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Democratic Constitutions, Electoral Commissions and Legitimacy – The Example of Australia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2021

Paul Kildea  and
Sarah Murray
Paul Kildea*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law & Justice, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Sarah Murray
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia Law School, Perth, Australia
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article explores the structure, management and institutional design of commissions in Australia and unpacks how these institutions operate within the Australian political landscape. Part 1 looks at the structure of Australian electoral commissions and how they maintain structural independence. Part 2 seeks to better understand Australian electoral institutions, through an examination of how they have manoeuvred administrative and political challenges and emergencies when they have arisen. Finally, Part 3 employs a neo-institutionalist lens to focus on the internal and external dynamics that assist or hinder the operation of commissions in Australia and how legitimacy and institutional trust can be created, maintained and harmed by electoral agencies in the Australian context.

Type
Article
Information
Asian Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 16 , Supplement S1 , December 2021 , pp. S177 - S192
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

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Footnotes

The authors would like to thank Professors Rosalind Dixon and Mark Tushnet for organising the Democratic Constitutions and Electoral Commissions Workshop in December 2020 from which this paper derives.

References

1 Tokaji, Daniel P, ‘The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions’ (2009) 28 Yale Law & Policy Review 125, 126Google Scholar.

2 M Moshin Alam Bhat, ‘Governing Democracy Outside the Law: India's Election Commission and the Challenge of Accountability’, this Special Issue.

3 Dinesha Samararatne, ‘Sri Lanka's First Election Commission: Strengthening Electoral Management or Advancing Electoral Integrity?’, this Special Issue.

4 Pal, Michael, ‘Electoral Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government’ (2016) 21 Review of Constitutional Studies 85Google Scholar.

5 Eg, Ackerman, Bruce, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113(3) Harvard Law Review 633CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2nd ed 2018) ch 5.

6 Two exceptions should be noted: the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) ss 94F and 94G establishes the Victorian Electoral Commissioner as an independent officer of the Parliament and ensures the continuance of the state's Electoral Boundaries Commission; the Constitution Act 1934 (SA), Part 5, entrenches the state's Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission and the electoral redistribution process.

7 Norm Kelly, Directions in Australian Electoral Reform: Professionalism and Partisanship in Electoral Management (ANU E-Press 2011) 10.

8 Colin Hughes, ‘Institutionalising Electoral Integrity’ in Marian Sawer (ed), Elections: Full, Free and Fair (Federation Press 2001) 142, 156.

9 CP House of Representatives Deb 2 November 1983, 2214, 2216 (Kim Beazley).

10 Michael Maley, ‘Appendix: How Australians Vote’ in Benjamin T Jones, Frank Bongiorno & John Uhr (eds), Elections Matter: The Federal Elections that Shaped Australia (Monash University Publishing 2018) 252, 279.

11 ibid. On the AEC's role in fostering and protecting electoral democracy see Kildea, Paul, ‘The Constitutional Role of Electoral Management Bodies: The Case of the Australian Electoral Commission’ (2020) 48 Federal Law Review 46CrossRefGoogle Scholar9.

12 Simon Butt & Fritz Siregar, ‘Multilayered Oversight: Electoral Administration in Indonesia’, this Special Issue; Samararatne (n 3).

13 Michael Pal, ‘Constitutional Design of Electoral Governance in Federal States’, this Special Issue.

14 Michael Maley & Graeme Orr, ‘Developing a Legislative Framework for a Complex and Dynamic Electoral Environment’ [2019] UQLRS 12.

15 Helena Catt and others, Electoral Management Design (International IDEA 2014) 21; see also in this Special Issue: Samararatne (n 3); Malcolm Langford, Rebecca Schiel & Bruce M. Wilson, ‘The Rise of Electoral Management Bodies: Diffusion and Effects’; Dian A H Shah, ‘The Malaysian Election Commission: Navigating Electoral Authoritarianism and Political Change’; Richard Stacey & Victoria Miyandazi, ‘Constituting and Regulating Democracy: Kenya's Electoral Commission and the Courts in the 2010s’.

