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The Club de la Unión and Kinship: Social Aspects of Political Obstructionism in the Chilean Senate, 1920-1924

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

Gertrude M. Yeager
Gertrude M. Yeager*
Affiliation:
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
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Extract

In 1920, Chile entered a transitional period during which political issues sparked intense social tensions. A fundamental reform of the Alianza Liberal coalition was to open the political system to fuller citizen participation, a prospect which threatened the Chilean elite. To thwart reform and change, an oligarchy, closely united by kinship ties and mutual interest, pursued a policy of obstructionism in the Senate which effectively paralyzed government. The four years 1920-1924 during which Arturo Alessandri occupied the presidency were so turbulent and frustrating that the military alone seemed capable of reestablishing order.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Americas , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , April 1979 , pp. 539 - 572
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1979

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References

1 Gil, Federico G., The Political System of Chile, Boston, 1966;Google Scholar Urzua, V. German, Los partidos políticos chilenos, de Chile, Santiago, 1960;Google Scholar Vicuña, Manuel Rivas, Historia política y parlamentaria de Chile, 3 Vols., Santiago, 1964.Google Scholar

2 Analysis of the Radical Party tends to support ideas presented by Stafford, Frank, “Social Aspects of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America: New Granada, 1825–1850,” Journal of Social History (1972), 344–369.Google Scholar

Older radicals such as Enrique Matta and Enrique Maclver were socially, politically and economically identified with the established order and Unionista leaders attempted to court them. Rather than split the party, the older Radical leaders simply abstained from active involvement in this particular election and allowed the younger leadership, namely Pedro Aguirre Cerda, to direct the party and determine policy. The youngest members of the party were members of the Chamber of Deputies. By and large, they were more militant and more reformist than their elders. They were typically concentrated in the Chamber because Chilean legislative seats were customarily allotted on a seniority basis. While the Alianza remained a minority coalition, younger radicals toed the line; control over the socialist deputies, however, diminished after the Alianza won control of the Senate in March, 1924. After this date, defiance proved effective in gaining leverage within both the party and the coalition.

3 Both groups voiced the principles of Christian Socialism. The Partido Popular was newly organized and did not have any representation in Congress. Christian Socialism had little apparent impact upon the senators under consideration here.

4 In the 1920 election, the Conservative, Radical and Democratic parties were not strong enough to run and elect a president. The era of the Conservatives was judged to be over; the year not yet ripe for a Radical or Democrat to be elected chief executive.

5 New interpretations of the Portalean era assume that the dominant political philosophy of the times was classical liberalism. See Kinsbruner’s, Jay Chile: A Historical Interpretation, New York, 1973 Google Scholar and Diego Portales, The Hague, 1967.

6 These terms were used throughout the parliamentary era to delineate coalitions composed of essentially center parties. The Alianza under consideration was formed in 1918 to run a slate of candidates for the Cámara elections.

7 Rumors circulated in Santiago from October, 1919 to April, 1920, concerning the monetary union of all liberals. See El Mercurio for the following dates: Oct. 5, 1919, p. 23; Oct. 6, 1919, p. 15; Oct. 7, 1919, p. 13; Oct. 13, 1919, p. 13; Nov. 6, 1919, p. 13; Nov. 28, 1919, p. 17; Jan. 9, 1920, p. 21; Mar. 19, 1920, p. 15. The problem stemmed from the unwillingness of the National Party to tolerate the inclusion of the Radical Party in any political coalition. Alianza liberals would not participate if Radicals were excluded.

8 El Mercurio, Mar. 8, 1921, p. 13. Enrique Maclver and older Radicals would not participate although asked to do so by Unión liberals, ibid., Mar. 19, 1920, p. 15.

9 The Radical Party received thirty percent of the total number of allotted delegates. The party’s influence is visible in the delegate selection method and in the final draft of the platform.

10 Conservatives apparently had not run a presidential candidate since 1910. They did participate in congressional and local elections and had the largest Senate delegation from 1910 to 1924; on the average the party held nine of the thirty-seven senate seats. See El Mercurio, July 13, 1924, p. 5.

