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A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a Recount and a Reappraisal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Maurice Klain
Maurice Klain
Affiliation:
Western Reserve University
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Extract

Well-established “facts,” scholars know, are sometimes overtoppled by research. The “Piltdown man” is a recent case in point. So is the “Jukes family,” whose value to hereditists has collapsed under scientific scrutiny. Of considerably smaller magnitude is a case, just discovered, relating to the putative election of state legislators in single-member districts.

“Popular election from single-member districts is the prevailing method by which individual legislators are chosen,” a Committee of the American Political Science Association reports. Every other authority concurs. Multi-member elections, all agree, are atypical.

“With few exceptions,” Ogg and Ray informed students, “senators and members of lower houses are chosen in small, single-member districts.” Among other writers of the older texts, John Mathews cited “the prevalent system of … single-member districts.” Charles Beard asserted that “the rule of one member to each district is generally applied.” The same assertion was made by the Willoughbys, Lindsay Rogers, James Garner, and others. “For the purpose of choosing their own legislatures,” Willoughby and Rogers noted, “the states are divided into senatorial and representative districts from each of which one senator or one representative is elected.”

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , December 1955 , pp. 1105 - 1119
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1955

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References

1 A leave of absence granted by Western Reserve University enabled the writer to complete this and several related studies aimed at testing the common assertion that singlemember districts foster two-party politics.

2 American Political Science Association, American State Legislatures: Report of the Committee on American Legislatures, ed. Zeller, Belle (New York, 1954), p. 63Google Scholar. See also pp. 38, 46, 62.

3 Ogg, Frederic A. and Ray, P. Orman, Essentials of American Government (New York, 1952), p. 591Google Scholar, and Introduction to American Government (New York, 1951), pp. 820, 821Google Scholar; Mathews, John M., American State Government (New York, 1934), p. 222Google Scholar, also p. 229 (footnote); Beard, Charles A., American Government and Politics (New York, 1936), p. 577Google Scholar; Willoughby, Westel W. and Rogers, Lindsay, An Introduction to the Problem of Government (New York, 1921), p. 421Google Scholar; Garner, James W., Political Science and Government (New York, 1935), p. 632Google Scholar; Willoughby, William F., The Government of Modern States (New York, 1936), pp. 300 ff.Google Scholar

4 For example, Anderson, William and Weidner, Edward W., American Government (New York, 1953), p. 510Google Scholar, and State and Local Government (New York, 1951), p. 342Google Scholar; Binkley, Wilfred E. and Moos, Malcolm C., A Grammar of American Politics (New York, 1951), p. 189Google Scholar; Burns, James MacGregor and Peltason, Jack W., Government by the People (New York, 1954), p. 342Google Scholar; Carr, Robert K., Morrison, Donald H., Bernstein, Marver H., and Snyder, Richard C., American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York, 1951), p. 168Google Scholar; Cayley, Charles, “The State Legislature,” Ch. 36 of An Introduction to American Government, ed. Jacobsen, Paul S. et al. (Harrisburg, 1954), p. 456Google Scholar; Corry, James A., Elements of Democratic Government (New York, 1951), p. 230CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ferguson, John H. and McHenry, Dean E., Elements of American Government (New York, 1954), p. 542Google Scholar; Gosnell, Cullen B. and Holland, Lynwood M., State and Local Government in the United States (New York, 1951), p. 185Google Scholar; Graves, W. Brooke, American State Government (Boston, 1953), p. 156Google Scholar; Holloway, William V., State and Local Government in the United States (New York, 1951), p. 134Google Scholar; Johnson, Claudius O., American Government: National, State and Local (New York, 1951), p. 800Google Scholar; Lane, Robert E., Problems in American Government (New York, 1952), p. 69Google Scholar; McLean, Joseph E., State and Local Government (New York, 1953), p. 77Google Scholar; Phillips, Jewell Cass, State and Local Government in America (New York, 1954), p. 144Google Scholar; Snider, Clyde F., American State and Local Government (New York, 1950), p. 168Google Scholar; Wit, Daniel, Comparative Political Institutions (New York, 1953), pp. 194–95, 213Google Scholar.

5 Henry A. Goodman, Research Assistant, The Council of State Governments, in a letter to the writer, Sept. 14, 1953.

6 Sterne, Simon, “Representation,” in Cyclopedia of Political Science, Political Economy and U.S. Political History, ed. Lalor, John J. (Chicago, 1883), Vol. 3, pp. 581–95Google Scholar, at p. 586. Little more than a decade later both John R. Commons and George H. Haynes produced evidence that Sterne was wrong. So did counsel for Wrightson in State v. Wrightson, an 1893 New Jersey case contesting the single-district system. See Haynes, George, “Representation in State Legislatures,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 15, pp. 204–36, 405–26 (1899)Google Scholar and Vol. 16, pp. 93–120, 243–73 (1900); Commons, John R., Proportional Representation (New York, 1896), pp. 266–68Google Scholar; 56 New Jersey Law Reports 126 (1895)Google Scholar.

7 For most of the data on legislative constituencies in the states today the writer is indebted primarily to the secretaries of state or, in some instances, to members of their staffs. The writer's inquiry was carried on largely by mail, with the information usually supplied by personal letter. Most of the data were checked against documentary sources.

8 Before 1954 Arizona had 19 senators, 10 of them elected in multiple districts, nine in single. An amendment adopted in 1953 increased the total to 28, representing 14 two-member districts, each district voting for both its senators simultaneously.

Alaska is divided into four senatorial constituencies, each represented by four senators, chosen two at a time at biennial elections. In Hawaii also, senators are chosen for staggered terms at biennial elections by four constituencies—the First being represented by four senators, the Second by three, the Third by six, the Fourth by two. In the Second District two senators are elected in one biennium, one in the other. (Letters to the writer from J. F. McKay, Executive Director, