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The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

George Tsebelis
George Tsebelis
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

The European Parliament under the current cooperation procedure has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission of the European Communities, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify, since only qualified majority is required for acceptance, whereas full unanimity for modification. The importance of this power, which I call the power of the conditional agenda setter, has not been recognized in previous scholarly work. For structural reasons explained in the text, this power is likely to increase in the future. I conclude by arguing that the conditional delegation of power to international actors (the European Parliament, Commission, and the Court of Justice) is a frequent phenomenon in European institutions. This delegation presents three important advantages: it makes possible the selection of one among many possible equilibria, it accelerates European integration, and it diffuses responsibility for politically unpopular measures.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 88 , Issue 1 , March 1994 , pp. 128 - 142
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1994

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