Power Over Presence: Women’s Representation in Comprehensive Peace Negotiations and Gender Provision Outcomes

Abstract

The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) sector assumes increasing the number of women involved in peace negotiations drives better outcomes for local women. However, empirical support for this assumption is inconsistent. This article tests how power alters the relationship between women’s formal (Track 1) involvement in peace negotiations and the inclusion of women-specific provisions in peace agreements. Using an original dataset comprised of 2,299 Track 1 delegates involved in 116 comprehensive peace agreements finalized between 1990 and 2021, I find women’s involvement in peace negotiations is positively correlated to comprehensive agreements containing provisions for women. However, this correlation is dependent on women holding positions of power—simply having women in the room is insufficient. This article offers a novel quantitative approach to WPS studies, provides nuance to theories linking descriptive and substantive representation, and casts doubt on the longstanding assumption that increasing women’s involvement inherently enhances gender equality.

The international community has largely advocated for women’s inclusion in peace processes based on research correlating women’s involvement with better agreement outcomes. Women’s involvement in post-conflict decision-making and gender equality is linked to increased conflict recovery (True and Hewitt 2019), extended durations of peace (Caprioli 2000; Caprioli, Nielsen, and Hudson 2010; Hudson et al. 2009; Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018; Principe 2017; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017; Stone 2014), increased likelihood of reaching an agreement (Nilsson 2012; O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016) and increased agreement longevity (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015; Stone 2014). However, these arguments view women’s involvement as a variable or mechanism that drives a desired outcome independent of women’s rights. Far less is understood about how women’s involvement in peace negotiations impacts local women. This article asks if women’s involvement in peace negotiations influences the likelihood final agreements contain provisions for women and how women’s access to powerful positions within negotiations alters this relationship. The international community largely assumes increasing the number of women in any room or deliberation will advance gender equality (see Fourth World Conference on Women 1995; Secretary-General 2021; UN General Assembly 1979; UN Security Council 2000). However, the data exploring this assumption are inconclusive.

Assuming women’s involvement in peace processes advances provisions for women is empirically supported by True and Riveros-Morales (2019), who find a positive correlation between women’s involvement in negotiations and provisions for women in agreements. However, data from Bigio et al. (2021) indicate that 59% of cases in which women are involved in peace processes as negotiators, signatories, or mediators do not mention women or girls, nor do agreements reference gender-specific issues such as gender-based violence. Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018) find less than 65% of peace agreements signed by local women contain provisions for women’s rights. This discrepancy of findings regarding the relationship between women’s inclusion and provisions for women extends beyond the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) sector—an international policy framework leveraged and created by International Organizations, NGOs, governments, and academics that advocates for women’s inclusion in peace and security issues. Research on women’s advocacy for women-specific issues in electoral politics remains heavily debated, with some finding a positive relationship between women legislators and pro-woman policy (see Bratton 2005; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991; 1994), while others dispute correlation (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Carroll 2001; Childs and Krook 2006; Dodson 2006). My findings suggest that this discrepancy of findings is driven by different conceptualizations of women’s involvement and provisions for women.

I offer alternative conceptualizations of women’s involvement and provisions for women that account for power and attempt to mitigate researcher bias. I aim for these conceptualizations to advance understanding of women’s involvement in peace negotiations and contribute to broader discussions of underrepresented groups. Specifically, I empirically test the assumed link between descriptive and substantive representation and account for positions held by women delegates during formal negotiation processes, such as signatories, negotiators, mediators, and observers. That is, I examine how the number of women in the room, in particular positions of varying power, influence the incorporation of provisions for women in peace agreements. I implement a quantitative approach using an original dataset comprised of all Track 1 delegates (individuals involved in formal and high-level talks) mentioned in 116 comprehensive peace agreements finalized between 1990 and 2021, henceforth referred to as the Peace Agreement Delegate Dataset (PADD). ¹ PADD includes the assumed gender of 2,299 negotiation delegates and the position they held during comprehensive negotiations. Findings indicate a positive relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation in Track 1 peace negotiations. However, this finding is dependent on women holding positions of power. In other words, it is not the number of women at the negotiation table that increases the likelihood final agreements contain provisions for women, but rather if women at the table have the power to influence outcomes. Findings further our understanding of underrepresented groups and gendered power dynamics in negotiation using an original dataset, reconceptualize measurements for substantive and descriptive representation, and account for power’s influence on negotiation outcomes. Findings may be applied to public and private sectors more broadly.

WOMEN’S DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

Representation can be categorized in two ways: descriptive and substantive (Phillips 1998). Descriptive representation is the idea that an individual with specific identifiers can represent a broader population with those same identifiers, be it race, gender, or sexual orientation (Mansbridge 1999). Descriptive representation is measured by the number of individuals belonging to a population of interest in a given setting (e.g., the number of women in the negotiation room). By contrast, substantive representation is the tendency of individuals to advocate on behalf of a broader population with the same personal identifiers (Mansbridge 1999). Research often turns to the promotion or passing of specific policy as a means of measuring substantive representation (e.g., women in leadership advancing legislation combating domestic violence) (see Thomas 1991). The idea that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation is most commonly explored through the theory of critical mass (see Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Dahlerup 2006; Norris and Lovenduski 2001).

