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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 October 2021
Unlike the First Amendment of the United States, the quest to develop a grand theory to explain the scope and purpose of the free speech clause of the Indian Constitution has rarely been attempted. In this void, the significant constitutional question of when expressive conduct should trigger free speech protection has not received adequate academic and judicial scrutiny in India despite its global resonance. This article examines the evolution of the current doctrine by the Indian Supreme Court on the issue of expressive conduct and finds that the Court's ad-hoc approach fails to provide a meaningful resolution framework. Analysing the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court on its First Amendment, it discusses two potential approaches available to the Indian Supreme Court: one based on the speaker's conduct, and the other, based on state purposes. It argues that focusing on state purposes not only provides a principled answer to this conundrum but is also consistent with Indian free speech jurisprudence. Contrary to contemporary scholarship, it demonstrates that the law on Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, as moulded by the Indian Supreme Court over decades, has implicitly treated the examination of state purpose as its predominant inquiry. This article concludes with some ideas on the limitations and prospects of adopting such an approach.
At the time of publication, the author is an LLM candidate at the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. I thank Siddhant Kohli for helping me think through many of the issues discussed in this article. I also thank Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj, and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments. Finally, I am grateful to Gautam Bhatia and Vasudev Devadasan for taking the time to briefly discuss some of these ideas at a nascent stage in January 2020.
1 Constitution of India, art 19(1)(a).
2 Constitution of India, art 19(2).
3 Schauer, Frederick, ‘On The Distinction Between Speech And Action’ (2015) 65 Emory Law Journal 427Google Scholar.
4 See eg, Emerson, Thomas, ‘Toward A General Theory Of The First Amendment’ (1962) 72 Yale Law Journal 877Google Scholar; Rubenfeld, Jed, ‘The First Amendment's Purpose’ (2000) 53 Stanford Law Review 767Google Scholar; Schauer, Frederick, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press 1982) 80–86Google Scholar; Scanlon, Thomas, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 204, 209Google Scholar.
5 For one such quest, see generally Bhatia, Gautam, Offend, Shock, or Disturb (Oxford University Press 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which concludes that there is no single consistent theory that can explain the different strands of Indian free speech jurisprudence.
6 Robinson, Nick, ‘Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure on the Indian and US Supreme Courts’ (2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 173CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 A prominent Hindu festival, also known as the ‘festival of lights’, traditionally celebrated by burning firecrackers.
8 See Section titled ‘Limitations of The Indian Supreme Court's Current Doctrine’ below.
9 See Section titled ‘Reconciling Purposivism with the “Direct and Inevitable Effect” Test In India’ below.
10 See eg, Sorabjee, Soli, ‘Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2)’, in Hidayatullah, M (ed), Constitutional Law of India (Bar Council of India Trust 1984) 285Google Scholar; Basu, DD, Constitutional Law of India (7th edn, Eastern Book Company 1998) 50Google Scholar; Dhavan, Rajeev, ‘The Press And The Constitutional Guarantee Of Free Speech And Expression’ (1986) 28 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 308Google Scholar.
11 Kagan, Elena, ‘Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 426CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As will be subsequently discussed, Justice Elena Kagan's seminal analysis of the role of state motive in the US makes it possible to draw many interesting parallels between the free speech jurisprudence of India and the US. I have accordingly found it helpful to borrow some of her formulations to describe the current state of Indian free speech doctrine.
12 See eg, Emerson (n 4) 877; Mill, JS, On Liberty And Other Writings (Collini, Stefan ed, Cambridge University Press 1989) 20–21Google Scholar; Greenawalt, Kent, ‘Free Speech Justifications’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 119, 130CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meiklejohn, Alexander, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers Of The People (Oxford University Press 1965) 26–27Google Scholar; Baker, C Edwin, ‘Scope Of The First Amendment Freedom Of Speech’ (1978) 25 UCLA Law Review 964, 966Google Scholar.
13 See Section titled ‘In Search Of A Limiting Principle’ below.
14 See eg, Bork, Robert, Slouching Towards Gomorrah (Harper Collins 1996) 185Google Scholar; Street v New York (1969) 394 US 576, 610 (Black J, dissenting). See also, Volokh, Eugene, ‘Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment’ (2009) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 1057Google Scholar.
15 Magid, Laurie, ‘First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct’ (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 470CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Henkin, Louis, ‘The Supreme Court, 1967 Term’ (1968) 82 Harvard Law Review 63, 79–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 Magid (n 15) 471.
17 ibid 1107.
18 ibid 471.
19 ibid.
20 ibid.
