No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Doom and Gloom or Economic Boom? The Myth of the ‘North Korean Collapse’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2025
Abstract
Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.
The DPRK is said to be an economist's nightmare. There are almost no reliable statistics available, making any analysis speculative at best. The few useable figures that we have, though, fly in the face of the media's curious insistence on a looming collapse. Food production and trade volumes indicate that the DPRK has largely recovered from the economic catastrophe of the 1990s. Indeed, Pyongyang's reported rising budget figures appear more plausible than Seoul's pessimistic politicized estimates. Obviously, sanctions, while damaging, have failed to nail the country down. There are signs that it is now beginning to open up and prepare to exploit its substantial mineral wealth. Could we soon be witnessing the rise of Asia's next economic tiger?
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Creative Commons
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.- Copyright
- Copyright © The Authors 2014
References
Notes
1 Rüdiger Frank, “A Question of Interpretation: Statistics From and About North Korea,”38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, July 16, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
2 See e.g.Evan Ramstad, “North Korea Strains Under New Pressures”, The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Geoffrey Cain, “North Korea's Impending Collapse: 3 Grim Scenarios”, Global Post, September 28, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Doug Bandow, “The Complex Calculus of a North Korean Collapse”, The National Interest, January 9, 2014. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
3 See e.g. Soo-bin Park, “The North Korea Economy: Current Issues and Prospects,” Department of Economics, Carleton University (2004). Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
4 World Food Programme. Office of Evaluation, Full Report of the Evaluation of DPRK EMOPs 5959.00 and 5959.01 “Emergency Assistance to Vulnerable Groups,” March 20 to April 10, 2000, p.1. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
5 Food and Agricultural Organization/World Food Programme, Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 12, 2012, p.10.Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
6 Food and Agricultural Organization/World Food Programme, Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, June 25, 1998.Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
7 For a summary of unilateral sanctions by the United States of America against the DPRK, refer to: U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, An Overview of Sanctions with Respect to North Korea, May 6, 2011. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
8 “Breaking the Bank,” The Economist, September 22, 2005. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
9 “Ernst & Young says Macao-based BDA clean, cites minor faults,” RIA Novosti, April 18, 2007. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
10 See Ronda Hauben, “Behind the Blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia,” Ohmynews, May 25, 2007. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; John McGlynn, John McGlynn, “North Korean Criminality Examined: the US Case. Part I,” Japan Focus, May 18, 2007. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Id., “Financial Sanctions and North Korea: In Search of the Evidence of Currency Counterfeiting and Money Laundering Part II,” July 7, 2007; Id., “Banco Delta Asia, North Korea's Frozen Funds and US Undermining of the Six-Party Talks: Obstacles to a Solution. Part III,” Japan Focus, June 9, 2007.
11 Daniel L. Glaser, testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, September 12, 2006. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
12 Simon Rabinovitch and Simon Mundy, “China reduces banking lifeline to North Korea,” Financial Times, May 7, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
13 Simon Rabinovitch, “China banks rein in support for North Korea,” Financial Times, May 13, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
14 See Rüdiger Frank, “The Political Economy of Sanctions against North Korea,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2006, at 5-36. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
15 Ibid.
16 Chad O'Caroll, “How Sanctions Stop Legitimate North Korean Trade,” NK News, February 18, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014 at: http://www.nknews.org/2013/02/how-sanctions-stop-legitimate-north-korean-trade/
17 Ibid.
18 See e.g. Michelle A Vu, “Living conditions in North Korea ‘very bad’,” Christian Today, March 31, 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Harry de Quetteville, “Enjoy your stay… at North Korean Embassy,” Telegraph, April 5, 2008. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
19 See, e.g., “Where the sun sinks in the east,” The Economist, August 11, 2012 (print edition). Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Nicholas Eberstadt, “The economics of state failure in North Korea,” American Enterprise Institute, May 23, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
20 Ibid.
21 Mika Marumoto, Project Report: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Economic Statistics Project (April-December 2008), Presented to Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management and the DPRK Economic Forum, U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University-School of Advanced International Studies. March 2009, at 42. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
22 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea”, The World Factbook. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
23 Ibid.
24 Calculations based on tables in the BOK report for 2012. See Bank of Korea, Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
25 Ibid. See also Bank of Korea, Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2008. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