Critical mass theory tethers women’s substantive representation to descriptive representation, arguing that the more women in the room, the more likely women-specific policy will be implemented (Thomas 1991). ² The theory is frequently applied to electoral politics (see Dodson 2006; Reingold 2000; Thomas and Wilcox 1998). Women electoral representatives are assumed to prioritize women-specific policy, subsequently ensuring women’s substantive representation. Therefore, simply electing women will advance the representation of women voters (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1998; Thomas 1991; Williams 2000). This belief explains advocacy organizations like EMILY’s List, She Should Run, and the Women Campaign Fund, which are designed to increase the number of women elected to public office, often with few electoral platform requirements. The same rationale fuels the WPS sector and UN gender equality efforts more broadly (see Fourth World Conference on Women 1995; Secretary-General 2021; UN General Assembly 1979; UN Security Council 2000). However, electing women does not always yield an increased focus on women’s issues (Towns 2003; Young 1997). The link between descriptive and substantive representation is tentative (Schlozman and Mansbridge 1979; Swain 1993). Descriptive representation does not guarantee substantive representation and assuming that it does risks essentializing populations (Mansbridge 1999). Viewing women as a monolithic group that can be represented by any woman is just one critique leveled against critical mass theory (Chaney 2006; Dahlerup 1988).

Broader contexts undermine the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Political party affiliation may constrain the opportunities afforded to women representatives (Childs 2004; Espírito-Santo, Freire, and Serra-Silva 2020; Swers 2002). Others point to limitations of institutional norms (Considine and Deutchman 1996; Dodson 2006; Kathlene 1995; Rosenthal 1998); individual legislative experience (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Cowley and Childs 2003; Jeydel and Taylor 2003); the external political environment (Tremblay 2003); and voter preference (Cowley and Childs 2003; Geisler 2000). Social norms may incentivize women to bow to dominant masculine legislative practices, undermining women’s capacity to substantively represent women (Carroll 2001; Cowell-Meyers 2001; Dodson 2006; Hawkesworth 2003). “Backlash” theory argues that increasing women’s descriptive representation drives hostility. The male majority will “employ a range of tactics to obstruct women’s policy initiatives and keep them outside positions of power,” subsequently inverting the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation (Childs and Krook 2006, 524; see also Crowley 2004; Hawkesworth 2003; Kathlene 1995; Towns 2003).

The same arguments that pertain to women’s representation in legislative politics apply to women in peace negotiations. Women delegates’ party affiliation may constrict their ability to advocate for women (Paffenholz et al. 2016); the masculine norms of peace processes may undermine women delegates’ capacity to negotiate for women-specific policy (Aharoni 2011; Corredor 2022; Lorentzen 2020; McAuliff 2022; Zahar 2023); how women access a seat at the table is likely to elevate select women with a pre-determined background, influencing the issues women delegates address (Brannon and Best 2022; O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015); and there is ample evidence of violent backlash against women activists (Berry 2017; Krook 2020; UN General Assembly 2019; UN Security Council 2022). Critiques leveled against critical mass theory have led researchers to shift focus toward “critical acts” (Dahlerup 1988), and claim critical mass theory is “probabilistic rather than deterministic” (Chaney 2006, 691). This study tests the broader link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation and offers empirical insight into “critical junctures” and “critical acts” theories.

Critical acts are defined as initiatives that “change the position of the minority and lead to further changes” and depend on “the willingness and ability of the minority to mobilize the resources of the institution” (Dahlerup 1988, 296). This article empirically tests women’s ability to engage in critical acts during critical junctures by accounting for power. Critical junctures are large, rapid, and discontinuous turning points in history (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Conflict is a critical juncture, enabling women to capitalize on altered political structures and institutions (Berry 2018; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017; Tripp 2015). Conflicts ending through peace negotiations offer women an “institutional opportunity structure through which women are able to assert their demands” (Tripp 2015, 19). Peace negotiations formalize economic, political, and social rights (Anderson 2016; Anderson and Swiss 2014; Ellerby 2013; Tripp 2023; True and Riveros-Morales 2019).

Although implementation of agreements is never guaranteed and provisions for women may be limited to rhetoric, provisions included in agreements are more likely to be implemented than those omitted (Cohn 2008). Further, gender-inclusive agreements are correlated with improved political rights for women post-conflict (Reid 2021). Understanding that which facilitates provisions for women has the potential to enhance gender equality for women in post-conflict societies. Despite this, WPS policy and peace negotiation processes are largely based on normative arguments and rational assumptions (Paffenholz et al. 2016).

UN policy issued from 1979 to 2022 assumes that women’s involvement inherently benefits women (see Fourth World Conference on Women 1995; UN General Assembly 1979; 1998; UN Security Council 2000; 2014; 2019b; 2022). In other words, there is an underlying assumption that descriptive representation begets substantive representation. However, unlike in electoral politics, little research has tested this assumption regarding women’s involvement in peace negotiations. This article contributes to closing this gap by quantitatively assessing women’s ability to perform critical acts during critical junctures. Specifically, I ask how power affects the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation.

ACCOUNTING FOR POWER

Power is inherently gendered and rests on distinctions that disadvantage and subordinate women (Sjoberg 2006; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). Despite this, few studies account for power when exploring women’s representation. Saint-Germain (1989) argues that as more women gain power, they will no longer behave as “token members,” giving them power and influence to effect change (see also Carroll 1984; Flammang 1985). However, these studies associate women’s increasing power with more women elected, rather than exploring the power held by individual women. Rosenthal (1998) studies the effects of gender on leadership styles in state legislative committee chairs. Findings suggest that it is not merely the numbers of women that influence outcomes, but their role within legislative bodies. Rosenthal indicates that failing to account for power held by individual women undermines analysis linking descriptive and substantive representation.

