With the advent of “total war” in Europe, America was shocked into a realization of the inadequacy of her defense measures in the event of becoming involved. While ideas conflicted sharply as to what our attitude toward the war should be, most schools of thought united in urging increased preparedness, and Congress appropriated staggering sums for defense. But the realization likewise came that preparedness involves more than mere appropriations—it takes time, and men, and materials, and industrial plants, and above all, coördination, in order to maintain defenses ample by modern standards. So as we contemplate the possibility of war, the spotlight focuses on our industrial system as perhaps the most important single factor in defense.

The entrance of this country into the last war found us similarly unprepared, from both a military and an industrial standpoint, and it was almost a year before the industries of the nation were meeting the tremendous demands thrust upon them, with production just reaching its peak at the time of the Armistice.

Political parties that cannot meet the requirements set up by statute for participation in the direct primary, or for the holding of legal conventions, are authorized in most states to choose their candidates by an alternative method. The statutory provisions on this matter vary widely. Some states follow a liberal policy, making it relatively easy for small parties to get a place on the ballot with their candidates' names identified by the party name or emblem. A few states follow a different policy, and make it difficult for small parties to put forward their candidates and allow no distinction upon the ballot between independent candidates and the candidates of small parties.

The forty-eight states may be divided into several classes as respects their statutory provisions for the nomination of candidates by new political parties and small parties which cannot meet the statutory definition of a political party:

1. States prescribing no minimum size for a political party to participate in the favored method of nomination, whether convention or direct primary—six states. In these states, new and small parties are in the most favored position. In the matter of nominating candidates and gaining a place on the general election ballot, they are accorded equal treatment with parties of long standing and substantial size.

During the past year, the state appellate courts have reviewed state legislation with a degree of restraint more marked than in the preceding year. The present attitude of the courts toward the work of legislatures may be in part the result of a change in court personnel. It is also both possible and probable that judges have been impressed by the more tolerant or liberal attitude of the United States Supreme Court. Finally, a few of the judges may have become aware of the fact that the times demand the relinquishment of an assumed judicial “supremacy” and the examination of legislative and administrative action under specific constitutional provisions in the light of social and economic realities. At all events, judicial review in the grand manner has given way to a more vigorous application of technical constitutional requirements. Courts are tending to emphasize procedure rather than substance; review appears to be at once more tolerant and more precise; decisions turn on narrower grounds, premises are less sweeping. When applied to state constitutions, this tendency means something quite different from what it means when applied to the national constitution.

This tendency may perhaps be regarded as charged with possible evil results for the courts. Although state constitutions are, in most cases, so detailed and diverse that no actual diminution of the courts' discretionary powers need result, and although to a successful litigant it makes little difference whether a statute is invalidated for want of due process or for want of a proper title or enacting clause, it is difficult to conceive of many things that will bring the courts more quickly into popular disrepute than an exaggeration of constitutional technicalities.

It seems to be generaally agreed that Franklin D. Roosevelt is very unpopular with the wealthier groups in society and that he is held to be a very warm friend of the poor. Indeed, it is sometimes asserted that no president since Jefferson has so divided the voters along economic lines as has Roosevelt. Popular opinion on this subject, as on many others, is likely to be exaggerated. In any case, it is well to check by measurement the idea that the rich are against Roosevelt and the poor are for him. This has been done in some of the sample polls. For instance, Fortune finds that the prosperous present about 15 to 20 per cent more opposition to Roosevelt than is found among the poor. Similarly, the Gallup polls have found over twice as much opposition to Roosevelt among the upper third of the population as among the lower third. Where these surveys of opinion on Roosevelt have been presented by social classes, there has been shown, in accordance with popular opinion, this division between the rich and the poor in their attitude toward Roosevelt. But the percentage difference is not quite so large as might be expected.

This difference between the rich and the poor in attitude toward Roosevelt became accentuated around the middle of his first term. It is interesting to inquire into the extent to which those of the lower income groups voted for Roosevelt in 1932 and in 1936.

The events of the days of May, when Parliament replaced the “National” Government of the third Chamberlain by the “truly National” Government of the third Churchill, illustrate the danger of simple explanations of the working of the British constitution. The notion that responsible government could be expressed in terms of Parliamentary “control” of the Government in power has disappeared. There has been, however, a tendency to replace it by the equally naive explanation of Governmental control of Parliament. The truth lies in between. On the one hand, it must be recognized that, through the party machine, a Government with a majority has very substantial powers of control. On the other hand, it must equally be recognized that public opinion, acting through members of Parliament, has a profound influence on the policy of the Government. The precise relationship has never been fully investigated, because the British electoral machine has never been adequately studied. It is doubtful if it can ever be adequately expounded, because, like so many parts of the British constitution, it depends upon intangible elements which do not lend themselves easily to demonstration.

Under the ordinary circumstances of peaceful relations with other states, the peculiar position of the Dominions in the British Commonwealth of Nations may be of little importance. Except to those insistent on the point of national pride, it makes little difference whether foreign Powers have or have not recognized the independent and sovereign character of the Dominions so long as they understand that the responsible governments with which they are dealing are the several ministries in the Dominions. Both external and internal autonomy has undoubtedly been attained by the Dominions in all normal peace-time affairs, and this situation has been recognized by other states. It matters little whether other states take seriously the symbolism of the Crown and the unity of the kingship or whether they regard these as among the odd aberrations of British illogicality. In war-time, however, a very different position is presented when one considers the status of the individual members of the Commonwealth.

The sovereign rights of war and neutrality are not necessarily two aspects of the same power. The war power is capable of unilateral exercise; a state of war is brought into existence by the action of one state, and the legal consequences of belligerency follow automatically and indeed may be claimed by political associations or communities which are not recognized as sovereign states.