11 The possibility of Conservative support was not clear until after the nomination of Alessandri on April 26, 1920, although it was hinted vaguely in 1919. See El Mercurio, Oct. 5, 1919, p. 23; April 1, 1920, p. 3; April 15, 1920, p. 19; May 11, 1920, p. 21. The actual announcement was not made until after the selection of Luis Barros Borgoño as the Unión’s candidate.

12 EI Mercurio, May 19, 1920, p. 17; May 20, 1920, p. 15.

13 To accomodate the Conservatives, the Liberals bypassed the selection of their three strongest candidates. The best choice, the man Alessandri acknowledged could have defeated his own candidacy, was Ismael Tocornal, an independent liberal and a compromise candidate, who could have united liberals of various persuasions. Conservatives, however, did not believe that they could support a man who had consistently opposed them for fifty years. Alessandri also argued that Enrique Zañartu and Ladislao Errázuriz were also bypassed because of their close identification with liberalism. Conservatives demanded a neutral candidate and Barros was selected on the eleventh round of Unionista balloting. El Mercurio, May 3, 1920, p. 17;May 4, 1920, p. 17;May5, 1920,p. 3.

14 Ibid., Mar. 17, 1920, p. 17; Mar. 18, 1920, p. 15.

15 “Diez años de coalición o el decenio político de la Compañía de Salitres de Antofagasta,” ibid., June 6, 1920, p. 19. The article tied Barros Borgoño to the Cía. de Salitres de Antofagasta and listed the major stockholding families. They included: Besa, Montt, Echenique, Urrejola, Balmaceda, Periera, Errázuriz, Lazcano, Salas, Irarrázaval, González Errázuriz, Cerda, Ross, and Barros.

18 Ibid., Apr. 25, 1920.

17 Ibid., May 10, 1920, p. 17; and May 11, 1920, p. 20.

18 Ibid., May 19, 1920, p. 17; May 20, 1920, p. 3. The evaluation of Diario Ilustrado was similar. See Donoso, Ricardo, Alessandri, agitador y demoledor, 2 Vols., Mexico, 1952, 1, p. 246.Google Scholar

19 Lists appeared in the following issues ofEl Mercurio in 1920: Mar. 23, p. 15; Mar. 27, p. 15; Mar. 29, p. 16; Mar. 31, p. 13; Apr. 2, p. 13; Apr. 6, p. 19; Apr. 7, p. 15; Apr. 8, p. 17; Apr. 9, p. 17; Apr. 10, p. 15; Apr. 11, p. 13; Apr. 13, p. 17; Apr. 15, p. 19; Apr. 16, p. 17; Apr. 17, p. 17; Apr. 18, p. 15; Apr. 20, p. 20; Apr. 22, p. 13; Apr. 23, p. 18; Apr. 24, p. 18; Apr. 28, p. 17.

20 Ibid., Apr. 20, 1920, p. 51.

21 Ibid., Apr. 20, 1920, p. 15.

22 Ibid., Apr. 10, 1920, p. 15.

23 Ibid., Apr. 1, p. 3.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., Apr. 25, 1920, p. 3.

26 Ibid., Apr. 23, 1920, p. 18; Apr. 24, 1920, p. 23.

27 Ibid., Apr. 24, 1920, p. 23.

28 Ibid., Apr. 21, 1920, p. 18; May 1, 1920, p. 16; May 2, 1920, p. 26.

29 Ibid., May 2, 1920, p. 26.

30 Ibid., Apr. 26, 1920, p. 3. Alessandri’s campaign trips were well reported in the press. See the following editions of El Mercurio: Mar. 25, 1920, p. 15; Apr. 3, 1920, p. 14; Apr. 6, 1920, p. 19; Apr. 7, 1920, p. 15; Apr. 8, 1920, p. 17; Apr. 9, 1920, p. 17; Apr. 13, 1920, p. 17; Apr. 14, 1920, p. 17; Apr. 20, 1920, p. 15.

31 Ibid., Apr. 26, 1920, p. 19; Donoso, , Alessandri, 1, 246.Google Scholar

32 Ibid., Apr. 26, 1920, p. 19.

33 Ibid., May 2, 1920, p. 25.

34 “Crítica,” ibid., May 14, 1920, p. 15. The article was written by Joaquín Edwards Bello for a Buenos Aires newspaper and reprinted in El Mercurio.