Representation theories generally assume (1) women are willing to advocate for provisions for women and (2) willingness is sufficient to influence outcomes. I hypothesize that in addition to willingness, women’s substantive representation also necessitates ability, that is, the power, to influence negotiation outcomes. I define power as that which “shapes the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 42). Within peace processes, power is conceptualized as the ability to influence an agreement’s outcome. Not all positions in hierarchical negotiation structures equally influence agreement outcomes. The degree of influence differs vastly between a woman in a decision-making position and a woman in an observational role. Further, the prestige of negotiation positions varies significantly. Signatories and negotiators are seen as imperative to negotiations, while observers may be considered guests at the table. This difference in prestige influences delegates’ ability to influence agreement outcomes (Krook and O’Brien 2012). Consequently, the role held by delegates acts as an effective proxy for power.

I theorize women in positions of power will be positively correlated with agreements containing provisions for women. Additionally, I theorize the relationship between women in weak positions and provisions for women will be insignificant. These hypotheses are rooted in the idea that women in positions of power are better equipped to navigate contextual constraints that undermine the link between descriptive and substantive representation, such as political ideology, masculine norms, and the fear of backlash.

RESEARCH DESIGN: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

The majority of research on women’s involvement in peace negotiations has leveraged qualitative methodology (known exceptions include Ellerby 2013; Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018; Stone 2014; True and Riveros-Morales 2019). Case study analysis caters to distinct peace processes, capturing unique origins, various levels of public transparency, different stakeholders, and fluctuations in women’s participation (Jeong 2005; Paffenholz 2014). A transnational study offers a broader picture of women’s representation which can inform and advance future case-specific research.

Substantive Representation: Provisions for Women (Dependent Variable)

Women’s substantive representation is often measured by the inclusion of women-specific policy, which is seen as a clear indication of advocacy. For example, electoral politics researchers measure women’s substantive representation by women’s promotion of reproductive health, family leave, or childcare policy (see Htun and Jones 2002; Norton 1999; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991; Vega and Firestone 1995). Similarly, WPS policy often defines provisions for women as pre-designated issues such as condemning sexual violence (see UN Security Council 2008). However, women-specific issues are often integrated into deliberations that are not exclusively about women. Examples of integrated women-specific policy include ceasefire commitments including gender-based violence as a recognized violation (see Burundi 2000), constitutional reforms with parliamentary quotas for women (see Central African Republic 2013), and economic and social development plans indicating funding requirements for women’s civil society groups (see Iraq 2005) (see Supplementary Appendix A.1 for a qualitative summary of provisions). We may fail to see these inclusions as provisions for women if considering only explicit references to pre-designated policy issues.

To overcome this weakness, I define provisions for women as explicit reference to women and/or girls or reference to gender-based violence. I leverage PA-X data by Bell et al. (2021) to apply a binary text-as-data approach that considers any reference to women, girls, widows, mothers, gender-based, or sexual-based violence as provisions for women. However, there are limitations to a binary text-as-data approach.

A binary approach restricts insight into the strength of provisions and obscures variation between provisions; agreements with a singular reference to women are weighted equal to agreements with comprehensive implementation plans for multiple provisions for women. Second, limiting the definition of “provisions for women” to policies that explicitly reference women, girls, and forms of gender-based violence omits gender-neutral policies that serve to disproportionally advance women’s equality, such as access to education (Rihani 2006) or property rights (Brulé 2020). This oversight is troubling given that women delegates may strategically advocate for women-specific issues without using gendered language to overcome barriers rooted in sexism.

Despite these limitations, I maintain a binary text-as-data definition for substantive representation and opt to address critiques through additional analysis. This is because the individual issues most relevant to women in Guatemala in 1996 (e.g., investment in social and economic growth) differ from the issues most important to women in Darfur in 2006 (e.g., ceasefire and security arrangements). While case-study analysis enables researchers to capture women’s advocacy for specific issues in a specific country during a specific negotiation, I would be remiss to identify any issue as “women-specific” in all 116 cases, spanning 54 countries and three decades. A binary text-as-data measurement of substantive representation offers a more equitable approach that encompasses what local women consider to be “women-specific,” rather than assigning specific issues as gendered based on my own biases. This approach aligns with Htun and Weldon’s call to “disaggregate women’s rights” to better assess the variation of women’s substantive representation over time and space (Htun and Weldon 2018, 3). In sum, any measurable conceptualization of provisions for women has consequences. A binary text-as-data approach casts the largest possible net for substantive representation, which is advantageous for a transnational study.

Peace processes are comprised of multiple agreements that can span decades. Consequently, provisions for women can be included or excluded along the way, complicating how researchers quantify representation. I use comprehensive peace agreements as my unit of analysis because they can be seen as the final step in negotiations, which offers a consistent snapshot in time across diverse peace processes and eliminates redundancy stemming from a single conflict with multiple agreements. As defined by PA-X, comprehensive agreements concern parties that are “engaged in discussion and agreeing to substantive issues to resolve the conflict and appear to be set out as a comprehensive attempt to resolve the conflict” (Bell et al. 2021, 7). Further, comprehensive agreements are the last opportunity for delegates to include provisions of interest. It cannot be deemed strategic for women delegates to withhold advocacy for provisions for women during the comprehensive stage because the formal negotiation period ends with the signing of comprehensive peace agreements. In other words, comprehensive agreements close the window for addressing gender inequality, which is often widest during peace negotiations (Anderson 2016). Within the specific scope of peace negotiations, comprehensive peace agreements offer the broadest lens to analyze women’s substantive representation during peace processes.

