No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
An observer who had much to do with the departments at Washington once remarked that the whole philosophy of rank in the government service was unsound. Anyone, he reasoned, could be the head of a department; to be the head of a division was much more difficult; while the office boy must be a real diplomat. There is doubtless much of truth in this view; and it may perhaps be pleaded in excuse of the habit which discussions of the federal personnel problem seem to have developed, of beginning (and, not infrequently, also ending) with the case of the government clerk.
Nevertheless, it is to be questioned whether the government clerk, or the subordinate personnel of the administrative services of the government generally, presents nearly so difficult a question as does the directing personnel. By and large, doubtless the most immediate problem of the federal personnel system today is to secure in the posts of responsibility and discretion a capable type of administrator.
In this view, logically the first item to be considered in a discussion of the federal personnel problem is the method of selecting the chief of the administration—the President; and, next in order, the method of selecting the chiefs of the executive departments—particularly, the chiefs of the predominantly administrative departments—post office, war and navy.
1 Of these, 10 are appointed by the heads of the department.
2 Since this paper was written the joint commission on the reclassification of salaries has rendered its report (March 12, 1920, H. Doc. 686, 66th Congress, second session). As expected, the commission recommends not merely a complete revision of salary rates, but the formulation of a comprehensive personnel policy and the creation of a central personnel agency with adequate powers.
Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.