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Parliamentary Control of External Relations in the British Dominions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
Extract
The British parliamentary system presumes a working government majority, or else an appeal to the electorate, with the inevitable confusion of issues involved therein. Hence, in studying the conduct of foreign relations throughout the British Commonwealth, little profit is to be gained from analysis of anomalous instances where governments and parliaments are found to have been at variance on external policies. Whatever familiarity with the “checks and balances” tradition may incline us to assume, such cases are no adequate criterion of democratization of control. On the contrary, this is to be found in the degree to which parliaments not merely are called upon to ratify governmental acts and policies, but are taken into the confidence of governments and consulted before decisions are conclusively formulated. In the second place, “external relations” should, in the case of the Dominions, include relations with other members of the Commonwealth, especially the mother country. These still comprise the bulk of their external contacts; and from the standpoint of the problem now under discussion, no actual difference in kind exists between them and truly foreign affairs. Moreover, it is upon the procedural foundation of the one that the principles governing the conduct of the other have been based.
As it happens, the issue of parliamentary control has been agitated most zealously in connection with representation at the Imperial Conference, the supreme council of the British League of Nations.
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1931
References
1 Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, V, 362–374Google Scholar; negatived 61-64 (January 29, 1924).
2 “That resolutions passed at Imperial Conferences are only obligatory upon any Dominion of the Empire if and when they are approved by the parliament of that Dominion,” ibid., V, 112-118 (July 5, 1924).
3 Ibid., V, 565-591 (March 27, 1924).
4 Ibid., VII, 530-549 (June 21,1926).
5 Ibid., IX, 472-485 (March 8, 1928).
6 Ibid., XI, 485-494 (March 19, 1930). Canada and South Africa followed suit in May, ibid., XI, 652 ff., 782 ff.
7 Ibid., II, 545; negatived 96-64 (April 27, 1921). Nevertheless, when premier, Mr. King refused to state beforehand the stand he intended taking on specific issues at the 1923 Conference; Ibid., IV, 784.
8 Ibid., III, 181 (October 18, 1921).
9 Ibid., II, 648-649 (March 17, 1921).
10 Ibid., II, 671-673 (May 23, 1921).
11 Ibid., II, 610, 618 (April 13, 1921).
12 Ibid., IV, 574 (June 14,1923).
13 Ibid., IV, 861-876 (June 14,1923); the latter motion was negatived 50-16.
14 See Mr. MacDonald's interesting proposal and the Dominion premiers' comments thereon (1924), in Cmd. 2301; for recent revivals of the multi-party suggestion, see Journal, IX, 459, 466Google Scholar; X, 545, 554; XI, 30.
15 For striking instances, see Journal, III, 345–346, 501Google Scholar; IV, 272, 279, 511; and V, 240; also the acrimonious interchanges in the Canadian House (June 9, 1924) as to the extent to which Premier King had made his position regarding the Lausanne negotiations clear to the 1923 Conference.
16 Thus the suppression of the record of the 1902 Conference, which in retrospect seems the most critical in the history of the imperial federation movement, was in deference to Laurier's wishes; see Cd. 1723.
17 Thus, in replying to a protest at the Canadian parliament's being left in ignorance of the Australian and New Zealand attitudes at the 1909 Defense Conference (those, in the opposition view, strongly reflected on Canadian coöperation in defense), Premier Laurier argued (November 19, 1909) that the arrangements of the several governments with the mother country were independent of one another (Canada, Commons Debates, session 1909-10, cols. 206-209). Similarly, when Mr. Meighen (June 13, 1923) inquired regarding a statement in the British House that the Pacific Dominions had strongly urged the coöperative fortification of the Singapore base, Premier King refused to take steps to amplify the published record of the 1923 Conference on this point (Journal, IV, 512Google Scholar).
18 See Journal, VI, 225Google Scholar.
19 Dominion participation in the conduct of “high policy,” which is essentially a war and post-war development, has followed the principles established during the preceding period for commercial diplomacy, i.e., devolution of negotiations upon the Dominions, redefinition of Dominion relations to existing treaties, and the insertion in new treaties of clauses providing that the Dominions should not be bound unless they expressly adhered thereto. Of these, the salient examples are, respectively, the Halibut Treaty of 1923 (Canada-U.S.), the Washington Four-Power Treaty superseding the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and Article 9 of the Locarno Pact.
20 Porritt, , Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom of the British Overseas Dominions, p. 207Google Scholar.