Descriptive Representation: Women’s Involvement (Independent Variable)

The WPS sector defines women’s involvement in peace processes along three separate tracks: Track 1, Track 2, and Track 1.5. Track 1 refers to official, formalized peace diplomacy between high-level officials representing warring parties. Track 1 involvement is often understood to be the “primary peacemaking tool of a state’s foreign policy” (Mapendere 2000, 67). This is distinguishable from Track 2, which includes unofficial dialogues, often involving civil society actors or public protests. Track 2 is a widely used trajectory for women to shape agreement outcomes. For example, during the 2003 Accra Peace talks, Liberian women-led protestors staged an effective sit-in, barricading meeting room doors to physically demand a settlement. Although a singular woman was involved in Liberia’s 2003 peace negotiation as a Track 1 observer to the African Union (Adwoa Coleman), women had an irrefutable influence over negotiation outcomes via Track 2 involvement.

As the name suggests, Track 1.5 is a hybrid between Track 1 and 2 involvement. Track 1.5 is defined as informal talks where both formal and informal delegates act in their “personal capacity” (Chang et al. 2015, 14; see also Bercovitch and Jackson 2009; Mapendere 2000). WPS promotes Track 1.5 involvement through parallel women-specific committees as a means of facilitating women’s engagement pending women’s prohibition from official Track 1 negotiations (e.g., the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board) (UN Women 2018). However, the power of women’s committee members is context-dependent since recommendations made by women’s committees are at the discretion of formal Track 1 delegates. Parallel but separate women’s committees have the potential to enhance influence by offering women an opportunity to coordinate and advance interests as a unified bloc (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Alternatively, women’s committees may simply pay lip service to international stakeholders and women’s proposals are ignored or dismissed by Track 1 delegates.

I limit my analysis to Track 1 involvement because it is the most constrained environment within which women operate and is therefore the greatest test for the theory that power influences women’s ability to advocate for provisions for women. Focusing on power distribution, I find just as much variation within Track 1 as between Tracks. Women may be in Track 1 positions of power, acting as signatories or negotiators, or they may be present as silent observers with limited to no opportunities to speak. Despite the difference in power between signatories and silent observers, most research considers women to be involved in peace negotiations if a singular woman fills either role. Consequently, women’s involvement can only be defined by what it is not—an absence of women.

True and Riveros-Morales (2019) weigh silent observers and lead negotiators equally. Paffenholz et al. (2016) distinguish types of involvement but do not highlight differences in direct involvement based on positions held by women delegates. Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018) exclusively account for local signatories, omitting alternative forms of involvement altogether. This difference in conceptualizing “involvement” likely accounts for contradicting findings between studies, but it also points to a larger methodological issue within the WPS sector. The difference between lead negotiators and silent observers is not a difference in degree, but a difference in kind. Measuring involvement through a power lens allows more explicit research on women’s role in formal peace negotiations and facilitates a better understanding of how women influence final agreement outcomes.

Measuring Power: Positions Held by Women Delegates

I use positions held by Track 1 delegates as a proxy for power. ³ I classify all Track 1 peace negotiation delegates mentioned in comprehensive agreements by the following positions: signatory, negotiator, mediator, advisor, observer, logistical support, women’s committee member, or unknown. These eight categories encompass the vast majority of positions involved in comprehensive peace negotiations from 1990 to 2021 and expand on current peace negotiation data (Bigio et al. 2021).

Signatories have the greatest capacity to alter agreement outcomes by demanding amendments before signing or simply refusing to sign documents. ⁴ While it is feasible that parties may replace a signatory who refuses to sign an agreement with someone willing, this would not impact research findings since a replaced signatory will no longer be coded as a signatory. Women may perceive their role as a signatory to be more precarious given a male majority. Consequently, women signatories may be less likely to voice disagreement or request amendments for fear of being removed from the process or hindering women’s future involvement. Further, signatories may be a “symbolic role,” allowing women to sign an agreement without allowing them to participate in the negotiation (UN Women 2015, 15). Despite social and patriarchal pressures that may alter women delegates’ willingness to dissent, any signatory has the technical ability to alter the outcome. Even in a symbolic role, women signatories have the capacity to ask for an amendment before signing. It is for this reason that Krause, Krause, and Bränfors argue that any signatory can be “assumed to have directly participated in negotiations, with voice and influence” (2018, 987). Further, these critiques are relevant to women in any delegate position. Therefore, women signatories have the greatest relative power to women in other positions.

Negotiators and mediators have the capacity to influence agenda items and push for specific provisions or amendments. While negotiators represent a specific interest group and strive to obtain stakeholders’ desired outcomes, mediators are third-party members (rarely belonging to the conflict parties) that strive for consensus (Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Therefore, negotiators have greater relative power and ability to advocate for women-specific provisions than mediators. Advisors are in a position to guide signatories, negotiations, or mediators. While advisers may have the greatest technical knowledge, they have relatively less autonomy and power than signatories, negotiators, or mediators.

Observers are limited to overseeing the peace process. Observers serve an important role by enhancing the legitimacy of negotiations, increasing local or international buy-in to peace, and may sway outcomes by acting as a physical reminder of certain interest groups or informing grassroots protestors (Paffenholz 2014). However, observers are generally deemed “powerless” because they are not in a position to negotiate and are rarely able to make demands (Paffenholz 2014, 79). This is also true for those in positions of logistical support. While logistical support staff are necessary for peace negotiations to function, they have little power over agreement outcomes and are rarely documented in final agreements.

Lastly, including women’s committee members (a Track 1.5 form of involvement) as a distinct category is controversial given the Track 1 scope of analysis. In developing PADD, I include all individuals listed in comprehensive peace agreements. Only two cases within the 116-case dataset documented the presence of parallel women’s committee members (Somalia, 2007 and Nigeria, 2016). While a sample size of two is not sufficient to quantitatively determine women’s committee members’ relative power, I distinguish women’s committee members as a distinct entity within PADD because it signifies an emerging WPS trend (UN Women 2018).

