No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Executive Reorganization. In long and highly controversial opinions, the majorities of the Indiana and Louisiana supreme courts invalidated state administrative reorganization plans of a type whose constitutionality might conceivably have been treated as political questions. The Indiana controversy grew out of the repeal, over a Democratic governor's veto, of the Executive-Administrative Act of 1933. In place of an administration consolidated into eight departments, each directly responsible to the governor, the Republican legislative majority substituted an organization of four departments—state, audit and control, treasury, public works and commerce—each headed by a hybrid board composed of the governor and two elective administrative officers, or one administrative officer, the governor, and the lieutenant-governor. Existing tenures were terminated and powers of appointment were expressly given to the respective three-man boards.
Upon adjournment of the legislature, this sweeping “reorganization” was immediately attacked on the grounds that it wrested authority from the governor and unconstitutionally delegated executive power to ministerial officers. Operation of the acts was enjoined in the lower court. On appeal, a divided supreme court declared the repealing statute unconstitutional. The heart of the majority opinion was the syllogism that under the Indiana constitution executive power, “including the administrative,” is vested, not in the executive department, but in the governor; that the appointive function is an exercise of the executive power; and hence only the governor may appoint.
Howard Jay Graham, research fellow in political science, University of California, gave invaluable aid in the preparation of this article.
1 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
2 Indiana Law Rev., Vol. 17, p. 139, n. 49 (Dec., 1941).
3 Tucker, Secretary of State, et al. v. State et al., 35 N.E. (2d) 270 (Ind., June, 1941). A Florida statute that provided for appointment of certain state officers by the governor “by and with the consent of the senate” was sustained despite the provision of the constitution that authorized the legislature to provide either for the election of the officers or for their appointment by the governor. Advisory Opinion to Governor, 2 So. (2d) 372 (Fla., May, 1941).
4 Formerly, and prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Louisiana court had held that a taxpayer's interest was too remote to permit him to challenge the constitutional validity of legislation. This view, reversed in Borden v. Louisiana Board of Education, 123 So. 655 (1929), was again repudiated in the present case.
5 Of the 28 proposed amendments voted on at the same time, only one lacked the clause designating the election date.
6 Graham et al. v. Jones et al., 3 So. (2d) 761 (La., June, 1941). With regard to the constitutional powers of the legislature to amend or repeal a popularly initiated law, see State ex rel. Strutz, Attorney-General, v. Baker, State Auditor, et al., 299 N.W. 574 (N.D., July, 1941).
7 City of Louisville v. German, 150 S.W. (2d) 931 (Ky., June, 1941).
8 Advisory Opinion to Governor, 1 So. (2d) 636 (Fla., April, 1941). See also Jackson, Mayor, v. Cosby et al., 22 A (2d) 453 (Md., Nov., 1941).
9 The California supreme court declared that references in the constitution to “officer” refer to a governmental officer. “But it does not necessarily follow that military … officers are governmental … officers.” Martin et al. v. Riley, State Controller, 123 P. (2d) 488 (Cal., Mar., 1942).
10 Commonwealth ex rel. Crow v. Smith, 23 A (2d) 440 (Pa., Jan., 1942). The court distinguished Kennedy et al. v. Cook, 146 S.W. (2d) 56 (Ky., Dec., 1940), mentioned in the 1941 state constitutional law survey in this Review, Aug., 1941, p. 690. See also 132 A.L.R. 251.
11 Cal. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 20.
12 McCoy v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County et al., 114 P. (2d) 569 (Cal., June, 1941). The court in the Smith case discussed above examined this opinion of the California court, but looked upon it as exceptional and refused to follow it. A statute which provided limited compensation to state or local officials called into national military or naval service was sustained by the New York Court of Appeals. The judges apparently were dubious whether “war service to the nation in itself alone” constituted a state or municipal purpose, but they upheld the law as a constitutional device similar in purpose and character to recently sustained pension systems. The court declared that the legislation granted no gratuities; rather, it was devised to secure the continuance in office of able officials, and to recognize and reward fidelity of service. Hoyt v. Broome County (Bennett, Attorney-General, Intervenor) 34 N.E. (2d) 481 (N.Y., May, 1941).