21 ibid; Barendt, Eric, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press 2007) 23–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 See Section titled ‘Limitations of the Indian Supreme Court's Current Doctrine’ below for a comprehensive overview of Indian jurisprudence on this issue.
23 The term ‘Lochnerism’ comes from the infamous case of Lochner v New York (1905) 198 US 45, which struck down a state law limiting bakers to 60-hour work weeks, symbolising the era in which the US Supreme Court invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare measures, including minimum wage laws and laws designed to enable employees to unionise. See eg, David Strauss, ‘Why Was Lochner Wrong?’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 373, 373.
24 Rubenfeld (n 4) 771.
25 ibid 768.
26 Eric Neisser, ‘Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas’ (1985) 74 Georgetown Law Journal 257, 258.
27 Frederick Schauer, ‘Harm(s) and the First Amendment’ (2012) 2011 The Supreme Court Review 110.
28 Spence v Washington (1974) 418 US 405.
29 Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) 515 US 557.
30 Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2013) 12 SCC 73 (Nariman, J, writing the Court's opinion, observed that ‘(m)ere discussion or even advocacy of a particular cause howsoever unpopular is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in.’)
31 See accompanying text to (n 12).
32 See Bhatia (n 5) 22–24.
33 See Section titled ‘Reconciling Purposivism with the “Direct and Inevitable Effect” Test In India’ below.
34 Hamdard Dawakhana vs Union of India (1960) 2 SCR 671.
35 Tata Press vs MTNL 1995 AIR 2438.
36 Raghav Kohli, ‘The Sound of Constitutional Silences: Interpretive Holism and Free Speech under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution’ [2020] Statute Law Review <https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmaa012> accessed 10 Jan 2021.
37 See Section titled ‘In Search of a Limiting Principle’ below.
38 Kohli (n 36).
39 See eg, Kameshwar Prasad vs State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 1166; PUCL vs Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd vs Union of India 1962 AIR 305.
40 See eg, Subramanian Swamy vs Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221; Sahara India Real Estate Corp vs SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603. For a comprehensive discussion on whether Article 19(2) provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions on speech, see Kohli (n 36).
41 Magid (n 15) 467.
42 Union of India vs Naveen Jindal (2004) 2 SCC 510; Barnes v Glen Theatre (1991) 501 US 560.
43 Clark v Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) 468 US 288.
44 Magid (n 15) 467.
45 See Kameshwar (n 39).
46 All India Bank Employees vs National Industrial Tribunal (1962) AIR 171.
47 See Kameshwar (n 39).
48 ibid.
49 See Barendt (n 21).
50 ibid.
51 See Kameshwar (n 39).
52 Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
53 Devulapalli Sriharsha et al, ‘The most influential judgements in Supreme Court's history’ (mint, 18 Sep 2018) <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/X4lDGjqQm6bto8isWPQbEN/The-most-influential-judgements-in-Supreme-Courts-history.html> accessed 9 May 2020.
54 See Maneka Gandhi (n 52).
55 ibid.
56 ibid.
57 Sheldon Nahmod, ‘The Sacred Flag and the First Amendment’ (1991) 66 Indiana Law Journal 512.
58 ibid.
59 See eg, Jawaharlal Nehru, observing that the flag is, ‘a flag of freedom not for ourselves, but a symbol of freedom to all people who may seek it.’ (Constituent Assembly Debates, 22 Jul 1947, 766); Texas v Johnson (1989) 491 US 397.
60 See Texas (n 59).
61 See Naveen Jindal (n 42).
62 ibid.
63 Irwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General) (1989) 1 SCR 927.
64 ibid.
65 See Naveen Jindal (n 42).
66 ibid.
67 See eg, Reliance Petrochemicals vs Indian Express (1989) AIR SC 190; LIC vs Prof Manubhai Shah (1993) AIR 171. In Shreya Singhal (n 30), Nariman J clarified that such a difference is only illusory.
68 See Naveen Jindal (n 42).
69 See Texas (n 59).
70 ibid.
71 Constitution of India, art 51A.
72 Bijoe Emmanuel vs State Of Kerala (1987) AIR 748.
73 See Naveen Jindal (n 42).
74 NALSA vs Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438.
75 Constitution of India, art 14.
76 Constitution of India, art 15.
77 Constitution of India, art 16.
78 Constitution of India, art 21.
79 Constitution of India, art 19(1)(a).
80 See NALSA (n 74).
81 ibid.
82 See eg, Erin Mulvaney, ‘Dress Codes Central in Supreme Court Gender Identity Bias Debate’ (BloombergLaw, 2019) <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/dress-codes-central-in-supreme-court-gender-identity-bias-debate> accessed 9 May 2020; See Bhatia (n 5) 278.
