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The Pragmatic Electorate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Francis G. Wilson
Francis G. Wilson*
Affiliation:
University of Washington
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Extract

Political science has dealt too long, on the one hand, with the ideal, and, on the other hand, with the abnormal and perverted features of political society, rather than with the normal and the eventual. Our theory of ideal democracy is perhaps more suited to the Greek and Roman city-state, with participation as the test of the good citizen. Representation has been heralded as the device which makes the ancient ideal possible on a large scale. But in practice it has been found that the enormous expansion of the public, i.e., the body of persons who have the right of participation, has made the problem far more complex than was at first thought possible. Greek ideals of education and coercion of the citizen body toward general improvement have been carried out with greater success, and our statute books reflect a Hobbesian attitude toward human nature which is true only in part. The political philosophy of democracy must be built on the facts of political life.

Shall we break with the Greek and Roman ideal of the participation of the citizen group in the affairs of the state? It is true that the present attitude is a revised form of the democratic ideal of antiquity, but with a different interpretation of the meaning of citizenship. All democratic governments must finally rest on some theory of the suffrage; any study of the fact of non-voting must be based on a theory of the suffrage likewise. With the expansion of the theory of citizenship to include all subjects, a corresponding theory of limited participation was developed—no doubt a product of the Middle Ages. The totality of citizens was distrusted, and some test of participation had to be devised. Such was the origin of religious tests for political participation; such was the origin of the distinction between the right to vote and the fact of citizenship.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , February 1930 , pp. 16 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1930

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References

1 Democracy may mean either a form of government or a social philosophy. The older theory has generally limited it to a form of government. This is clearly shown in the writings of Bryce and Maine. It seems we must think of it more in terms of a general appreciation of human personality, or as a social philosophy underlying the modern constitutional state, though as a political process it may be viewed as a form of government. Pragmatism is here taken to mean the application of the doctrine of consequences to political concepts. The true concept is the workable one. Hence, pragmatism is for politics more than a theory of truth, or a method of ascertaining truth; it becomes, in fact, the justification of a program in which the ideal is tested by the actual.

2 Cf. Harrington's, “Oceana,” in Ideal Commonwealths (New York, 1901), p. 239 Google Scholar, for an early modern statement of this view.

3 The conservative contemporary theory is stated very well in Munro, W. B., The Government of the United States (New York, 1925), pp. 101–113 Google Scholar. Following Thomas M. Cooley, Munro argues the connection between the vote and public welfare; the vote is a privilege given for community benefit, therefore there is an obligation to exercise it. Of course, the qualifications for voting must be laid down by the state. The restrictions imposed are obviously for general welfare, but these are considered to be exceptions to the general rule that adult citizens, under proper conditions, should be able to vote. It is doubtful whether the privilege of voting was established on a purely general welfare theory. More probably the doctrine of equality and nineteenth-century individualism brought it about. Those who have opposed suffrage extension have undoubtedly made a wide use of the general welfare theory.

4 A recent book by Merz, Charles (The Great American Band Wagon, New York, 1928)Google Scholar suggests by implication that the really remarkable fact may be that there is as much interest in politics as there is; for politics offers no exciting escape from the realities of life as do a thousand other things, such as the radio, the automobile, and the tabloid. Cf. Lord, A. B., The Principles of Politics (Oxford, 1921), p. 161 Google Scholar. “The more frequently elections are held, the less interesting and important they appear to be, and the less likely is a busy man to go out of his way to record a vote. Private affairs in populous and prosperous communities have assumed an abnormal and disproportionate importance; and amongst those who are immersed in commercial enterprises, political duties, except where they directly affect private businesses, are apt to be resented as an intrusion upon and an interruption of the normal course of life. The professional and the economically influential classes tend more and more to ask for government without trouble.”

5 Cf. Dicey, A. V., Law and Opinion in England (London, 1920), p. 19 Google Scholar; also Maine, H. S., Popular Government (New York, 1886), pp. 127ffGoogle Scholar, stressing the essentially conservative character of public opinion.

6 Cf. Smith, J. Allen, The Spirit of American Government A New York, VTVEQ, pp. 209ffGoogle Scholar, for an adverse criticism of American government on these grounds. Smith contends that the devices in the American Constitution to check ordinary majorities tend to defeat popular will and rob it of vitality, thus diminishing interest in government.