16 AEC, New South Wales Electoral Commission (NSWEC), Tasmanian Electoral Commission, Australian Capital Territory Electoral Commission.

17 Victorian Electoral Commission, Electoral Commission Queensland, Electoral Commission of South Australia, Northern Territory Electoral Commission.

18 Western Australian Electoral Commission (WAEC).

19 Kelly, Directions in Australian Electoral Reform (n 7) 39.

20 Electoral Act 2017 (NSW), s 10; Electoral Act 2002 (Vic), s 10; Electoral Act 2004 (Tas), s 10.

21 Eg, the provision of international electoral assistance: Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), ss 7(1)(fa) and 38(1).

22 Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Establishing a Sustainable Framework for Election Funding and Spending Laws in New South Wales: A Report Prepared for the New South Wales Electoral Commission’ (November 2012) 39.

23 Catt and others (n 15) 21.

24 ibid 172.

25 Colin Hughes, ‘Institutionalising Electoral Integrity’ in Marian Sawer (ed), Elections: Full, Free and Fair (Federation Press 2001) 142, 156.

26 Catt and others (n 15) 9.

27 Kelly, Directions in Australian Electoral Reform (n 7) 45.

28 ibid 47–48.

29 Financial Management Act 1996 (ACT), ss 20AB and 20AC; Electoral Act 1992 (ACT), s 6A.

30 Electoral Act 2002 (Vic), s 8(2)(b).

31 See generally Kelly, Directions in Australian Electoral Reform (n 7) 44.

32 Michael Maley, ‘Electoral Management Under COVID-19’ (Electoral Regulation Research Network 2020) 20 <https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/3393066/WP71_Maley.pdf> accessed 26 February 2021; Graeme Orr, The Law of Politics – Elections, Parties and Money in Australia (2nd edn, Federation Press 2019) 202.

33 See also in the United States context, Pal (n 13).

34 cf Catherine Renshaw & Michael Lidauer, ‘The Union Election Commission of Myanmar 2010 – 2020’, this Special Issue.

35 Casey Briggs, ‘AEC hopes to get federal election voter queues moving faster than ever’ (ABC News, 4 April 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-04/how-the-aec-is-working-to-reduce-waiting-times-during-elections/10967528> accessed 26 February 2021.

36 Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Report on the Conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto (November 2018) 74–6.

37 ibid 79–84.

38 Parliament of New South Wales Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, ‘Administration of the 2019 NSW State Election’ (2020) 51ff; Sarah Gerathy, ‘NSW Election Confusion, Chaos as Computer Problem Shuts Several Pre-poll (ABC News, 13 March 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-13/nsw-election-voters-being-turned-away-from-pre-poll-stations/10895954?nw=0> accessed 26 February 2021; Victorian Electoral Matters Committee, ‘Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2018 Victorian State Election’ (2020) [4.5.2].

39 AEC, ‘Supplemental Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters – Improving Electoral Security & Trust in Australia's Electoral System’ (2020) 10ff.

40 Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Hearing, ‘Conduct of the 2019 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto’ (6 December 2019) 2.

41 AEC, ‘Supplemental Submission’ (n 39) 2.

42 See, eg, NSWEC, Report on the Conduct of the 2019 NSW State Election (2019) 46 and 58.

43 See, eg, WAEC, 2017 State General Election - Election Report (2017) 32.

44 Eg, NSWEC (n 42) 16; ibid 28–29.

45 This is a longstanding challenge: see eg, Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, ‘Conduct of the 1990 Federal Election Part III and Preparations for the Next Federal Election’ (1992) 1.

46 AEC, ‘Supplemental Submission’ (n 39) 2.

47 See, eg, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, ‘Featured Elections Held and Mitigating Measures Taken During COVID-19’ (21 October 2020) <https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/elections_held_and_mitigating_measures_taken_during_covid-19.pdf> accessed 26 February 2021; AEC, ‘Supplemental Submission’ (n 39), 3.