26 BOK, supra note 24.
27 CIA, supra note 22
28 Marumoto, supra note 21, at 48
29 Ibid., at 58-63.
30 CIA, supra note 22
31 The DPRK does not now participate in global Human Development Index (HDI) calculations, which would be a better measure of development than GDP as it includes life expectancy, education and standard of living variables. The only HDI figures we have now are based on 1995 data, during the famine that followed the collapse of the socialist bloc. Even then, UN data indicate that the DPRK still had an HDI of 0.766, roughly the same as Turkey (0.782) or Iran (0.758), placing 73rdout of 158, on the verge of leaving the medium HDI category (0.5 – 0.8) for a high HDI one (0.8 – 1). See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1998, at 20. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
32 Marcus Noland, “The Black Hole of North Korea”, Foreign Policy, March 7, 2012.
33 Marumoto, supra note 21, at 48
34 Noland, supra note 32
35 Frank, supra note 1
36 Randall Ireson, “The State of North Korean Farming: New Information from the UN Crop Assessment Report,”38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, December 18, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
37 Food and Agricultural Organization/World Food Programme, Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 25, 2011. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
38 Food and Agricultural Organization/World Food Programme, Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 28, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
39 Ireson, supra note 36
40 Marumoto, supra note 21, at 58-63
41 Ibid.
42 See, generally, UN Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), Report, March 6, 2014, S/2014/147. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
43 Marumoto, supra note 21, at 58-63
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid, at 67-69.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Sanctions Busting,” Peterson Institute of International Economics, June 12, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
52 See graphs on the i-RENK database. Retrieved on April 10, 2014 (Korean only).
53 European Union Directorate-General for Trade, European Union, Trade in Goods with North Korea, November 7, 2013.
54 CIA, supra note 22
55 See graphs on the i-RENK database. Retrieved on April 10, 2014 (Korean only).
56 “Inter-Korean trade hits 8-year low in 2013,” Yonhap News Agency, February 23, 2014.
57 “Trade between N. Korea, China hits record $6.45 bln in 2013,” Yonhap News Agency, February 1, 2014.
58 Aidan Foster-Carter, “South Korea has lost the North to China,” Financial Times, February 20, 2014.
59 The National Committee on North Korea, DPRK-Japan Relations: A Historical Overview, December 1, 2011. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
60 Scott A. Snyder, “North Korea's Growing Trade Dependency on China: Mixed Strategic Implications,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
61 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Budget Blanks and Blues,” 38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, June 26, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
62 Frank, supra note 1
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 See tables on the FAO website. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
68 Food and Agricultural Organization/World Food Programme, Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 16,2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
69 “N.Korea backtracks as currency reform sparks riots”, The Chosun Ilbo, December 15, 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
70 Ibid.
71 Alexandre Mansourov, North Korea: Changing but Stable, 38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, May 1, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
72 Ibid.
73 Blaine Harden, “North Korea revalues currency, destroying personal savings,” Washington Post, December 2, 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
74 Bank of Korea, Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
75 Bank of Korea, Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2008. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
76 Bank of Korea, supra note 74
77 “New N.Korean Currency Sees Runaway Inflation,” The Chosun Ilbo, January 6, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
78 The FAO CFSAR for 2010/2011 reports that the 4.48 mMT production for that harvesting year was up 3% compared to 2009/2010, meaning the latter harvesting year's production was about 4.35 mMT. The difference with the BOK's 4.1 mMT might be explainable by the FAO's inclusion of winter crops in its figure. FAO, supra note 68
79 Patrick Worsnip, “North Korea maneuvers to evade U.N. sanctions: experts,” Reuters, November 18, 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
80 “N.Korea Climbs Down Over Anti-Market Reforms,” The Chosun Ilbo, February 11, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
81 See “Chaos in North Korea Coverage,” 38 North, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, June 2, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
82 Meihua Jin, “DPRK at Economic Crossroads,” China Daily, December 22, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