13 Martin, Attorney-General, v. Smith, State Treasurer, 1 N.W. (2d) 163 (Wis., Dec., 1941). The Texas supreme court held that a member of the Texas legislature who was also a member of the National Guard did not lose his constitutional per diem compensation as a legislator on being called into active army service. A statute that limited the compensation of state officers and employees in military service to twelve days in any year was held not to apply to legislators. Spears v. Sheppard, 150 S.W. (2d) 769 (Texas, April, 1941).
14 United Ins. Co. v. Rushton, Attorney-General, et al., 1 N.W. (2d) 510 (Mich., Jan., 1942). The validity of two vetoes that were imposed by the president of the senate as acting governor in the absence of both governor and lieutenant-governor was unsuccessfully challenged in Walls et al. v. Hall, Secretary of State, 154 S.W. (2d) 573 (Ark., Oct., 1941).
15 Slater v. Olson, Chairman, Civil Service Commission et al., 299 N.W. 879 (Iowa, Sept., 1941). Cf. Prichard v. Battle, director of division of motor vehicles, in which the denial of a license to operate a motor vehicle was held to be neither a penalty nor a part of punishment within the meaning of the state constitution. Thus, a full and complete pardon granted to the operator of a motor vehicle whose driver's license had been revoked following his conviction of a crime in connection with the operation of an automobile did not operate to restore his right to drive an automobile. 17 S.E. (2d) 393 (Va., Nov., 1941).
16 Daly et al. v. Madison County et al., 38 N.E. (2d) 160 (Ill., Nov., 1941). For a discussion of the mathematics of legislative reapportionment, see Shaw et al. v. Adkins, Governor, et al., 153 S.W. (2d) 415 (Ark., July, 1941).
17 State ex rel. Harbage v. Ferguson, Auditor, et al. (Court of Appeals) 36 N.E. (2d) 500 (Ohio, July, 1941).
18 Peck v. State, 120 P (2d) 820 (Id., Dec., 1941).
19 State ex rel. Todd et al. v. Yelle, State Auditor, 110 P (2d) 162 (Wash., Feb., 1941). See this Review, Aug., 1941, p. 685.
20 Kenton County et al. v. City of Covington, 154 S.W. (2d) 540 (Ky., Sept., 1941).
21 Stewart et al. v. Stanley, Attorney-General, et al., 5 So. (2d) 531 (La., Dec., 1941). The constitutional requirement that an act of the legislature shall not embrace more than one object is not applicable to joint resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Guillory v. Jones, Governor, et al., 1 So. (2d) 65 (La., Mar., 1941). In the case of Dornacker v. Strutz, Attorney-General, a North Dakota “juke box” tax act was held unconstitutional because the reference in the title of the act to “amusement games” was not broad enough to cover “juke boxes.” 1 N.W. (2d) 614 (N. D., Jan., 1942). See also Beckham County Excise Board v. Lowdin, 117 P. (2d) 109 (Okla., Sept., 1941) invalidating a section of astatute whose title referred only to population figures based on the 1930 census but whose body related to succeeding censuses as well; and State, v Beaver Portland Cement Co., 124 P. (2d) 524 (Ore., Apr., 1942) voiding a statute that prohibited obstructions in the Rogue River but failed to mention the fact in the title.
22 Crouch v. Benet et al., 17 S.E. (2d) 320 (S.C., Nov., 1941).
23 Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation Commissioner et al., and five other cases, 17 S.E. (2d) 330 (W.Va., Nov., 1941). A North Carolina statute requiring county officers of counties of less than 85,000 population to bring suit for claims within six months was also held to offend a special legislation clause. The exemption of the four larger counties was deemed arbitrary and unreasonable. Gillespie v. Pickens County, 14 S.E. (2d) 900 (N. C., May, 1941). See also Anderson, County Judge, et al. v. Wood, Sheriff, 152 S.W. (2d) 1084 (Texas, May, 1941), and this Review, Aug., 1941, pp. 703–4.
