Taking its point of departure in the elitist paradigm and the much-discussed relationship between elite integration and stable democratic political systems, this article offers a typology of fragmented and integrated national elites and investigates the structure of the “consensually integrated” elite type. It is hypothesized that “consensually integrated” elites have largely similar structures consisting of personal interaction networks which are more inclusive and less class-based, and which contain more extensive and centralized connections among all major elite groups, than the plural elite, power elite or ruling class models of elite structure separately depict. Support for these hypotheses is found in a comparison of the network structures of two consensually integrated national elites, the American and Australian, as these structures are revealed by issue-based sociometric data taken from closely comparable elite samples and studies in the two countries.

This article examines alternative visions of “strong” party systems by analyzing relationships between party systems and several dimensions of performance of the political process in 28 democracies of the 1967-1976 decade. Party system theorists agree that voting support for extremist parties manifests a weakness in the party system. They disagree, however, about the virtues or vices of party majorities and close linkages between social groups and parties. The evidence, including multivariate analysis of party system types and characteristics, with controls for environmental conditions, indicates that during this period extremist party support was associated with executive instability and mass rioting. Scholarly concern about other aspects of party system strength or weakness should focus on the desired feature of political performance. The representational, multiparty systems were most successful in limiting rioting. Aggregative majorities, responsible majorities, and representational party systems all had good executive stability in the short run, although the first two types seemed somewhat more stable over the decade. Aggregative majority party systems were associated with low citizen voting participation.

Machiavelli is presented as the founder of modern political science, with due regard to the fact that he never spoke of “political science.” His usage of “prudence” and “art” in The Prince is examined to see whether, as founder, he was a teacher or a ruler of future generations. His comprehensive attack on classical political science is outlined and developed through two essential points, the cycle and the soul.

Large-scale complex research project designs are providing a new impetus to the elimination of subfield boundaries within political science. Major projects are taking advantage of the methodology and technology of contemporary social research to include comparisons among institutions, across cultural boundaries, and extending through time. As a consequence, traditionally narrow field and subfield concentrations on segments of the political process are giving way to intellectual interests that bring together hitherto separate concerns. The full potential for discipline-unifying research will, however, not be realized until there is a strengthening of the organizational infrastructures for research, a broadening of training in research design and administration, and an increase in funding for large-scale projects. The execution and subsequent intellectual exploitation of large research projects will carry additional problems that will be solved only with substantial changes in the workways of the political scientist, but those problems are greatly outweighed by the positive contribution that such research will make to the future of the discipline.

Georges Sorel was of course a critic of “citizenship” in the sense current then as now. But behind his ideal picture of industrial organization there lay a conception of citizenship which derived from an older tradition. This conception in turn modified the themes which Sorel drew from a second tradition, that of thought about “industry.” The result was a vision of industrial organization which displaced civil association by taking some of its typical features for itself. What is represented by notions such as the “myth of the general strike” is not, as some have held, a romantic reaction against modern organization but, on the contrary, a thoroughly modern doctrine of organization as the “sublimation” of civil life which continues to pose problems of relevance today.

This article tests the hypothesis that postwar affluence led to an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Post-Materialist values among Western publics, and analyzes the consequences of the economic uncertainty prevailing since 1973. The young emphasize Post-Materialist values more than the old. Time-series data indicate that this reflects generational change far more than aging effects, but that the recession of the mid-1970s also produced significant period effects. As Post-Materialists aged, they moved out of the student ghetto and became a predominant influence among young technocrats, contributing to the rise of a “New Class.” They furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero-growth and antinuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top priority to reindustrialization and rearmament constitutes a distinctive and persisting dimension of political cleavage.

