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Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Edward N. Muller  and
Karl-Dieter Opp
Edward N. Muller
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
Karl-Dieter Opp
Affiliation:
Universität Hamburg
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Abstract

A basic problem for a rational choice theory of rebellious collective action is to explain why average citizens would participate in such behavior, since they have nothing to gain (they will receive benefits of successful rebellion, in terms of public goods, regardless of whether they take part or not), but much to lose (rebellious behavior may be quite costly). According to the conventional private interest or “by-product” theory, the incentive to participate must come from the expectation of receiving selective benefits; but since average citizens in a general case cannot expect substantial private material rewards, the relevant selective benefits must be psychological in nature. In contrast to the model of private interest theory, a public goods model is proposed, stipulating that the value of rebellion in terms of public goods can be a relevant incentive for participation. Using data from surveys conducted in New York City and Hamburg, West Germany, we investigate the relationship between participation in rebellious political behavior and measures of the incentives of public goods and private interest. The results do not support predictions of the private interest model in regard to nonmaterial selective incentives. Hypotheses of the public goods model are supported.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 80 , Issue 2 , June 1986 , pp. 471 - 487
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1986

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