Muthucumaraswamy SORNARAJAH, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 276–305.

25. See generally Sornarajah, ibid. See further Antony ANGHIE, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 196–235; Kate MILES, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 78–9.

26. Dilini PATHIRANA, “Sowing the Seeds: How Trade and Investment Shaped the European Colonial Encounter in Sri Lanka” (February 2020), online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3524876>; Dilini PATHIRANA, “An Overview of Sri Lanka's Bilateral Investment Treaties: Status Quo and Some Insights into Future Modifications” (2017) 7 Asian Journal of International Law 287.

27. See generally K.M. DE SILVA, A History of Sri Lanka (India: Penguin Books, 2005); Roland WENZLHUEMER, From Coffee to Tea Cultivation in Ceylon, 1880–1900: An Economic and Social History (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Nira WICKRAMASINGHE, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006); Ananda WICKRAMASINGHE and D.C. CAMERON, “British Capital, Ceylonese Land, Indian Labour: The Imperialism and Colonialism of Evolution of Tea Plantations in Sri Lanka” (2005), online: <https://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ejrot/cmsconference/2005/proceedings/managementorganizational/Wickramasinghe.pdf>.

28. See generally G.C. ALLEN and Audrey G. DONNITHORNE, Western Enterprises in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1954). See further Michael J. ENRIGHT, “China's Inward Investment; Approach and Impact” in Julein CHAISSE, ed., China's International Investment Strategy–Bilateral, Regional, and Global Law and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 23 at 24.

29. Allen and Donnithorne, ibid.

30. For a discussion on the post-colonial attempt to reshape the world economic order, see generally Anghei, supra note 25.

31. With respect to China, see Thomas N. THOMPSON, “China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism 1949–57”, School of Law, University of Maryland, Occasional Paper, 1979. With respect to Sri Lanka, see generally Saman KELEGAMA, Development Under Stress: Sri Lankan Economy in Transition (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006).

32. See generally Thompson, ibid; Wenhua SHAN, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2005) at 7–10.

33. Kelegama, supra note 31 at 39–51.

34. For a discussion on the North-South debate, see generally Anghie, supra note 25.

35. For China's traditional approach towards international investment law, see Axel BERGER, “China's New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Substance, Rational and Implications for International Investment Law Making” (2008), online: <https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Berger_ChineseBITs.pdf> at 7–10. For Sri Lanka's early approach towards foreign investments, see Kelegama, supra note 31 at 39–51.

36. Kenneth J. VANDEVELDE, “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” (2005) 12 U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 157 at 166.

37. Kelegama, supra note 31 at 52–7, 91–104. See further Sajith DE MEL, “Economic Policy Shifts in Sri Lanka” (2008) 34 Economic Review; Energy Crisis and Alternatives 43.

38. Shang-Jin WEI, “Foreign Direct Investment in China: Sources and Consequences,” in Takatoshi ITO and Anne KRUEGER, eds., Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 77 at 78; Cai CONGYAN, “China–US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications” (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 457 at 459. For political analysis of China's open-up endeavour, see Susan SHIRK, How China Opened Its Door: The Political Success of the PRC's Foreign Trade and Investment Reforms (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994).

39. See generally Vandevelde, supra note 36 at 178–84. For a detailed discussion on this phenomenon, see Kenneth VANDEVELDE, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

40. Sornarajah, supra note 24 at 172–87.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. For a detailed discussion on Sri Lanka's BIT, see Pathirana, supra note 26. See further C.P. MALALGODA and P.N. SAMARAWEERA, “The Experience of Sri Lanka with International Investment Treaties”, South Centre, Investment Policy Brief, December 2016.

44. For detailed discussions on China's investment treaty-making programme, see Berger, supra note 35; Congyan, supra note 38. See further Stephan SCHILL, “Tearing Down the Great Wall; The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's Republic of China” (2007) 15 Cardozo Journal of International & Comparative Law 73; Wenhua SHAN and Jinyuan SU, eds., China and International Investment Law: Twenty Years of ICSID Membership (Leiden/Boston, MA: Brill, 2014); Kate HADLEY, “Do China's BITs Matter? Assessing the Effect of China's Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Investors’ Rights, and the Rule of Law” (2013) 45 Georgetown Journal of International Law 255; Axel BERGER, “The Politics of China's Investment Treaty-Making Program” in Tomer BROUDE, Marc L. BUSCH, and Amelia PORGES, eds., The Politics of International Economic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 162; Leon TRAKMAN, “China and Foreign Direct Investment: Does Distance Lend Enchantment to the View?” (2014) 2 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1; Guiguo WANG, “China's Practice in International Investment Law: From Participation to Leadership in the World Economy” (2009) 34 Yale Journal of International Law 575.