PADD Composition

This research uses Peace Agreements (PA-X) Database and Dataset (Bell et al. 2021) coding to determine which agreements are comprehensive. I extract all comprehensive peace agreements finalized between 1990 and April 2021 for 116 observations across 54 countries (see Supplementary Appendix A.2 for a regional distribution). I do not limit my analysis to peace negotiations that involve the United Nations because this restricts samples to negotiations between parties that invited the International Organization to mediate or observe. The UN Women Report, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations,” focuses on 31 peace processes (Diaz and Tordjman 2012), while PADD captures data on 74 comprehensive agreements finalized during the same study period (1992–2011).

PA-X lists the signatories of agreements but does not code for gender. This information is not available from other datasets including the UN Peacemaker Peace Agreements Database, the UCDP dataset, or the Transitional Justice Institute Peace Agreement Database. While Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018) develop a dataset that codes for gender, it is limited to local signatories between 1989 and 2011 and therefore does not account for the full range of positions held by Track 1 delegates. I turn to PA-X and the UN Peacemaker Peace Agreements Database to access original and translated peace agreement texts. I code for all individuals mentioned in the agreement. ⁵ I separate given (first and middle) names from family (last) names using local naming practices. I determine the gender of given names using Gender API software which uses country-specific naming data to associate a name with a gender and provides a confidence score. For example, the name “Ali,” identified as male, has a 61% confidence score in the United States given the unisex application of the name but has a 98% confidence score in Jordan. I manually code for all names with a confidence score of 75% or below, as well as any discrepancies between the gender associated with first and middle names. I additionally use a randomized number generator to manually code for 30 names with a confidence score above 75%. This randomized check did not find any false coding.

In the event manual coding is inconclusive when finding a specific delegate, I turn to social media profiles, coding the delegate as a woman or not depending on social media profiles associated with the given name in question. In the event a name remains androgynous after looking at Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, employee profiles, and news reports, I rely on the Gender API software findings, even if the confidence score is below 75%. In the event a manual check and the Gender API software are inconclusive, the individual is coded as “NA.” This methodology may misgender an individual who does not follow traditional naming structure, such as a Jordanian woman named Ali. However, this coding error would be equally distributed across the 2,299 individual delegates involved in the 116 comprehensive peace negotiations, minimizing the impact of measurement error.

A more thoroughgoing shortcoming of this research is that it mistakenly views gender as binary, which does not represent the author’s view of gender and fails to account for the plurality and diversity of gender identities and expressions across socio-cultural and historical contexts. Despite non-binary pronouns only recently gaining greater traction in Western popular and academic discourses, a rich array of nuanced gender concepts and a spectrum of gender identities have long been recognized in a wide variety of indigenous contexts. While coding gender along a binary—a delegate is labeled a woman (1), or not (0)—risks misgendering delegates, this is also likely to be equally distributed across the dataset and is thereby unlikely to skew findings. Regardless, this theoretical limitation signals the need for greater work in this area to attend to the complex interplay between gender identity and gender performance.

The position held by individual delegates is recorded from original and translated peace agreements published by PA-X and UN databases and is categorized by position, for example, signatory; negotiator; mediator; or observer. In the event an individual holds more than one position, I defer to their highest position of power. For example, if an individual is listed as a signatory and observer, they are coded as a signatory. ⁶ Although this increases observations for positions of greater power relative to positions of lesser power, I do so because I am interested in how power influences the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. Therefore, while an individual may be formally recognized as a signatory and observer, they are more likely to advocate for provisions for women through their signatory role. Further, signatories represent a range of different political actors including members of armed groups, government representatives, and delegates from civil society groups, subsequently minimizing issues of endogeneity (Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018).

Controlling for Women in Conflict

To account for alternative hypotheses, I control for numerous variables that may explain the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation in comprehensive peace negotiations (see Supplementary Appendix A.5 for a full list of controls and data sources). I control for women’s involvement in conflict as both combatants and as survivor-victims of wartime sexual violence. Women’s exclusion from peace negotiations is often linked to women’s military absence (Aharoni 2011). Israel’s deputy foreign minister defended women’s exclusion in the Oslo Process (1993–2000) by saying “… women don’t reach high military ranks. And since the military plays such a vital role not only in war but also in the peace process, women have less to say in this process” (Aharoni 2011, 403). Similarly, Kampwirth (2002) finds Central American women gained greater prestige after participating in combat. Women’s participation as combatants may increase the likelihood that women are involved in peace processes (Brannon and Best 2022). Thomas (2024) finds gendered provisions in peace processes are more likely when women serve as rebel combatants. To account for this alternative explanation, I control for women’s involvement as armed combatants using the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD) (Wood and Thomas 2017). ⁷

The international community widely advocates for women’s inclusion in peace negotiations based on conflict-related sexual violence (see UN Security Council 2008; 2019a). This corresponds to the finding that women are more likely to be included in peace negotiations by eliciting sympathy (Brannon and Best 2022). High levels of conflict-related sexual violence may provoke a strong response from stakeholders and increase women’s involvement in peace negotiations as a result. I control for rates of sexual violence using the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset (Cohen, Nordås, and Nagel 2021). I calculate the average rate of documented sexual violence for all conflict years preceding the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement.