24 Ettinger v. Studevent, 38 N.E. (2d) 1000 (Ind., Jan., 1942).
25 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
26 Rollo v. Wiggins, 5 So. (2d) 458 (Fla., Jan., 1942). The supreme court of North Carolina, ruling upon substantially the same question, found no denial of due process, and distinguished Tumey v. Ohio. Ex parle Steele, 18 S.E. (2d) 132 (N.C., Jan., 1942).
Stanley, Attorney-General, v. Jones upheld the removal from office of a Louisiana district judge for “gross misconduct” not connected with the office. 2 So. (2d) 45 (La., April, 1941).
27 Bigelow v. Brumley et al., 37 N.E. (2d) 584 (Ohio, Nov., 1941).
28 Opinion of the Justices, 35 N.E. (2d) 676 (Mass., June, 1941). The decision of the secretary of state on the validity of a referendum petition may not be reviewed and set aside by the courts. Moses, Governor, v. Thorson, Secretary of State, 299 N.W. 305 (N.D., July, 1941).
29 Knappenberger v. Hughes, Secretary of State, et al., 35 N.E. (2d) 317 (Ill., June, 1941). For a decision denying county commissioners power to spend county funds in the interest of a proposed constitutional amendment, see State ex rel. Bell et al. v. Board of County Commissioners of Beadle County et al., 300 N.W. 832 (S.D., Nov., 1941).
30 In re Opinion of the Justices, 19 A (2d) 53 (Me., Feb., 1941).
31 Peck v. City of New Orleans et al., 5 So. (2d) 508 (La., Dec., 1941); Peck et al. v. Tugwell, Treasurer, et al., 5 So. (2d) 524 (La., Dec., 1941).
Despite the declaration of the Rhode Island constitution that “the general assembly may also provide special regulations and manner of voting for those persons who are absent from the state in the actual military service of the United States” (Art. XXI, Sec. 1), the state supreme court held that the legislature was unable “to confer upon the absent electors in the actual military service of the United States a greater franchise than that expressly conferred by the amendment (Art. XXI, Sec. 1.) upon all absent electors.” Opinion of the Justices, 25 A (2d) 360 (R.I., March, 1942).
32 Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney-General v. Furste 157 S.W. (2d) 59 (Ky., Dec., 1941). See also the prior ruling in the same case, 156 S.W. (2d) 198 (Ky., Nov., 1941).
33 In re Harris, 34 N.E. (2d) 504 (Mass., May, 1941). See also County Court of Raleigh County v. Painter, Special Judge, et al., 15 S.E. (2d) 396 (W.Va., June, 1941).
34 Washington Const., Art. II, Sec. 25.
35 State ex rel. Bergin v. Yelle, Auditor of State of Washington, 118 P. (2d) 807 (Wash., Nov., 1941).
36 16 How. 416, 429 (1853).
37 Wickham v. Grand River Dam Authority, 118 P. (2d) 640 (Okla., Oct., 1941). Against claims of governmental immunity, the Pennsylvania supreme court permitted Philadelphia to collect its wage tax on the salaries of state employees resident in Philadelphia. Marson v. City of Philadelphia, 21 A (2d) 228 (Pa., June, 1941).
38 State v. Martin et al., 5 So. (2d) 377 (La., Dec., 1941).
39 People v. Bohnke, 38 N.E. (2d) 478 (N.Y., Dec., 1941). Petition for certiorari denied, 62 S. Ct. 1034 (April, 1942). Where a Jehovah's Witnesses minister had peddled religious tracts in the town of Casa Grande without payment of the $25.00 quarterly license fee required of solicitors and peddlers, the Arizona court held that there likewise had been no denial of religious freedom. For only when the minister insisted upon commercializing his profession had he been obliged to comply with the law or pay the penalty. State v. Jobin, 118 P. (2d) 97 (Ariz., Oct., 1941). Affirmed by United States Supreme Court, June 8, 1942, in a five-to-four decision. See also Commonwealth v. Pascone (two cases), 33 N.E. (2d) 522 (Mass., April, 1941).
40 State v. Lefebvre, 20 A (2d) 185 (N.H., May, 1941). A Mississippi statute which provided for distribution of free textbooks to pupils in all qualified elementary sectarian and private schools as well as public schools was sustained in Chance et al. v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Board et al., 200 So. (2d) 706 (Miss., Feb., 1941). The action of a village zoning commission in refusing a special permit to erect a church in a residential district was held arbitrary and unreasonable and a violation of the rights of the church under the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph et al., 39 N.E. (2d) 515 (Ohio, Jan., 1942).
