No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
In the last few weeks, Kim Jong Il has inspected a pig farm, a mine, a solar thermal energy research unit, a restaurant, an orchestra, and even gave field guidance to the Tudan Duck Farm on how to raise these pesky birds, where he reportedly enjoyed an art performance given by the members of the art group of the Pyongyang Poultry Guidance Bureau at the newly built house of culture of the farm, and congratulated them on their successful performance. He also travelled to the industrial east coast city of Hamhung, a crosscountry trip that one of the authors, having done it, can attest requires a bit of effort. Accompanied by his son, Kim Jong Il even managed to visit a terrapin farm. Given all these visits, how one might ask, does the peripatetic Kim Jong Il find time for his commander-in-chief military and foreign policy duties?
1 “Kim Jong Il Gives Field Guidance to Taehung Youth Hero Mine and Ryongyang Mine”, Korean Central News Agency, (15 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
2 “Kim Jong Il Provides Field Guidance to Solar Equipment Center”, Korean Central News Agency, (9 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
3 “Kim Jong Il Enjoys October Concert Given by Unhasu Orchestra”, Korean Central News Agency, (11 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
4 “Senior Party and State Officials Visit Tudan Duck Farm”, Korean Central News Agency, (16 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011
5 “Kim Jong Il Gives Field Guidance to Major Industrial Establishments in Hamhung City”, Korean Central News Agency, (16 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
6 “Kim Jong Il Provides Field Guidance to Taedonggang Terrapin Farm”, Korean Central News Agency, (13 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
7 J. Lewis, “DPRK Road Mobile ICBM?,” Arm Control Wonk, October 5, 2011, link.
8 “S. Korean military beefs up border vigilance against N. Korea”, Yonhap News, (21 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
9 Michael Martina and Olivia Rondonuwu, “North and South Korea hold “constructive “talks,” Reuters, July 22, 2011, link.
10 Voice of America, “North, South Korean Envoys Open Nuclear Talks in Beijing,” September 21, 2011, link.
11 “Seoul Begged for Inter-Korean Summits, Says Pyongyang,” Chosun Ilbo, June 2, 2011, link. Readers should note that it is standard DPRK delegation practice to demand that their travel costs be paid, in cash, on visits overseas—partly a way to earn foreign exchange, and partly in recognition of the bankrupt state of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The DPRK did not release any such tapes after making threats to do so.
12 John M. Glionna and Ju-min Park, “Obama's envoy optimistic after North Korea visit,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2009, link.
13 W. Wan, “U.S., N. Korean diplomats meet in New York,” Washington Post, July 28, 2011, link.
14 B. Knowlton, Choe S.H., “New U.S. Envoy to Talk With North Koreans,” New York Times, October 19, 2011, link.
15 “N. Korean Delegate to Attend Talks in Hawaii,” Joongang Ilbo, (17 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
16 M. Mazzetti, “U.S. Suspends GI Recovery Efforts in North Korea,” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2005, link.
17 Pentagon To Resume NKorea Talks On War Remains by The Associated Press, Washington October 17, 2011, 11:15 pm, link. A summary of these operations is supplied by Ashton Ormes, Research Director of Defense Prisoner of War, Missing Personnel Office at Memorandum on Areas In Which US/DPRK Joint Recovery Operations Have Been Conducted, DPRK Briefing Book, link. See also A. Ormes, “MIA Joint Recovery,” presentation at US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop January 27th, 2003, link.
18 B. Starr, “North Korea willing to resume U.S. missions to recover remains of MIAs,” CNN Pentagon, January 18, 2011, link.
19 Associated Press, “Japanese doctors arrive in North Korea to examine atomic bombing victims, October 11, 2011, link.
20 P. Hayes, S. Bruce, “Unprecedented Nuclear Strikes of the Invincible Army: A Realistic Assessment of North Korea's Operational Nuclear Capability,” NAPSNet Special Report, September 22, 2011, link.
21 “N.Korea could conduct third nuclear test: Seoul,” Agence France-Presse, (7 October 2011, link). (search date October 18, 2011)
22 “DPRK's Principled Stand on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Clarified”, Korean Central News Agency, (30 September 2011, link). (searched date: 18 October 2011).
23 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Command History for 1991, October 30, 1992, Volume 1, pp. 90-93, link.
24 “U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from the peninsula as a result of President Bush's policy.” In Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Command History 1992, October 29, 1993, Volume 2, p. 394, pending digital publication by Nautilus Institute.
25 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Command History 1992, October 29, 1993, Volume 1, pp. 83-84, link.
26 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Command History for 1991, October 30, 1992, Volume 1, p. 91, classified and released under FOIA here.
27 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Command History 1992, October 29, 1993, Volume 2, p. 388, 392, pending digital publication by Nautilus Institute.
28 The precise agreement by both Koreas at that time was: “The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” The text of this declaration is on-line.
29 The reader may wish to note here that the issue of Chinese or Russian stationing of nuclear weapons in the DPRK was not a subject of discussion in these negotiations. However, during the Cold War, the DPRK did allow Soviet long range, nuclear-capable bombers to overfly the DPRK, and Soviet warships also visited DPRK ports. The DPRK also often referred in its public statements to the terrible nuclear destruction that would ensue should it be attacked at this time, thereby effectively invoking a diluted form of nuclear extended deterrence from Russia and China, whatever their stated policies with regard to providing nuclear extended deterrence to their allies. Some of the DPRK allusions are found in P. Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, Lexington Press, 1990, p. 135, link.
30 The text stated: “The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to principles of: - Assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; - Peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs; and - Support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.” The full text is available here.
31 The US statement of intention was matched carefully and therefore contingent upon the adherence by the DPRK statements of intention to “consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and “engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.” The text of the Agreed Framework is on-line.
32 Readers should note that the delay between signing and ratification of the NPT by the DPRK was itself a form of non-compliance, of much concern at the time; and that its initial declaration to the IAEA of its nuclear facilities was found to be false, rendering it in non-compliance with its IAEA obligations from the very outset.
33 The full text of the statement is on-line.
34 This section draws from our “The DPRK and the Warsaw Clause: An Unnoticed Change in US Nuclear Policy,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, July 28, 2011, link.
35 The Clinton Administration conditioned its 1995 negative security assurance on a state being in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. See Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Declaration by President Clinton regarding America's commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)” (6 March 1995, link) (searched date: 30 September 2010).
36 “Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum on N-Issue”, Korean Central News Agency, (21 April 2010, link). (searched date: 30 September 2010). Korean language version here. (searched date: 30 September 2010).
37 “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Totally Refutes UNSC Resolution” Korean Central News Agency, (17 October 2006, link). (searched date: 30 September 2010).
38 “DPRK Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Dismisses U.S. Wrong Assertion,” Korean Central News Agency, (17 January 2009, link). (searched date: 30 September 2010).
39 “KEDO Suspends Construction of Nuclear Reactors,” Arms Control Today, December 2003, link.
40 The requirements for such an engagement are spelled out in P. Hayes, D. von Hippel, Engaging the DPRK Enrichment and Small LWR Program: What Would It Take?, NAPSNet Special Report December 23, 2010, link.
You have
Access
Open access