48 Maley, ‘Electoral Management Under COVID-19’ (n 30) 6; Antony Green, ‘How to Manage the Eden-Monaro By-Election in a Time of Covid-19’ (1 May 2020) <https://antonygreen.com.au/managing-the-eden-monaro-by-election-in-a-time-of-covid-19> accessed 26 February 2021; but cf ECQ, ‘State General Election’ (Media Release, 30 October 2020) <https://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/media/2020-media-statements> accessed 26 February 2021.

49 Narelle Miragliotta, ‘Remote Voting Under COVID-19’ (ERRN Working No 72, 2020) <https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/3504254/WP72_Miragliotta.pdf> accessed 26 February 2021.

50 The lack of widespread use of internet voting has exacerbated the complications wrought by COVID-19: cf use of online voting in Myanmar: Renshaw & Lidauer (n 34).

51 Dennis F Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States (University of Chicago Press 2002) 178–179.

52 ibid 179; Tham, ‘Establishing a Sustainable Framework’ (n 22) 50–51.

53 Damon Muller, ‘Election Funding and Disclosure in Australian States and Territories: a Quick Guide’, (Research Papers 2018–2019, Parliament of Australia 2018) <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1819/Quick_Guides/ElectionFundingStates> accessed 26 February 2021.

54 Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) ss 70 and 97L (since repealed); now see Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW), ss 78 and 96.

55 NSWEC, ‘Liberal Party of Australia (NSW Division) Ineligible for further Public Funding and Supporting Information’ (Statement by Chairperson, NSW Electoral Commission, 23 March 2016); NSWEC, ‘Liberal Party of Australia (NSW Division) Eligible for Public Funding after Deduction of Value of Unlawful Donations Received in 2010/11’ (Statement by Chairperson, NSW Electoral Commission, 22 September 2016).

56 Graeme Orr, ‘Never too Late to Regulate: Political Finance and the Electoral Commission and Liberal Party of NSW’ (AUSPUBLAW, 29 March 2016) <https://auspublaw.org/2016/03/never-too-late-to-regulate> accessed 26 February 2021.

57 Auditor-General, Administration of Financial Disclosure Requirements Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act (Auditor-General Report No 8, 2020–2021) 6.

58 ibid 6–8.

59 Christopher Knaus, ‘AEC not Punishing Political Donors that Break the Rules, Damning Audit Finds’ (The Guardian, 17 September 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/17/australian-electoral-commission-not-punishing-political-donors-that-break-the-rules-damning-audit-finds> accessed 26 February 2021.

60 Orr, The Law of Politics (n 32) ch 11.

61 Eg, Electoral Funding Act 2018 (NSW), ss 78 and 96.

62 Joo-Cheong Tham, Money and Politics: The Democracy We Can't Afford (UNSW Press 2010) 44.

63 ibid.

64 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) Pt XXA, s 329(1).

65 Garbett v Liu [2019] FCAFC 241 [3].

66 (1981) 147 CLR 169.

67 On AEC position see Garbett v Liu [2019] FCAFC 241 [151].

68 ibid [132]–[135], [144].

69 ibid [144].

70 AEC, Twitter (17 June 2020) <https://twitter.com/AusElectoralCom/status/1273144624501096448> accessed 26 February 2021.

71 Josh Taylor, ‘AEC Argues Chinese-language Election Signs Could Not have Swayed Voters’ (The Guardian, 7 November 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/07/aec-argues-chinese-language-election-signs-could-not-have-swayed-voters>.

72 Paul Pirani, ‘Elections and Administrative Law’ (2012) 68 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 19, 38–39.

73 Garbett v Liu [2019] FCAFC 241 [154].

74 Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Electoral Management Bodies: The Case of Australian Electoral Commissions’ (2013) 12 Election Law Journal 386, 399.

75 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 25 May 2011, 13 (Scott Ryan).

76 ibid.

77 ibid 13.

78 ibid.