83 Navtej Singh Johar vs Union of India (2018) AIR SC 4321.
84 See Hamdard Dawakhana (n 34).
85 ibid.
86 ibid.
87 ibid.
88 See Bhatia (n 5) 258–260.
89 See eg, Naveen Jindal (n 42), where the Court citing Emerson noted that free speech is ‘necessary (1) as assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in society.’
90 See Hamdard Dawakhana (n 34).
91 See Tata Press (n 35).
92 ibid.
93 See eg, Dr BR Ambedkar's speech in the Constituent Assembly, where he discusses the similarities between the Indian free speech clause and the US First Amendment in Vol VII, ‘Constituent Assembly Debates’ (4 Nov 1948) <https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/7/1948-11-04> accessed 15 Jan 2021. For Indian cases citing First Amendment jurisprudence, see eg, Naveen Jindal (n 42), Hamdard Dawakhana (n 34), Tata Press (n 35), etc.
94 Adrienne Stone, ‘The comparative constitutional law of freedom of expression’, in Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon (eds), Comparative Constitution Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 407.
95 See eg, UK (Lee v Ashers Baking Company (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 49); ECtHR (Açik v Turkey App No 31451/03; Tatár and Fáber v Hungary App Nos 26005/08 and 26160/08); Canada (Irwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General) (1989) 1 SCR 927).
96 See eg, United States v O'Brien (1968) 391 US 367, 376 (‘We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled “speech” whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea’); Brown v Louisiana (1966) 383 US 131, 165 (Black J, dissenting) (‘… if one group can take over libraries for one cause other groups will assert the right to do so for causes which, while wholly legal, may not be so appealing to this Court. The States are thus paralyzed with reference to control of their libraries … and … inevitably the next step will be to paralyze the schools’).
97 Magid (n 15) 473.
98 O'Brien (n 96).
99 ibid 376.
100 For use of the term ‘speech plus’, see eg, NAACP v Button (1963) 371 US 415, 455 (Harlan J, dissenting).
101 See eg, Emerson (n 4).
102 Tribe, Lawrence, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press 1978) 599–601, 616Google Scholar.
103 John Hart Ely, ‘Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1495.
104 ibid.
105 See eg, Cox v Louisiana (1965) 379 US 536, 555 (Justice Goldberg's opinion); Tinker v Des Moines Indep Community School Dist (1969) 393 US 503.
106 Melville Nimmer, ‘The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment’ (1973) 21 UCLA Law Review 29, 31.
107 See Spence (n 28).
108 ibid.
109 ibid.
110 See eg, Dr Justice DY Chandrachud, ‘Imagining Freedom through Art’ (Literature Live's Annual Independence Lecture, 17 Aug 2019) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/mumbai/attack-on-art-is-attack-on-freedom/article29121902.ece> accessed 20 May 2020; John Hospers, ‘The Concept of Artistic Expression’ (1954) 55 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 313.
111 See Hurley (n 29).
112 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd v Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018) 584 US.
113 ibid.
114 ibid.
115 Magid (n 15) 493.
116 Corbin, Caroline M, ‘Speech Or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims Of Wedding Vendors’ (2015) 65 Emory Law Journal 241Google Scholar; Post, Robert, ‘Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 1249CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
117 Corbin (n 116) 244.
118 See Clark (n 43).
119 ibid.
120 Rumsfeld v FAIR (2006) 547 US.
121 See Hurley (n 29) (Hurley observing that the ‘inherent expressiveness’ of marching makes parades expressive).
122 See Rumsfeld (n 120).
123 Corbin (n 116); City of Erie v Pap's A M (2000) 529 US 277, 289 (on the ‘inherently expressive’ nature of nudity).
124 See Clark (n 43) 306.
125 ibid.
126 Ely, John Hart, ‘Legislative And Administrative Motivation In Constitutional Law’ (1970) 79 Yale Law Journal 1205CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kagan (n 11); Rubenfeld (n 4) 771.
127 Rubenfeld (n 4) 776.
128 Kagan (n 11).
129 ibid.
130 ibid.
131 ibid.
132 ibid.
133 Rubenfeld (n 4) 818. He calls this principle the ‘Anti-Orthodoxy Principle’ in deference to Justice Jackson's famous observation in WV State Board of Education v Barnette (1943) 319 US 624, 642: ‘If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.’
