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Post-Totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Lewis J. Edinger
Lewis J. Edinger*
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Extract

A good deal has been heard in recent years concerning the “liberation” of peoples living under totalitarian rule, but the question of who are the men who succeed to the leadership of a state after the fall of its totalitarian rulers has received relatively little attention. Such observations as have been made on the subject, whether by political opponents of a totalitarian regime or by professional social scientists, have tended to follow implicitly—if not explicitly—the theory of alternating elites. There is assumed to be, on the one hand, a more or less homogeneous totalitarian elite, and, on the other, an actual or potential counter-elite, representing the political antithesis to the totalitarian elite. The stability of the rule of the former is said to vary inversely with the degree of organization of the latter. The totalitarian elite is variously identified with the holders of high positions in the totalitarian system, with the “responsible leaders,” with an entire ruling class, or simply with those individuals who are said to be influential in the determination of national policy. The counter-elite is identified with the active overt and covert opponents of the totalitarian elite—resistance leaders, the “vanguard of the proletariat,” prominent exiles, and “men on whose backs in concentration camps the lash has written the new gospel in blood and tears.” Both elite and counter-elite are thus seen as directly, actively involved in the totalitarian system, either as its leaders or as its opponents.

Revolution, in this schema, is identified with the destruction of the totalitarian elite and its replacement by the counter-elite. Or, conversely, the destruction of the totalitarian elite is an act of revolution and will result in the emergence of the counter-elite to power. It is an attractively simple thesis, and it warrants investigation.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1960 , pp. 58 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1960

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Footnotes

*

This study represents part of a larger investigation into post-totalitarian leadership, particularly in Germany, which will examine the macrocosm of the elite structures as well as the role of specific leaders in a post-totalitarian setting. A comparative analysis of the present West German elites and earlier elites in Germany will appear shortly. An intensive study of a specific post-totalitarian political leader, the late Social Democratic leader Kurt Schumacher, is now in progress. A study of the incumbents of elite positions in the German Democratic Republic will follow.

For their criticism and advice in the preparation of this article I am indebted to Karl W. Deutsch, Alfred G. Meyer, Frank A. Pinner, and Joseph A. Schlesinger. I am also grateful for support from the Bureau of Social and Political Research and the All-University Research Fund, both of Michigan State University.

References

1 Lasswell, Harold D., and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press (1950), p. 267.Google Scholar

2 Lowenstein, Karl, Political Reconstruction, New York (1946), p. 233.Google Scholar

3 Allied Control Council Directive No. 24 (January 12, 1946), as excerpted in U. S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945–1946, Publication 2783. European Series 23, Washington: G. P. O. (1947), p. 113.Google Scholar

4 Ibid., p. 114.

5 Montgomery, John D., Forced to be Free, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1957), pp. 4ff, 16ff, 184 and passim.Google Scholar The data for Germany in this first-class study are based on an earlier study prepared under Montgomery's direction by a team of German scholars for the Operations Research Office, The John Hopkins University. See also Zink, Harold, The United States in Germany 1945–1955, Princeton: Van Nostrand (1957), pp. 150–168.Google Scholar

6 The following biographical reference works were used: General: Habel, Walter (ed.), Wer ist Wer? (Berlin: Arani, 1955)Google Scholar; Kliemann, Horst G. and Taylor, Stephen S. (eds.), Who's Who in Germany (Munich: International Book and Publishing Company, 1956)Google Scholar; International Who's Who (London: Europa Publications, 1956); British Ministry for Economic Warfare, Who's Who in Germany and Austria (London, 1945)Google Scholar; World Biography (Institute for Research in Biography, 1954). For the political elite in particular: Political Activities Branch, Civil Administration Division, Military Government for Germany (U. S.), Political Parlies in Western Germany (1949)Google Scholar; Bundestagsverwaltung, , Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2, Wahlperiode 1953 (Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1954)Google Scholar; Sänger, Fritz (ed.), Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1954)Google Scholar; Trossmann, Hans, Der Zweite Deutsche Bundestag (Bonn: Verlag Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei Gebr. Scheur, 1954).Google Scholar For military leaders: Podzun, Hans-Henning (ed.), Das Wehrarchiv; Handbuch des Wehrwesens der Gegenwart (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1956–1957).Google Scholar For business leaders in particular: Spezial Archiv der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Leitende Männer der Wirtschaft 1955 (Berlin-Darmstadt-Essen: Hoppenstedt: 1955).Google Scholar For educational leaders: de Montessus de Ballore, R. (ed.), Index Generalis (Paris: Dunod, annual)Google Scholar; Oestreich, Gerhard (ed.), Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender 1954 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1954).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Some of these averages may be slightly misleading because of the unusually wide age-spread between the youngest and the oldest members of an elite group—as in the case of the Federal Cabinet. A detailed comparison between incumbents of the same elite positions in 1906, 1926, 1936 and 1956 is being prepared by this writer.

