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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 May 2015
Luigi Labruna makes a number of proposals, in his recent Vim fieri veto: alle radici di una ideologia, of considerable importance to both the legal and the political history of the later Republic. The basic theme of the work is the possessory interdict uti possidetis, but in furtherance of his avowed purpose of illuminating the juridical, political, economic and social background to this early possessory remedy the author moves freely and knowledgeably in a number of fields. It is well that it should be so. The delimitation of the boundaries of Roman private law in a purely juridical setting is and will always be an indispensable and rewarding discipline, but it is more and more coming to be realized that the law of a given society needs also to be seen in a wider ambit, not only for the better understanding of the law but also for the better understanding of the society. His successful application of this wider approach to the rather austere problems of the possessory interdicts marks Labruna’s work out as one of considerable significance and merit.
1 Scuola di perfezionamento in diritto civile dell’Università di Camerino, 1971.
2 Pp. 143–286; cf. 89–132.
3 Notice must however be taken of the particularly well argued demonstration (pp. 156 ff.) that vis ex conventu had nothing to do with the interdict uti possidetis and of the concomitant illumination of the troublesome passages dealing with possessory disputes in Cic. Pro Cote, Pro Tull.
1 On these interdicts see Berger, A. ‘lnterdietum’, RE 9 1609 ff. at 1653–6.Google Scholar
5 The term is not attested but conveniently earmarks this group.
6 Labruna, op. cit., pp. 36 ff., 39 ff., 62 ff, 69 ff.
7 lb. pp. 69 ff.
8 On the confusion between M. Aemilius and M. Atilius as the incumbent of this office, and for a rational resolution of the problem, see Labruna, op. cit. pp. 72 ff.
9 Livy XXV I. 6–12.
10 Id. XXV 12.2 ff.
11 Livy’s account of the carmina Marciana is in any event direct evidence for compliance with the edict of 213 at least to the extent of the surrender of objectionable literature.
12 That is, interdicta prohibitoria (‘quibus praetor vetat aliquid fieri’), i. restitutoria (‘quibus restituì aliquid iubet’) and i. exhibitoria (‘per quae iubet exhiberi’). On this ‘grundlegende Einteilung der I.’ see Berger, op. cit. 1613 ff. and, on the prohibitory and restitutory interdicts in particular, Wenger, L.Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure, tr. Fisk, O.H. (New York, 1955), p. 251.Google Scholar See also Buckland, W.W.A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd rev. ed. Stein, P. (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 731 f.;Google ScholarKaser, M.Das Ramisene Zivilprozessrecht (Munich, 1966), pp. 321 ff.Google Scholar For a full and valuable discussion of many pertinent aspects of interdictal classification see Daube, D. ‘Concerning the Classifications of Interdicts’, RIDA 6 (1951), 23 ff.Google Scholar
13 Berger, op. cit. 1687 ff.; Buckland, op. cit. pp. 736 ff; Kaser, op. cit. pp. 323 ff.
14 Cf. n. 13. In this the Roman interdict differs materially from the remedy of the same name in Roman-Dutch Law and also from the injunction of English Law, in both of which committal for contempt of court sanctions disobedience even to a provisional order.
15 Cf. n. 13. See also Jolowicz, H.F.Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 2nd ed. repr. (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 239 f.Google Scholar
16 Neuquis … sacrificaret. Cf. n. 9.
17 This problem is not considered in the works consulted. Many anomalies in the interdictal procedure still await resolution.
18 Strofr, pp. 40 f.
19 lb. pp. 475 (‘die gesammte magistratische Coercition im eigentlichen Sinne des Worts’), 39 n–4, 235. 647.
20 Strachan-Davidson, J.L.Problems of the Roman Criminal Law (Oxford, 1912), Vol. 1, p. 99.Google Scholar
21 Raber, F. ‘Coercitio’, Kl.P. 1 1240 f.Google Scholar See also Siber, H.Römisches Verfassungsrecht (Lahr, 1952), PP. 81 f.Google Scholar
22 Raber doubts the availability of this penalty because of ‘die lex Porcia pro scapulis’ (presumably the lex Porcia de provocatione, as it is usually known—the pro scapulis is the title of a speech by the elder Cato in support of the law), but as far as chastisement was concerned the prohibition related only to si quis verberasset (Livy x 9.4) and would not have covered si quis castigasset, for example. Cf. n. 30 and the text there.
23 Mommsen, Strafr. pp. 39 f.; Siber, op. cit. pp. 81 f. See also (both on this and, most lucidly, on coercitio as a whole) Greenidge, A.H.J.The Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time (Oxford, 1901), pp. 331 ff.Google Scholar Some of the difficulties encountered by Lintott, A.W.Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford, 1968), pp. 94 ff.Google Scholar might have been less acute if he had noticed the proceedings of 213.
24 Livy XXV I. II f.
25 Thus Jolowicz, op. cit., p. 241 : ‘Interdicts have to a certain extent a “police” character … (and) are further characterised by comparative rapidity of procedure; the praetor can issue them on dies nefasti and they can be tried outside term time.’ Cf. Wenger, op. cit., p. 246: ‘In the interdict a commanding magistrate speaks.’ See also Berger, op. cit. 1700 f. with older literature; Kaser, op. cit., p. 318 and n. 4 (‘cogere, coercern’). Cf. n. 62 and the text there.
26 So Pernice, cited by Berger, op. cit. 1700 f. and there also said to have seen the interdict as originally a consular measure. For some effective criticisms of this view see Berger, op. cit. 1701 f. See also n. 47 below. More recently, Gandolfi, cited by Kaser, op. cit., p. 325 n. 63, has argued for the enforcement of the praetor’s interdictal orders manu militari. Contra Biscardi, reviewing Gandolfi, in Iura 7 (1956), 361 ff.,Google Scholar and Kaser, loc. cit. See also the review of the literature by Labruna, op. cit., p. 38 n. 21. Cf. n. 62 and the text there.
27 On these see Packard, D.W.A Concordance to Livy (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), Vol. 4, pp. 564 f.Google Scholar
28 Livy iii 15. 7; xli 25. 7; iii 50. 12; xxii 56. 1; xxvi 35. 7; xxi 20. 4; xlii 26. 1; ii 29. 9; iv 16. 3; ii 29. 4; vi 42. 11; xxi 31. 9; ? 47. 6; xxv 37. 15; iv 46. 9; xlv 36. 9; xli 6. 1; XXV 29. 10; xxii 56. 6; vii 15. 8; xxi 33. 10; xl 39. 8.
29 Id. iii 17. 12; xxxiv 24.6; xxviii 21. 8; xxv 37. 10; ii 57. 1; xxxix 39. 1; xxxix 24. 1; vii 3. 4; xxi 20. 5; i 16. 2; ii 64. 9; iii 3. 5; i 39.2; xxxiv 5. 8; xxxix 26. 10; iii 65. 6; x 15. 10; iii 49. 7.
30 ld. xxvi 21. 17.
31 Cf. n. 62.
32 Livy xxv 1. 7: ‘mulierum turba erat nec sacrificantium nec precantium deos patrio more.’ Id. xxv i. 8: ‘numerum auxit rustica plebs, ex incultis diutino bello infestisque agris egestate et metu in urbem compulsa.’
33 The position disclosed by Kaser, op. cit., pp. 46, 149 and n. 14, 150 and n. 20 is that in both the legis actio and formulary procedures the filiafamilias and the uxor in manu could not be sued at all and that the woman who was sui iuris required auctoritas tutoris. As against this, the exposure of women to coercitio is beyond doubt. Mommsen, Strafr., p. 37.Google Scholar
34 This, however, would not have been an absolute barrier. Cf. Kaser, op. cit., p. 149 on the actio iudicati against the filiusfamilias who does not possess property. But an interdict against a man of straw would for all practical purposes have lost all trace of an effective penal sanction.
35 Buckland, op. cit., p. 742, although making it clear that the exact details are not known. Cf. Berger, op. cit. 1693.
36 On the gravity of the multa see Lübtow, U.v.Das Römische Volk (Frankfurt a/M, 1955), p. 264 :Google Scholar ‘Eine Multstrafe konnte die vermôgensrechtliche Existenz des Burgers vernichten.’ This was of course subject to provocatio once the limits of the multa maxima (v. Lübtow, op. cit., pp. 266 ff.) were exceeded, but women may very possibly have not possessed the right oì provocatio. So Mommsen, Strafr., p. 143,Google Scholar although his concession of the right to them in the case of aedilitian multae tends to weaken our point. Perhaps the greater anomaly is the fixation of the amount of the sponsio in the case of public and sacred places. In any event the multa lay to compel obedience to restitutory and exhibitory orders as well as to prohibitory, so that in those cases at least minor coercitio had an advantage over the interdict.