45. Tyler COHEN and David SCHNEIDERMAN, “The Political Economy of Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy” (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 110.

46. Ibid. See further Trakman, supra note 44 at 12; KONG Qingjiang, “Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Chinese Approach and Practice” (2008) 8 Asian Year Book of International Law 105 at 112–14; Axel BERGER, “Investment Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: Is China Following the Global Trend Towards Comprehensive Agreements?”, German Development Institute, Discussion Paper No. 7, 2013 at 6.

47. Cohen and Schneiderman, supra note 45 at 117.

48. For a discussion on India-Sri Lanka relationship in the late 1980s, see Seeni Mohamed ALIFF, “Indo-Sri Lanka Relations After the LTTE: Problems & Prospects” (2015) 6 Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies 321 at 323.

49. Kong, supra note 46 at 111.

50. Ibid.

51. Art. 1(1) of the China-Sri Lanka BIT. Accordingly, the term “investment” means every kind of asset including, but not limited to, movable and immovable property and other property rights, shares, stock, debentures, and similar interests in the property of companies, claims to money, copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, and business concessions.

52. For a discussion on illegal investments, see Stephan W. SCHILL, “Illegal Investments in International Treaty Arbitration” (2012) 11 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 281.

53. See, for example, Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 204.

54. The requirement of legality in China's early BITs with Western countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Italy were also articulated by the common specification: “making investment in accordance with host state law.”

55. Kong, supra note 46 at 120.

56. Art. 2(1), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

57. See generally Sonarajah, supra note 24 at 319.

58. Art. 3(1), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

59. See, for example, Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN Case No. ARB/01/1, 31 March 2003, paras. 60–2; Gruslin v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, 27 November 2000, para. 25.5.

60. Art. 6, China-Sri Lanka BIT.

61. Art. 6(1), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

62. For a discussion on the public purpose, see Sonarajah, supra note 24 at 407–8.

63. Ibid.

64. Art. 10, China-Sri Lanka BIT.

65. For a general discussion on state sovereignty, see Karen GEVORGYAN, “Concept of State Sovereignty: Modern Attitudes” (2014), online: <http://ysu.am/files/Karen_Gevorgyan.pdf>.

66. Art. 6(2), China-Sri Lanka BIT. For a discussion on judicial fullness, see Gevorgyan, ibid., at 446–7.

67. Art. 13, China-Sri Lanka BIT.

68. Art. 13(3), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

69. Ibid.

70. Art. 1(4)(a), (b), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

71. For detailed discussion on the history China's SOEs, see Wang, supra note 16 at 644–8.

72. For a discussion on investment by SWF, including China's SWF, see Julien CHAISSE, “Demystifying Public Security Exception and Limitations on Capital Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign Investments in the EU Internal Market” (2015) 37 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 583.

73. For an overview of the CIC, see China Investment Corporation, “2017 Annual Report” (July 2018), online: CIC <http://www.china-inv.cn/chinainven/Media/2018-07/1001376.shtml>.

74. Jeswald W. SALACUSE, The Law of Investment Treaties, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 274.

75. Art. 4, China-Sri Lanka BIT. For a discussion on China's approach towards the MFN clause, see Hadley, supra note 44 at 289–90.

76. Art. 3(2), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

77. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”, Working Papers on International Investment No 2004/3, September 2004 at 8. For a discussion on China's approach towards the FET, see Kong, supra note 46 at 123; Hadley, supra note 44 at 281–2.

78. Art. 13, China-Sri Lanka BIT.

79. Art. 11, China-Sri Lanka BIT.

80. For a discussion on the “prohibition and restriction clauses”, see Wolfgang ALSCHNER and Kun HUI, “Missing in Action: General Public Policy Exceptions in Investment Treaties” in Lisa SACHS, Jesse COLEMAN, and Lise JOHNSON, eds., Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

81. For a detailed discussion on the NPM clauses in IIAs, see William W. BURKE-WHITE and Andreas von STADEN, “Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of International Law 307. For a critical discussion on public policy exceptions in IIAs, see Alschner and Hui, supra note 80; Caroline HENCKELS, “Should Investment Treaties Contain Public Policy Exceptions?” (2018) 59 Boston College Law Review 2825.

82. Burke-White and Staden, supra note 81 at 334.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid., at 342.

86. Art. 4, China-Sri Lanka BIT.

87. Such invocation of the MFN clause was rejected in the case of CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, para. 377.

88. For a discussion on self-judging and non-self-judging NPM clauses, see Burke-White and Staden, supra note 81 at 368–86. See further Cc/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited., and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v. The Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 25 July, 2016, para. 219.

