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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
In the past few years, an increasing number of Private Security Companies (PSCs—sometimes also referred to as Private Military Companies, PMCs [1]) have emerged and are offering and conducting maritime security services in Southeast Asia. These companies offer services in addition to security provided by Southeast Asian states and their government agencies. This paper explores the role of private companies in securing vessels, ports, offshore energy installations and fishing grounds across Southeast Asia, and discusses whether PSCs are an alternative or viable supplement to government efforts to protect national waters, shipping lanes and other maritime assets.
1. There has been an ongoing debate how to distinguish between PMCs and PSCs. Some observers have suggested that PMCs provide active security services, including military training, while PSCs offer more passive services. However, it has been argued that these distinctions are difficult to maintain in practice. This paper is concerned with maritime security services offered in archipelagic Southeast Asia, (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore). As these services are mostly provided outside areas of active armed conflict or war, I will use the term PSC.
2. Michael Stehr, Piraterie und Terror auf See. Nicht-Staatliche Gewalt auf den Weltmeeren 1990 bis 2004, Bewaffnete Konflikte nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes, Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koester, 2004, pp. 58-9.
3. ‘Rights & Environmental Disputes Flare’, February 2001, accessed 15 May 2005.
4. The lines between criminally and politically motivated illegal activities have become blurred, with an increase in the criminalisation of separatist and terrorist movements in recent years.
5. See for example: Anucha Charoenpo, ‘Illegal Thai Fishing Robbed Indonesia of Billions of Catches and Cash’, Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 2003, accessed 24 May 2006. N. Ganesan, ‘Illegal Fishing and Illegal Migration in Thailand's Bilateral Relations With Malaysia and Myanmar’, in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D.Kenneth Boutin (eds), Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Select Publishing for Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001, pp. 507-27.
6. Eric Ellen (ed), Shipping at Risk - The Rising Tide of Organised Crime, Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1997, pp. 112-4.
7. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Annual Reports 1992-2006), Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1992-2007.
8. Peter Chalk, Non-Military Security and Global Order. The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 68-71.
9. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Annual Reports 1992-2006), Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1992-2007.
10. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Annual Reports 1992-2006), Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1992-2007. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report. 1 January - 31 December 1997, Barking, Essex: International Chamber of Commerce, 1998, pp. 35-6. In those cases the vessel's original cargo is disposed of and the ship is then registered under a different name.
11. Phar Kim Beng, ‘No Relief in Indonesian Oil Slump’, 4 September 2004, accessed: 15 May 2005.
12. ‘Rebels Become Malacca Pirates’, Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, 2 August 2006, accessed 8 August 2006 (password required).
13. John F. Bradford, The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia, p. 70.
14. See, for example, Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb For Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004.
15. Malaysian and Indonesian officials have, for example, stated that they do not need US troops operating in the Straits of Malacca to combat terrorism, stressing their own capabilities to address the threat. David Rosenberg, ‘Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea’, Japan Focus, 13 April 2005, accessed 15 May 2007.
16. Juliet Labog-Javellana and Philip Tubeza, ‘Superferry 14 Bombing Solved, Says Arroyo’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 October 2004, p. A1.
17. Sam Bateman, ‘Asean's Tiger Navies’, Jane's Navy International 102.3 (1997), n. p. Sam Bateman, ‘Sea Change in Asia-Pacific’, Jane's Navy International 101.8 (1996), n. p. For a detailed list of the ships and equipment available and purchased by ASEAN navies see also: Richard Scott, ‘Fleet Review: Safeguarding the Seaward Lifeline’, Jane's Navy International 102.6 (1997), n. p.
Joris Janssen Lok, ‘Asean Navies Extend Their Regional Reach’, Jane's Defence Weekly 27 November 1996, pp. 25-8.
18. Bateman, ‘Sea Change in Asia-Pacific’, n. p. Bateman, ‘ASEAN's Tiger Navies’, n. p. Russia, France or the UK are considered major maritime powers, with the US the only naval super power.
