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Closing the Kaesŏng Industrial Zone: An Assessment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Rüdiger Frank  and
Théo Clément
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On February 10, 2016, the South Korean government announced that it would close the Kaesŏng Industrial Zone (KIZ) in response to the North Korean nuclear test of January 6th and the launch of a satellite on February 7th. The zone, sometimes simply called by the name of the adjacent city of Kaesŏng, had been the last tangible outcome of the historic first inter-Korean summit of June 2000, which later that year had earned one of its two participants, the South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, the Nobel Peace Prize. His counterpart Kim Jong-il, who hosted the summit, received none. He was compensated generously by what has been rumored to be millions of dollars from South Korea. The payment was allegedly facilitated by Hyundai. That is the same company that managed the Mt. Kŭmgang tourism project in North Korea, another successful joint project that has been frozen since 2008. Through its subsidiary Asan, Hyundai also built the Kaesŏng industrial zone.

Type
Research Article
Information
Asia-Pacific Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 6 , March 2016 , e3
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Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016

References

Notes

1 “S Koreans charged over summit cash”, BBC, 25.06.2003, accessed 22.02.2016.

2 A profound and elaborate discussion of this statue and other patriotic symbols can be found in: Sheila Miyoshi Jager: Narratives of Nation Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism

3 In a way, one could argue that the Cold War never really ended on the Korean peninsula. In anticipation of a second Cold War between great powers to emerge in the next years, we prefer to call the Cold War (1945-1990) Cold War I, following the terminology on World Wars I and II. See “Cold War 2.0 would benefit North Korea”, The Korea Herald, 01.06.2014,

4 “‘Regime collapse’ awaits North Korea, says South's leader in nuclear warning”, The Guardian, 16.02.2016, accessed 26.02.2016.

5 Jung-en Woo: Race to the Swift. State And Finance In Korean Industrialization (Columbia University Press, 1991).

6 “Businessmen seek a ‘second Kaesŏng Complex’ in N. Korea”, The Hankyoreh, 05.02.2014, accessed 02.03.2016.

7 People-to-people exchange is particularly intense in this northeastern region of North Korea because of the relatively lightly guarded border with China and the close ethnic ties with a Korean-speaking minority in Yanbian province. It is no coincidence that Barbara Demick's Nothing to Envy (Spiegel and Grau 2009) is based on a story from Ch'ŏngjin, the provincial capital of North-Hamgyŏng.

8 This is by no means to say that all of the information coming in that way is fake. However, it would be naive to assume that years of an obvious willingness to pay by South Korean and Japanese journalists and other information-seekers (demand) would remain without an effect on the supply side, i.e. inspire attempts by at least a few individuals to produce or manipulate evidence. Very often, the traumatic nature of the experience in North Korea and along the escape route has an impact on how the victims later present their memories. The case of Shin Dong-hyuk (“Escape from Camp 14”) who, after growing pressure admitted in January 2015 that some key facts of his story were not true, is one indicator of this phenomenon; the not uncontroversial personal story of Yeonmi Park is another one. See Mary Ann Jolley: “The strange tale of Yeonmi Park”, The Diplomat, 10.12.2014, accessed 03.03.2016.

9 “Gaeseong joint complex reaches $3 bln in accumulated production volume, 11 yrs after opening”, Korea Herald, 04.10.2015, accessed 02.03.2016.

10 “Shutdown of Kaesŏng Complex a possible response to North Korean rocket launch?”, The Hankyoreh, 05.02.2016, accessed 01.03.2016.

11 “After rocket launch, South Korea will shut down joint industrial park with North Korea”, LA Times, 10.02.2016, accessed 01.03.2016.

12 Personal communication of R. Frank with John Delury, 27.02.2016.

13 劳木: 在核爆问题上，朝美很像是"一伙", Huanqiu Shibao, 19.01.2016, accessed 03.03.2016.

14 Kim Ga Young: “‘Trustpolitik’ should be not with Kim Jong Un, but the North Korean people”, Daily NK, 19.02.2016, accessed 26.02.2016.

15

16 “S. Korea tracks money flow over N. Korea's Kaesŏng revenue use”, Yonhap, 15.02.2016, accessed 01.03.2016.

17 “The Kaesŏng Closure: North-South Trade over the Longer-Run”, Witness To Transformation, 19.02.2016, accessed 01.03.2016.

18 KOTRA: “2014 년북한의대외무역동향"”, accessed 20.11.2015

19 韩媒称朝鲜向中国东北输出大量劳工赚取外汇, Cankan Xiaoxi, 01.02.2016, accessed 01.02.2016.

20 Kim InSung and Karin Lee: “Mt. Kumgang and Inter-Korean Relations”, NCNK, 10.11.2010, accessed 05.03.2016

21 Jonathan Watts: “South Korean tourist shot by soldier in North”, The Guardian, 12.07.2008, accessed 03.01.2016

22 “Law on Special Zone for International Tour of Mt. Kumgang”, KCNA, 02.06.2011, accessed 04.04.2012

23 “North Korea seeks Chinese tourists for Mount Kumgang resort”, The Telegraph, 01.09.2011, accessed 05.03.2016

24 “U.N. resolution must not affect normal life of N. Korean people: China”, Yonhap, 26.02.2016, accessed 26.02.2016.

25 Richard Nephew: “UN Security Council's New Sanctions on the DPRK”, 38North, accessed 03.03.2016

26 North Korea became, in 2015, China's most important foreign supplier of textile products, outranking Italy and Vietnam. 朝鲜首次成为中国最大服装供应国去年出口超6亿美元, QuanqiuFangzhi,05.02.2016. Last accessed 02.03.2016.

27 Andrea Berger: “The New UNSC Sanctions Resolution on North Korea: A Deep

28 For a discussion of Russia's interests and its position after UNSC Resolution 2270, see Georgy Toloraya: “UNSCR 2270: A Conundrum for Russia”, 38North, 05.03.2016, accessed 06.03.2016

29 “N Koreans toiling in Russia's timber camps”, BBC, 26.08.2009, accessed 26.02.2016.

30 Chad O'Carroll: “Russia and North Korea agree in principle to build joint trade house”, NK-News, 14.10.2015, accessed 25.02.2016.

31 “RZD says new U.N. sanctions might halt joint project with N. Korea”, Yonhap, 25.02.2016. Last accessed 02.03.2016.

32 A defector recently confirmed that people in North Korea have been discussing the working conditions at the Kaesŏng zone. See Je Son Lee: “I'm sad to see the Kaesŏng Complex go”, NK-News, 16.02.2016, accessed 18.02.2016.

33 To be precise, factories in Kaesŏng were free of North Korean propaganda, but not of posters put up by the South Korean employers that were seeking to instill the right work ethic among the employees.

34 Raj Kollmorgen, Frank Thomas Koch and Hans-Liudger Dienel (eds.): Diskurse der Deutschen Einheit. Kritik und Alternativen (Discussions on German Unity. Critique and Alternatives) (VS Verlag, 2011).