Controlling for International Involvement

International commitment to women’s involvement in peace and security formalized with the ratification of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 and has been reiterated in nine other related resolutions between 2008 and 2019. Given the international community’s focus on WPS, gender provisions are more likely when the UN acts as a signatory to a peace agreement (Bell and O’Rourke 2010). I account for international involvement through the following proxies: the number of UN Security Council Resolutions issued about the conflict up to the date the peace agreement is signed; if the UN is a signatory to the agreement; if any other international actor, state representative, or international organization personnel, such as NATO or the African Union, is a signatory to the agreement; and if the country has a 1325 National Action Plan at the time of signing the comprehensive agreement. National Action Plans (NAPs) are country-specific strategies to “secure the human rights of women and girls in conflict settings” (WILPF 2022).

Controlling for Gender Equality

Countries with higher levels of gender equality may be more likely to include women in peace negotiations and may be more likely to include provisions for women in final agreements. This is because women’s rights are more likely to be codified through laws and norms and women are more likely to access high-level institutional opportunities in places with greater gender equality. Further, women with higher economic, social, and cultural capital, are more likely to gain power at the household level, which filters to the community and national level (Domingo et al. 2015). Therefore, are women delegates influencing peace agreement outcomes to contain provisions for women, or are provisions for women and women’s involvement outcomes stemming from societal norms?

To answer this question, I control for gender equality using the Gender Development Index (GDI) issued by the United Nations Development Programme because it has the most robust data relative to other gender indexes. I exclude the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Global Gender Gap Index from regression analysis due to collinearity. ⁸ These three indexes use different variables and proxies to calculate gender equality at the country level (see Supplementary Appendix A.5). I independently control for the percentage of secondary pupils who are girls and rates of teen pregnancy using World Bank data.

Overcoming Missingness: Multiple Imputation

Nine agreements (7.8% of cases) had missing delegate data, that is, the individuals involved could not be determined through publicly accessible peace agreements. This rate of missingness is not disruptive to analysis. However, control data vary widely across the 116 cases due to conflict. For example, press coverage contains no missing values; girls’ access to secondary education is missing in 9% of cases; the Gender Development Index omits 40% of cases; and the public perception of women is missing in 72% of cases. To overcome missingness, I implement multiple imputations.

Multiple imputation replaces missing values with estimated values derived from the distribution of, and relationship among, observed variables (Li, Stuart, and Allison 2015; Rubin 2018). Specifically, I leverage predictive mean matching imputation (pmm). Drawing on available data, the model calculates values closest to the predicted value for the missing entry. This method predicts the distribution of missing data to align with the distribution of observed data (see Supplementary Appendix A.8 for examples). I create five imputed datasets to ensure sufficiency (Allison 2000). In addition to excluding my independent and dependent variable from imputation, I exclude variables with overwhelming proportions of missing data, ⁹ non-control variables that have perfect collinearity, ¹⁰ and variables that are irrelevant to prediction. ¹¹

RESULTS: WOMEN IN POSITIONS OF POWER

Findings highlight that strikingly few women are involved in Track 1 comprehensive peace processes. After omitting agreements with missing data for a total n of 108 comprehensive agreements, ¹² I find that 36% of comprehensive peace agreements (39 cases) include at least one woman-delegate. Women comprise at least 10% of delegates in 18% of negotiations (19 cases) and in no instance did women comprise at least 30% of delegates. ¹³

A total of 191 known women have been involved in formal negotiations, comprising 8% of total delegates. However, this includes women in documented women-specific side committees (1.5 Track involvement). Excluding women’s 1.5 Track involvement found no change in findings and results in the lower bound of women delegates (6%). The upper bound includes Track 1.5 delegates and unknowns (NAs), since unknown delegates may be women. In the event all unknowns are women, it is possible that women comprise 22% of all Track 1 delegates. However, this is unlikely based on prior data patterns. I omit NAs for the remaining analysis.

I find women comprise 55% of documented logistical staff; 7% of signatories; 6% of negotiators; 6% of observers; 5% of mediators; and 0% of advisors (Supplementary Appendix A.10). This does not mean women have not acted in formal advisor roles, (see Colombia). Rather, no woman is documented as an advisor without also being identified and coded in a higher power position, such as moderator.

Linking Descriptive and Substantive Representation

I find a significant positive correlation between women’s involvement in peace negotiations and the inclusion of provisions for women in comprehensive peace agreements, supporting the claim that women’s descriptive representation (women in the room) increases substantive representation (provisions for women). A total of 72% of agreements that involve women delegates include provisions for women, while only 48% of agreements that do not involve women delegates include provisions for women (Table 1).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

A positive relationship holds when measuring women’s involvement as a binary and when accounting for the percentage of women delegates in a negotiation (see Supplementary Appendix A.11, model 1 for binary and Table 2 for percentage). The percentage of women delegates captures variation in the total number of delegates (both men and women) involved in comprehensive peace agreements. For example, Nigeria’s 2016 agreement involved a total of 235 delegates while Nepal’s 2006 agreement involved 2. On average, women comprise just 3.9% of delegates to negotiations. Despite the small percentage of women delegates, their influence is significant (Table 2). Models 1–5 (Table 2) indicate that a 1% increase in woman delegates nearly doubles the likelihood an agreement will contain provisions for women. Low statistical power may explain insignificant findings in model 6. Note that agreements referencing women, girls, widows, mothers, gender-based, or sexual-based violence do not necessarily equate to beneficial policy or legal protections for women. A binary measurement of “provisions for women” means women’s inclusion may increase the likelihood women are simply referenced within the agreement. While references are important (Cohn 2008; Reid 2021), they are not a silver bullet for gender equality.

