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In Dangerous Waters: Japan's Forgotten Minesweeping Operations in the Korean War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
This paper examines the little-known and long forgotten overseas deployment of Japanese minesweepers to North Korea in 1950 and the events that led to postwar Japan's only known deployment to a combat zone that led to the loss of Japanese life.
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- Copyright © The Authors 2022
References
Notes
1 The story of the MSA's minesweeping operations in the Korean War remains largely absent from English language histories of early postwar Japan. However, several Western scholars have written about the topic as part of works that examine the formation of the MSDF and Japan's little known, albeit extensive, role in the Korean War. One such prominent author is Tessa Morris-Suzuki who has done more than any other Western scholar to reveal the depth of Japan's overt and covert participation in the Korean War. In her chapter, “A Fire on the Other Shore?: Japan and the Korean War Order” in The Korean War in Asia: A Hidden History (2018), Morris-Suzuki briefly discusses the MSA's actions at Wonsan and provides a unique eyewitness account in the form of the experiences of Ariyama Mikio, the captain of minesweeper MS 06. The MSA's position within the broader framework of Japanese postwar military history has been examined by Garren Mulloy's Defenders of Japan: The Post-Imperial Armed Forces 1946-2016, A History (2021). In particular, Mulloy work provides a brief and insightful discussion of the MSA's postwar formation and activities in the Korean War. Mulloy's discussion illuminate the activities and losses suffered by Japan's merchant marine during the Korean War, in addition to introducing the little-known efforts by Japan's merchant marine to assist the US war effort in Vietnam and their losses as a result of North Vietnamese action.
2 Yasunobu Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen: saigo no senshisha (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2013), 35.
3 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 36.
4 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 35.
5 “General Order No. 1 Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed August 21, 2022.
6 Ibid.
7 “SCAPIN-2: DIRECTIVE NO. 2, OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,” Nihonkenkyū no tame no rekishijōhō, accessed June 10, 2022.
8 In December 1945 the Navy Ministry was renamed the Second Ministry of Demobilization, the Army Ministry became the First Ministry of Demobilization.
9 Kōseishō, ed., Hikiage to engo sanjyūnen no ayumi (Tokyo: Kōseishō Engokyoku, 1978), 60-64.
10 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 37-38.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 40.
14 Yōji Kasawa, “Dai yon shō chōsen sensō to nihonjin sen'in: gunyōsen nado no jōsōin toshite,” Kaiin, no 10. (October 2007): 91.
15 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 25-27,
16 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 30.
17 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 27,
18 Thomas B. Buell, Naval Leadership in Korea: The First Six Months (Washington: Naval Historical Center Department of the Navy, 2002), 33.
19 Ibid.
20 Buell, Naval Leadership in Korea, 34-35.
21 There seems to be some disagreement in the sources over whether Burke invited Ōkubo to his headquarters or if Burke visited Ōkubo at his office. I have used Ōkubo's version of events for this article because of the preponderance of secondary sources supporting his recollections, but according to American naval historian Thomas B. Buell, Burke insisted he visited Ōkubo. For Burke's account of this meeting see: Buell. Naval Leadership in Korea, 33-34.
22 Takeo Ōkubo, Uminari no hibi: kakusareta sengoshi no danzō (Tokyo: Kaiyō mondai kenkyūkai, 1978), 208.
23 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 30.
24 Ibid.
25 “Shōwa nijyūsannen hōritsu dai nijyūhachi gō kaijōhoanchōhō,” E-Gov hōrei kensaku, accessed June 5, 2022.
26 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 27.
27 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 31.
28 For a detailed record of Burke's conversation with Yoshida, see: Buell, Naval Leadership in Korea, 35.
29 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 29.
30 Wada Haruki, The Korean War: An International History (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 138.
31 Ibid.
32 Hisao Ōnuma, “Chōsen sensō ni okeru nihonjin no sansen mondai.” Sensō sekinin kenkyū 31, (Spring 2001): 2-4.
33 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 33.
34 Ōkubo, Uminari no hibi, 211.
35 Shōji Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” Sōkaibutai no rekishi.“ (February 2002): 5.
36 Shōgo Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsusōkaitai,” (March 1978): 7.
37 Ibid.
38 Yōichi Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken: Chosen sensō ji no kyōkun,” Chūōkōron 106, no. 6 (June 1991): 128.
