Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T07:04:25.717Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Soviet Policy in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Herbert S. Dinerstein
Herbert S. Dinerstein*
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The general conclusions of the study will be stated at the outset in the broadest terms to aid the reader in his evaluation of the argument as it is unfolded in more detail.

The Soviet leaders expected to make great advances in the underdeveloped world as it decolonized. They hoped that the Communists would lead the nationalist rebellions and convert them into Communist states. Only in the North of Indochina has the Communist party been able to do so; the South is still in contest. High hopes in Indonesia, Algeria, and the Congo have come to naught. The successful seizure of power in Cuba has taken place in an unanticipated manner.

In this case, a non-Communist revolution converted itself into a Communist one. Before Castro's assumption of power in Cuba, the Soviet Union viewed Latin America in general, and the Caribbean in particular, as an area where American power severely limited Communist opportunities. The overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 seemed to prove the point. But for a time after the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cubans believed, and seemed to have convinced the Soviets, that the Cuban revolution could be exported. But the failure of several attempts to do so, and the outcome of the missile crisis in the fall of 1962, caused first the Soviets and somewhat later the Cubans to revise their hopes for new Communist states in Latin America in the near or foreseeable future. Now several years after the windfall of Castro's conversion, Soviet attention is increasingly centered on the costs to be borne. First, although Castro will probably remain a Communist, he will continue to be as defiant as he can afford to be. Second, Castro has cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money and, although these contributions have been reduced, the end is not yet in sight.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 61 , Issue 1 , March 1967 , pp. 80 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1967

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 No authoritative figure is known to me, but a million dollars per day has often been mentioned.

2 The following is an expression of Soviet preferences in the form of a prediction: “Some developing countries have already begun their noncapitalist development. It would be more accurate to say of those who have followed this path consistently that they occupy a ‘special place,’ not in the capitalist world system, but rather in the socialist world system. This means that the appearance and establishment of world socialism can no longer be represented only by the unity of countries where socialism has already been completely victorious and where the political form is the dictatorship of the proletariat or the government of the whole people which has developed from that form. The world socialist system can also include not completely socialist or semi-socialist links. The passage of the developing countries from the world capitalist to the world socialist system is possible not only in the form of a comparatively rapid action, such as occurred in Cuba in 1959–1960, but also in the form of a prolonged process stretching over many years.” Tiul'panov, S., “Osnovnye problemy politekonomii razvivaiu-shchikhsia stran” (The Basic Problems of the Political Economy of the Developing Countries), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia No. 9, 1965, p. 72.Google Scholar

3 Emphasis in original. Debray, Regis, “America Latina: Algunos problemas de estrategia revolucionaria” (Some Problems of Latin American Revolutionary Strategy), Bohemia, Havana, Nos. 57 and 58, November 19 and 26, 1965.Google Scholar The article also appeared in Politica, Mexico City, November 15, 1965, Supplement, p. 7.

4 Tiagunenko, V. L., Problemy sovremennykh natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii (Problems of Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions) Moscow, 1966, pp. 175–178.Google Scholar After stating that Soviet Central Asia is a model for underdeveloped states, the author gives an excellent exposition of all the factors which have made it a unique case rather than a model.

5 Krasin, Iu. A., and Li, V. F., “O zakonomernostiakh nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiia osvobodivshikhsia stran” (Rules Governing the Non-capitalist Development of the Liberated Countries) Voprosy filosofii (8) 1964, pp. 29–40.Google Scholar On pp. 30–31 the authors say: “The noncapitalist stage of development, which is the specific form of the metamorphosis of the democratic revolution into the socialist, creates the social and economic base for the subsequent progress of the country without the participation of private capitalist elements….”; Ul'ianovski, R., “Sotsializm i natsionalnoosvo-boditel'naia bor'ba” (Socialism and the national liberation struggle), Pravda, 04 15, 1966Google Scholar, warns that in addition consumer demands must be met during this stage or else the non-capitalist path is discredited, as happened in Ghana.