35 Ibid., May 24, 1920, p. 11.

36 Ibid., May 23, 1920, p. 25; May 24, 1920, p. 11; May 25, 1920, p. 17; May 27, 1920, p. 13.

37 Ibid., June 15, 1920, p. 17. 3aIbid., June 22, 1920, p. 9.

39 Ibid., July 1, 1920, p. 19; Alessandri, Arturo, Recuerdos de gobierno, 3 Vols.Google Scholar, de Chile, Santiago, 1950, 1., pp. 35–39.Google Scholar Donoso, , Alessandri, 1, 251–253.Google Scholar

40 Donoso, , Alessandri, 1, 251–253.Google Scholar

41 Ibid., I, 254–256; Alessandri, , Recuerdos, 1, 43–64 Google Scholar; Bonilla, Frank, “The Student Federation of Chile: Fifty Years of Action,” Journal of Inter-American Studies (July, 1960), p. 312.Google Scholar

42 “Calificación de la elección presidencial: se propone un tribunal de honor,” El Mercurio, July 9, 1920, p. 17 and “El tribunal de honor,” ibid., July 9, 1920, p. 3. Donoso, , Alessandri 1, p. 262 Google Scholar; Alessandri, , Recuerdos, 1, 47–52.Google Scholar

43 El Mercurio, Oct. 1, 1920, p. 3. When the tribunal became locked in a stalemate Unionistas pressured one of its members, Guillermo Subercaseaux, to tilt the decision to their candidate. Subercaseaux was president of the unionist National Party. When he balked, they forced his resignation and replaced him with the historian, Francisco Encina.

44 El Mercurio, Oct. 7, 1920, p. 3.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1920, p. 19; Oct. 8, 1920, p. 3 and p. 11; Oct. 26, 1920, p. 3; Oct. 28, 1920, p. 3; Oct. 29, 1920, p. 3; Nov. 6, 1920, p. 3; Nov. 21, 1920, p. 3.

47 Matte, Guillermo Edwards, El Club de la Unión en sus ochenta años, Santiago, 1944, p. 12.Google Scholar

48 Ibid. Although he does not discuss membership requirements, he notes that the entire body voted on applicants and that four negative votes were sufficient to deny admission.

49 Edwards, Alberto, La fronda aristocrática en Chile, Santiago, 1928, p. 191.Google Scholar

50 Nearly all the leaders, in fact, were older men.

51 Figures from unofficial lists of Club de la Unión members in Durán, Carlos Pinto, Diccionario personal de Chile (supplement), Santiago, 1924 Google Scholar, passim, and Figueroa, Virgilino, Diccionario histórico, biográfico y bibliográfico de Chile, 1800–1933, 5 Vols, Santiago, 1925–1931Google Scholar. See also Petras, James Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, Berkeley, 1969, p. 53 Google Scholar, note 18 who employs the same sources in defining the Chilean elite.

52 The following senators were members of the Club Unión: Enrique Maclver Rodríguez, Alfredo Escobar, Guillermo Rivera, Rafael Urreloja, Joaquín Echenique, Armando Quezada, Alberto González Errázuriz, Ladislao Errázuriz Lazcano, Pedro Correa Ovalle, Pedro Letelier Silva, Alfredo Barros Errázuriz, Héctor Zañartu Prieto, Guillermo Edwards Matte, Enrique Zañartu Prieto, Luis Barros, Fernando Friere, Ricardo Valdés Bustamente, Eliodore Yáñez, Silvestre Ochagavia, Abraham Gatica, Arturo Lyon Peña, Francisco Huneeus, Juan Enrique Concha Subercaseauz, Eduardo Opaso Letelier, Romualdo Silva Cortés, José Alessandri, Pedro Aguirre Cerda. Luis Claro Solar, Gonzalo Bulnes and Jorge Errázuriz Tagle were also apparent members.