134 Post (n 116) 1255.
135 In Chaplinsky v New Hampshire (1942) 315 US 568, 572, the US Supreme Court defined ‘fighting words’ as words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’
136 Kagan (n 11) 438.
137 Rubenfeld (n 4) 779.
138 Buckley v Valeo (1976) 424 US 1, 23, 29, 45.
139 Miller v Civil City of South Bend (1990) Nos 88-3006, 904 F2d 1081 (7th Circuit, 24 May 1990).
140 ibid.
141 ibid.
142 Rubenfeld (n 4) 781.
143 ibid.
144 Subramanian Swamy (n 40).
145 See eg, Sakal Papers (n 39); DTC vs DTC Mazdoor Congress (1991) Supp (1) SCC 600; St Stephen's College vs University of Delhi (1992) 1 SCC 558; Mr ‘X’ vs Hospital ‘Z’ (1998) 8 SCC 296; Ram Jethmalani vs Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 1; In re: Noise Pollution (V) (2005) 5 SCC 733.
146 Subramanian Swamy (n 40).
147 Modern Dental College & Research Centre vs State of MP (2016) 7 SCC 353.
148 For a comparative discussion on the tests of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’ in Indian constitutional law, see Chintan Chandrachud, ‘Proportionality, Judicial Reasoning, and the Indian Supreme Court’ (2016) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 12/2016. See also Anuradha Bhasin vs Union of India (2019) SCC 1725; Modern Dental College & Research Centre vs State of MP (2016) 7 SCC 353.
149 Rubenfeld (n 4) 794–795.
150 See eg, RC Cooper vs Union Of India (1970) AIR 564; see Maneka Gandhi (n 52).
151 Kagan (n 11); Rubenfeld (n 4).
152 See O'Brien (n 96). It is important to clarify that the third limb of the test does not imply that expressive conduct can only be regulated when the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The third limb is better understood as the triggering circumstance in which the O'Brien case applies.
153 ibid.
154 ibid.
155 Brest, Paul, ‘The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation’ (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 585, 590CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
156 Kagan (n 11).
157 AK Gopalan vs State of Madras (1950) AIR SC 27.
158 ibid.
159 ibid.
160 Ram Singh vs State of Delhi (1951) AIR SC 270.
161 ibid.
162 ibid.
163 ibid.
164 Express Newspaper (P) Ltd vs Union of India (1959) SCR 12.
165 Dwarkadas Shrinivas vs Sholapur Spinning and Weaving (1954) SCR 674, 683.
166 See Express Newspaper (n 164).
167 ibid.
168 ibid.
169 ibid.
170 ibid.
171 See Hamdard Dawakhana (n 34).
172 ibid.
173 ibid.
174 See RC Cooper (n 150).
175 ibid.
176 ibid.
177 Bennett Coleman vs Union Of India (1973) AIR 106.
178 ibid.
179 ibid.
180 ibid.
181 ibid.
182 Sakal Papers (n 39).
183 Indian Express Newspapers vs Union Of India (1986) AIR 515.
184 See Bhatia (n 5) 281–308; See also Dhavan (n 10) 316–317.
185 See Bennett Coleman (n 177) (Mathew J, dissenting opinion).
186 ibid.
187 ibid.
188 In coming to this conclusion however, Mathew J relied on Hamdard Dawakhana (n 34), which incorrectly held that commercial advertisements do not fall within Article 19(1)(a).
189 See Maneka Gandhi (n 52).
190 ibid.
191 ibid.
192 See eg, Jindal Stainless Ltd vs State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1; State of Maharashtra vs Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn (2013) 8 SCC 519.
193 See Maneka Gandhi (n 52).
194 ibid.
195 ibid.
196 ibid.
197 ibid.
198 ibid.
199 ibid.
200 ibid.
201 Rubenfeld (n 4) 778.
202 For similar criticisms, see Farber, Daniel et al. , ‘Practical Reason and the First Amendment’ (1987) 34 UCLA Law Review 1615, 1616Google Scholar; Solum, Lawrence B, ‘The Value of Dissent’ (2000) 85 Cornell Law Review 859, 859Google Scholar.
203 See Irwin Toy (n 63).
204 Gautam Bhatia, ‘ICLP Turns 7 | A Constitutionalism Without the Court’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 2020) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2020/08/01/iclp-turns-7-a-constitutionalism-without-the-court/> accessed 18 Aug 2021; Gautam Bhatia, ‘Contempt of Court and Freedom of Speech: An Analysis of the Prashant Bhushan Judgment’ (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 2020) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2020/08/14/contempt-of-court-and-freedom-of-speech-an-analysis-of-the-prashant-bhushan-judgment/> accessed 18 Aug 2021.