Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The construction of an empirical theory of democratic political development is dependent on the formulation of causal propositions which are generalizations of the developmental process. To date, several essential steps in the process of constructing such a theory have been taken. First, concept formation and clarification by students of political development has led to an emphasis upon political democracy as one of the dependent variables for the field. Second, the gathering and publication of quantitative indicators of social, economic, cultural, and political phenomena provide a firm basis for subsequent empirical inquiry. Finally, correlational analysis has identified numerous variables which are closely associated with the development of democratic political institutions.
The next major task is the formulation and testing of empirical models of democratic political development which provide a basis for inferring causal relationships by distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects. The accomplishment of this task would enable us to derive explanatory propositions concerning the process of democratic political development.
1 For an interesting discussion of this material as well as important findings on factors which relate to democracy, see Lipset, Seymour Martin, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” this Review, 53 (1959), pp. 69–105.Google Scholar
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6 Loc. cit.
7 Ibid., pp. 73–74. Latin American political systems are classified somewhat differently, but still dichotomously.
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10 Ibid., p. 574. Scores may vary from 0 to 66 based on a total of three for each of twenty-two years (1940–1961).
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13 Cutright, op. cit., p. 577.
14 For theoretical contributions which indicate the central role of communications systems in more general types of political development, see Pye, Lucian W., (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).Google Scholar
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17 Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).Google Scholar
18 Ibid., p. 60.
19 Blalock, op. cit., p. 62. Also see Simon, Herbert A., “Spurious Correlations: A Causal Interpretation,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 49 (1954), pp. 467–479.Google Scholar
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23 Social scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the similarities in the logic of these techniques. Boudon, for example, subsumes them all under a more general formulation which he calls “dependence analysis”: Boudon, Raymond, “A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis,” American Sociological Review, 30 (1965), pp. 365–374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
24 See Cnudde, Charles P., “Legislative Behavior and Citizen Characteristics: Problems in Theory and Method,” (a paper delivered at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, Ill., 04 29, 1966).Google Scholar
25 Cutright, op. cit., pp. 577–581.
26 Ibid., p. 580.
27 Clearly, there is no incompatibility between Cutright's technique of using the prediction equation based on the regression line and this type of causal analysis. In fact, Cutright's technique applied at each stage of the developmental process would effectively isolate the deviant cases at each stage. His present research on historical trends in political development should also shed light on the adequacy of this causal model. See ibid., pp. 577–581 for a discussion of Cutright's techniques and research.
28 Cnudde and McCrone, op. cit., p. 72.
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