79 Maley, ‘Appendix: How Australians Vote’ (n 10) 252, 281.

80 New South Wales Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Inquiry into Voter Enrolment (2006) [4.34]-[4.43]; Rodney Smith, International Experiences of Electronic Voting and Their Implications for New South Wales (2009); New South Wales Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Review of the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 and the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (2013).

81 Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Third Interim Report on the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2016 Federal Election: AEC Modernisation (June 2017).

82 AEC, Submission No 66.11 to JSCEM, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into and Report on All Aspects of the Conduct of the 2016 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto (February 2017) 6.

83 Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Hearing (n 40).

84 Australian Electoral Commission, Annual Report 2013–2014, 42 <http://annualreport.aec.gov.au/annual-reports.html> accessed 20 October 2020. Records indicated that these missing papers including 120 informal and 1250 above the line votes: AEC v Johnston (2014) 251 CLR 463 [48] (Hayne J).

85 Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, The 2013 Federal Election – Report on the Conduct of the 2013 Election and Matters Related Thereto (2015) vii.

86 AEC v Johnston (2014) 251 CLR 463, [10], [122] (Hayne J).

87 Australian Electoral Commission, Annual Report 2013–2014, 96 <http://annualreport.aec.gov.au/annual-reports.html> accessed 20 October 2020.

88 AEC Media Release, ‘Australian Electoral Commission Statement: WA Senate Recount’ (31 October 2013) <https://www.aec.gov.au/media/media-releases/2013/e10-31.htm> accessed 26 February 2021.

89 M Keelty, ‘Inquiry into the 2013 WA Senate Election’ (December 2013) <https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/files/inquiry-into-the-2013-wa-senate-election.pdf> accessed 20 October 2020.

90 ibid 11.

91 ibid 22.

92 ibid 24.

93 Fran Kelly, ‘Australian Electoral Commission Apologises for Lost Senate Votes’ (RN Breakfast ABC Radio National, 4 November 2013) <https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/australian-electoral-commissioner-ed-killesteyn/5066974> accessed 26 February 2021.

94 Judith Ireland & James Massola, ‘Electoral Commissioner Ed Killesteyn Resigns after Bungled WA Senate Vote’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 2014) <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/electoral-commissioner-ed-killesteyn-resigns-after-bungled-wa-senate-vote-20140221-336vx.html> accessed 26 February 2021.

95 March, James & Olsen, Johan, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life’ (1984) 78(3) The American Political Science Review 734Google Scholar; Walter W. Powell, ‘Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis’ in Walter W Powell & Paul J DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (University of Chicago Press 1991) 183.

96 James March & Johan Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”’ in Sarah A. Binder, R.A.W. Rhodes & Bert A Rockman, Oxford Handbooks of Political Institutions (2009) 4 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0001.

97 ibid 6; Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, ‘Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a “New Institutionalism”’ in Lawrence Dodd & Calvin Jillson (eds), The Dynamics of American Politics- Approaches and Interpretations (Westview Press 1994) 311, 326.

98 See Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985) 201.

99 Powell (n 95) 183, 195.

100 Maley, Michael, ‘The Australian Electoral Commission: Balancing Independence and Accountability’ (2001) 38(1) Representation 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 27.

101 Kelly, ‘Australian Electoral Commission Apologises for Lost Senate Votes’ (n 93).

102 See, eg, Langford, Schiel & Wilson (n 15).

103 Michael Koziol, ‘Electoral Commission Warns Record Number of Early Votes Could Delay Results’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 16 May 2019), <https://www.smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/electoral-commission-warns-record-number-of-early-votes-could-delay-results-20190515-p51nqj.html> accessed 26 February 2021.

104 Langford, Schiel & Wilson (n 15).

105 Kelly, ‘Australian Electoral Commission Apologises for Lost Senate Votes’ (n 93).

106 Commonwealth Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Hearing (n 40).

107 For a good example see: Parliament of New South Wales Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (n 38) [5.195].

108 See generally, Powell (n 95) 183, 201.