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Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Stanley Rothman
Stanley Rothman*
Affiliation:
Smith College
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Extract

Of the spate of articles on interest group behavior and interest group theory which have appeared since the “rediscovery” of Bentley, only a few have been mildly critical. Two American commentators have criticized the vagueness of certain terms and a British observer has noted that, somehow, empirical research on group behavior rarely makes use of the theoretical schemes which have been devised.

But surely if we are to accept the claim of the group theorists that this is indeed the key to a science of politics, it is legitimate to ask that they submit their propositions to the tests imposed by science as a method. Perhaps the gap between research and theory stems less from a lack of data than from some limitations inherent in the group approach itself? This, in fact, is the argument of the present essay. The failure of group theory to serve as an adequate guide to research is the result both of the logical inconsistencies of its propositions and of its inability to explain what it purports to explain. The two weaknesses are related, for in their empirical work group theorists are constantly forced into inconsistencies as a result of the inability of the theory to deal with certain dimensions of experience. The ability of those who use the approach to ignore these consequences stems both from a certain looseness of vocabulary and a tendency, not limited to American scholars, to universalize their own political experience.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1960 , pp. 15 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1960

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References

1 The Process of Government (Bloomington, 1908), pp. 208–209.

2 The critics are Ehrmann, H. W. in his (ed.), Interest Groups on Four Continents (Pittsburgh, 1958)Google Scholar; Odegard, Peter H., “A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Old Myth,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 11 (September, 1958), pp. 689–702 Google Scholar; and MacKenzie, W. J. M., “Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework,” Political Studies, Vol. 3 (October, 1955), pp. 247–255.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Among the more notable “group” studies are: Herring, Pendleton, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore, 1920)Google Scholar; Schattschneider, E. E., Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York, 1935)Google Scholar; Odegard, Peter, Pressure Politics (New York, 1928)Google Scholar; Blaisdell, Donald C., American Democracy Under Pressure (New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Gross, Bertram D., The Legislative Struggle (New York, 1953)Google Scholar; Latham, E., The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca, 1952)Google Scholar; Finer, S., Anonymous Empire (London, 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 319 (September, 1958); Meynaud, Jean, Les Groupes de pression en France (Paris, 1958)Google Scholar; Hagan, Charles B., “The Group in Political Science,” in Young, Roland (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, 1958).Google Scholar

3 New York, 1951.

4 Ibid., pp. 13, 507 ff.

5 Ibid., p. 12.

6 The term supernumerary is from Braithwaite, R. B., Scientific Explanation (Cambridge, 1953).Google Scholar It is only fair to note that Truman would probably deny that he ever meant to establish as closely defined a system as I am attributing to him. However, one test of the ability of any theoretical approach is to see what happens when one does attempt to systematize it, and to make implicit assumptions explicit. Again, the argument is that the seeming explanatory power of group theory is based on the sub rosa introduction of propositions which stand in contradiction to the major assumptions of the theory itself, and that any attempt to systematize these major assumptions reveals serious weaknesses in the approach.

7 Truman, op. cit., p. 24.

8 Ibid., p. 23.

9 The distinction has its origins in Cooley's, Charles H. Social Organization (New York, 1909).Google Scholar

10 Truman does distinguish between them on p. 43, but fails to do so throughout most of the remainder of his book.

11 Truman, op. cit., p. 33.

12 Ibid., p. 51.

13 Ibid., p. 511.

14 Ibid., pp. 512, 513, 159 and passim.

15 Ibid., p. 51.

16 Ibid., p. 138.

17 Ibid., p. 512.

18 Ibid., p. 27. Truman never defines the term. This definition and the later propositions (see p. 20 below) have been constructed from his use of it.

19 Ibid., pp. 27–31, 58–60.

20 Ibid., pp. 14–65 and passim.

21 E.g.: “The Constitution … was not only a compromise product of the efforts of a collection of able men; it was … more significantly the reflection of many demands and expectations concerning government…. That many of the stipulations in that document are fully operative nearly two centuries later speaks for the skill with which they reflected certain of the strong and lasting interests in the society.” Ibid., p. 448.