39 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan Tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 1.
40 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 6.
41 Ibid. The reason for the unusual silence was not due to a lack of concerns or questions. Apparently, many of the captains wished to avoid showing disrespect to Tamura, who was a graduate of a more senior class from the IJN's naval academy on Etajima.
42 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 7.
43 Ibid.
44 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 1 & 8.
45 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 7.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 7.
49 Hidetaka Suzuki, “Chōsen kaiiki ni shutsugeki shita nihon tokubetsu sōkaitai: sono hikari to kage,” Senshi kenkyū nenpō (March 2005), 5. This quote was reproduced by the author of this article written on behalf of the Ministry of Defense. The original quote first appeared on page 98 of a 2001 book titled, “Umi no yūjō,” by Agawa Naoyuki.
50 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 8.
51 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 7.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,” 129.
55 Nobuyuki Kanō, “Nihon sōkaitai no Chosen sensō sanka,” Gunjishigaku 34, no. 1 (June 1982): 82.
56 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,” 129; Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 8.
57 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 12-13.
58 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 13; Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,” 129. Second Squadron consisted of four minesweepers, three patrol craft, as well as Tamura flagship, which is listed as an airplane tender. All vessels were built for the IJN during the Second World War.
59 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan Tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 13.
60 Ibid.
61 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 14.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 14-15.
65 Ibid.
66 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 15.
67 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 15-16.
68 These mines were provided to the North Koreans by the Soviet Union.
69 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,” 129. It is a testament to the prodigious number of mines and the difficulties encountered in removing them that by the time UN forces landed, South Korean units had already advanced over land and secured the beachhead. Thus, the Wonsan landings proved to be redundant. However, a few months later the mine-swept waters off Wonsan would prove invaluable in permitting the evacuation of UN forces fleeing advancing Chinese forces.
70 Shizuo Yamazaki, Shijitsu de kataru Chosen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō (Tokyo: Hon no izumisha, 1998), 254-255.
71 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 18.
72 Ibid.
73 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 19.
74 Kanō, “Nihon sōkaitai no Chosen sensō sanka,” 81.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 20-22.
78 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 23.
79 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 24.
80 Ibid.
81 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,”129.
82 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 30-31.
83 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 15.
84 Ibid.
85 Tajiri, “1950nen genzan tokubetsu sōkai no kaiko,” 31.
86 Yamazaki, Shijitsu de kataru chōsen sensō kyōryoku no zenyō, 260.
87 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 15.
88 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,”129.
89 To this day, there remains disagreement over whether Rear Admiral Smith threatened to fire upon MSA vessels. While Tamura and fellow Japanese officers claimed that Smith threatened to fire on them, other eyewitnesses claim that Smith merely told Tamura that he was “fired.” Tamura was the only MSA officer who directly heard Smith's comments. Consequently, there is no other firsthand source in Japanese to provide corroboration evidence. Generally, all accounts by Japanese participants at Wonsan have agreed with Tamura's understanding of Smith's words. I have followed this interpretation, since this is what was understood to have been said at the time among Japanese personnel.
90 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 153.
91 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 15.
92 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 148.
93 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 15.
94 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 16.
95 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,”129-130.
96 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 16.
97 Hirama, “Sōkaitei haken,”130.
98 Nose, “Chōsen sensō ni shutsudō shita nihon no tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 1.
99 Suzuki, “Chōsen kaiiki ni shutsugeki shita nihon tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 7.
100 Stephen Dwight Blanton, “A Study of the United States Navy's Minesweeping Efforts in the Korean War” (MA Thesis, Texas Tech University), 133.
101 Anzō Ishimaru, “Chōsen sensō to nihon no kakawari: wasuresarareta kaijōyusō,” Senshikenkyūnenpō 11, (March 2008): 35.
102 Suzuki, “Chōsen kaiiki ni shutsugeki shita nihon tokubetsu sōkaitai,” 6.
103 Shirōchi, Shōwa nijyūgonen, 213.
104 Chōsen dōran tokubetsu sōkaitai-shi (Tokyo: Sewajinkai, 2009), 127.