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Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Nature of the American Indians

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

José A. Fernández-Santamaria
José A. Fernández-Santamaria*
Affiliation:
California State University, Hayward, California
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Extract

Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda epitomizes in many ways, both personally and intellectually, the cosmopolitanism of Spanish political thought in the sixteenth century. Educated in Italy, disciple of Pomponazzi, translator of Aristotle, chronicler of the Emperor and mentor of his son Philip, Sepúlveda is best known—and often misunderstood as the defender of the more unsavory aspects of the Spanish conquest and colonization in America—for his bitter controversy with Bartolomé de las Casas. To that debate Sepúlveda brought a humanist's training and outlook anchored in his devotion to Aristotle, but strongly tempered by his attachment to Saint Augustine. It is the purpose of this paper to examine Sepúlveda's ideas on the nature of the American natives, particularly the question of whether the Indians are natural slaves. Considerations of space, of course, rule out the possibility of undertaking here a detailed scrutiny of the foundations upon which those ideas rest. It can be said, however, that they are typically Renaissance views, a blend of traditions characteristic of the composite nature of the age's intellectual milieu.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Americas , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , April 1975 , pp. 434 - 451
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1975

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References

1 Sepúlveda’s political ideas are fundamentally embodied in four tracts: Cohortatio ad Carolum V ut helium suscipiat in Turcas (Bologna, 1530), Democrates primus (Rome, 1535), Democrates alter (1545), De Regno (Lérida, 1571). In parenthesis are indicated the places and dates of publication; except for the Democrates alter. Sepúlveda was denied official permission to publish this treatise completed ca. 1545. It saw the light in 1892, and then only in a defective edition based on an incomplete manuscript. The definitive edition is that of A. Losada, Demócrates segundo o de las justas causas de la guerra contra los indios (Madrid, 1951). For details concerning the life and works of Sepúlveda, see Losada, A., Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda a través de su Epistolario y nuevos documentos (Madrid, 1949).Google Scholar Also Marcos, T. Andrés, Los imperialismos de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda en su Democrates alter (Madrid, 1947)Google Scholar; Bell, A.F.G., Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Oxford, 1925)Google Scholar; Pérez, J. Beneyto, Ginés de Sepúlveda, humanista y soldado (Madrid, 1944).Google Scholar

2 See the letter in which Sepúlveda dedicates the Democrates alter to Luis de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla. “It is a transcendental problem to ascertain whether the war waged against the Indians by the kings of Spain in order to subject them to our dominium is just or unjust, and upon what juridical grounds our imperium over these peoples is founded.” This was also the subject discussed at Valladolid in 1550–51, when Sepúlveda and Las Casas appeared before a junta of theologians to defend their views.

3 The four principal traditions supporting Sepúlveda’s scheme are: the universalism of the Stoa, the Aristotelian political theory of the Greek city-state, Augustinian Christianity, and the civic humanism of the Italian Quattrocento. Their influence on Sepúlveda is discussed in my forthcoming paper, “Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda: A Spanish Humanist’s Eclectic Blueprint for a Universal Society.”

4 This superiority derives from Sepúlveda’s discussion of the traditionally fundamental question which debates the relative merits of the vita activa and the vita contemplativa. Its importance is examined in “Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda: A Spanish....”

5 de Sepúlveda, Juan Ginés, Democrates alter, ed. and trans. Losada, A. (Madrid, 1947), p. 40 et passim.Google Scholar Cited hereafter as DA. See also Democrates primus (De convenientia disciplinae milharis cum Christiana Religione dialogus), in Opera, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (4 vols., Madrid, 1780), vol. IV, p. 234. Cited hereafter as DR.

6 de Sepúlveda, Juan Ginés, De Regno et Regis officio, in Opera, vol. 4, p. 99.Google Scholar Cited hereafter as DR.