This study offers an empirical description of the voting alignments that dominated the American Constitutional Convention as the delegates struggled to produce the final report of that historic assembly. Its conceptual roots are firmly planted in the theoretical traditions of Schattschneider on conflict and cleavage, and of Key, Burnham and Sundquist on critical realignment of the American party system. I demonstrate that dynamic processes analogous to Key's conception of “critical elections” at the macro-level of national politics can also be identified and analyzed at the micro-level of the constituent assembly. Therefore, I argue that one of the “mainsprings of American politics,” as Burnham calls the critical election phenomenon, permeates all levels of the American political system and not simply the national level of electoral mass politics. More specifically, this clear description of coalition alignment, operation and realignment in the Constitutional Convention, when informed and enlightened by the “critical realignment” model, greatly facilitates the more traditional discussion of debate, conflict and ultimate decision on the central issues before that body—representation, federalism, senatorial authority, and the nature of the executive in a republican government.

This article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority. This problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy, international politics, and economic and social exchange. The problem is formalized as an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals.

Results from three approaches are reported: the tournament approach, the ecological approach, and the evolutionary approach. The evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account. A series of theorems is presented which show: (1) the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of TIT FOR TAT, (2) the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable, and (3) how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection.

A selective review of the literature on equal educational opportunity supports an argument for explicit use of normative models in research. The argument has two parts. First, we show that confusion over the Coleman Report (1966) was due to a mismatch between the implied reform objective and the statistical approach. The objective was to reduce black/white differences in educational achievement, but the statistics explained individual differences in achievement. Second, we partly develop and apply a normative dynamic model of the objectives of school integration over time. Normative dynamic models could be used in conjunction with behavioral data to operationalize theoretical concepts such as accountability, symbolic politics and non-decisions.

The purpose of this article is to test the widely shared view that the experience of industrial democracy, the experience of direct decision making at places of work, necessarily leads to the enhancement of cooperative and egalitarian orientations among participants. Based on data collected through indepth interviews and questionnaires in Pacific-Northwest plywood cooperatives, the article argues that in market societies, such experiments in industrial democracy do not have the hypothesized results. Indeed, they seem to encourage the development of values most closely identified with classical liberalism or what MacPherson terms “possessive individualism.”

The central argument of this paper is developed as a criticism of a widely accepted interpretation of collective violence in new states. It is shown that instead of indicating political decay, violence in these states is an integral part of the process of accumulation of power by the national state. To the degree that this power accumulation is necessary for the imposition or maintenance of order, collective violence also indicates movement towards political order on a new scale. Admittedly, our evidence is far from definitive. Nevertheless, it consistently contradicts the interpretation of violence as political decay and supports our interpretation of violence as a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of power.

James Madison believed that political institutions are not the effects of conflicts among private groups in society. He traced political authority to human nature. It is the ultimate source of both public opinion and the motives which impel some individuals to hold government offices. Prudently contrived governmental institutions can moderate the countervailing tendencies arising from these two sources of authority, although they are necessarily in a state of continuing tension. Strict accountability of representatives to the whole range of diverse opinion in society is in conflict with the tendency of government to become autonomous. The latter tendency follows from government's using its power to establish the fiscal and military institutions required to wage war. By doing so a government may Creole a new political equilibrium which is masked by apparent adherence to established constitutional balance and is then independent of the balance of private property.

Carole Pateman (1970) argued that democratized industrial authority structures would require workers to develop precisely the skills and resources necessary for participation in political life beyond the workplace. She based her argument on a close analysis of classical democratic theory and the indirect empirical evidence available at the time concerning workplace-related political participation. Although a great deal of research in industrial psychology and sociology and organization behavior is available, none treats expressly political correlates of workplace democracy. Analysis of data from a new factory designed on the basis of semi-autonomous, self-managing work groups provides empirical evidence directly supporting Pateman. The analysis also results in empirically grounded scales that differentiate between work humanization and work democratization. The latter correlates significantly with a sense of political efficacy. Further research to support democratizing industrial authority structures seems warranted for a political science that would contribute to a more participatory politics.

Previous research on the distribution of federal aid monies has been dominated by the donor's perspective. Different distribution formulas, political influence of congressional representatives, bureaucrats, and individual aid recipients have been studied as the sole determinants of aid allocations. Each explanation, however, fails to examine the question of aid allocations from a demand-side perspective. This omission assumes that all governmental units are equally desirous of federal assistance and that any bias in the distribution of federal aid is a function of supply-side conditions. Identifying a linkage between demand-side and supply-side determinants of aid allocations, this article proposes and tests hypotheses derived from an integrated model of federal aid allocations.