7 See Walsh, C. M., The Political Science of John Adams (New York, 1915), p. 226 Google Scholar: “Still, the Constitution …. exists. It is the instrument attesting the people's act. It frees them from the need of continual surveillance, which, in fact, is left to the judiciary as the custodian of the people's reserved rights.” Cf. the statement of Marshall, cited in Martin, C. E., An Introduction to the Study of the American Constitution (New York, 1928), p. 66 Google Scholar. Cf. also Bosenberry, M. B., “Administrative Law and the Constitution,” 23 American Political Science Review, 38–39 Google Scholar: “One of the undesirable results of the constitutional, as opposed to the parliamentary, system is that it engenders in our lawmakers a feeling that they are not directly responsible for the consequences of a law if the law is constitutional. In the public mind the responsibility for bad law is placed upon the courts.” It should be observed that the effort to make the naval oil leases of the Harding administration a political issue failed, and that judicial remedies are more effective. The ballot seems to be a highly uncertain weapon against corruption. The so-called “aroused electorate” seldom wins against the party or the machine, and even more seldom twice in succession. A few indictments and sentences to terms in the penitentiary are usually more effective in smashing corrupt rings.

8 See Bryce, James, The American Commonwealth (New York, 1919), II, Ch. 58Google Scholar, for a discussion of the relation of interest in politics to the type of issues considered, showing in general that American politics is less interesting than European because of the removal of important issues from active political conflict. Bryce does not, however, in this connection emphasize constitutional provisions.

9 Cf. Ford, Henry J., Representative Government (New York, 1924)Google Scholar, passim, for one of the ablest recent discussions of the importance of the organization of government.

10 In a recent article, Professor Munro criticizes civic uplifting campaigns, asserting that the technique employed has not been tested by scientific means, and that much of the money spent is wasted because of the sheer irrelevance of the means employed to the ends desired. Bawling at the voter to come out and vote will neither improve the quality of elective officials nor materially increase the total number of votes cast. “Physics and Politics—An Old Analogy Revised,” 22 American Political Science Review, 7 Google Scholar. The ultimate deductions from his position would lead to conclusions suggested by this paper. But see also an article by the same author, “Is the Slacker Vote a Menace?” 17 National Municipal Review, 80–86 Google Scholar.

11 Cf. Merriam, C. E., Barnes, H. E., and Others, A History of Political Theories; Recent Times (New York, 1924), p. 383 Google Scholar.

12 See The Federalist (Ford's, edition), No. 61 (60), p. 405 Google Scholar. The framers of the Constitution seemed to appreciate the inevitability of indifference in the electorate. See 69th Cong., 1st Sess., House Doc. 398, p. 192. Here Madison reports Mr. Jennifer as observing that “too great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them.” Madison also reports Mr. Gerry as saying (ibid., p. 442): “The election of the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance and will excite great earnestness.”

13 See Merriam, C. E., American Political Ideas, 1865–1917 (New York, 1920), pp. 305ffGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of the influence of non-official agencies in expressing public opinion on matters of policy.

14 See Calhoun, J. C., “A Disquisition on Government,” Works, I, pp. 75–76 Google Scholar. Calhoun associates the press with the right of suffrage. Both are organs of public opinion, but the press aids more in forming opinion, while the suffrage is a more authentic expression of it. But what is called public opinion, instead of being the united opinion of the whole community, is usually the opinion or voice of the strongest interest or combination of interests; and not infrequently, of a small, but energetic and active, portion of the whole. Cf. Havenner, G. C., “Voteless Washington Expresses Itself,” 17 National Municipal Review, 326 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Herring, E. P., Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore, 1929), p. 2 Google Scholar, passim; Elliott, W. Y., The Pragmatic Revolt m Politics (New York, 1928), p. 13 Google Scholar. Elliott says: “The experience of men holds the great state to be alien, to their daily control, remote, gigantic, capable of being moved only by the pressure of great interest groups, in which the individual is almost as much lost as he is in the state.”

15 See Bryce, op. cit., II, Ch. 58.

16 Cf. Duguit, Léon, Law in the Modern State, tr. by Laski, H. and Laski, F. (New York, 1919), p. xii Google Scholar; also Merriam, C. B., American Political Ideas, 1865-1917, p. 277 Google Scholar, for a similar position taken by Wendell Phillips.

17 “As indicated by the increased vote, the presidential election of 1928 was undoubtedly such a juncture in the lives of a large number of American electors. Cf. Ford, P. L., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States (Brooklyn, 1888)Google Scholar, “Address by Melancthon Smith,” p. 99: “But when a government is adopted that promises to effect this [union], we are to expect the ardour of many, yea, of most people, will be abated Besides, the human mind cannot continue intensely engaged for any great length of time upon one object. As after a storm, a calm generally succeeds, so after the minds of a people have been ardently employed upon a subject, especially upon that of government, we commonly find that they become cool and inattentive … . .” See ibid., “Remarks by Alexander Contee Hanson,” p. 249: “To acquit themselves, like men, when visible danger assails; and, when it is repelled, to sink like savages into indolence, is said to be characteristic of Americans.”

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