19. Frank Umbach, ‘Financial Crisis Slows but Fails to Halt Easy Asian Arms Race - Part One’, Jane's Intelligence Review 10.8 (1998), n. p. David Foxwell, ‘Downturn Ties up Rmn Ambitions’, Jane's Navy International 103.3 (1998), n. p. Malcolm Davis, Rahul Bedi and Richard Scott, ‘Back on Course’, Jane's Defence Weekly 24 January 2001, n. p.
20. David Capie, ‘Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The US ‘War on Terror’ and Southeast Asian-US Relations', Pacific Review, vol 17, no 2, pp.229-36.
21. Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities’, in Sheldon W. Simon (ed), The Many Faces of Security, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, p. 51.
22. Sam Bateman, ‘Naval Balance in Southeast Asia - Search for Stability’, Jane's Defence Weekly 11 May 2005, n. p.
23. Hasjim Djalal, ‘Combating Piracy: Co-Operation Needs, Efforts, and Challenges’, Derek Johnson and Mark J. Valencia (eds), Piracy in Southeast Asia. Status, Issues, and Responses, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 148.
24. The official launch occurred in March 2006. It is estimated that the MMEA will have 80 small and medium sized vessels available for their operations. See: Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, Homepage, accessed 26 October 2006.
25. Robert Karniol, ‘Malaysians Boost Naval Power in South China Sea’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 1996, n.p. ‘Semporna Rmn Base Opens’, 13 July 2005, accessed 27 September 2005.
26. Author's Interview (confidential) in Hutan Melintang, Malaysia.
27. Author's Interview (confidential), Malaysia.
28. See: Pasuk Phongpaichit, Sungsidh Piriyarangsan and Nualnoi Treerat, Guns Girls Gambling Ganja. Thailand's Illegal Economy and Public Policy, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1998, pp. 31-2, 137-42, 47-50.
29. Bateman, ‘Naval Balance in Southeast Asia - Search For Stability’, n. p. Ian Bostock, ‘Asia's Amphibious Capability Assessed’, Jane's Intelligence Review 12.10 (2000), pp. 43-6. Malcolm H. Murfett, '“All Bets Are Off”: The Maritime Situation in Southeast Asia in the Year 2000,“ in Geoffrey Till (ed), Seapower at the Millenium, Thrupp: Sutton Publishing in association with Royal Naval Museum Publications, 2001, pp. 167-71.
30. Edith Regalado, ‘PR Can't Police Sea Lanes Between Mindanao, Indonesia’, Philippine Star 16 October 2006, n. p.
31. ‘Poorly Paid Philippines Police Officers Pawn Guns’, 29 June 2006, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, accessed 29 June 2006. For corruption within the navy see: Lt Antonio F. Trillanes IV PN, ‘Corruption in the Philippine Navy Procurement System’, March 2002, accessed 20 September 2004.
32. Bateman, ‘Naval Balance in Southeast Asia - Search for Stability’, n. p. Hasjim Djalal, ‘Combating Piracy’, pp. 145-8. Hasjim Djalal estimates that the Indonesian Navy would need at least 300 fully operational vessels to secure Indonesian waters.
33. Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High a Price. The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities’, vol. 18, no. 5, June 2006, pp.4-5. However, as the report points out, these estimates are controversial.
34. Military funding through business activity is highly controversial as it diminishes state control over armed forces. For a discussion of the Indonesian case see: Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High a Price’.
35. Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High a Price’, p. 2.
36. Peter Chalk, ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 21 (1998), p. 94.
37. Author's Interview (confidential), February 2004, Singapore.
38. In 1997, for example, a major on an operational appointment received about Rp500,000 (Us $214) per months. Tim Huxley, ‘Indonesia's Armed Forces Face up to New Threats’, Jane's Intelligence Review 9.1 (1997), n. p.
39. Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High a Price’, p. 46.
40. Human Rights Watch, ‘Too High a Price’, pp. 46-7.
41. More precisely, the Grasberg mine in Papua is operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, which is 90.64% owned by Freeport McMoRan and 9.36% owned by the Indonesian government.