Like all languages, the language of American law can liberate or confine thinking. Its confining power is illustrated by the absence of the radical “group rights” claim in the Bakke litigation despite the prominence of that argument in the popular debate over affirmative discrimination. This absence establishes the limitations of the metaphor developed to give meaning to the concept “persons” in the equal protection context. While capable of investing the corporation with many of the attributes of “personhood” as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, the metaphor makes absurd the claim of a racial group to exercise rights or privileges distinct from those of its members. This analysis illuminates the metaphorical structure of law language and concludes that the restricted range of metaphorical thinking in law weakens the law's capacity to mediate struggles over social goals.

This article (1) sketches a general explanation for the growth of coordinative machinery and of irregular personnel in modern governments; (2) identifies both general and specific reasons for this phenomenon in the United States with special reference to foreign policy making; (3) identifies within the American foreign policy-making context the modal characteristics of irregular and regular syndromes of policy making, and the conjunction between personnel and institutional base; (4) traces the implications arising from these different policy syndromes; and (5) evaluates some proposals for improving the coherence and knowledge base of American foreign policy making. The problems of defining foreign policy authority, assuring an integrated perspective, and effectively using specialized expertise are best seen in terms of the larger problem of governance in Washington against which all proposals for reform must be abraded.

As in Hobbes' view it is principally the capacity for speech that distinguishes men from even the social animals, so it is in verbal and doctrinal controversies that he usually finds the sources of conflict and sedition. Hobbes analyzes—in the hope of doing away with them—a variety of what he regards as abuses of language, such as metaphor, equivocation, eloquence, and absurdity, which are especially productive of political disorder. He also offers models and, in his own political philosophy, examples of the proper uses of language as science and counsel, which he believes are necessary to the establishment and governance of well-ordered commonwealths in the modern world, characterized as it is by widespread learning and disputatious habits. In the pursuance of his project, however, Hobbes himself is paradoxically forced to resort to the eloquence which he otherwise condemns, and his own observations on language provide grounds for doubts about the success of his enterprise.

The right to leave one's country, in conjunction with the right to change one's nationality, both of which are proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), are examined in historical and philosophical perspective and with special reference to their implications for a theory of citizenship. These rights are novel elements in enumerations of fundamental rights, at variance with traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and with the practice of many slates, past and present. They are also rights which have not frequently been defended, and have often been denied, by political and legal philosophers, many of whom have defended stronger ties of allegiance and obligations between the citizen and the state than is evidently implied by the human rights doctrine. These rights are clearly grounded in basic liberal values of individual liberty and voluntarism; however, they represent extensions of these values beyond what was usually acknowledged in the classical liberal tradition.

The notion that at-large elections for city council seats are discriminatory toward blacks has recently been attacked as empirically invalid. Recent studies have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether electoral arrangements or socioeconomic factors are the major influence on how proportionately blacks are represented. This article addresses this issue, using a regression-based analysis in which proportionality is treated as a relationship across cities with electoral structure as a specifying variable. Socioeconomic variables found to be important in other studies are included. The results support the traditional notion and suggest that the electoral structure begins to have a discernible impact on the level of black representation once the black population reaches 10 percent of the total municipal population. While one socioeconomic variable, the relative income of the city's black population, is found to affect the election of blacks, its impact is greater than that of the electoral structure only when the black population is less than 15 percent.

The phrasing of the title telegraphs the thesis of this essay: study of the history of political theory ought to be understood and approached as a branch of political studies. Prior to the postwar success of empirical political science, the view would have seemed unexceptional. But the need for a defense against the empiricist attack impelled many theorists to turn to theories of interpretation in search of a philosophical and methodological identity. A preoccupation with issues of interpretation now threatens the customary, political study of the tradition. This essay, written in defense of a political understanding of the field, identifies fundamental propositions distinguishing “political commentary” and suggests critical standards appropriate to the enterprise. It also criticizes two currently fashionable applications of interpretative theory to the study of politics, historicist commentary and hermeneutical political science.