89. Furthermore, art. 11, 2003 Peru-Singapore BIT, which contains language almost identical to art. 11, China-Sri Lanka BIT, has been expounded as a clause “very close to a self-judging clause”, despite the fact that it establishes “objective conditions for invoking the exception”. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “The Protection of National Security in IIAs; UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development” (2009), online: UNCTAD <https://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20085_en.pdf> at 94–5.

90. See generally Michael D. NOLAN and Frédéric G. SOURGENS, “The Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging Emergency Clauses in International Investment Agreements” in Karl SAUVANT ed., Yearbook of International Investment Law and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 362.

91. See generally Berger, supra note 35; Berger, supra note 46; Kong, supra note 46; Schill, supra note 44; Trakman, supra note 44; Congyan, supra note 38.

92. Kong, supra note 46 at 110–11; Berger, supra note 35 at 8.

93. Kong, supra note 46 at 110–11; Berger, supra note 35 at 8. See further Schill, supra note 44 at 78.

94. See generally Kong, supra note 46 at 124; Berger, supra note 35 at 8–9; Berger, supra note 44 at 11–13; Berger, supra note 46 at 8; Hadley, supra note 44 at 290–2; Schill, supra note 44 at 94–7; Congyan, supra note 38 at 461.

95. See, for example, Sri Lanka-UK BIT, 1980.

96. Berger, supra note 46 at 8; Schill, supra note 44 at 89–91; Hadley, supra note 44 at 303–6; Congyan, supra note 38 at 481.

97. Kong, supra note 46 at 129–32; Berger, supra note 46 at 8.

98. Sri Lanka is the first country against which a foreign investor has had recourse to international arbitration based on the dispute settlement clause in a BIT. This was the case of Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 June 1990). For a discussion on this case, see Pathirana, supra note 26 at 296.

99. See generally Kong, supra note 46 at 116; Berger supra note 35 at 7.

100. See generally Berger, supra note 35.

101. Supplementary Environmental Impact Assessment Report on the Colombo Port City project, supra note 8 at 5.

102. See, for example, Bath, supra note 21.

103. See generally Dilini PATHIRANA, “Making an Arbitration Claim Under Chinese BITs: Some Inferences from Recent ISDS Cases” (2017) 5 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 420 at 426–8.

104. See, for example, Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 12 February 2009; Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People's Democratic Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2013-13, Award on Jurisdiction, 13 December 2013; Beijing Urban Construction Group Co Ltd v. Republic of Yemen, supra note 19.

105. Art. 13(3), China-Sri Lanka BIT 1987.

106. Art. 6(1), (2), China-Sri Lanka BIT 1987.

107. A similar interpretative approach was adopted by Sanum and BUCG tribunals. For a detailed discussion, see Pathirana, supra note 103 at 427.

108. See, for example, Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 104. See further Nils ELIASSON, “The Chinese Investment Treaty Programme, Jurisdictional Challenges and Investment Planning: The Example of Chinese Outbound Investments in the Natural Resources Sector” in Wenhua SHAN and Jinyuan SU, eds., China and International Investment Law Twenty Years of ICSID Membership (Leiden/Boston, MA: Brill, 2014), 235 at 246; Jane WILLEMS, “Investment Disputes under China's BITs: Jurisdiction with Chinese Characteristic?” in Julien CHAISSE, ed., China's International Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Law and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019), 444 at 449–50.

109. See, for example, RosInvest UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, ICSID Case No. V079/2005, Award, 12 September 2010; Berschader v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award, 21 April 2006.

110. Pathirana, supra note 103 at 428.

111. For a detailed discussion on the application of China's IIAs to Hong Kong and Macao, see Odysseas G. REPOUSIS, “On Territoriality and International Investment Law: Applying China's Investment Treaties to Hong Kong and Macao’ (2015) 37 Michigan Journal of International Law 113. See further Willems, supra note 108.

112. BOI, supra note 23 at 5.

113. The Shangri-La Hotel, Colombo, damaged by the Easter Sunday attack, is one of the hotels that belongs to the Shangri-La International Hotel Management Limited—a Hong Kong-based multinational company.

114. China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 and over Macao on 20 December 1999.

115. See generally Willems, supra note 108 at 455.

116. These are the criteria used by the Sanum Tribunal in its analysis on the applicability of the 1993 China-Laos BIT to Macao. For a detailed discussion, see Pathirana supra note 103 at 424–6.

117. Art. 2(1)(b), China-Sri Lanka BIT.

118. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on October 21, 2016” (October 2016), online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1407743.shtml>.

119. Art. 1(3)(b), China-Sri Lanka BIT. Furthermore, in the case of Tza Yap Shum v. Peru the Tribunal determined that the claimant investor was a Chinese national by referring to the Law of Nationality of the PRC in recognizing his standing to bring a claim under the 1994 China-Peru BIT.