22 Ibid., p. 165; see also p. 505. Truman is careful to note that present affiliations will not give a complete picture of the individual's norms. Rather they are the result of a genetic process “that includes the whole of [his] life experiences.” Ibid., p. 22.

23 Ibid., pp. 19–20.

24 The studies are to be found in: Roethlisberger, F. J., Management and Morale (Cambridge, 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lazarsfeld, P. F., et al., The People's Choice (2d ed., New York, 1958)Google Scholar; and Newcomb, Theodore M. and Hartley, Eugene L., Readings in Social Psychology (New York, 1947).Google Scholar For recent summaries of the literature see: Merton, Robert K. and Rossi, Alice S., “Contributions to the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure,” pp. 225–280 Google Scholar; Merton, R. K., Social Theory and Social Structure (rev. ed., Glencoe, 1957), pp. 281–386 Google Scholar; Sherif, M. and Sherif, C., An Outline of Social Psychology (rev. ed., New York, 1956)Google Scholar; and Katz, E. and Lazarsfeld, P. F., Personal Influence (Glencoe, 1955).Google Scholar

25 In his theoretical analysis Truman also introduces the variable of biological make-up. Some behavioral differences result, he argues, from the fact that no two human organisms are identical in biological functioning and endowment. Op. cit., p. 22. However, he never uses the concept for explanatory purposes. I think it safe to assume, therefore, that he feels it can be ignored for purposes of macro-societal analysis.

26 Ibid., pp. 21, 23, and 505.

27 Ibid., pp. 346–350, and passim.

28 In his The Study of Man (New York, 1936).

29 Braithwaite, op. cit., p. 19.

30 Truman, op. cit., pp. 27–31, 59, and passim.

31 Ibid., pp. 66–7.

32 Ibid., p. 103.

33 See Wright, C. R. and Hyman, H. H., “Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 23 (June, 1958), p. 287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar There is every reason, furthermore, to conclude that the amount of associational activity has increased as discrimination has decreased.

34 For an interesting discussion of this issue see Margolis, Joseph, “The American Negro and the Issue of Segregation,” The American Scholar, Vol. 28 (Winter, 1958–1959), pp. 73–80.Google Scholar

35 Truman, op. cit., pp. 7, 157, 508–10.

36 Ibid., pp. 156–167.

37 Ibid., p. 157.

38 See Wright and Hyman, op. cit., pp. 284–294; Scott, J. C. Jr., “Membership and Participation in Voluntary Associations,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 22 (June, 1957), pp. 315–326 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scott Greer, “Individual Participation in Mass Society;” Young (ed.), op. cit., pp. 329–343; Lazarsfeld and Katz, op. cit., and the extensive literature cited by them.

39 See, for example, Rémond, Réne, “Les anciens combattants et la politique,” Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol. 5 (April–June, 1944), pp. 267–290.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40 And, again, it is these which seem to have the really important influence upon atti tude developments. See Lazarsfeld and Katz, op. cit., and the literature cited therein.

41 And this means more than merely what is politically possible. For example, in England, trade union leaders have sometimes been more willing than the rank and file to accept a policy of wage restraints, because of an awareness of objective economic problems. For some evidence of this from England, see Stewart, John D., British Pressure Groups (Oxford, 1958), pp. 35, 176Google Scholar; and Baldwin, G. B., “Nationalization in Great Britain: A Sobering Decade,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 310 (March, 1957), pp. 39–54 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and from Williams, France P., Politics in Post-War France (London, 1954), p. 340.Google Scholar

42 Truman, op. cit., p. 514.

43 See above, pp. 18.

44 See above, pp. 17. Note also the striking contradiction in these two quotations taken from succeeding pages of Truman's essay:

“… From interaction in groups arise certain common habits of response, which may be called norms or shared attitudes…. In this respect all groups are interest groups because they are shared-attitude groups.” (p. 33).