42. Global Witness, ‘Paying For Protection. The Freeport Mine and the Indonesian Security Forces’, Global Witness, 2005.
43. Abid Aslam, ‘Rights: Us Oil Giant Sued over Human Rights Abuses in Indonesia’, 2001, accessed 9 June 2007. These cases are, however, seldom straightforward, as oil/gas and mining companies are known to have paid separatist and other local movements while similarly paying the state forces to protect them from attacks.
44. Abid Aslam, Rights: Us Oil Giant Sued over Human Rights Abuses in Indonesia'.
45. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, p. 64-5.
46. Mark J. Valencia, ‘Piracy and Politics in Southeast Asia’, in Derek Johnson and Mark J. Valencia (eds), Piracy in Southeast Asia. Status, Issues, and Responses, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp. 104-6. Valencia and other authors discuss cooperation since 1992 in more detail. See also: Hasjim Djalal, ‘Combating Piracy’, pp. 143-59. The author offers among other things an in-depth discussion of the South China Sea Workshop.
47. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, p. 69. George Joseph, ‘Nov S ‘pore Meet For Council Overseeing Anti-piracy Centre’, Business Times, Singapore, 5 September 2006, n. p.
48. Valencia, ‘Piracy and Politics in Southeast Asia’, pp. 104-5. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects For Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, p. 66-7.
49. Ministry of Defence Singapore, ‘Launch of Eyes in the Sky (EiS) Initiative’, 13 September 2005, Government of Singapore, accessed 6 November 2006. Rajeev Sawhney, ‘Redefining the Limits of the Straits: A Composite Malacca Straits Security System’, 18 May 2006, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, accessed 3 November 2006. Catherine Zara Raymond, ‘Piracy in Southeast Asia. New Trends, Issues, and Responses’, October 2005, Working Paper no. 89, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, accessed 28 December 2005, pp.16-7.
50. Raymond, ‘Piracy in Southeast Asia. New Trends, Issues, and Responses’, p. 16-7.
51. Storey, Ian, ‘China's “Malacca Dilemma”‘, China Brief, vol. VI, no. 8, 12 April 2006, pp. 4-6, accessed 2 November 2006, pp.4-6. However, Malaysia and Indonesia have suggested that those states relying on the Malacca Straits and other Asian sea lanes should provide funds or equipment to littoral states to increase security, rather than offering active involvement in securing Asian sea lanes.
52. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, p. 74.
53. Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison, ‘Theorising South-East Asia's Boom, Bust, and Recovery’, in Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison, and Richard Robison (eds), The Political Economy of South-East Asia. Conflicts, Crises, and Change, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.2-3. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the relationship between PSCs operating in maritime Southeast Asia and the rise of neoliberal theory and practice. More research on the companies operating in Southeast Asia is needed to fully understand these issues. For a general discussion of the driving forces behind the privatisation of military forces and the consequences of privatising security see: Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp.66-70. Deborah D. Avant, The Market For Force. The Consequences of Privatizing Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
54. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists ‘Making a Killing: The Business of War’, in: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Making a Killing. The Business of War, Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, 2003, accessed 24 November 2003, p.1.
55. Doug Brooks, ‘Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services’, in: Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram (eds), Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp.131-132.
56. Deborah Avant, ‘Think Again: Mercenaries’, Foreign Policy, July/August 2004, accessed 1 September 2004 (registration required).
57. David Isenberg, ‘Corporate Mercenaries. Part 1: Profit Comes With a Price’, Asia Times, 19 May 2004. Accessed 1 September 2004.
58. These include in Britain, Gray Page Limited, in Germany MarineServe GmbH (MSG), in Israel G.S. Seals, in the USA the Trident Group and in Australia Counter Terrorism International (CTI), to mention just a few.
59. This is also the case for PSCs offering nonmaritime related services. See: Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 73-5.
60. There are also a number of companies that offer a range of technical maritime security products, including electrical fences for vessels and non-lethal weapons.