21 C. 7553, pp. 5-6, 69; Keith, , Responsible Government (2nd ed.), pp. 848–853Google Scholar.
22 E.g., Canadian acts of January, 1907, bringing the Dominion within the scope of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1894; Canada, Commons Debates (1906-7), cols. 1546-53; Sessional Papers (1907-8), no. 74b.
23 Canada, Commons Debates (1903), col. 14802.
24 Ibid. (1909), cols. 633ff.; (1909-10), cols. 37, 6647ff.; (1910-11), cols. 9128ff.
25 Ibid. (1909), cols. 550, 633ff. Objection by the United States appears to have been a factor in preventing submission to the Canadian House; see Canadian Annual Review (1909), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.
26 His demand that the peace treaties be made subject to ratification by the Dominion parliaments was in terms identical with that made during a debate on the Boundary Waters Treaty: “Such approval should be obtained in the case of treaties imposing any burden on the people, or involving any change in the law of the land, or requiring legislative action to make them effective, or affecting the free exercise of the legislative power, or affecting territorial rights.” Canada, Sessional Papers (1919 special session), no 41j, pp. 10–13Google Scholar; cf. Debates (1909-10), cols. 6647ff.
27 Journal, I, 87–105, 193–220, 322–327, 384–387, 464–469, 540–554, 741–743Google Scholar.
28 Thus the treaty with Czechoslovakia was assented to in respect of Canada by order in council (Journal, I, 465Google Scholar), as was also the Franco-Canadian commercial treaty of 1921 (ibid., II, 346); while the Italian trade convention of 1923 was submitted to parliament (ibid., IV, 814). In defending his course regarding the Chanak affair, Premier King made much of the contention that the Canadian parliament had never ratified the Sèvres treaty, but had merely passed an enabling act upon which the government had taken no action (Can. Ann. Rev., 1922, p. 185Google Scholar). As regards certain League protocols approved in 1922, the premier stated that they were submitted for ratification because parliament was then in session (III, 568). In South Africa, General Hertzog opposed the grant of powers to the government in the Treaties of Peace Act, 1921, on the ground that the peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria had not been submitted to parliament; this omission was defended on the plea that parliament was not then in session (Ibid., II, 906-908).
29 Although senatorial ratification is generally secured, it should be noted that governments consider themselves amenable only to the lower house. The plea that the approval is by parliament, necessarily implying action by both houses, has been unsuccessfully advanced in the House of Lords and the South African Senate; Journal, X, 384–390Google Scholar; XI, 255, 451-452. Cf. discussion in Canadian Senate, Ibid., XI, 347-350.
30 In fact, members of the present Canadian government maintained, while in opposition, that when legislation is required to implement a treaty, actual enactment of such legislation should precede the final act of ratification (ibid., X, 847-851).
31 This appeal was intended primarily for Australia and New Zealand, which had a special interest in the Straits, but was sent pro forma to Canada and South Africa as well. For the data and debates on the episode, see Journal, IV, 94–104, 138–145, 268–283, 586–593, 619–621Google Scholar; Can. Ann. Rev. (1922), pp. 174–89Google Scholar; also Mr. J. S. Ewart's characteristic discussion, Canada and British Wars.
32 New Zealand time.
33 For a résumé of opinion and spontaneous offers of enlistment, see Can. Ann. Rev. (1922), pp. 181–184Google Scholar.
34 Briefly, Sir Wilfrid Laurier's general assertion of Dominion autonomy in external as in domestic affairs (eventually embodied in the Balfour report of 1926) was circumscribed by the late Canadian government to a specific vindication of parliamentary control in foreign relations—against the exercise of discretion by the cabinet on the one hand and popular referenda on the other—and became a stereotyped formula to be invoked whenever external obligations threatened. It constitutes the salient example of a confusion between constitutional questions wholly internal to each Dominion and those involving relationships with the mother country which has continually beset the controversy over Dominion status. See the present writer's Dominions and Diplomacy, index under “Laurier policy.”
35 Negatived 67-10.
36 For instance, the first MacDonald government, instead of ignoring the imperial preference resolutions of the 1923 Economic Conference held under the auspices of their predecessors, took the ground that they should be submitted to parliament for such action as that body might determine (Journal, V, 6, 10, 198Google Scholar). For the significant extension of parliamentary control over foreign policy during this administration, and its prompt repudiation by their successors, see Ibid., V, 229; VI, 28-29, 223-226; Annual Register (1025), p. 29Google Scholar.
