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Khrushchev's Economic Neo-Stalinism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2018

Lazar Volin
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Extract

In Russia the exit of an autocrat, whether voluntary or involuntary,is traditionally a signal for a popular sentiment that “it is time for a change” in other ways, too—a change for the better, of course. And sometimes such hopes have been at least partially realized, as when a hundred years ago the accession to the throne of Alexander II (1855-81), in the midst of the disastrous Crimean War, eventually brought about such important liberal reforms, despite all their shortcomings, as the eagerly awaited emancipation of the peasantry from the hateful serfdom, the judicial and other reforms. More often, however, such popular aspirations have proved to be what the last Russian emperor, Nicholas II (1894-1917), called “senseless dreams” when at the beginning of his reign he scoffed at modest suggestions for establishing a representative government. Yet, despite many disappointments, the tradition that a basic change accompanies a new regime has persisted.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Slavic and East European Review , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 1955 , pp. 445 - 464
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies 1955

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References

1 “The Malenkov-Khrushchev New Economic Policy,” The Journal of Political Economy, LXII, No. 3 (June, 1954), 187-209. Reprinted in an abridged form in Problems of Communism, Vol. 3, No. 5 (September-October, 1954), pp. 16-25.

2 It is worth noting Khrushchev's originally positive identification with this program, particularly on the agricultural side, so that it seemed appropriate at the time to speak of the Malenkov-Khrushchev policy.

3 Reported in Pravda and Izvestija on August 9, 1953.

4 The economists with whom Shepilov takes issue are not the well-known names in the profession, and only one of those, I. A. Vekua, succeeded in bringing out his views in print (in Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 9, 1954). However, an authoritative textbook on political economy, authored by a number of prominent economists, including Shepilov, himself, and completed for printing at the end of August, 1954, took a position which, as far as practical effect is concerned, does not differ greatly from that of the “heretic”economists. It is true that the book repeats the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist doctrine with respect to the priority of heavy industry, postulating the necessity “ of a more rapid growth of the branches of industry manufacturing means of production compared with those producing consumers’ goods.” But, on the same page, the book admits that, “There has developed a disparity between the level of production of consumers’ goods and the growing needs of the population. At the same time, on the basis of the successes achieved in the development of the heavy industry during the fifth Five-Year Plan, there were created real conditions for a sharp upswing in production of consumers' goods.” And so forth in the same vein. (Ostrovitjanov and others, Politicheskaja ekonomija. Uchebnik. [Moscow, 1954], p. 416-17).

5 Pravda, December 24, 1954.

6 It seems paradoxical that the renewed emphasis on heavy industry, which includes, of course, the armament industry, was followed by a more conciliatory Soviet international policy than has been witnessed in many years. The paradox, perhaps, may be resolved when we remember the Soviet penchant for quick shifts from one alternative to another and the corresponding need to be ready on several fronts.

7 In one phase of this campaign—the proposed resettlement of the peasants in the so-called agro-gorod (enlarged villages)—Khrushchev was overruled. It is possible that Malenkov as the then Secretary of the Central Committee may have opposed Khrushchev on this point. But it is equally possible that Stalin intervened on his own initiative. Khrushchev, by the way, so far has made no attempt to revive the agro-gorod issue.

8 Jasny, Naum, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR (Stanford, 1949), pp. 541 and 728 Google Scholar. Volin, Lazar, “Agricultural Statistics in Soviet Russia: Their Usability and Reliability,” The American Statistician, Vol. 7, No. 3 (June-July 1953), pp. 8–12 Google Scholar; also Foreign Agriculture, Vol. 17, No. 3 (March, 1953), pp. 59-63.

9 Pravda and Izvestija, September 15, 1953.

10 There was also a 50 percent decrease during the same period in the amount of potatoes and a reduction in concentrates fed to collective livestock, as well as a sharp decrease in the amount of roughage distributed to the kolkhozniki. Lutsenko, M., Kommunist, No. 15 (1953), page 30 Google Scholar.

11 Volin, , “The Turn of the Screw in Soviet Agriculture,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January, 1952), pp. 277-88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Volin, “Stalin's Last Testament and the Outlook for Kolkhozy during the Succession,” Journal of Political Economy, LXI, No. 4 (August 1953), pp. 291-305.

13 The “scissors” are manifested in high prices, shortages and poor quality of manufactured goods, and low prices of agricultural products, with consequent low real returns to farmers.

14 I discussed these matters in greater detail in The Journal of Political Economy, op. cit., June, 1954.

15 In addition to state investment in agriculture, kolkhozy also make capital investments of their own in labor and cash. Money investments were to increase to 18 billion rubles in 1955, compared with 10.9 billion in 1952 and 12.5 billion in 1953. The increase in kolkhoz investments has, of course, a deflationary effect on the income of kolkhozniki.

16 All figures are from a budget report by Minister of Finance, Zverev, A. G., Pravda and Izvestija, April 22, 1954 Google Scholar.

17 Kudrin, V., Planovoe khozjajstvo, No. 3 (1954), p. 45 Google Scholar.

18 This was later confirmed by Khrushchev in the above-mentioned interview given to John Bernal.

19 Volin, , “A New Battle for Grain in Soviet Russia,” Foreign Agriculture, Vol. 18, No. 11 (November, 1954), pp. 194-99Google Scholar.

20 It may be recalled in this connection that, on the eve of the last war, in April, 1940, there was also adopted a three-year program of grain-acreage expansion in the eastern regions, which called only for an addition of less than 11 million acres of tillable land (not of seeded acreage).

21 Sel'skoe khozjajstvo, November 10, 1954.

22 Pravda, November 8, 1954.

23 Pravda, June 27, 1954.

24 The new system was revealed not through a publication of some official decree or order but through an article appearing in the agricultural paper Sel'skoe khozjajstvo of August 31, 1954, and entitled “The Compulsory Minimum of Work Days for Kolkhozniki” by N. Nazartsev.

25 Pravda, February 2 and 3, 1955.

26 Sel'skoe khozjajstvo, May 21, 1955; also Foreign Crops and Markets, Vol. 70 (June 6, 1955). pp. 675-76.

27 Vasil'chikov, A., Sel'skij byt i sel'skoe khozjajstvo v Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1881), p. 100 Google Scholar.

28 Volin, , A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture, U. S. Department of Agriculture Monograph 5 (Washington, D. C, 1951), pp. 89–90 Google Scholar.

29 M. Blinkova, S. Benevol'skij, V. Kondrat'ev, Sel'skoe khozjajstvo, June 19, 1954.

30 Izvestija, March 11, 1955.

31 Osnovy postroenija agrotekhniki socialisticheskogo zemledelija (The Foundations of Farm Technique of Socialist Agriculture), 1936, p. 68.