37 Livy xxxix 14. 6 (‘quaestionem … extra ordinem consulibus mandant’); SC. De Bacchanalibus, FIRA 1 240 f.Google Scholar
38 38 See below.
39 FIRA i 241. 24–5: ‘sei quei esent, quei arvorsum ead fecisent, quam suprad scriptum est, eeis rem caputalem faciendam censuere.’
40 N.39 and Livy xxxix 14. 6, 8.
41 Livy xxxix 13. 9 f.; xxxix 14. 4, 6; xxxix 14. 9 (‘viderent ne qua sacra in operto fierent’). For lucid accounts of the Bacchanalian affair see Strachan-Davidson, op. cit., Vol. i, pp. 232 ff.; Kunkel, W.Unters. z. Entwicklung d. röm. Kriminalverf. in vorsullanischer Zeit (Munich, 1962), pp. 25 f.Google Scholar To the literature cited by Kunkel add Lear, F.S. ‘Treason and related offences in Roman and Germanic law’, Rice Institute Pamphlet 42. 2 (1955), p. 19:Google Scholar Labruna, op. cit., p. 71 and n. 119.
42 On the manifest crime see Kunkel, ‘Die Funktion des Konsiliums in der magistratischen Strafjustiz und im Kaisergericht’, ZSS 84 (1967), 218 ff.Google Scholar at 220 and n. 7; ZSS lxxxv (1968), 253 ff. at 256, 258, 314; ‘Prinzipien des röm. Strafverf.’, Symbolae Iuridicae et Historicae Martino David Dedicatae, Vol. i (1968), pp. 111 ff. at 118 ff.
43 This appears from the terms of the edict in Livy xxv 1. 12 and also from ‘nec iam in secreto modo atque intra parietes abolebantur Romani ritus, sed in publico etiam ac foro Capitolioque’ in xxv 1.7.
44 Pace Labruna’s assertion, op. cit., pp. 70 f., that the cult of 213 was ‘una delle prime manifestazioni di quel “revival” di “forme orgiastiche ormai trascurate della religione dionisiaca [rurale] dell’età ellenistica”, destinate ad acutizzarsi e ad esplodere nella pratica sempre più diffusa dei baccanali’. It is inconceivable that the Bacchic cult as described, for example, by Toynbee, A.J.HannibaVs Legacy, Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 391 ff.Google Scholar could have been practised in public in 213 when even in the more dissolute climate of 186 its adherents preferred to blush unseen. Moreover, Livy in no way suggests an orgiastic connotation in 213: his whole basis in xxv 1. 6 ff. is simply that celebrations were no longer patrio more but novo aut externo ritu.
45 Livy xxxix 14. 7 f.
46 In spite of the repeated references to praitor urbanas in SC De Bacchanalibus (FIRA i 240. 5, 8, 241.17, 21) and the complete absence of the consuls there is no reason, in view of the purely administrative rôle of the praetor in the document, to doubt Livy’s attribution of the edict for the future as well as the quaestio for the past to the consuls.
47 On Pernice’s view to the contrary and Berger’s criticisms thereof see n. 26. Pernice of course did not so much mean to imply the consul’s invocation of a private law remedy as his invocation in the early period of a remedy that had not yet become private, but far as we may be prepared to go in diluting the dividing-line between the private and public spheres (see below, esp. nn. 58–63 and the text there), some feature peculiar to the private law has to be present throughout, otherwise there is no continuity whatever between the consular measure and the praetorian: that feature would have to be the right of any private citizen to initiate the proceedings (below), but there is nothing to show that the consul (unlike the praetor) ever permitted the activation of his imperium to depend on private initiative.
48 See nos. 33–36 in Berger’s list of interdicts, op. cit. 1653–56.
49 Dig. xliii 6. Labruna’s reasons, op. cit., pp. 77 ff., for extending the interdict to loca religiosa and loca sancta are conclusive. The uniqueness of this interdict assists Labruna’s case as far as sacred places (but not public places) are concerned. On this aspect see further below.
