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A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Todd Sandler ,
John T. Tschirhart  and
Jon Cauley
Todd Sandler
Affiliation:
University of Wyoming Australian National University
John T. Tschirhart
Affiliation:
University of Wyoming
Jon Cauley
Affiliation:
University of Hawaii-Hilo
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Abstract

This article presents some “rational-actor” models that depict the negotiation process between terrorists and government policymakers for those incidents where hostages or property are seized and demands are issued. The models account for the objectives and constraints faced by both the terrorists and the policymakers. Uncertainty is introduced through probability constraints (i.e., chance constraints) requiring a specific likelihood of some event occurring. Implications are subsequently extracted from the comparative static analysis as the models' parameters are changed. The last part of the article presents a club theory analysis concerning the sharing of transnational commando forces.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , March 1983 , pp. 36 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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