Table 2. Women Delegates and Agreements Containing Provisions for Women (OLS Regression)

Note: Analysis omits agreements that negatively reference women (Adadda Agreement 2007). See Supplementary Appendix A.12 for analysis including the omitted case. See Supplementary Appendix A.13 for lagged Gender Development Index variables for 1 and 5 years before the year the agreement was signed. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.

Robustness Checks for a Text-as-Data Approach

Measuring provisions for women (substantive representation) using a binary text-as-data approach omits provisions for women that do not explicitly reference women, girls, widows, mothers, gender-based, or sexual-based violence. To address this, I leverage PA-X data (Bell et al. 2021) to assess the relationship between women delegates and provisions for narrow interests understood to disproportionally benefit women in patriarchal societies (Table 3).

Table 3. Relationship between Women’s Inclusion in Peace Negotiations and Provisions from Which Women Would Disproportionally Benefit

Note: “Provisions for children” are defined as “comprehensive mechanisms or commitment to children or youth” (Bell et al. 2021, 14). See Supplementary Appendix A.14a–e for GLM regression tables. **p-value at the 0.01 level.

I find an insignificant relationship between women’s involvement in peace processes and most provisions that disproportionally benefit women in contexts with high rates of gender inequality. For example, women and girls likely disproportionally benefit from access to education even if the provision does not specify girls’ access to education. However, I find women delegates across the 116 agreements are not significantly correlated to agreements containing provisions for education. This suggests high variation in the types of issues women prioritize across the 116 agreements. A text-as-data approach to measuring women’s substantive representation accounts for this variation by coding explicit references to women, girls, or gendered violence.

However, a text-as-data approach risks coding agreements as containing provisions for women if agreements reference women, girls, or gendered violence in ways that disadvantage women. To ensure provisions for women advance gender equality, I read all agreements containing provisions for women. I found a singular case (Adadda Agreement 2007), where women did not stand to benefit from provisions. The agreement stipulates that “one godobtir girl” will be given in exchange for one deceased person from the Bah Ararsame, suggesting forced marriage. Omitting this agreement from analysis does not alter the significance of models 1–5, but does result in insignificance for model 6 (Table 2). ¹⁴ Given the marginal difference in standard error and p-values between Table 2, model 6 (SD 0.95, p-value 0.059) and Supplementary Appendix A.12, model 6 (SD 0.78, p-value 0.013), insignificance does not deviate from findings in the initial analysis and likely stems from a reduced sample size (Gelman and Stern 2006).

More than Numbers: Requiring Seats with Power

Findings support the theory that women in positions of power are positively correlated to provisions for women—a one percentage point increase in the presence of women signatories increases the likelihood an agreement contains provisions for women by 2.1 percentage points (Table 4, model 1). A GLM model confirms this relationship (Table 4, model 1); the average marginal effect of the presence of women signatories on the likelihood agreements contain provisions for women is 31.3 percentage points. While OLS regression finds a one-unit increase in the presence of women negotiators increases the likelihood an agreement contains provisions for women by 2.4 percentage points (Table 4, model 2), the sample size (n = 18) limits the persuasiveness of this finding. There is no significant relationship between women negotiators and provisions for women using GLM regression (Table 5, model 2). There is no statistically significant relationship between women mediators or women observers and provisions for women (Table 4 or Table 5, models 3 and 4).

Table 4. Percentage Measurement of Women Delegates (OLS Regression)

Note: Policy implications are not derived from OLS models given the small number of observations for women negotiators, mediators, and observers. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.5; ***p < 0.01.

Table 5. Binary Measurement of Women Delegates (GLM Regression)

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.5; ***p < 0.01.

Using OLS regression to capture the relationship between the percentage of women in various roles and provisions for women works well for women signatories (Table 4, model 1). This is because I observe women signatories in 103 cases. However, OLS regression is less persuasive for women in other roles (Table 4, models 2–4). Only 18 agreements indicate the involvement of women negotiators (Table 4, model 2), 48 mention women mediators (Table 4, model 3), and 55 mention women observers (Table 4, model 4). This does not mean that only 18 agreements involved women negotiators, but rather 18 comprehensive agreements referenced women negotiators who exclusively acted as negotiators (i.e., were not a negotiator and signatory). ¹⁵ To increase the sample, I use a binary measurement; (1) for agreements that reference women negotiators, (0) for all others (Table 5). I do not use multiple imputations because missingness involves the independent variable.

As a robustness check, I categorize all women delegates as either “signatory” or “other” (Supplementary Appendix A.11). Using GLM regression, I find the average marginal effect of a woman delegate in any role on the likelihood agreements contain provisions for women is 23.8 percentage points while the average marginal effect of the presence of women signatories on the likelihood agreements contain provisions for women is 31.3 percentage points. Non-signatory women delegates are not significantly correlated to provisions for women (AME 14.9). I remove logistical support staff and women’s Track 1.5 committees from analysis given positions were documented in three and two cases respectively.

WPS POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Women comprise 6% of known Track 1 delegates to comprehensive agreements between 1990 and 2021, justifying the WPS sector’s call to increase women’s inclusion in peace processes. Despite women’s marginal representation, I find a significant correlation between women’s involvement in peace negotiations and the inclusion of provisions for women in final comprehensive peace agreements. Findings support research linking descriptive and substantive representation (see Brulé 2020; Phillips 1998).

Findings indicate that it is not enough to increase the number of women to advance provisions for women. Rather, women must hold positions of power. ¹⁶ The lack of correlation between women observers and provisions for women supports research that advocates for women’s involvement beyond observational roles due to observers’ limited ability to influence outcomes (Paffenholz et al. 2016). However, the insignificant relationship between women mediators or negotiators and provisions for women encourages additional inquiry given the relatively high power and prestige of roles.