37 This whole episode is somewhat tortuous, but lack of space precludes discussion here. See the correspondence (unfortunately incomplete) in Cmd. 2146, and the Canadian debate of June 9,1924. For criticisms, see Corbett, and Smith, , Canada and World Politics, pp. 94–98Google Scholar, and the present writer's Dominions and Diplomacy, Vol. II, pp. 147–166Google Scholar. See also footnote supra on the King formula.
38 This serious consideration did not escape the attention of the oppositions. In Canada, the veteran senator, Sir George E. Foster, in a scathing denunciation, noted that parliament had been in session for more than a month prior to the rejection. In Australia, the leaders of both oppositions (ex-Premier Hughes and Mr. Charlton), divided though they were on the issue itself, maintained that parliament should have been specially summoned to pass upon it (Journal, VI, 318–322, 536–537)Google Scholar.
39 Action on the Geneva Protocol, for instance, may be summarized as follows. The rejection by the British government on behalf of the Commonwealth was announced to the League Council March 12, 1925, and debated in the Commons March 24. The Canadian decision for rejection was despatched to London March 4; the papers brought down and the issue debated March 12. The Australian decision was signified March 5, noted in the governor-general's speech June 10, and debate was resumed on submission of the League delegates' report August 14. The New Zealand government advised Downing Street of its position in a memorandum of January 6, 1925, but (owing to the fatal illness of the premier) parliamentary consideration was postponed until the simultaneous debate on the Locarno Pact September 28. A statement on the South African rejection was made in the House by Premier Hertzog during the debate on the estimates May 6. The Free State government does not appear to have informed Downing Street of its attitude until after a statement in the Dáil by the minister of external affairs on May 13. Cmd. 2458 and Journal, VI, passim.
40 Journal, VII, 392–401Google Scholar.
41 For instance, the major issue of resuming diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was several times discussed in the British Parliament following the accession of the present Labor government, and Premier MacDonald promised “that any conclusion that His Majesty's government may come to regarding recognition cannot become effective until it has been debated in this House;” Ibid., X, 790 (July 11,1929). Cf. debates of November 5 and December 18, Ibid., XI, 8-15.
42 See Canada, Commons Debates (1900), cols. 10-136, 1793-1876; (1901), cols. 1290-1366; and Can. Ann. Rev. (1902).
43 For discussions of this move, see Canada, Commons Debates (1907-8), cols. 3493ff., 3636ff., 4317ff.
44 Ibid., cols. 1585ff.; Can. Ann. Rev. (1907), pp. 380–98Google Scholar.
45 Canada, Commons Debates (1903), col. 14817; during the post mortem on the Alaska boundary award.
46 See Keith, , Selected Speeches and Documents, Vol. II, pp. 310–312Google Scholar.
47 Canada, Sessional Papers (1919 special session), no. 41j; Can. Ann. Rev. (1919), pp. 70–86Google Scholar.
48 See comment in Round Table, VIII, 207–208Google Scholar; IX, 603-604, 610, 818-819; X, 183-184.
49 For the eailier phase, see 1907 Conference Proceedings, Cd. 3523, pp. 548-563; on the German colonies issue, see Can. Ann. Rev. (1916), pp. 160, 183 (1918), pp. 168–169Google Scholar; Round Table, IX (articles from Australia and New Zealand, passim).
50 Journal, III, 877, 881, 907–908Google Scholar; IV, 590-591; Can. Ann. Rev. (1921), pp. 79–80, 116Google Scholar.
51 Canada, Sessional Papers (1923), no. 111a; Journal, IV, 300–303, 801–814Google Scholar; Lowell, and Hall, , British Commonwealth, pp. 639–645Google Scholar.
52 Cmd. 1987, pp. 13-15; Corbett and Smith, op. cit., Appendix I. It would be difficult to find any parliamentary mandate for this pronouncement.
53 Journal, VI, 519, 723Google Scholar; VII 152, 328-329.
54 Yet the actual announcement in 1920 came as a surprise; the premier declined to present the papers; and a motion for delay pending further information was lost by only five votes. Ibid., I, 476ff.
55 Compare the basis announced May 10, 1920 (Ibid., 476-477), with that of the Free State ministry (Cmd. 2202), or Mr. Massey's letter of credence (Corbett and Smith, op. cit., Appendix IV). The Free State principle actually adopted by Canada is that of a distinct legation; hence is applicable to all Dominions and any foreign capital. The Canadian Conservative proposal was intended to meet the special needs of Canada in Washington only; the minister, though responsible to his own government, would have been a member of the British embassy, acting vice the ambassador in the latter's absence. This peculiar arrangement was designed to preserve Imperial diplomatic unity, while the other implies complete decentralization.
