The challenges in conducting a thorough analysis of matters relating to Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) arise not only from the secretive nature of terrorist activities but also from the difficulties in testing its impact empirically as one never knows whether existing measures are effective. In this book, Goldbrasht kickstarts the analysis with an optimistic outlook, offering documentary evidence to explain the high level of compliance, even if such measures are imposed mainly through soft laws. The book examines soft laws imposed primarily by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), one of the three pillars used to tackle CTF alongside the Terrorist Financing Convention and the United Nations (UN) Security Council (p. 33).
This book analyses the non-binding norms embedded in the otherwise complicated systems that involve dynamics between international law and domestic political processes. Chapter 1 theorizes the influence of hard and soft law in governing issues related to CTF, analyzing the processes of norm creation. It touches on state compliance with these norms in a legal field previously regulated by a traditional approach of creating binding norms in international law, which subsequently shapes the world's standards leading to a high rate of compliance.
Chapter 2 explains the importance and challenges of CTF initiatives. A comprehensive background of the financing of civil and military wings is offered, although there is a lack of a concrete and unified definition of what terrorism is compared to simple criminal activities. Chapter 3 lays out the international framework under “the three pillars” approach (p. 63), including the non-binding yet highly observed recommendations. Chapter 4 describes the implementation of a regulatory framework from all UN member states with a descriptive analysis that examines the status of implementation. Chapter 5 assesses the implementation of these measures in six selected countries (the UK, Australia, India, Israel, Malaysia, and Thailand). Chapter 6 identifies the common reasons for the high level of compliance despite the norms being non-binding. Chapter 7 concludes with an argument to solidify and strengthen the legitimacy of the FTAF through further administrative measures, which may be contradictive with a preceding analysis of well-functioning measures already in place (p. 232).
In his innovative approach to exploring the binding nature of soft law through its alignment with domestic political processes, Goldbrasht provides much-needed clarity and a clear description of how each layer flows and correlates its impacts to others. The identification of high compliance despite the non-binding nature of these regulations emerges from rationality and self-interest arising from the “name-and-shame” strategy (p. 226). These views, regrettably, were not substantially evidenced empirically but, instead, come more from logical deduction from written policies. It is unclear what impact could be gained by filling in the accountability deficits arising from a legitimacy issue when the entire system appears to be well complied with, as is argued. The real question may be whether the high level of compliance results in effective deterrence, which Goldbrasht acknowledges is difficult to empirically examine (e.g., pp. 83–4). Yet, this would be the natural next step based on the foundations developed in this book.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
