Institutional and Political Impediments to Spain's Settlement of the American Rebellions

Extract

Spain's imperial government, in facing the political and military threat posed by the Wars of Independence in America, could be no stronger than the sum of its parts. Among the important questions not previously detailed concerning Spanish American independence, a significant one is why metropolitan Spain itself responded so weakly and indecisively to the danger. There were, of course, severe constraints on resources as well as limitations in terms of the leadership. These two elements, however, while they were certainly real, need not have been automatically decisive. After all, despite incredible hardship and difficulty, the Spanish Comisión de Reemplazos—the Cádiz-based supply committee made up of merchants—alone and by its own tally between 1811 and 1820 dispatched thirty expeditions of peninsular troops to America involving more than 47,000 men and a cost of 350 million reales. The Morillo expedition in 1815involved 12,254 men. The so-called “Great Expedition” that gathered at Cádiz for use in Buenos Aires consisted of 14,000 men before it revolted in January 1820. In July 1820 the minister of War told the Cortes that Spain had sent a total of 27,342 troops to America since the king's restoration in 1814. Thus there was a military response from the metropolis, to say nothing, of course, of the more critical military mobilization of the American viceregal governments. One could also argue that, despite the undoubted failings of individual Spanish leaders under both the Cortes and the absolutist regimes, the political chaos at least brought a number of differing political persuasions to power. After all, Spain experienced in these years six major transformations of its political system. The leadership ran the gamut of political ideology, from extreme conservatives to extreme liberals. Pintos Vieites, in an attempt to revise Ferdinand VII favorably, even argues that the king in the first restoration purposely appointed moderates in order to hear their advice. While the parliamentarians of 1812 and 1820 tended to be young and relatively inexperienced, most of the ministers had served in the previous reign or had substantial experience.