8 For this period, as for most other years, we lack adequate information for one im portant group—the business and industrial leaders of 1956. Almost half the 47 men analyzed failed to indicate any pre-Nazi occupations; in view of their average age it may be assumed that many of these individuals were already engaged in business and industry. Of the 17 (36 per cent) business and industrial leaders of 1956 who indicated the same oc cupation before 1933, 15 had even then held prominent positions.

9 The three legislative leaders and the one member of the 1956 state cabinets who in dicated politics as their chief occupation for the period were also members of the S.P.D. executive committee and thus were counted twice. Of fifteen—out of seventeen—members of the Federal Cabinet listing their occupations in the years 1933–1940, none was in politics, four were teachers, six were employed in business and industry, two worked for the Nazi government, one was in private law practice, and one a student. The occupaional activities of the Christian Democratic leadership of 1956—many of whose members were in the Federal Cabinet—were very similar. Two worked for the government, three practiced law, and nine were in business and industry. Among the 35 legislative leaders who listed a different occupation for this period, eight worked for the Nazi government, six practiced private law, and 13 were engaged in business and industry. Nine of the 48 members of the state cabinets of 1956 listed their occupation 1933–1940 as government employees, six practiced law, and 21 were employed in business and industry. The rest were in various occupations, such as farming (3) and teaching (2). Almost one-third of the trade union leaders of 1956 were employed in business and industry—mostly as clerks or craftsmen—while one-quarter did not Hst any occupation. Apart from the 10 members of the S.P.D. leadership who were in anti-Nazi politics abroad, one was in a Nazi prison, one a student and 12 followed various other occupations; e.g., four practiced law.

10 More than 74 per cent of the senior civil servants were members of the totalitarian bureaucracy, if we include the additional 14 per cent who failed to indicate their occupation. The business and industrial leaders were even less informative about their occupational activities in this period than before 1933. Of the 19 (41 per cent) who listed them selves in the same occupation, 17 held leading positions. The extraordinarily large propor tion who failed to indicate their occupation, yet did not claim to have been occupationally displaced by Nazi persecution, (55 per cent) suggests that in fact far more, possibly as many as 96 per cent, were in the same occupation as in 1956. Among the educational leaders, the proportion of the same occupation was probably also larger than indicated, for none claimed to have been persecuted. However, among the press-radio leaders of 1956 probably only a minority did indeed follow the same occupation; quite a few were victims and opponents of the totalitarian regime.

11 However, a decrease of 18 per cent among the Social Democratic leaders listing politics as their occupation was not entirely due to the 17 per cent in this group who served in the German armed forces. A good many of the exiles were interned abroad as “enemy aliens” or otherwise forced to interrupt their political work with the outbreak of the war. See Edinger, Lewis J., German Exile Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), pp. 225–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 See Franz, Günther, “Der Parlamentarismus,” in Führungsschicht und Eliteproblem (Frankfurt, Berlin, Bonn: Moritz Diesterweg, 1957), pp. 88–96.Google Scholar

13 Thus, of the 21 of 23 CDU/CSU leaders listing their occupation for the war years, three were in private law practice, three were working for religious organizations, and two others were engaged in research and writing. Of the 25 future members of the 1956 Social Democratic leadership three practiced law, two worked for religious organizations, two were journalists, and two others were otherwise engaged in professional-academic type work. Of 15 future members of the Federal Cabinet, five were in various academic and professional occupations; among the 36 future legislative leaders listing their occupation, ten held various academic or professional jobs.

14 Only seven of the former Gauleiters were known to be alive in 1955; all of them were living in obscurity and in no sense could be considered members of the contemporary German elites. See John D. Montgomery, unpublished manuscript on Denazification, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chapter II, p. 61.

15 See biographical sources cited under Note 6.

16 On the relative influence of different elites in the making of contemporary German foreign policy, see Deutsch, Karl W. and Edinger, Lewis J., Germany Rejoins the Powers: A Study of Mass Opinion, Interest Groups and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).Google Scholar

17 While the S.P.D. leaders could claim to include among them by far the largest proportion of major anti-Nazis, it should be noted that this was in a large part due to the fact that 10 out of 29 members of the executive committee had been exiles. Nonetheless (as shown in Table III) with the exception of the press and radio elite—which included many Social Democrats—more members of the S.P.D. leadership suffered imprisonment than any other group.

18 An attempt has been made by German writers to make a case for a large “Inner Emigration” of Germans opposed in attitude, though not in behavior, to the Nazi regime. As we can not determine empirically an individual's contemporary attitude toward the regime, but only his occupational status and record of overt opposition, we can only conjecture on the basis of such behavioral evidence what his attitude may have been. Unless an individual evidently was permitted to serve the Nazi regime in an office subject to close scrutiny with regard to his loyalty, we have not classed him as a supporter of the regime. Unless there was some evidence of opposition, we have not counted him as an opponent.