41 State v. Davis et ux., 120 P (2d) 808 (Ariz., Jan., 1942).
42 State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A. (2d) 754 (N.H., Mar., 1941). This decision was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 S. Ct. 766 (Mar., 1942). A statute that made it a crime to incite or advocate hatred, abuse, etc., against any group of persons by reason of their race, color, or religion was held void in a case which involved members of the German-American Bund. The statute was condemned as violating the guarantee of freedom of speech, and also because it was vague, uncertain, and indefinite. State v. Klapprott, 22 A (2d) 877 (N.J., Dec., 1941). See also City of Gaffney v. Putnam, 15 S.E. (2d) 130 (S.C., June, 1941).
43 Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W. (2d) 291 (Mo., Feb., 1942).
44 312 U.S. 287 (Feb., 1941).
45 312 U.S. 321 (Feb., 1941).
46 Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213, et al. v. Ritter's Cafe et al., 149 S.W. (2d) 694 (Texas, Apr., 1941). See also Borden Co. et al. v. Local No. 133 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 152 S.W. (2d) 828 (Texas, May, 1941).
47 62 S. Ct. 807 (Mar., 1942).
48 310 U.S. 88 (Apr., 1940).
49 Alliance Auto Service, Inc., v. Cohen, 19 A. (2d) 152 (Pa., Mar., 1941).
50 McKay Jewelers, Inc., et al. v. Bowron et al., 122 P. (2d) 543 (Cal., Feb., 1942).
51 State v. Sentner, 298 N.W. 813 (Iowa, June, 1941). The case of State v. Conway et al. is of unusual interest, not so much for the novelty of the views expressed with regard to waiving the privilege against self-incrimination as for the thorough analysis of the conflicting views in American jurisdictions. 154 S.W. (2d) 128 (Mo., Sept., 1941). The North Carolina court declined to construe the privilege against self-incrimination as preventing the introduction in evidence of reports of a chemi cal analysis of blood and urine taken from the accused without compulsion. State v. Cash, 15 S.E. (2d) 277 (N.C., June, 1941). See also this Review, Aug., 1941, p. 649.
52 In re Holland, 36 N.E. (2d) 543 (Ill., Sept., 1941).
53 Art. 1, Sec. 13.
54 State ex rel. Cutsinger v. Spencer, Judge, 37 N.E. (2d) 88 (Ind., Nov., 1941).
55 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
56 State v. Pierre, 3 So. (2d) 895 (La., July, 1941). Certiorari denied by U.S. Supreme Court, 62 S. Ct. 186.
57 Waller v. Commonwealth, 16 S.E. (2d) 808 (Va., Oct., 1941). A grand jury may not usurp the functions of a trial jury. Thus a Georgia grand jury that summoned an accused person before it and questioned him concerning the charge against him while considering a bill of indictment was held to be acting “against the public policy of this state” and in violation of the constitution. Jenkins v. State, 14 S.E. (2d) 594 (Ga., April, 1941). Trial by jury means trial by a jury in the presence of a judge who supplies the jury with ample guidance. He must not limit his comment to an abstract discussion of the law. Smith v. Kappas et al., 15 S.E. (2d) 375 (N. C., June, 1941).
58 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
59 Taylor v. State, 13 S.E. (2d) 647 (Ga., Mar., 1941), reversed in Taylor v. Ga. 62 S. Ct. 415, Jan. 12, 1942. The attitude of the Kansas supreme court expressed in Graham v. Board of Education of Topeka stands in sharp contrast to that of the Georgia court in the Taylor case. A twelve-year-old Topeka Negro boy was promoted from the sixth grade of the Buchanan elementary school and applied to Boswell Junior High School for enrollment in the seventh grade. He was denied the right to enroll because of his race and color, and thereupon instituted mandamus proceedings, alleging that refusal to grant him the educational advantages of the Boswell school was discriminatory and violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Kansas supreme court upheld this contention. It declared that segregation of races is permissible provided equal facilities are maintained, but that maintenance of a six-six plan for white children and an eight-four plan for Negroes, with many facilities and advantages afforded students at the Boswell school that were lacking at the Buchanan school, necessarily constituted discrimination. 114 P. (2d) 313 (Kan., June, 1941).