6 For a summary of the Soviet literature, see my “Soviet Doctrine on Developing Countries: Some Divergent Views” in London, Kurt (ed.), New Nations in a Divided World (New York, 1963), pp. 80–84.Google Scholar

7 Eliutin, Iu., “Latinskaia Amerika: Krizis pomeshchichei oligarkhii” (Latin America: The Crisis of the Landholding Oligarchy), Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' (2), 1963, pp. 52–61.Google Scholar See pp. 56–57 for a version of this formulation; also see Kuznetsov, V. O., Agrarnye reformy v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh i stranakh vysokorazvitogo kapitalizmu (Agrarian Reforms in the Developing Countries and the Highly Developed Capitalist Countries), Moscow, 1965, p. 155Google Scholar; and Danilevich, M. V., “Agrarnye otnosheniia i bor'ba za agrarnuiu reformu v stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki” (Agrarian Relations and the Struggle for Agrarian Reform in the Latin American Countries), in Rumiantsev, A. M., Agrarnyi vopros i natsional'noosvoboditel'noe dvizhenie (Agrarian Question and the National Liberation Movement) (Moscow, 1963), pp. 432–458.Google Scholar

8 According to one Soviet scholar who has written on the subject for many years, “The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot, naturally, count on the socialist states' being in a position to provide all their requirements for capital, equipment, and technical assistance. A significant portion of their requirements has to be satisfied through the agency of the imperialist states.” Tiagunenko, V., “Aktual'nye voprosy nekapitalisticheskogo puti razvitiia” (Current Problems of the Non-capitalist Path of Development); Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 11, 11 1964, p. 17.Google Scholar See also the same author in an article entitled “The Future of the Liberated States” in the more official Kommunist, No. 4, March 1965, p. 113, and Potemkin, Iu. and Sandakov, V., “Razvivaiushchiesia strany: neko-torye aspekty problemy nakopleniia” (The Developing Countries: Some Aspects of the Problem of Accumulation); Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 4, 1965, p. 43Google Scholar, for a similar statement with particular reference to Latin America, and most recently Varnai, Ferenc, “Whither the Third World?” Nepszabadsag, Budapest, 03 16, 1966.Google Scholar

9 The Chinese have singled out for particular ridicule the following Soviet formulation of this idea: “The leading role of the proletariat on a world scale finds expression in part in the circumstance that under the influence of its ideology the transition to socialist transformations in some countries can take place even without the direct leadership of the working class and—at least in the initial stage—under the leadership of the progressive forces which gradually go over to the position of scientific socialism,” Ponomarev, B. N. (ed.), Mezhdunarodnoe revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie rabochego klassa (The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class) (Moscow, 1964), p. 325.Google Scholar The very same statement appears in the revised 1965 edition. The 1964 edition was printed in 50,000 copies, the 1965 edition in 25,000 copies.

10 “On 13 February [1959] the position of Prime Minister of the revolutionary government was taken over by Fidel Castro, leader of the rebel army. This meant that ‘the principal role in the government went over into the hands of the petty radical bourgeoisie’,” Obyden, Konstantin M., Kuba v bor'be za svobodu i nezavisimost' (Cuba in the Struggle for Freedom and Independence), Moscow, 1959Google Scholar, in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (hereinafter cited as JPRS): 3563. 18 July 1960, p. 6.

11 See Einaudi, Luigi Roberto, Marxism in Latin America: From Aprismo to Fidelismo (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1966), especially pp. 160–250Google Scholar for a convincing account of Castro's analysis of the Guatemalan experiences.

12 Before the missile crisis, expectations were very high. “Latin America today is rapidly being converted into one of the most revolutionary regions of our planet” was the concluding phrase of an important article. See Tarasov, K., “Gavanskaia deklaratsiia-prizyv k bor'be protiv imperializma” (The Havana Declaration is a Summons to the Struggle Against Imperalism), Kommunist, No. 4, 1962, p. 89.Google Scholar See also Vesely, Milos, “Latin America on the Move,” Nova Mysl, 07 1962, No. 7, Prague, in JPRS 15606, No. 254, p. 1.Google Scholar

13 The Communist Party of Brazil took the position, revised after his overthrow, that “Goulart came to power as a result of a compromise between the national bourgeoisie and the forces of reaction.” See Souza, Manuel de, “Communism in Brazil in 1965,” Est & Ouest, No. 357, Paris, pp. 16–1802 1966Google Scholar, in JPRS 35051, No. 823, p. 137.