7 DA, 35 et sqq. In the Apologia pro libro de fisti belli causis written in defense of his Democrates alter after the universities of Salamanca and Alcalá had opposed the latter’s publication, Sepúlveda gives the following definition of “barbarian”: “Barbarians, on the authority of Saint Thomas, are those men wanting in reason … such men must obey those who are more civilized and prudent in order that they may be governed by better mores and institutions.” Opera, vol. IV, p. 332.

8 DA, 58. Two important ideas are implied in this passage. First, as long as the laws and the institutions of a people are in harmony with natural law, Sepúlveda will concede their soundness. It is solely upon this foundation—and its natural derivative, a superior culture— that he bases the Spanish claim to superiority. Secondly, Sepúlveda acknowledges the supremacy of law in social and political life. Only when this supremacy is assured will justice, the highest expression of the Christian political ethic, become an attainable goal.

9 It is important to note that from the very beginning the problem is set on decidedly political foundations. As we shall shortly see, it is the political element that will crucially influence Sepúlveda’s ideas on the status of the Indians.

10 Lewis Hanke maintains that Sepúlveda fully intended to translate servus as slave; an interpretation which seems to derive from Las Casas’ reading of Sepúlveda. See Hanke, L., Aristotle and the American Indians (Chicago, 1959).Google Scholar This opinion, however, is not universally shared, for other scholars have pointed out that servus may be taken to mean either slave or serf, and it was the latter meaning that Sepúlveda sought to convey. See Quirk, Robert E., “Some Notes on a Controversial Controversy,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 34 (1954), pp. 357–364.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Aristotle, Politics 1. 4. 1253b30. All references are to the Jowett edition and will be cited hereafter as Pol.

12 Ibid., 1.4.1254al5.

13 Ibid., 1.4.1254a5-10.

14 “The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interests of the master…” Ibid., 3. 6. 1278b30-35. Such, it will shortly become clear, is not the case in the relations between peaceful Indian and Spaniard as advocated by Sepúlveda.

15 “Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him.” Ibid., 1.4. 1254a5-15.

16 Ibid., 1.7. 1255b 15-20.

17 Natural slaves, however, are not quite like animals because although lacking reason they are nevertheless capable of apprehending rational principles. Ibid., 1. 5. 1254b20, et sqq. “Yet he [the slave] possesses a kind of moral virtue—the kind which enables him to do his work in subordination to his master—the moral virtue, in fact, of a subordinate confined to humble functions, and itself of a humble type. How any form of moral virtue can subsist in the absence of the deliberative faculty, Aristotle does not explain.... There are, indeed, other indications that it was not possible for Aristotle wholly to reconcile the two aspects of the slave, as a man and as an instrument or article of property.” Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle (2 vols., Oxford, 1887), vol. 1, p. 149.Google Scholar See also Mcllwain, C. H., The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York, 1932), pp. 70 et sqq.Google Scholar

18 Pol., 4. 4. 1290b35-40. Mechanics and laborers are not citizens; “they may be de-scribed as necessary conditions of the state. But the answer varies from one kind of con-sitution to another: in an aristocratic constitution, mechanics and labourers cannot be citizens; in an oligarchy, a rich mechanic may.” Barker, E., The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1946), p. 107.Google Scholar

19 DA, 120.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 20.

22 Ibid., 121.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 122. See also Pol., 2. 9.

25 DA, 122. The exception mentioned by Sepúlveda is an essential part of my argument and will fully be dealt with when Sepúlveda’s ideas on war are examined.