“… It is possible to examine interests that are not at a particular point in time the basis of interactions, but that may become such.” (p. 34).

45 We find here an interesting paradox. Truman has firmly denied that one can speak of a national interest. After all, the nation is not a group and only groups have interests. (Truman, op. cit., pp. 51–52) But if interests and groups and attitudes are different ways of speaking about the same things, as he often asserts, and the nation as a whole shares the widespread attitudes that he lists as a potential group, then these attitudes would constitute the national interest. Part of his confusion here, aside from the whole problem of the potential group, is the identification of interests with attitudes or values. One can, of course, define interests in any way one wishes. But if they are attitudes it becomes difficult to discuss changes in the attitudes of group members as to what constitute their interests, and one cannot distinguish between the group's attitudes on the relative merits of Bach and Beethoven as against their attitudes on the effect of a new tax law on the state of the country or on the group. All in all, it would seem wiser to retain the traditional distinction and regard interests as ends or goals about which people have attitudes. See MacIver, R. M. and Page, Charles H., Society (New York, 1949), pp. 23–40.Google Scholar

46 See Lazarsfeld and Katz, op. cit.

47 See Merton, “Continuities in the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure,” op. cit.

48 Truman, op. cit., p. 22, and passim.

49 The point is made by Olmsted, M. S. in The Small Group (New York, 1959).Google Scholar

50 See Parsons, T. and Shils, E. (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1951).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

51 Truman could conceivably retort by pointing to his remark (pp. 23–4) that individ uals generally begin to interact on the basie of some characteristic, and hence common interest, which they share. But this proposition stands in direct contradiction to the rest of his system. What constitutes a common characteristic is defined by attitudes. Thus, in our own society, blondes do not form groups while businessmen do.

To admit that individuals join together on the basis of perceived interests (attitudes) is to admit that groups are not the only or even necessarily the primary determiners of attitudes and hence of actions. Such an admission completely destroys the scientific status of group theory as the theory of politics. For if groups are not the determiners of attitudes there is no obvious reason to concentrate on their behavior as against the behavior of individuals. Groups become just one of two possible kinds of political actors. And if groups do not structure all attitudes then the question of the sources of attitudes and hence action is once again open. The ideas which men accept as guides to action may stem from the writings of a political philosopher, from the internalization of certain conceptions of what is right, from the socio-economic structure of the society, from the universality of the oedipus complex, etc. Most so-called group theorists (see Latham, op. cit.) usually make just such an admission.

52 Truman, op. cit., p. 25.

53 Ibid., p. 67.

54 Ibid., p. 18.

55 While individual families are groups, any similarities one finds among Bible-reading families of the type described, are likely to be the function of similar experiences rather than interaction.

56 Ibid., p. 69. The explanation, incidentally, is not sufficient to clarify the reasons for the A.F. of L.'s difficulty in securing agreement on national policies. In England local trade unions were established before the T.U.C., which has always had very limited formal power, and, in Germany, a federal system like that of the United States, the same development occurred. Yet in both countries the sense of national trade union discipline has been much higher than that of American trade unions. The literature is extensive, but see: Williams, Francis, Magnificent Journey (London, 1954)Google Scholar; Roberts, B. C., Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain (Cambridge, 1956)Google Scholar; G. D. H. Cole, An Introduction to Trade Unionism; Taft, P., “Germany,” in Galenson, Walter (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements (New York, 1952)Google Scholar; and Anderson, Evelyn, Hammer or Anvil: The Story of the German Working Class Movement (London, 1954).Google Scholar

57 Both social and non-social objects, to use Parsons' terminology.

58 Truman, op. cit., p. 69.

59 Ibid., p. 68.

60 Thus interests are not merely attitudes, nor even attitudes about interests. (See above, p. 18.)

61 For example Bertram D. Gross, op. cit., and Earl Latham, op. cit. Latham goes back to the beginning of the tradition and sounds almost like a Hobbist.

