So evident has become the reality of the international community on the one hand, and that of occupational groups on the other, that sociology, which is more concerned with social tendencies than with formal doctrine of any kind, has largely discarded the idea of the sovereign nation-state. But juristic science in considerable measure still clings to it. This is true because the latter is naturally more concerned than sociology with the conservative function of legal formalities. Yet the progressivist influence that sociology has already exerted upon legal concepts is likely to continue; which means that the present sociological insistencies will more nearly correspond with the legal ideas of tomorrow than they do with those of today. Law, in order to maintain its function, must of necessity feed upon the fresh materials of change; to live, it will, in the long run, have to conform to moral and social needs. Morality, which is always at least a step ahead of the law, requires to be followed by the law, for the sake of the life of both, at a distance neither too great nor too short. For the law that follows too closely upon the heels of morality, no less than that which is too far behind, fails to be generally respected and enforced. Legal development is in constant need of being harmonized with all the other strands of history, to the end of the good life. This historic propriety is the ideal not only for the content of legislation, but also—though here the steps of change are fewer and longer—in the realm of fundamental juristic concepts such as that of national sovereignty.

The student of international organization who visits the League of Nations in its home city of Geneva encounters one phenomenon associated with the organization and activity of the League which seldom receives much, if any, attention in the news of the day or in current discussions of League problems. That is the so-called Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations. As will appear, these institutions are sometimes located elsewhere than in Geneva; but most of them are located there, and it is there that their activities are most easily observable. It is proposed to describe this institution as regards its nature and its proper nomenclature, its history, its organization, its functions, and its actual and potential value for international government.

The title inscribed at the head of this paper was adopted, to speak frankly, because it had become somewhat familiar by usage, official and unofficial, and because, superficially at least, it seems to describe the institution under discussion. A little analysis, however, will reveal both its shortcomings and the difficulty of labelling, in familiar language, the phenomenon in question. Both the nature and the consequent nomenclature of the institution must be studied by reference to the formal legal status given to it by the official agencies creating and maintaining it, and also by reference to its own activities and essential character as observed in operation; the former test will be applied first and the second reverted to later.

Confusion reigns almost supreme in the field of political science, particularly when the meaning of terms is involved. Some of our most commonly used words have so many meanings, shades of meaning, and connotations that hearers and readers are frequently at a loss as to the meaning and significance of terms used unless the speaker or writer defines them as he uses them. A cursory examination of the term “state” brought to light no fewer than one hundred forty-five different definitions, even though only a few writers were included who might be classed as radical. Less than half of the definitions were in general agreement. Even this statement is based on the assumption that when the same words were used by two writers they were used to mean the same thing; and I doubt whether the assumption is entirely justifiable. Furthermore, “state” is not the only term in political science which is defined in multifold ways. A similar situation was found when others, especially “law,” “government,” “political,” “administration,” were investigated.

The process of communication between political scientists, as well as between these scientists and laymen or between laymen and laymen, comes to be a guessing game. Consciously or unconsciously, it is suggested, we are spending much of our time guessing what the sender means when he uses even technical words.

American political theorists have long assumed that the various governmental units composing the United States act only in accordance with the powers bestowed upon them by constitutions and conforming laws of their respective jurisdictions. But in recent years they have received an electric shock through the development of “government by special consent.” Basically, the new principle means that a supervisory authority can in reality exercise rights over persons and property not brought under its wing by the constitution under which it operates—provided certain public agencies or private parties agree to the extension. This practice, which has not yet received philosophical treatment, has enabled the several governments of the Union to conquer new worlds without resorting to the long, difficult, and unwieldy process of constitutional amendment. The novel method of transfer by agreement is both rapid and flexible. But why, one is led to inquire, do independent bodies surrender portions of their “sovereignty” to other groups? Certainly not through mere altruism. They do it “for value received,” be it financial aid, convenience, advertising advantages, or other rewards. In all ages, from biblical days to the latest moment, birthrights have been sold for “pottage.”

Financial pottage needs no introduction to most American observers. They are well aware that various states in the Union, for example, have agreed to accept national control over their internal roads, educational affairs, forestry, agriculture, and other matters in exchange for monetary assistance from the federal government. Such transfers of authority for cash are of mutual benefit.