26 In time, when the Indians have mended their ways and adopted the Christian re-ligion, their governance, mixture of paternal and herile authority, shall give way to a “freer and more liberal treatment.” Ibid., 120. The political nature of the relationship binding Indian and Spaniard is again stressed when, in the context of the just war, Sepúlveda likens the dominion of Spaniards over Indians to the “imperium of the Romans over all the other peoples.” Ibid., 31 et sqq. It is clear, however, that even if the Indians willingly accept the Christian religion and the suzerainty of the Spanish monarch, they must not be admitted to the same rights enjoyed by “other Christians and even Spanish subjects” of the king. For “there is nothing more opposed to the so-called distributive justice than giving equal rights to unequal people; and to equate in favors, honor, or rights those who are superior in dignity, virtue, and merits to those who are inferior.” Ibid., 119. But it must be understood that this is not proposed for the benefit of the Indians alone. It is widely accepted among political thinkers in the sixteenth century that although men are born free, they are not created equal; an idea which explains the general distaste for democracy as a system of government.

27 DR, 98.

28 Pol. 1.4. 1254al5 et sqq.

29 DA, 78.

30 Ibid., 79.

31 Ibid., 118–123.

32 “It is only another of the institutions ordained by God to cope with man’s wickedness. As such, however, it must be considered as an outward status and must never obstruct the effects of God’s grace; it does not deprive the slave of the character of a man nor reduce him to the level of an ‘animate instrument’ as Aristotle thought. Masters and slaves are fellow men and by the grace of God may become brothers in Christ, equal before God though necessarily unequal under human law while sojourners in this ‘earthly city’”. Quoted in Mcllwain, op. cit., 161.

33 An interesting case in point is the Spanish Trinitarian monk, Alonso de Castrillo. When discussing in his Tractado de República the obedience that the citizens owe their king, Castrillo cites Book XIX, Chapter 15, of the City of God, where Saint Augustine writes on man’s freedom and servitude; and he interprets the passage as explaining the origin of political authority and translates the key word servitutis as servidumbre. The same Castrillo, however, when describing the dismal and evil manner in which in his own corrupt world greed keeps justice, faith, peace, and virtue in bondage, he uses the word esclavas. In the same vein, compare Book I, Chapter V of Bodin’s République in the Latin (Paris, 1586) and French (Paris, 1583) versions, and the English translation of 1606 by Richard Knolles (ed. K.D. McRae, Cambridge, 1962). On the problem of expressing sixteenth-century ideas in Latin see Febvre, L., Le problème de l’incroyance au XVle, siècle: La religion de Rabelais (Paris, 1947).Google Scholar

34 For an extensive analysis of Saint Augustine’s views on war, see Deane, H. A., The Political and Social Ideas of Saint Augustine (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

35 DA, 16–19, DR, 146–148. “A just war demands not only just cause and sound intentions, but also that it be waged in the right manner.” DA, 27.

36 DA, 19.

37 Ibid., 19, 22. The other three are: “… Secondly, to banish the horrible crime of cannibalism and devil-worship.… [Thirdly] to free from serious injury the innocent who are yearly immolated by these barbarians. … Fourthly, to open the way to the propagation of the Christian faith, and to facilitate the task of its preachers.’ Ibid., 83–93. These four arguments constitute one of the themes attacked by Las Casas during his disputation with Sepúlveda at Valladolid.

38 Ibid., 30.

39 Ibid., 42,43, 79–80,90.

40 Ibid., 30.

41 Ibid., 28–29.

42 Ibid., 60,90.

43 Ibid., 90 et sqq.

44 Ibid., 117. Cliens, stipendiarius, and vectigalis are words frequently used by Sepúlveda to describe the position of the Indians in relation to the Spanish state; an indication of how clearly he keeps in mind the example of the kind of authority Rome exercised over her client states. In a letter to Francisco de Argote before 1552, Sepúlveda reiterates his position on the Indian question. “I do not maintain that the barbarians should be reduced to slavery, but merely that they must be subjected to our dominion; I do not propose that we should hold herile empire over them, but regal and civil rule for their benefit.” Quoted in Marcos, T. Andrés, Los imperialismos. … p. 184.Google Scholar See also Losada, A., Epistolario de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (Madrid, 1966), Letter 53.Google Scholar

45 DA, 100 et sqq.

46 Ibid., 118.

47 Ibid., 94–95.

48 Ibid., 118.