14 Tarasov, K. S., Soiuz radi grabezha (The Alliance for Looting), Moscow, 1965, a pamphlet, pp. 27–28Google Scholar; Sheremetyev, I., “Latin America's Social and Economic Problems,” International Affairs, Moscow, 2, 1965, pp. 43–48Google Scholar; Perlo, Victor, “U.S. Monopolies and Latin America,” International Affairs, Moscow, 5, 1965Google Scholar; Shulgovsky, A., “Political Trends in Latin America,” International Affairs, Moscow, 11, 1965, pp. 43–49.Google Scholar

15 “The unity of the Latin American Revolution does not exclude but on the contrary presupposes various national processes, a wealth of tactics, dissimilar tempos of development, various levels of the sharpness of the class struggle, and an endless gamut of political struggle in each country, region, or group of countries.” Arismendi, Rodney, “Latinskaia Amerika vykhodit na avanstsenu” (Latin America Comes to the Front of the Stage), Kommunist, No. 5, 03 1961, p. 73Google Scholar; and Rumyantsev, A. M. of the authoritative World Marxist Review said: “It is clear that the position with regard to the national bourgeoisie is not the same in Cuba, as, let us say, in Colombia. The revolutionary movement in Latin America, as in all other continents, develop unevenly.” “Building a United Anti-Imperialist Front,” World Marxist Review, VI (1), 01 1963, p. 83Google Scholar; and in the context of a discussion of the example of Cuba, the old Communist leader, Corvalan, said: “Any tendency towards a mechanical copying of one or another revolutionary process by regarding it as a universal pattern is, at best, subjectivism.” “The Peaceful Way—A Form of Revolution,” World Marxist Review VI (12), December 1963, pp. 8, 9.

16 “Pamiatnaia zapiska Palmiro Togliatti,” Pravda, September 10, 1964.

17 Kudachkin, M. and Mostovets, N., “Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike” (The Movement of National Liberation in Latin America), Kommunist, No. 11, 07 1964, pp. 121–130Google Scholar; Sivolobov, A., “Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike” (The Peasant Movement in Latin America), Kommunist, No. 12, 08 1964, pp. 100–107.Google Scholar

18 The first article said (p. 127): “A study of the programs of the Communist parties of Latin America shows that the form of struggle has not been absolutized by the Communists and that they change according to the situation in one or another country.

“Latin American Communists consistently support the implementation of the line indicated in the programmatic documents of the international Communist movement and reject the position of the Chinese leaders who are trying to impose on all the parties the strategy and tactics which they worked out in the specific conditions of their country [viz., armed revolution and civil war].” The article then went on to cite statements from the Chilean and Salvadorean Communist parties, both of which are opposed to violence in their own countries at present. The second of the two articles said in its last paragraph (p. 107): “An analysis of recent events established that in countries where dictators are in power, dictators who are the henchmen of foreign monopolies, the development of the struggle on a broad front, including armed struggle, and the creation of partisan detachments in some areas, is a completely justified course.” Then follows a warning that this does not apply to liberal reformist regimes.

19 “Communicado: Conferencia de los Partidos Communistas de América Latina” (Communiqué: A Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America), Revolución, Havana, January 19, 1965.

20 Havana Domestic Radio, January 16, 1966.

21 Kobysh, V., “Uspekhov tebe, Braziliia” (We Wish You Success, Brazil), Izvesliia, 09 7, 1965Google Scholar, congratulates Brazil on the day of her national holiday and says that countries with different social systems can cooperate to mutual advantage.

22 Nuñez, Carlos, “Y ahora, en que campo está Cuba?” (And Which Camp is Cuba in Now?), Marcha, Montevideo, 02 18, 1966.Google Scholar

23 Solis, Marta D., “Peru, la guerrilla es su signo,” (Guerrilla Warfare is Peru's Motto), Siempre, Mexico City, 02 2, 1966.Google Scholar

24 E.g., see Posadas, S., “The Expulsion of Guevara from Cuba is a Blow to the Development of the Cuban Socialist Revolution,” Voz Proletaria, Buenos Aires, 10 27, 1965, JPRS 33, 204, No. 785, pp. 116–139.Google Scholar

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.