60 In re Hendrickson, 123 P. (2d) 322 (Wash., Mar., 1942).
61 Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 55, pp. 285–6 (Dec., 1941).
62 Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson, Attorney-General, 115 P. (2d) 123 (Okla., July, 1941). Reversed by United States Supreme Court, 6 S. Ct. 1110 (June 1, 1941). See Smith, Elmo R., “Validity of Statute Providing for Sterilization of Habitual Criminals,” Cal. Law Rev., Vol. 30, pp. 189–193 (Jan., 1942).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
63 Unemployment Compensation Commission v. J. M. Willis Barber and Beauty Shop et al., 15 S.E. (2d) 4 (N.C., May, 1941); Picklesimer v. Pratt et al., 17 S.E. (2d) 524 (B.C., Nov., 1941); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 21 A (2d) 45 (Pa., Sept., 1941); New Haven Metal & Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, Administrator, etc., 21 A (2d) 383 (Conn., July, 1941); Friedman v. American Surety Co. of New York (Supreme Court) 151 S.W. (2d) 570 (Texas, May, 1941). A divided court in the Friedman case distinguished the Texas decision in McCombs et al. v. Dallas County et al. (Court of Civil Appeals), 136 S.W. (2d) 975 (Texas, Feb., 1940), examined in this Review, Aug., 1940, p. 718.
64 See this Review, Aug., 1940, pp. 715–716, and Aug., 1941, pp. 697–698, for previous summaries.
65 Benjamin v. Housing Authority of Darlington County et al., 15 S.E. (2d) 737 (S.C., July, 1941).
66 State ex rel. Grubstein v. Cambell, Tax Assessor, et al., 1 So. (2d) 483 (Fla., Apr., 1941); Smith, County Tax Assessor, v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 3 So. (2d) 880 (Fla., Sept., 1941).
67 Campbell v. State, 122 P. (2d) 458 (Wash., Feb., 1942).
68 Lasdon et al. v. Hallihan, Director of Registration and Education, et al., 36 N.E. (2d) 227 (Ill., Sept., 1941).
69 Marburg v. Cole et al., 36 N.E. (2d) 113 (N.Y., July, 1941).
70 Golden v. Bartholomew et al., 299 N.W. 356 (Neb., July, 1941).
71 Buehman et al. v. Bechtel, 114 P. (2d) 227 (Ariz., June, 1941). An ordinance of Scranton, Pennsylvania, which had set barber shop hours at 8:30 to 6:30, with an hour longer on Saturdays and before holidays, was invalidated by the supreme court. Saccone et al. v. City of Scranton et al., 20 A (2d) 236 (Pa., May, 1941).
72 City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. (2d) 364 (Fla., July, 1941).
73 Hav-a-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, Chairman of State Road Dept., 5 So. (2d) 433 (Fla., Jan., 1942); John H. Swisher & Son, Inc. et al. v. Johnson, Chairman of State Road Dept., 5 So. (2d) 441 (Fla., Jan., 1942).
74 Anderson v. Schockleford, 76 So. 343, 345.
75 Nashville, C., and St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, and cases there cited.
76 Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, 5 So. (2d) 244 (Fla., Jan., 1942).
77 Leary v. City of Manchester, 21 A. (2d) 156 (N. H., June, 1941). A California court invalidated a statute which made public utility companies liable for attorney's fees and other expenses growing out of unsuccessful attempts to enjoin municipalities from acquiring their own public works. The court saw no reasonable basis for classifying suits by public utilities opposed to public ownership in the same category with suits by insurance companies and railroads contesting insurance claims, fence, and tax legislation. Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (District Court of Appeal) 115 P. (2d) 582 (Cal., July, 1941).