83 Ibid.
84 Ministry of Unification (Republic of Korea), White Paper on Korean Reunification, 2013, p.86. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
85 Embassy of the PRC in the DPRK, Zhongchao Jingmao Gaikuang, July 20, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014 (Chinese only)
86 Note that this has lead the i-RENK database to record Sino-Korean trade volumes at nil during this period, indicating those volumes to amount toto $1.71 rather than $2.68 billion. This one billion dollar difference creates the wrong impression that Sino-Korean trade levels were in free-fall due to the sanctions. See Chris Buckley, “China hides North Korea trade in statistics,” Reuters, October 26, 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; see also graphs here (in Korean only)
87 Frank, supra note 1
88 This is neither the time nor the place to review the truth behind the sinking, but suffice to say that Pyongyang proposed to prove its innocence by sending a team to review the evidence (Seoul refused), that Moscow concluded in its own report that a stray mine was a more plausible cause, and that the UN Security Council found Seoul's version too inconclusive to point any fingers. See “N.Korea's reinvestigation proposal alters Cheonan situation”, The Hankyoreh, May 21, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; “Russia's Cheonan investigation suspects that the sinking Cheonan ship was caused by a mine in water”, The Hankyoreh, July 27, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; “Presidential Statement: Attack on Republic of Korea Naval Ship ‘Cheonan‘”. United Nations Security Council (United Nations). 9 July 2010. S/PRST/2010/13. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
89 See Barbara Demick and John M. Glionna, “Doubts surface on North Korea's role in ship sinking,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; “Ex-Pres. Secretary Sued for Spreading Cheonan Rumors”, The Dong-A Ilbo, May 8, 2008. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; John M. Glionna, “South Korea security law is used to silence dissent, critics say,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Ronda Hauben, “Netizens question cause of Cheonan tragedy,” Ohmynews, June 8, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
90 Blaine Harden, “President's party takes hits in South Korean midterm elections,” Washington Post, June 3, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; Donald Kirk, “At polls, South Korea conservatives pay for response to Cheonan sinking,” Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 2010. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
91 See e.g. Curtis Melvin, “North Korea's construction boom,” North Korean Economy Watch, May 21, 2009. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
92 Jack Kim and James Pearson, “Insight: Kim Jong-Un, North Korea's Master Builder,” Reuters, November 23, 2014. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
93 Rüdiger Frank, “Exhausting Its Reserves? Sources of Finance for North Korea's ‘Improvement of People's Living’,” 38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, December 12, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Leonid A. Petrov, “Rare Earth Metals: Pyongyang's New Trump Card,” The Montreal Review, August 2010. Retrieved April 10, 2014.
97 Choi Kyung-soo, “The Mining Industry in North Korea”, NAPSNet Special Reports, August 4, 2011. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
98 Korea Resources Cooperation, Current Development Situation of Mineral Resources in North Korea (2009), xii. As cited in Choi, supra note 97.
99 “‘N.K. mineral resources may be worth $9.7tr’,” The Korea Herald, August 26, 2012. Retrieved on April 10, 2014; “N. Korea possess 6,986 tln won worth of mineral resources: report”, Global Post, September 19, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
100 Frik Els, “Largest known rare earth deposit discovered in North Korea”, Mining.com, December 5, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
101 Choi, supra note 97
102 Ibid.
103 See Georgy Toloroya, “A Eurasian Bridge Across North Korea?,” 38 North., Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, November 22, 2013.Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
104 “Putin lobbies for ‘Iron Silk Road’ via N. Korea, hopes political problems solved shortly,” Russia Today, November 13, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
105 “China, DPRK meet on developing economic zones in DPRK,” Xinhua, August 14, 2012. Available here. As cited in The National Committee on North Korea, Special Economic Zones in the DPRK, January 14, 2014. Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
106 The zones are the North Pyongan Provincial Amnokgang Economic Development Zone; the Jagang Provincial Manpho Economic Development Zone; the Jagang Provincial Wiwon Industrial Development Zone; the North Hwanghae Provincial Sinphyong Tourist Development Zone; the North Hwanghae Provincial Songrim Export Processing Zone; the Kangwon Provincial Hyondong Industrial Development Zone; the South Hamgyong Provincial Hungnam Industrial Development Zone; the South Hamgyong Provincial Pukchong Agricultural Development Zone; the North Hamgyong Provincial Chongjin Economic Development Zone; the North Hamgyong Provincial Orang Agricultural Development Zone; the North Hamgyong Provincial Onsong Island Tourist Development Zone; the Ryanggang Provincial Hyesan Economic Development Zone; and the Nampho City Waudo Export Processing Zone. See “Provincial Economic Development Zones to Be Set Up in DPRK,” KCNA, November 21, 2013. Available here. As cited in NCNK, supra note 105
107 State Economic Development Committee Promotional Video, as cited by Bradley O. Babson, “North Korea's Push for Special Enterprise Zones: Fantasy or Opportunity?,” 38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, December 12, 2013. Retrieved April 10, 2014.
108 See NCNK, supra note 105
109 See “DPRK Law on Economic Development Zones Enacted,” KCNA, June 5, 2013. Retrieved on April 10, 2014. As cited in NCNK, supra note 105
110 Yonho Kim, “A Closer Look at the ‘Explosion of Cell Phone Subscribers’ in North Korea,” 38 North, Washington, D.C.: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Retrieved on April 10, 2014.
You have
Access
Open access