53 Amunátegui, Domingo y Solar, , Mayorazgos i titulos de Castilla, Santiago, 1901–1904Google Scholar, 3 Vols; Kinsbruner, Jay, “The Political Status of Chilean Merchants at the End of the Colonial Period: The Concepción Example, 1790–1810,” The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History (July, 1972), 31–56 Google Scholar; Góngora, Mario, Encomenderos y estancieros; estudios acerca la constitución social aristocrática de Chile después de la conquista, 1580–1660, Santiago, 1970 Google Scholar; Barbier, Jaques, “Elites and Cadres in Bourbon Chile,” Hispanic American Historical Review (1972), 416–435 Google Scholar; Haigh, Roger M., The Formation of the Chilean Oligarchy, 1810–1821, Salt Lake City, 1973 Google Scholar; Pike, Frederick B., Chile and The United States, 1880–1962, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1963, pp. 4–7.Google Scholar

54 Donoso, Ricardo, Desarrollo político y social de Chile desde la constitución de Santiago, 1942, p. 113.Google Scholar

55 Ibid., Edwards, , La fronda, p. 190 Google Scholar. See also Solar, Domingo Amunátegui, Historia social de Chile, Santiago, 1932 Google Scholar; and the same author’s El progreso intelectual y político de Chile, Santiago, 1936.

58 See note 51.

57 Approximately fourteen percent of the Club’s membership traced their lineage to mayorazgo holders.

58 Independence-era patriot families included the Errázuriz, Vicuña, Eyzaguirre, Salas, Carrera, Cotapos, Barros, Prieto, Bascuñán and Zañartu, among others. Membership in this exclusive club was determined by consulting the Archivo Bernardo O’Higgins and the Juan Fernández prisoner lists.

59 This group numbered 164 members and included such surnames as Edwards, Donoso, Tocornol, Huneeus, Concha, Izquierdo and Bunster.

60 Older, established families included the Larraín, Garcia Huidobro, Covarrubias and Ruiz Tagle, all mayorazgo holders. The Errázuriz, Vicuña and Prieto families were represented on the Juan Fernández prisoner rolls. The Concha were descended from a royal oidor. The Izquierdo were professionals typical of those prominent in capital political, economic and bureaucratic life. Immigrant families such as the Edwards were deliberately excluded from the present sample.

61 The ten formed a core around which revolved newer families, usually families which had marital links with only one of the core. In general the degree of intermarriage was remarkable. For example, four families, each extensive in its own right, bore the surname Covarrubias Ortúzar. There were four lines of Vicuña Subercaseaux and two with the surname Subercaseaux Vicuña. Some of the important collateral families attached to the core group were González Errázuriz, Barros Errázuriz, Fernández Concha and Zañartu Prieto, to name a few.

62 Figueroa, Virgilino, Diccionario histórico, 3, pp. 645–646 Google Scholar, Archivo de don Bernardo O’Higgins, 42 Vols, Santiago, 1959-Vol. XXIV, 119–125; Ezyaguirre, Jaime, “La conducta política del grupo dirigente chileno durante la guerra de la independencia,” Estudios de Historia de las Instituciones Políticas y Sociales, (1967), 227–269 Google Scholar; Haigh, The Formation, Passim.

63 Figure determined by including families with more tenuous connections, among them the Gandarillas, Bunster, Lazcano Cotapos, Lecaros and others.