Observers of the American political system have long recognized the difficult position of the opposition party as an effective critic of the legislative and executive policies of the party in power, especially in the interval between campaigns. Our constitutional practices result in the nomination of “available” men for the presidency, and in the rather complete elimination of the defeated candidate from a position of acknowledged party leadership. The methods and traditions which govern and control the procedure of Congress are hardly adapted to produce party leaders who can speak authoritatively for the minority. It is rare that the party out of power is cohesive, united, and ready to present and support an alternative program. It is decidedly difficult, under normal conditions, to arouse public interest in the minority's position, save in the period which precedes an election. On the other hand, because of the great prestige attaching to the presidential office, and because of the elaborate methods of favorable publicity so highly developed by recent chief executives, the party in power is able to direct continuous attention to its policies and program.

The question of effective minority opposition concerns chiefly the Democratic party, since it seems probable that it will remain, for the most part, in the position of an opposition party. The lack of funds adequately to finance campaigns and the relatively insignificant press support given to the Democracy are factors which accentuate the difficulty.

The Supreme Court continues its century-long task of drawing the line that separates commerce which is interstate or foreign from that which is local. The realistic nature of the test which it uses is made clear in two cases decided during the present term. In Superior Oil Company v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, the plaintiffs, by a cleverly devised arrangement of technicalities, sought to make it appear that they were selling gasolene in interstate commerce. They hoped thus to escape the payment of the tax of three, and later four, cents a gallon imposed by Mississippi law upon the sale of gasolene within the state. The device used was as follows: The plaintiffs sold oil and gasolene to fish packers in Mississippi and delivered it to them at their wharves. The packers loaded this onto their own boats and sent it to a point in Louisiana where they in turn delivered it to shrimp fishermen who used it in fishing. The fishermen brought back their catch and sold it to the packers and were charged for the oil and gasolene. In each case the oil company gave the packers a bill of lading stipulating that the gasolene remained the company's property until delivered to the consignee's agent at the point of destination. In other words, a Mississippi seller deliberately takes gasolene outside the state of Mississippi in order to deliver it to a Mississippi buyer in the expectation that the transaction will have the appearance of interstate commerce and escape local taxation as such.

Signor Mussolini's unequivocal refusal to cooperate in M. Briand's proposal of a United States of Europe and the intransigent policy adopted by Italy at the London Naval Conference of 1930 have again directed attention to the power which the Italian dictator possesses over the foreign policy of his country. The constitutional measures by which he has attained, and now holds, this power throw much light upon the Fascist régime.

In Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, the conduct of foreign policy has been vested in the executive, subject to but few constitutional limitations. However, whereas most European constitutions confer upon the legislature an ultimate control over the foreign policy of the government, this has never been the case in Italy. The Statuto of March 4, 1848, which today remains the nominal fundamental law, endowed the king with almost exclusive jurisdiction over foreign relations. It is the king who “commands all land and naval forces; declares war; makes treaties of peace, alliance, commerce, and other treaties, communicating them to the house as soon as the interest and security of the state permit,” subject only to the limitation that “treaties involving financial obligations or alterations of the territory of the state shall not have effect until after they have received the approval of the houses.” Under the system of ministerial responsibility originally established, these powers came to be exercised by the ministers, the king personally assuming the familiar position of the constitutional monarch.

Losses by the Labor party—looked upon as one of the most radical of Western European labor parties—and gains by the non-socialist groups at the Storting elections on October 20, 1930, resulted in a notable, though not a decisive, move toward the right in Norwegian parliamentary politics. The move was a remarkable one in that the Labor party lost 12 of its 59 seats in the Storting; the Conservative party added 13 to the 31 seats it already held; and the Communists, who had held three seats, were unable to elect a single representative. The move lacked decisiveness, however, because the Laborites, in spite of their losses, still constitute the largest parliamentary party. At the same time, the popular vote registered for the party was the largest ever given to any Labor or Socialist group in the history of Norway. The Conservatives did not take over the government, and the Radical government under the premiership of Mowinckel continued. While the Radicals joined with the other non-socialist parties in the fight against Labor, it advocates, nevertheless, a progressive social program. Furthermore, the present move to the right is not nearly so marked as was the move to the left in the last triennial election in 1927. The new Storting remains farther to the left than was the Storting before the 1927 elections.

The chief reason why this election deserves attention is that in it there were placed before a literate, alert, and intelligent electorate—representing a homogeneous people with a democratic background—vital issues involving the acceptance or rejection of an advanced socialistic program.