56 Ibid., V, 341, 747.
57 See Toynbee, , Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations, p. 60Google Scholar; and for the implications, Corbett and Smith, op. cit., pp. 125-129.
58 See Canadian Annual Review for these years; and for background, Industrial Canada, organ of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association.
59 Journal, II, 537ff., 609ff., 635ff., 856ff.Google Scholar; III 89ff., 149ff., 556. The principle embodied in the Four-Power Pact was broached in several of these discussions.
60 See adverse comment in Round Table, XI, 910–913Google Scholar.
61 E.g., Journal, IV, 512Google Scholar; V, 345.
62 In supply (June 11, 1928); ibid., IX, 660-666.
63 On private members' motions (April 11, 1928 and 1929); ibid., 667-668, X, 596-600.
64 On a private member's motions (April 11, 1928 and February 21, 1929); ibid., X, 46-50, 324-327.
65 On a motion for papers (February 16, 1928); ibid., IX, 406-409.
66 On De Valera's motion for adjournment (May 31, 1928); ibid., 765-768.
67 For instance, claiming that parliament was wholly in the dark as to the government's intentions, and also in the belief that by their insistence on reservations Australia and New Zealand were blocking acceptance of the Optional Clause by the British nations, Mr. Holland forced the issue on a motion for adjournment in the New Zealand House (September 19, 1929). While Premier Ward was pleading the bar of secrecy upon him, the evening papers announcing signature arrived in the House, ibid., XI, 411-414.
68 Ibid., VI, 304-306 (February 9, 1925). The premier's reply was that, as the issue was still pending, no reference had been made to it in the Speech—an excellent illustration of the contrasting status of domestic and external government projects in relation to parliament.
69 Ibid., 848 (July 1, 1925); VII, 864 (June 23, 1926).
70 Ibid., VIII, 579-581 (March 11, 1927).
71 Ibid., IV, 284-285; Can. Ann. Rev. (1922), pp. 96–98Google Scholar.
72 E.g., Laurier's reply to Colonial Secretary Lyttelton's imperial federation proposal in 1905 (Cd. 2785, no. 14), and King's to the first MacDonald government's suggestion of a conference on Imperial foreign relations in 1924 (Cmd. 2301, no. 3, and Journal, V, 749Google Scholar).
73 E.g., South Africa: Dr. Malan's protest (June 23, 1923) that the discussion of the forthcoming Imperial Conference which he had demanded had been left until the last day of the session (Journal, IV, 900Google Scholar). Canada: J. S. Woodsworth's complaint (March 22, 1926) that in the previous session the promised discussion of foreign relations had been postponed until after midnight on the final sitting (ibid., VII, 777-778). New Zealand: protest of leaders of both oppositions (December 3, 1927) that the debate on the 1926 Conference findings had been so long delayed (ibid., IX, 459, 464).
74 The effect of the Balfour memorandum from the strictly legal standpoint is, however, another matter. (Cf. Keith, Sovereignty of the British Dominions). The word “settlement” is here used advisedly, despite the seeming intensification of constitutional discussion during the ensuing years. The latter has been concentrated on very concrete issues, i.e., the corollaries still to be worked out; whereas the earlier controversy was over vaguer, yet more fundamental, general principles.
75 Notably under Laurier in Canada, Hughes in Australia, and Massey in New Zealand.
76 Perhaps the moat striking modification was in Australia under Bruce (e.g., his voluntary statements to the House on the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, March 8,1928, and August 22, 1929, and on the Peace Pact, May 15 and June 1, 1928). But in Canada also, as the King government became more firmly seated and the issue of constitutional status untangled itself (and probably also owing to parliamentary criticism of the arbitrary course pursued in 1922-24), a change was observable.
77 Herein lies ample justification for the “academic debate”—which is commonly resorted to several times in a session in Canada, but less frequently in the other Dominions—and probably also the explanation of why it attracts the serious attention of parliamentary leaders, including premiers and leaders of the opposition. It affords excellent opportunity for the analysis of issues (the more so because the fate of the government is not at stake), and has provoked some most enlightening discussions. The proposition is introduced by a private member's motion, is debated, and is as likely as not withdrawn after thus serving its purpose. A salient recent instance is Miss Macphail's motion in the Canadian House (March 26, 1928) to establish a government department for the promotion of peace and international understanding, which was made the occasion for a survey, at two sittings, of the country's foreign relations (Journal, IX, 393–401)Google Scholar.
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