The insignificant relationship between women mediators and negotiations and provisions for women may be explained by “the less visible and unequal structures that inform access, influence, legitimacy, and leverage within highly security-centric and masculinized negotiations” (McAuliff 2022, 20; see also Ellerby 2017). Women are perceived to be peacemakers (see Schneiker 2021; Zahar 2023). This essentialist view casts women who advocate for more than a peaceful end to conflict as social deviants (see Sjoberg 2010; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). Accordingly, women may be forced to play the peacemaker role in exchange for inclusion (Anderson and Golan 2023; Dayal and Christien 2020; Lorentzen 2020). For example, women delegates subordinated their interests to broader goals in Burundi’s Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000) (Anderson 2016), Afghanistan’s 2010 peace process (Rivas and Safi 2022), and Democratic Republic of Congo’s 2003 process (Wijeyaratne 2009, see also Aduda and Liesch 2022). Although women have leveraged masculine priorities to their advantage (see Colombia’s 2016 peace process, Corredor 2022), women’s substantive representation is frequently restricted by peace processes’ gendered hierarchies.

Mediators are third-party members often representing a neutral international organization or country (Buchanan et al. 2012; O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015). Mediators are met with “competing demands,” and often succumb to the wishes of local governments to women’s detriment (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015, 7). Findings suggest that provisions for women continue to be deprioritized by mediation teams and peace negotiation processes. It is curious to note that WPS policy has largely prioritized increasing the number of women in mediator positions (see UN Department of Political Affairs 2017; UN Security Council 2022), rather than dismantling peace processes’ gendered power hierarchies that may limit mediators’ ability to advocate for women (see Corredor 2022; McAuliff 2022; Sapiano et al. 2022; Waylen 2007).

The causal mechanism explaining the inconsistent relationship between women negotiators and provisions for women (significant using percentage data and insignificant using binary data) calls for additional research. One possible explanation is that women negotiators are influenced by alternative factors, such as party ideology. Paffenholz et al. (2016) found that “party loyalties often trumped shared women’s interests” (26). For example, Bríd Rodgers of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, Lucilita Bhreatnach of Sinn Féin, and Eileen Bell of the Alliance Party were involved in Northern Ireland’s peace process but did not explicitly advocate for gender provisions in their capacities as party representatives. Alternatively, similar to mediators, women negotiators may be pressured to adapt to peace processes’ gendered hierarchies. Irene M. Santiago, a member of the government panel for the 2014 Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Bangsamoro in the Philippines, only gained respect as a cease-fire specialist, rather than as a “soft gender expert” (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015, 22; see also Santiago 2015). However, this line of reasoning applies to women delegates in any position (Aduda and Liesch 2022; Anderson 2016; Rivas and Safi 2022; Wijeyaratne 2009). Negotiator findings may be a consequence of the relatively small number of cases with women negotiators (n = 18). Therefore, the relationship between negotiators and provisions for women may be more susceptible to individual variation. This study calls for future research to determine why signatories do not follow a similar trend to negotiators.

Women are not monolithic, and while women’s involvement in positions of power increases the likelihood that agreements will contain provisions for women, it does not follow that including any woman as a signatory will advance gender equality. This article does not suggest that simply promoting women to positions of power advances gender equality, as this then risks becoming an amendment to the outdated, “add women and stir” approach. Findings do not account for women delegates’ willingness to advocate for provisions for women. No two women have identical interests or experiences (Brannon and Best 2022; Buchanan et al. 2012). Not every woman delegate will support “gendered interests” in a peace negotiation setting. Findings do not indicate women delegates represent the interests of women writ large. Women are not interchangeable and the presence of “any woman” is not sufficient to advance gender equality (Ní Aoláin and Rooney 2007). For example, a woman delegate for the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador claimed the women’s movement was “extremist and radical” and not strategic for the party’s negotiations (Luciak 2001, see also Ellerby 2016). Similarly, it is believed women in the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF) did not advocate for women-specific provisions because they were the wives of NDF leaders (O’Reilly, Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz 2015). Consequently, it is essential to account for women’s ability and willingness to advocate for women.

While women are capable of advocating for anything and each delegate has diverse interests and priorities, women on average advocate for provisions for women more than all-male delegations. This fact supports the conclusion that agreements are socially gendered. However, determining the exact mechanism explaining the link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation calls for future research. High standing or prestige may explain women’s ability to influence peace talks from Track 1 positions (Krook and O’Brien 2012). Alternatively, women in positions of power may facilitate substantive representation by influencing agendas (Aduda and Liesch 2022) or reordering institutions to advance women’s bargaining (Brulé 2020). Women’s substantive representation may be explained by social networks between women Track 1 delegates and broader civil society organizations (Anderson and Valade 2022; Dayal and Christien 2020; Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018). Lastly, “critical acts” during “critical junctures” may explain women’s substantive representation. Critical acts refer to women’s willingness and ability to mobilize for specific issues (Dahlerup 1988), while critical junctures recognize conflict as an opportunity to alter political structures to women’s benefit (Berry 2018; Tripp 2015).

Just because women are statistically more likely to advocate for provisions for women does not mean women’s rights are exclusively the responsibility of women delegates (Sapiano et al. 2022; Turner 2020). Findings indicate male delegates need to step up in terms of advocating for gender equality and provisions for women. Although this article focuses on women’s representation in peace negotiations, understanding power’s role in substantive representation applies to broader issues of representation, negotiation, and diversity and inclusion.