78 People v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 36 N.E. (2d) 362 (Ill., Sept., 1941).
79 See note, Ill. Law Rev., Vol. 36, pp. 796–98 (Mar., 1942). Illinois farm organizations tried to show that farm lands had been assessed at thirty-five per cent of fair cash value while city property had been assessed at twenty-five per cent. Though it was forcibly argued that this violated the state uniformity clause, as well as federal due process and equal protection, the supreme court declined to intervene: plaintiffs had failed to show either fraudulent valuation or that their own lands had been discriminated against. Tuttle et al. v. Bell, County Collector, 37 N.E. (2d) 180 (Ill., Nov., 1941). Certiorari denied by United States Supreme Court, Mar. 2, 1942, 62 S.C. 801.
80 Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Commission, 175 So. 248, 112 A.L.R. (1937); State ex rel. Graham v. Enking 82 P. (2d) 649 (1938); and Miller v. State Apple Commission, 296 N.W. 245 (1941). See this Review, Aug., 1941, p. 699.
81 Stuttgart Rice Mill Co. v. Crandall, 157 S.W. (2d) 205 (Ark., Jan., 1942).
82 Williams v. City of Richmond, 14 S.E. (2d) 287, 134 A.L.R. 833 (Va., April, 1941).
83 Maryland Theatrical Corporation v. Brennan (Court of Appeals) 24 A (2d) 911 (Md., Mar., 1942). A city ordinance which imposed a five-dollar-a-year license tax on cigarette-vending machines, but which provided that the fee should apply only to operators of four machines or more, was invalidated by the Kansas supreme court as an arbitrary classification. Two judges dissented. Matheny v. City of Hutchinson, 121 P. (2d) 227 (Kan., Jan., 1942). A licensing statute which required restaurants and kitchens to be separated from other businesses in the same place, and which applied only to restaurants subsequently established, was held violative of state and federal due process and equal protection clauses. State ex rel. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. State Board of Health et al., 298 N.W. 183 (Wis., May, 1941).
84 Direct Plumbing Supply Co. et al. v. City of Dayton et al., 38 N.E. (2d) 70 (Ohio, Oct., 1941). State courts continue to look with less favor on so-called “Green River” ordinances which make uninvited house-to-house canvassing a nuisance per se. On finding that recent decisions in Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey were all adverse, the Iowa court held that such legislation imposed unreasonable and unwarranted restraint upon lawful business. City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W. (2d) 83 (Ia., Feb., 1942). To the same effect, see City of Mt. Sterling et al. v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W. (2d) 237 (Ky., Oct., 1941), and Ex parte Faulkner, 158 S.W. (2d) 525 (Texas, Feb., 1942). An ordinance which imposed a hundred-dollar license fee on merchants having no fixed place of business in the town was sustained by the California supreme court despite the fact that a local merchant would have had to pay but twenty dollars. Hansen v. Town of Antioch et al. 114 P. (2d) 329 (Cal., July, 1941). Compare Southern Linen Supply Co. et al. v. City of Hazard et al., in which the Kentucky supreme court disapproved collection of an annual license fee of four hundred dollars from out-of-town laundries and dry cleaners, a charge eight times that required of local business men. 151 S.W. (2d) 758 (Ky., May, 1941).
85 Safeway Stores, Inc., of Texas v. Sheppard, 158 S.W. (2d) 319 (Tex., Jan., 1942), writ of error denied, Mar. 11, 1942.
86 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State, 158 S.W. (2d) 336 (Tex., Feb., 1942).
87 Banner Laundering Co. v. Gundry et al., 298 N.W. 73 (Mich., May, 1941).
88 The majority of the court here distinguished the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 61 S. Ct. 583 (1941), on the ground that the mail order house in that case had been liable for the sales tax because of its intrastate retail store business, whereas the Illinois tailoring firm previously had been held not to be liable for the Michigan sales tax.
89 J. B. Simpson, Inc., v. Gundry et al., 298 N.W. 81 (Mich., May, 1941).
90 City of Tampa v. Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., 186 So. 411 (Fla., Jan., 1939); Burnett v. American Welding & Tank Co., 197 So. 458 (Fla., July, 1940); and National Container Corp. v. State, 189 So. 4 (Fla., May, 1939), 122 A.L.R. 1000.
91 Fleischer Studios, Inc., v. Paxson et al., 2 So. (2d) 293 (Fla., May, 1941).
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.