62 See Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955).Google Scholar

63 The Structure of Social Action (New York, 1937).

64 See, for example, Ehrmann, H. W., Organized Business in France (Princeton, 1957)Google Scholar, and Scalapino, Robert, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 1953).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

65 For Germany, see Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (London, 1955).Google Scholar

66 For France, see Dansetts, Adrien, Histoire religieuse de la contemporaine, 3 vol. (Paris, 1948, 1951, 1957).Google Scholar

67 To paraphrase Marx's criticism of Bentham. It also, incidentally, distorts our analysis of American politics, although not quite so seriously.

68 In The Liberal Tradition in America.

69 In addition to the works of Parsons previously cited, see Easton, D., “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,” World Politics, Vol. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 383–401 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Beer, S. H. and Ulam, A. (eds.) Patterns of Government (New York, 1958), pp. 3–15 Google Scholar; Almond, G., “Comparative Political Systems,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (August, 1956), pp. 391–410 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mitchell, W. C., “The Polity and Society,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2 (November, 1958), pp. 403–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar All of them rely on the action frame of reference, and all would appear to agree with my statement on the role of values.

70 See the Report of the First Research Planning Session of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, “A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process,” this Review, Vol. 52 (March, 1958), pp. 270–283.Google Scholar

71 G. E. Lavau, “Political Pressures in France,” in Ehrmann (ed.), op. cit., pp. 89–90.

72 See Ehrmann, op. cit.; Clapham, J. H., The Economic Development of France and Germany, 4th ed. (Cambridge, 1951)Google Scholar; and Landes, D., “Observations on France: Economy, Society, and Polity,” World Politics, Vol. 9 (April, 1957), pp. 329–351 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and the essays by Landes, and Sawyer, in Earle, E. M. (ed.), Modern France (Princeton, 1951).Google Scholar

73 Jean Maynaud, op. cit., pp. 227–228, and passim.

74 S. E. Finer, op. cit.; J. D. Stewart, op. cit.; and Beer, S. H., “Pressure Groupe and Political Parties in Britain,” this Review (March, 1956), pp. 1–24.Google Scholar

75 Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, “Some Remarks on Interest Groups in the German Federal Republic,” in Ehrmann (ed.), op. cit., pp. 9–117; Finer, S. E., “The Federation of British Industries,” Political Studies, Vol. 4 (February, 1956), p. 71 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Beer, op. cit., p. 19.

76 Sutton, Frances X. et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 326–346 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and passim.

77 Parsons and Shils, op. cit., pp. 107–109, and passim. The authors also use the term “equilibrium” to refer to the tendency of the system to maintain itself within certain boundaries relative to an environment. I am not prepared to deal with this second definition. For a discussion of some of the issues see Buckley, Walter, “Structural-Functional Analysis in Modern Sociology,” pp. 236–259 Google Scholar, in Becker, Howard and Boskoff, Alvin (eds.), Modern Sociological Theory (New York, 1957).Google Scholar

78 This is essentially Myrdal's, G. analysis in An American Dilemma (New York, 1944).Google Scholar

79 At least, the burden of proof is upon those who would eliminate any or all of these factors from consideration.

80 On p. 530, op. cit., Truman states: “For better or for worse … the Constitution has acquired the quality of a sacred writ that renders it immune to examination de novo.” But compare this statement with footnote 21. And he goes even further. At a later point he implies that a proper understanding of “reality” can result in a change in values:

“Since such advantages derive from the structure and values of the society, elite groups change with changes in the society. The values that give such groups their power provide a frame of reference by which most members of the society interpret experience…. When experience can no longer be understood in such a frame of reference … the values change ‥” (p. 250).

Madison explicitly stated that both leadershp and ideas played an autonomous role in the political process, in addition to arguing explicitly that a knowledge of reality could influence the making of public policy under certain circumstances. Two quotations from The Federalist, No. 10, should suffice:

“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power … have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity.”

“The effect of the first difference is … to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country….”

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