120. Art. 1(4)(b), China-Sri Lanka BIT. Furthermore, in the case of Sanum Investments Limited v. Laos the tribunal determined that the 1993 China-Laos BIT applies to “all the territory over which the PRC has sovereignty” and, thus concluded that Sanum Investments Limited which was established under the laws and regulations of the Macao SAR as an “economic entity established in accordance with the laws and regulations of the PRC”.

121. Sanum Award, supra note 104 at para. 303.

122. Willems, supra note 108 at 461.

123. Ibid.

124. Simon BATIFORT and J. Benton HEATH, “The New Debate on the Interpretation of MFN Clauses in Investment Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateralization” (2017) 11 American Journal of International Law 873.

125. Ibid. See further UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment—UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (New York/Geneva: United Nations, 2010); Suzy NIKIÈMA, “The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause in Investment Treaties”, International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD Best Practices Series, February 2017; Facundo PÉREZ-AZNAR, “The Use of Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses to Import Substantive Treaty Provisions in International Investment Agreements” (2018) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 777.

126. Hochtief AG v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 October 2011, para. 82.

127. See, for example, Bayindir InsaatTurizmTicaretVeSanayi AS v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005; White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 November 2011.

128. See, for example, Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000; RosInvest UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V (079/2005), Award on Jurisdiction, 1 October 2007.

129. See, for example, Plama Consortium Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005; Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 November 2004.

130. See, for example, Daimler Financial Services AG v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, 22 August 2012, para. 239. While rejecting the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the tribunal in this case held that Contracting Parties do not explicitly exclude international investor-state dispute resolution provisions from the scope of the MFN clause simply because they never considered such an invocation of the clause to be possible.

131. For a detail discussion on treaty shopping, see Julien CHAISSE, “The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration” (2015) 11 Hastings Business Law Journal 225; Alan FRANKLIN, “Treaty Shopping and Denial of Benefits Clauses—What Investors Should Know” (April 2018), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3161829>; Suzy H. NIKIÈMA, “Best Practices Definition of Investor”, The International Institute for Sustainable Development, Best Practice Series, March 2012.

132. See Chaisse, supra note 131; Franklin, supra note 131; Nikièma, supra note 131.

133. See, for example, Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvadorv, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on Jurisdiction Objections, 1 June 2012; Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 17 December 2015.

134. Nikièma, supra note 131 at 11–12.

135. For a detailed discussion on political risk insurance, see Kathryn GORDON, “Investment Guarantees and Political Risk Insurance: Institutions, Incentives and Development”, The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Investment Policy Perspectives, 2008.

136. For a discussion on public and private PRI providers, see ibid., at 96–106. See further Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), World Bank Group, online: <https://www.miga.org/>.

137. For a discussion on the SINOSURE and Belt and Road Initiative, see Lisa HIELSCHER, “China's Overseas Investment Insurance—Sinosure” (May 2019), online: Belt and Road Initiative <https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/tag/sinosure/>; CHEN Yingqun, “In Overseas Ventures, Insurance Gives Firms a Sure Footing” China Daily (28 April 2019), online: China Daily <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/28/WS5cc4ec64a3104842260b8cde.html>.

138. See, for example, Chen, supra note 137.

139. Gordon, supra note 135.

140. Ibid., at 94, 101, 102, 104.

141. Ibid.

142. See generally Miles, supra note 25; MONTT, Santiago, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration; Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2009)Google Scholar.

143. Geoffrey GERTZ, “Commercial Diplomacy and Political Risk”, Brookings Institution, Global Economy & Development Working Paper 106, August 2017; GERTZ, Geoffrey, JANDHYALA, Srividya, and POULSEN, Lauge N. Skovgaard, “Legalization, Diplomacy, and Development: Do Investment Treaties De-Politicize Investment Disputes?” (2018) 107 World Development 239CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

144. For a general discussion on the commercial diplomacy, see Olivier NARAY, “Commercial Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview”, 7th World Conference of TPOs, Conference Paper, 2008. See further STODDARD, Edward, “Tough Times, Shifting Roles: Examining the EU's Commercial Diplomacy in Foreign Energy Markets” (2017) 24 Journal of European Public Policy 1048CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

145. See generally Pattanaik, supra note 4; Dharmawardhane, supra note 10.

146. See generally Bath, supra note 21.

147. Tharushan FERNANDO, “Tripartite Agreement Signed for Colombo International Financial City” Newsfirst (12 August 2016), online: Newsfirst <https://www.newsfirst.lk/2016/08/12/government-signs-tripartite-agreement-colombo-international-financial-city/>; “Tripartite Agreements for Port City Investments” DailyFT (15 January 2019), online: DailyFT <http://www.ft.lk/top-story/Tripartite-agreements-for-Port-City-investments/26-670863>.

148. See generally Bath, supra note 21.