64 Figueroa, , Diccionario, 3, 637–648.Google Scholar

65 Ibid, III, pp. 637–639, 646.

66 Ibid. III, pp. 647–648.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., III, p. 640.

69 Ibid., pp. 637–648.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 641.

72 The four senators Errázuriz Tagle, Errázuriz Lazcano, González Errázuriz and Barros Errázuriz. Ibid., III, pp. 59–72.

73 Ibid, III, pp. 67–68; Nunn, Frederick, Chilean Politics, 1920–1931, Albuquerque, 1970, p. 51 Google Scholar.

74 Figueroa, , Diccionario, 3, pp. 72–75.Google Scholar

75 El Mercurio, May 2, 1920, p. 25.

76 Figueroa, , Diccionario, 3, pp. 291–292, 552–559 and IV–V, pp. 1113–1115.Google Scholar

77 Ibid., IV–V, pp. 1113–1115; Alessandri, Recuerdos, I, pp. 261–263.

78 Figueroa, , Diccionario, 4–5, p. 1115.Google Scholar

79 Ibid. III, pp. 553–555.

80 Ibid., II, pp. 536–542.

81 Ibid., II, pp. 537–542.

82 Ibid., IV–V, pp. 1041–1051.

83 Ibid., III, pp. 137–140, 293–298 and IV–V, pp. 730–732, 877–879.

84 Ibid., II, pp. 474–479.

85 Ibid., II, pp. 420–423; III, pp. 150–152, 530–532.

86 Alessandri, , Recuerdos, Vol. 1, pp. 207–210.Google Scholar

87 El Mercurio, Mar. 23, 1920, p. 15.

88 Donoso, , Alessandri, Vol. 1., p. 385.Google Scholar

89 Zegers, Christian, Aníbal Pinto: historia política de su gobierno, Santiago, 1969.Google Scholar

90 Encina, Francisco A., Historia de Chile, 22 Vols., Santiago, 1951, Vols. 18, XIX.Google Scholar

91 Alessandri, , Recuerdos, Vol. 1, pp. 222–223 Google Scholar; Nunn, , Chilean Politics, pp. 40–44.Google Scholar

92 El Mercurio, Mar. 19, 1924, p. 3.

93 Lee Anderson, F., et al, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, Evanston, Illinois, 1966 Google Scholar: Rice, Stuart A., “The Behavior of Legislative Groups: A Method of Measurement,” Political Science Quarterly, (1925), 60–72 Google Scholar; Gambill, Edward L., “Who were the Senate Radicals,” Civil War History, (1965), 237–244 Google Scholar; Bogue, Allan G., “Bloc and Party in the United States Senate, 1861–1883,” Civil War History, (1967), 221–241 Google Scholar; Linden, Glenn M., “Radicals’ and Economic Policies: The Senate, 1861–1873,” Journal of Southern History,(1966), 189–199 Google Scholar; Belknap, George M., “A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior,” Midwest Journal of Politics, (1958), 377–402 Google Scholar; Macrae, Duncan Jr., “A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes,” American Political Science Review, (1962), 909–926 Google Scholar. The Guttman Scale was employed to test for obstructionism in roll call votes cast between June, 1921 and March, 1924. The votes of a lame duck session and of an Alianza-dominated Senate were deliberately omitted because of the small number of votes cast. From a total population of thirty-four votes, thirty were studied. Four content-related categories were then created: votes of censure; political votes; votes rejecting administration-initiated legislation and votes approving legislation not sponsored by the government. These votes produced eleven scales.

Y= pattern vote for obstructionism, Ν = pro-Administration vote, o= absent. Thirty votes fit into this scale. Missing senators, voting in less than fifty percent of the ballots are not included. Senator Opazo Letelier replaced Errázuriz Tagle when the latter died in office in 1922. Because the vote patterns were the same, their votes were combined. Senators not included were: Alfredo Escobar, Guillermo Rivera, Rafael Urreloja, Armando Quezada, Regulo Valenzuela, Fernando Friere, Luis Barros, Ricardo Valdés Bustamente, Rafael Ariztia, Abraham Gatica, Luis Garnham, Carlos Balmaceda Toro. CR = .97.

  • Voting Key: 1.

    Voting Key: 1. summary three votes cast to censure Alessandri’s Minister of Interior 25-x-1921.

  • 2.

    2. pattern vote rejecting reform of Merchant Marine and Reform of Railway granting concession policy.

  • 3.

    3. vote to reject the Washington Protocol.

  • 4.

    4. vote to pass liberal inheritance tax law.

  • 5.

    5. 5. pattern on rejection of Senate procedural reform and demand for special election in Nuble.

  • 6.

    6. pattern of six final votes of censure.

94 Absences were ignored.

95 Donoso, , Alessandri, 1, 251–252.Google Scholar

96 Ibid., I, 251–261.

97 Alessandri, , Recuerdos, 1, pp. 72 Google Scholar, 77–79, 88, 152–153.

98 Ibid., I, pp. 200–221, 223. Donoso, , Alessandri, 1, pp. 336–339, 343.Google Scholar

99 Donoso, , Alessandri, 1, pp. 279, 335–338Google Scholar; Alessandri, , Recuerdos, 1, pp. 67–71.Google Scholar