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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.
2 Boyd v. Jordan, 35 P. (2d) 533 (Calif., Sept., 1934).
3 Collier v. Gray, 157 So. 40 (Oct., 1934). On the other hand, the requirement that the yeas and nays be entered upon the journals was held mandatory in Tipton v. Mitchell, 35 P. (2d) 110 (Mont., July, 1934).
4 Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270 (Fla. July, 1934).
5 Kerby v. Luhrs, 36 P. (2d) 549 (Ariz., Oct., 1934).
6 State v. O'Quinn, 154 So. 166 (Fla., March, 1934).
7 Bigham v. State, 156 So. 246 (Fla., July, 1934).
8 Brown v. Clark, 34 P. (2d) 17 (Wyo., June, 1934).
9 State v. Whitman, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
10 Gibson Auto Co. v. Finnegan, 259 N.W. 420 (March, 1935). For approval of this reasoning by the federal Supreme Court, see Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
11 Ex parte Laswell, 36 P. (2d) 678 (Sept., 1934).
12 2 Dallas, 409 (1792).
13 In re Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 33 P. (2d) 772 (May, 1934).
14 Ex parte Steckler, 154 So. 41 (La., March, 1934).
15 In re Haddad, 173 A. 103 (June, 1934).
16 Millers Nat. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank, 190 N.E. 433 (May, 1934).
17 People v. Niesman, 190 N.E. 668 (Ill., April, 1934).
18 Smith v. Steineauf, 36 P. (2d) 995 (Nov., 1934). Cf. also Ule v. State, 194 N.E. 140 (Feb., 1935), holding valid the Indiana hit-and-run drivers act as not violating the double jeopardy provision nor compelling a person to testify against himself.
19 Cf. Patterson v. State, Powell v. State, and Weems v. State, 141 So. 195, 201, 215 (1932), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20 Norris v. State, 156 So. 556 (Oct., 1934).
21 Norris v. State, 55 S. Ct. 579 (1935).
22 Herndon v. State, 174 S.E. 597 (May, 1934). See note, 34 Yale Law Jour. (Nov., 1934) 1357Google Scholar.
23 Herndon v. State, 176 S.E. 620 (Sept., 1934).
24 Home Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
25 See this Review, Vol. XXVIII, p. 614, and decision of supreme court of Louisiana approving a mortgage moratorium law. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Norris, 159 So. 388 (Feb., 1935).
26 Hanauer v. Republic Bldg. Co., 255 N.W. 136 (June, 1934). The reasoning of the Blaisdell Case was held controlling in Illinois in sustaining an act prohibiting suit on official bonds of custodians of public funds for a period not exceeding two years in which deposit accounts with closed banks were being liquidated. Town of Cheney's Grove v. Vanscoyoc, 191 N.E. 289 (June, 1934). For consideration of similar cases, see note, 48 Harv. Law Rev. (Nov., 1934) 126, 134.
27 United States Mortg. Co. v. Matthews, 173 A. 903 (July, 1934).
28 Travellers Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 74 S.W. 658 (Sept., 1934). See note, 13 Texas Law Rev. (Dec., 1934) 78Google Scholar, in which it is pointed out that the Texas moratorium law was substantially the same as the Minnesota law, so far as its validity under the contract clause is concerned.
29 Langever v. Miller, 76 S.W. (2d) 1025 (Nov., 1934); Cf. 13 Texas Law Rev. 85 ff.
30 When real estate values declined and mortgage guaranty companies were unable to meet their obligations, by court orders they were placed in the hands of the superintendent of insurance as a statutory receiver. It was to meet the unsatisfactory conditions created by this action that the Schackno Act above referred to was passed. See 43 Yale Law Jour. (April, 1934) 1007Google Scholar.
31 People v. Title Mortgage Guarantee Co., 190 N.E. 153 (March, 1934).
32 Moses v. Meier, 35 P. (2d) 981 (Ore., Sept., 1934). See contention of Chief Justice Rand, dissenting, that the anticipated profits from the liquor business will become part of the revenues of the state, and that the debt to be charged against them will be a part of the state indebtedness.
33 Dunn v. Love, 155 So. 331 (Miss., June, 1934).
34 Lowell Coöperative Bk. v. Coöperative Central Bk., 191 N.E. 921 (Mass., July, 1934).
35 Holliman v. Cole, 34 P. (2d) 597 (June, 1934).
36 State v. Citrus County, 157 So. 4 (Sept. 1934).
37 Hourigan v. North Bergen Tp., 172 A. 193 (April, 1934).
38 1 Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 124Google Scholar.
