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Half Full or Half Empty? North Korea after the 7th Party Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

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Is the glass half full or half empty? Although this question is held up by pop-psychologists as a test of whether one is optimistic or pessimistic, it may be taken as making an epistemological point: one cannot tell the direction of a change by looking at the current state. A change can be fully appreciated only when it is seen over a longer period and in a larger context.

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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
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References

Notes

1 See here.

2 Ilpyong J. Kim, “Kim Jong Il's Military-First Politics,” in Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds. North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (New York: Routledge, 2006), 64-65.

3 At the 6th Congress, a representative with voting rights was elected per 1,000 members and a representative with speaking rights per 1,000 candidate members. The population estimate is from CIA's World Factbook.

4 Lee Jongseok, “[chonglon] joseonnodongdang je7cha daehoeui uimiwa teugjing [[Overview] The Meanings and Characteristics of The Korean Workers' Party 7th Congress],” Jeongchaek beuriping, Sejong Institute, May 17, 2016.

5 Wada Haruki argues that the North Korean state can be characterized as “yuugekitai kokukai [guerilla state]” under Kim Il Sung and “seikigun kokukai [Regular Military State]” under Kim Jong Il. Wada Haruki, Bukjoseon: yugyeokdaegukgaeseo jeonggyugungukgaro [North Korea: from Guerilla State to Regular Military State], translated by Seo Dongman and Nam Gijeong, (Seoul: Dolbegae, 2002).

6 Kim Gapsik, “Joseonnodongdang je7cha daehoe bunseog (1): chongpyeong [An Analysis of the Korean Workers' Party 7th Congress (1): An Overview],” Online Series, CO 16-12, Korea Institute for National Unification, May 11, 2016. It is worth noting that even if Pyongyang placed economy before nuclear force in all its pronouncements, he reversed the order of the two without explanation.

7 See here.

8 Jeong Uksik, “Pukhaneui haek dokteurin, dareun naradeulgwk bikyohaeboni… [North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine, in Comparison with Other Countries'], Peuresian, May 27, 2013.

9 Seo Jaejeong, “Nodongdang 7cha daehoe ihuui bukan [North Korea after the 7th Congress of Korean Workers Party],” Changbijugannonpyeong, June 8, 2016.

10 Robert Carlin, “North Korea Said it is Willing to Talk about Denuclearization…But No One Noticed,” 38 North, July 12, 2016.

11 Ruediger Frank, “Can North Korea Prioritize Nukes and the Economy at the Same Time?” Global Asia, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2014, p. 39.

12 Kim Ji Young, “migugui yogyeogmang ttulhgo nalaoleun [Hwasong-10 Flew Through the U.S. Anti-missile Network,” Chosunshinbo, June 23, 2016.

13 Michael Madden, “The Fourth Session of the 13th SPA: Tweaks at the Top,” 38 North, Junly 6, 2016.