50 Dig. xliii 8. 2 pr.
51 E.g. Dig. xliii 8. 2. 11 ; xliii 8. 2. 21, 22; xliii 8. 2. 35; xliii 8. 2. 45. See also Labruna, op. cit., pp. 39 ff.
52 Op. cit., pp. 39 ff., 80 ff.
53 Dig. xliii 6. 1 pr.
54 Ib. xliii 6. 1. 2.
55 Labruna, op. cit., pp. 80 ff.
56 Cf. Berger, op. cit. 1621 ff. and pass.
57 Cf. Wenger, op. cit., p. 254; Kaser, op. cit., p. 320.
58 Cf., on the general inefficacy of the interdict, Kelly, J.M.Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966), pp. 9 ff.Google Scholar
59 Berger, op. cit. 1691 f.; Jolowicz, op. cit., p. 241; Buckland, op. cit., p. 729.
60 See e.g. the view of Gandolfi cited in n. 26. The same view is implicit in the characterizations of the interdict cited in n. 25, once the praetor has given a final judgment. Cf. n. 62.
61 Berger, op. cit. 1692. Jolowicz, op. cit., p. 241, probably envisages a later date of cessation : ‘It is highly probable … that this system only had to be given up because of an intolerable pressure of business on the single judicial magistrate.’
62 See the valuable observations of Kaser, op. cit., p. 321 (‘Annalität, passive Unvererblichkeit, Zurückbeziehung d. Restitution auf den Zeitpunkt der Tat’). To these we may add the somewhat surprising fact to be gleaned from Ulpian’s commentary on the edict, that the exceptio rei iudicatae in interdicts was based expressly on the precedent of the criminal courts : ‘nam nec in publicis iudiciis permittitur amplius agi quam semel actum est, quam si praevaricationis fuerit damnatus prior accusator.’ Dig. xliii 29. 3. 13. Berger, op. cit. 1689, limits this exceptio to interdicta popularia, which suits us very well indeed.
63 On these see Berger, op. cit. 1621 ff. The locus classicus is Dig. xliii 8. 2 pr., 2.2: ‘“nequid in loco publico facias … qua ex re quid illi damni detur.” hoc interdictum prohibìtorium est et tam publicis utilitatibus quam privatorum per hoc prospicitur.’ It is also worth glancing at the immediately following observation by Ulpian in the same passage: ‘loca enim publica utique privatorum usibus deserviunt, iure scilicet civitatis, non quasi propria cuiusque, et tantum iuris habemus ad optinendum, quantum quilibet ex populo ad prohibendum habet.’
64 Livy xxvi 33. 10 ff.
65 On the question of whether this commission violated provocatio see the works cited in n. 41, especially the discussions of Strachan–Davidson and Kunkel—including the former’s examination of Mommsen’s position. For other views see Brecht, C.H.Perduellio (Munich, 1938), pp. 235 ff.Google Scholar (suspension by the senate of the comitial process in favour of Kriegsrecht) ; v. Liibtow, op. cit., pp. 294 ff. (the senate’s resumption of its imperium and entrustment of the activation thereof to the consuls) ; Toynbee, op. cit., p. 391 n. 5 (the right of provocatio was not exercised by a citizen but by the tribunes on his behalf, and their waiver of the right was all that was required). The crux of the matter is that this quaestio either represents the deliberate exclusion of provocatio on some basis or other or it proves that the right of provocatio did not apply to this sort of case at all. The writer hopes on another occasion to enlarge upon his position in the text, in favour of the first of these possibilities.
66 The defective locus standi of women (n. 33 and the text there) remains somewhat awkward, but there is room for the argument that the rules restricting them applied only to the cases for which they were framed (in the examples alluded to in n. 33, to the legis actio and formulary procedures) and thus have no bearing on the case here postulated, in which the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings should not be overlooked. As far as active locus standi is concerned Dig. xlvii 23. 6 may—if the actio popularis (on which see Buckland, op. cit., pp. 694 f.) is analogous to the interdictum populare—be against the view here expressed, but only if passive locus standi is necessarily on the same footing, and the fact that women could be reae but not accusatores in public criminal processes shows that such a conclusion is very far from being an imperative one.