39 34 P. (2d) 48 (Ida., May, 1934).
40 Kercheval v. Ross, 7 F. Supp. 355 (Feb., 1934).
41 State v. Cooney, 32 P. (2d) 851 (Mont., May, 1934).
42 Hibernia Securities Co. v. Pirie, 41 P. (2d) 431 (Feb., 1935).
43 Samuel Bevard Manuro Products Co. v. Baughman, 173 A. 40 (Md., June, 1934), sustaining the imposition of a larger license fee for the operation of pneumatic than for solid tire vehicles; Bowen v. Hannah, 71 S.W. (2d) 672 (Tenn., May, 1934), regulating motor transportation agents acting as intermediaries between prospective travellers and private automobile carriers; Ravitz v. Steurele, 77 S.W. (2d) 360 (Ky., Dec., 1934), licensing and regulating those engaged in the business of making loans of $300 or less, exempting those engaged in automobile financing and refinancing; Carpel v. City of Richmond, 175 S.E. 316 (Va., June, 1934), ordinance requiring licenses of peddlers, exempting distributors of motor vehicle fuels and petroleum products, farmers, dealers in forest products, and producers and manufacturers; Laing v. Fox, 175 S.E. 354 (W. Va., June, 1934), a privilege tax on every person engaged in any business, profession, trade, or calling except persons engaged in agriculture, horticulture, or grazing.
44 State v. Knott, 154 So. 143, 145 (Fla., March, 1934). See Riley Y. Sweat, 149 So. 48 (1933), in which a similar act was declared void.
45 State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931).
46 J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P. (2d) 784 (April, 1934). A similar South Carolina chain-store law was upheld in Southern Grocery Stores v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 55 F. (2d) 931 (Feb., 1932). But see a decision of the Vermont supreme court condemning an act imposing a gross retail sales tax graduated according to the amount of gross sales from stores under a common ownership as a violation of the equal protection clause. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Harvey, 177A. 423 (March, 1935). See note, 43 Yale Law Jour. (April, 1934) 1022Google Scholar, on the applicability of a chain-store tax to filling stations.
47 Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 259 N.W. 352 (March, 1935). A similar decision was rendered by the supreme court of Oregon in sustaining an ordinance of the city of Portland. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Portland, 42 P. (2d) 162 (March, 1935).
48 Woolf v. Fuller, 174 A. 193 (June, 1934).
49 State v. Cohen, 177 A. 403 (Feb., 1935).
50 111 U.S. 746(1883).
51 177 S.E. 44 (Nov., 1934).
52 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
53 55 S. Ct. 7 (1934).
54 Patton v. City of Bellingham, 38 P. (2d) 364 (Dec., 1934). See also State v. Johannes, 250 N.W. 537 (Minn., March, 1935).
55 McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 F. Supp. 855 (Oct., 1933); and cf. note, 47 Harv. Law Rev. (April, 1934) 1058Google Scholar.
56 People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E. 301, and People v. Alterie, 190 N.E. 305 (April, 1934).
57 State v. McKune, 255 N.W. 916 (Wis., June, 1934).
58 73 S.W. (2d) 475 (June, 1934).
59 Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
60 Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 34 P. (2d) 534 (Mont., June, 1934).
61 Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 190 N.E. 918 (Ill., April, 1934).
62 State Bank and Trust Co. v. Village of Willmette, 193 N.E. 131 (Ill., Oct., 1934).
63 Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Fed. of S. Workers, 172 A. 551 (May 1934).
64 Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 193 N.E. 112 (Oct., 1934). See decision of court of appeal of Louisiana under a state anti-injunction law refusing to issue an injunction to restrain a labor union from peaceful picketing, Dehan v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, etc., 159 So. 637 (March, 1935).
65 State v. Anklam, 31 P. (2d) 888 (April, 1934).
66 Connally v. General Const. Co. 269 U.S. 385 (1926). See State v. Garfield Building Co., 3 P. (2d) 983 (1931).
67 In re Thornton's Estate, 33 P. (2d) 1 (May, 1934).
68 Acklin v. First Nat. Bank, 254 N.W. 769 (N. Da., May, 1934). Cf., also, note, “Judicial Treatment of Retrospective Legislation,” 44 Yale Law Jour. (Dec., 1934) 358CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
69 Hazzard v. Alexander, 173 A. 517 (Del., June, 1934). A former statute failing to distinguish between ordinary and gross negligence was held void. Coleman v. Rhodes, 159 A. 649 (1932).