61. David Boey, ‘Ship Owners Using Hired Guns. Guards Provide Anti-Piracy Security for Vessels in Regional Waters’, Straits Times, 8 April 2005, p. 3. Author's Interview with Mike Martino, Counter Terrorism International (CTI), Murdoch University, Perth, 16 September 2005.
62. ‘Group 4 Security Company Called in by Caltex in Riau’, in Down to Earth, 49, May 2001. Accessed 15 May 2005.
63. Boey, ‘Ship Owners Using Hired Guns’, p. 3. Tracey Sua, ‘For Hire: Guardians of the Sea’, Straits Times 15 April 2005, pp. H4-5.
64. ‘Malaysia Warns on Private Marine Security Escorts’, 2 May 2005, accessed 6 May 2005. ‘Indonesia Rules out Private Armed Escorts in Malacca Strait’, 2 May 2005, accessed 6 May 2005.
65. Capt. Noor Apandi Osnin, ‘Armed Escorts in the Strait of Malacca: A Challenge to Malaysia's Governance’, MIMA Seminar on Private Maritime Security: Options for Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 2006), pp. 17-8.
66. Author's Interview with Stephen Weatherford, Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), Singapore, 28 October 2005.
67. Boey, ‘Ship Owners Using Hired Guns’, p. 3. Sua, ‘For Hire: Guardians of the Sea’, pp. H4-5.
68. Author's Interview with Mike Martino, Counter Terrorism International (CTI), Perth, 16 September 2005.
69. Karl Malakunas, ‘Armed Escorts in High Demand on Sea’, 2005, accessed 13 May 2005.
70. Quoted in: Boey, ‘Ship Owners Using Hired Guns’, p. 3.
71. For a broader discussion see: Carolin Liss.‘The Privatization of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia.‘, in: Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (eds), Private Military and Security Companies, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007. pp. 135-48
72. For more details see Carolin Liss, ‘Private Security Companies in the Fight against Piracy in Southeast Asia’, 2005, Working Paper no. 120, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, accessed 13 November 2005.
73. Keith Bradsher, ‘Insurance Premiums Rise as Threats to Ships Grow’, New York Times, 25 August 2005.
74. Aegis Defence Services Ltd, accessed 6 December 2005.
75. Jackson Sawatan, ‘Ministers Want Lloyd's Risk Assessment on Straits Corrected’, 2 August 2005, accessed 3 August 2005.
76. International Chamber of Shipping, ‘Intertanko, Shipowners Challenge Malacca Strait War Risk Zone’, Press Release, 2005.
77. Singapore Shipping Association, SSA Backs Ministerial Initiative, Press Statement, 2005.
78. ‘Attacks on Ships in Malacca Strait Fall Sharply Due to Indonesian Patrols – IMB’, 30 November 2005, accessed 2 December 2005.
79. Burton, John, ‘Lloyd's Drops War Rating on Malacca Strait’, 9 August 2006; accessed 13 August 2006. ‘Malacca Straits Removed From War Risk List’, Insurance Journal, accessed 15 November 2006.
80. If issues such as poverty are addressed in these countries, some security threats such as piracy may also be reduced.
81. There are, however, other, more preferable ways for oil/gar or mining companies to prevent local unrest, including respect for the local people and their culture, as well as the environment, and, a sincere consideration of the interests of the people in surrounding communities.
82. See for example: Hart, ‘Hart's Code of Conduct’, accessed 2 January 2006.
83. See for example: Alex Duperouzel, ‘The Role of Private Security in the Malacca Straits’, Paper presented at the ‘LIMA’ Conference, Langkawi, Malaysia, 2005.
84. International Peace Operations Association, Homepage, accessed 2 January 2006. A similar British association, named the British Association of Private Security Companies was launched in February 2006. See: British Association of Private Security Companies, Homepage, accessed 8 May 2007.
85. International Peace Operations Association, ‘Mission Statement’, accessed 2 January 2006.
86. For the complete list see: International Peace Operations Association, ‘IPOA Members’, accessed 2 January 2006.
87. See: International Peace Operations Association, ‘IPOA Code of Conduct’, accessed 2 January 2006.
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