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Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Lewis A. Froman Jr.
Lewis A. Froman Jr.*
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
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Extract

The literature on interest groups is, by and large, either heavily abstract and theoretical or highly concrete and descriptive. There are, on the one hand, several attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the study of interest groups, the major foci being either “the group basis of politics” or “mass society.” On the other hand are numerous case-studies which describe in some detail, either for a particular policy or for a particular interest group, relevant political activities which lead to inferred conclusions about the impact that such groups have on the issue or issues. What we lack, and what is needed to raise the study of interest groups to the level of empiricallybased generalization, are studies which collect data and generalize about interest groups using multiple units of analysis.

This observation is not meant to depreciate or undervalue the important theoretical and descriptive contributions which have been made in the examination of the role of interest groups in governmental systems. It is simply to state a fact about the literature and to plead for more systematic data collection and empirically-based generalization from which verified propositions about interest groups may emerge.

I think there are two major reasons why the literature on interest groups lacks a comparative base. First, many of the concepts which are employed in theories about interest groups are difficult to operationalize for data collection. Such concepts as “cohesion,” “access,” “resources,” etc., represent complex phenomena and would involve a good deal of effort to apply rigorously and empirically.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 60 , Issue 4 , December 1966 , pp. 952 - 962
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1966

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References

1 See, for example, Truman, David B., The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951), Chapters 2 and 3Google Scholar; Latham, Earl, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), Chapter 1Google Scholar; Schattschneider, E. E., The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960)Google Scholar; and Zeigler, Harmon, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), Chapters 1–3Google Scholar. There is also a voluminous journal literature discussing the pros and cons of “the group approach.” See, for example, Rothman, Stanley, “Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach,” this Review, 54 (03, 1960), 15–33Google Scholar.

2 See Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959)Google Scholar.

3 See Bauer, Raymond A., Pool, Ithiel de Sola, and Dexter, Lewis Anthony, American Business And Public Policy (New York: Atherton, 1963)Google Scholar for a policy case study which also develops very interesting and useful theory.

4 See Monsen, R. Joseph Jr, and Cannon, Mark W., The Makers of Public Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965)Google Scholar for a number of discussions of particular interest groups and their activities.

5 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.

6 Data from The Book of the States, 1964–1965 (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1964), pp. 12–15Google Scholar.

7 David B. Truman, op. cit.; Dahl, Robert A., A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956)Google Scholar; William Kornhauser, op. cit.; and Key, V. O. Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 1964), 5th edGoogle Scholar.

8 Zeller, Belle (ed.), American State Legislatures (New York: Crowell, 1964), Chapter 12, especially Table 9, pp. 190–191Google Scholar.

9 See, for examples, Selltiz, Claire, Jahoda, Marie, Deutsch, Morton, and Cook, Stuart W., Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961)Google Scholar.

10 Lipset, Seymour Martin, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” this Review, 53 (03, 1959), 69–105Google Scholar.

11 Neubauer, Deane E., On The Theory of Polyarchy: An Empirical Study of Democracy in Ten Countries (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1966)Google Scholar.

12 A note of caution, however, should undoubtedly be entered here. The measurement of “strength” of interest groups being employed may probably best be construed to mean strength of interest groups vis-a-vis the state legislature. At least this is the sense in which it appears that the Committee defined strength. It is certainly the case that interest groups could vary in strength in a number of different ways. For example, size of membership, or number of groups may, under certain conditions, be appropriate measures of strength. As strength of interest groups is being used here it will be defined primarily in terms of legislative activity.

In addition, the results of this study must be interpreted cautiously since the time periods in which the independent and several of the dependent variables were measured are not coterminous. Strength of interest groups was measured by the Zeller Committee in 1954. Length of constitution and difficulty of amending the constitution (a variable to be introduced later in this paper) correspond to this time period, but the three variables having to do with amendments (number proposed, number adopted, and percentage of amendments adopted) are measured to the date when each state's current constitution was adopted. In several cases this reflects many years. It is therefore necessary, in three of the propositions, to make the assumption that strength of interest groups in states is a relatively stable phenomenon. Although there is not much evidence to support or deny the validity of this assumption, it does not appear unduly unrealistic to make it. Changes in governments, barring revolutions, are likely to take place slowly. If this is the case it does offer a certain plausibility to the assumption.

13 For descriptions of the differing state systems see The Book of the States, op. cit., pp. 13–15.

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