70 Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co. 188 Mass. 348 (1905).
71 General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 193 N.E. 799 (Jan., 1935). See note, 48 Harv. Law Rev. (March, 1935) 848Google Scholar.
72 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Baker, 71 S.W. (2d) 678 (May, 1934).
73 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 55 S. Ct. 486 (1935).
74 City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 190 N.E. 896 (May, 1934).
75 O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, 25 P. (2d) 114 (1933).
76 Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 33 P. (2d) 563 (May, 1934).
77 Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 and 158 U.S. 601 (1894).
78 Miles v. Dept. of Treasury, 193 N.E. 855 (Jan., 1935). The Indiana intangible tax and gross income tax law was sustained in Lutz v. Arnold, 193 N.E. 840 (Jan., 1935), as was also a Vermont income and franchise tax law in Colgate v. Harvey, 175 A. 352 (Nov., 1934).
79 Brattleboro Retreat v. Town of Brattleboro, 173 A. 209 (May, 1934).
80 Sparling v. Refunding Board, 71 S.W. 182 (Ark., May, 1934). See dissent of Justices Smith and Butler holding the tax to be on property particularly with respect to fuel used for other than highway purposes.
81 Steward Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 7 F. Supp. 438 (Dec, 1933). See reversal of this decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, 55 S. Ct. 525 (1935).
82 Standard Oil Co. v. State Revenue Commission, 176 S.E. 1 (Aug., 1934).
83 Mt. Hope Cemetery Co. v. Pleasant, 32 P. (2d) 500 (Kan., May, 1934).
84 Ex parte Day, 76 S.W. (2d) 1060 (Tex., Oct., 1934).
85 City of Tacoma v. Tax Commission, 33 P. (2d) 899 (Wash., May, 1934). Cf. dissent of three justices based largely on previous decision in Cascade Telephone Co. v. Tax Commission, 30 P. (2d) 976 (March, 1934).
86 Smith v. Thompson, 258 N.W. 190 (Dec, 1934).
87 Hard v. State, 154 So. 77 (March, 1934). Justices Knight and Thomas dissented on the ground that the legislature authorized the making of a binding contract.
88 State v. Macy, 190 N.E. 463 (Ohio, April, 1934).
89 Abramson v. Hard, 155 So. 590 (May, 1934).
90 State v. Christensen, 35 P. (2d) 775 (Utah, Sept., 1934).
91 State v. Corley, 172 A. 415 (Del., April, 1934).
92 State v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377 (Sept., 1934). Justice Moellring, dissenting, believed that the language of the constitution applied only to offenses committed against the laws of the state. Cf. note, 48 Harv. Law Rev. (Feb., 1935), in which it is pointed out that the decision of the court, though desirable from the standpoint of public policy, is not as well supported by legal precedents as is the view of the dissenting justice.
93 Retirement Board of Allegheny Co. v. McGovern, 174 A. 400 (June, 1934).
94 See Indianapolis Water Co. v. McCardle, 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
95 Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore City v. West, 7 F. Supp. 214 (May, 1934). For consideration of this case by the federal Supreme Court, see West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935).
96 Dairymen's Coop. Sales Ass'n v. Public Service Comm., 177 A. 770 (Pa., April, 1935).
97 See Justice McReynold's opinion in Norman v. Baltimore and O. R. Co., 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935). Warning of the impending peril is given in the dictum that “to let oneself slide down the easy slope offered by the course of events and to dull one's mind against the extent of the danger, … that is precisely to fail in one's obligation of responsibility.”
98 See Edward S. Corwin's book by this title (Yale University Press, 1934).
99 J. Elbridge of Mississippi, dissenting:
Goodbye, dear old Constitution, I hate to see you go
You have been a good companion; I have learned to love you so.
Give me your parting blessing before I breast the wave
Of Revolution's stormy waters, Caprice's rebellious slave:
Before I face advancing Anarchy's dark tempestuous tide,
With no friendly port to shield me, and no polar star to guide.
Dunn v. Love, 155 So. 331 (Miss., June, 1934), involving the consideration of an act providing for reopening of closed banks. Cf. supra, note 33.
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