19 Montgomery, , Forced to be Free, p. 188.Google Scholar

20 Op. cit. note 14, ch. 1, p. 80.

21 Forced to be Free, p. 186.

22 Lasswell, Harold D., “The Elite Concept,” in Lasswell, and others, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 6.Google Scholar

23 The oustanding exceptions to this rule were the religious elites, in which Germans retained all positions.

24 See Zink, , The United States in Germany, p. 353.Google Scholar

25 The divergent developments in the two parts of the former totalitarian state suggest some interesting comparisons between the incumbents of positions which provide elite status in the Federal Republic, but not in the Democratic Republic. For example, what difference, if any, exists today in the professional and political background of the holders of top administrative, military, and educational positions in the two German political communities? Did Russian rule over the Democratic Republic lead to a more thorough purge of these positions or did it, on the contrary, permit former Nazis and collaborators to retain positions which no longer were elite positions?

26 Department of State, The Axis in Defeat, Publication 2423, Washington, n.d., p. 50.Google Scholar

27 Zink, op. cit., p. 174.

28 Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers trained selected POWs during the war to assume positions of authority in post-war Germany. The former, as in the case of Hungary and Rumania, apparently made considerable use of these men, particularly in the organization of the People's Police and People's Army. The story of apparent failure of the Western plans to utilize “reeducated” POWs in the administration and political life of Germany remains to be written.

29 Only 18 per cent of the deputies in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) 1953–57 had been imprisoned, according to data by Martin Virchow, with collaboration of Rudolf Holzgräber, in the volume by Hirsch-Weber, Wolfgang and Schultz, Klaus, Wähler und Gewählte (Berlin, 1956), pp. 353–392.Google Scholar In contrast, 56 per cent of the members of the Austrian National Assembly in the same period had been imprisoned for political reasons. Included in the latter group were the foreign minister and the defense minister. See Handler, M. S., “Previous Regimes Imprisoned 92 of 165 Austrian Deputies,” The New York Times, May 9, 1959, p. 3:5.Google Scholar

29a Recent developments in Cuba illustrate once again the dilemma. “Possibly one of the greatest handicaps of the Revolutionary Government is the insistence that every official and employee of the Government be members or closely connected with the 26th of July Movement,” wrote the correspondent of The New York Times in Havana on May 23, 1959. “Some of the best talent and skill of the nation is being disregarded because anyone outstanding in public life during Gen. Fulgencio Batista's regime is considered tinged with the guilt of collaboration.” See R. Hart Phillips, “Cuban Land Reform Adds Uncertainty,” ibid., May 24, 1959, p. 4E:5–6.

30 The religious and communication elites may be thought of as lying somewhere between the low-skill politicians and the high-skill elite occupations. While a certain amount of skill and training is obviously necessary to be a bishop, a journalist, or a Rektor, it would seem easier to find qualified replacements for elite positions in these occupations than in the high-skill occupations.

31 Rather than argue in terms of circulation of elite personnel, one might consider the circulation of elite values. That is, elite offices may not circulate between an elite and a counter-elite and the denazification purge may not have been particularly effective in placing counter-elite personnel in all positions of influence and authority in Western Germany, but the post-totalitarian elites may differ from the totalitarian elites in that the values of the office holders may have changed as a result of altered conditions.

32 Lipset, Seymour Martin, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” this Review, Vol. 53 (March, 1959), p. 70.Google Scholar

33 In the satellite states, the old military leaders were removed as rapidly as either Russian or Communist officers could be found to replace them. In Rumania, reeducated POWs were a major source for replacements, in Poland it was Russian officers; in China a new military elite drawn from the Communist armies immediately replaced all Kuomintang generals. See Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955)Google Scholar, passim; Lerner, Daniel, “The Role of Brains in the Total State,” Commentary, August 1953, pp. 167–173 Google Scholar; Ritter, Gerhart, Carl Goerdler and the German Resistance (New York, Prager, 1958)Google Scholar; Wheeler-Bennet, J. W., The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945 (London, 1954)Google Scholar; Seabury, Paul, The Wilhelmstrasse (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1954).CrossRefGoogle Scholar I also wish to thank my colleague Frank Houn for providing me with data on the distribution of pre-1949 Communists and non-Communists in the present government of Communist China, which lack of space prevents me from presenting here. See his “The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: A Study of an Elite,” this Review, Vol. 51 (March 1957), p. 392.

34 I am most grateful to Norman Kogan of the University of Connecticut for providing me with this information from his forthcoming study on the Italian foreign office.

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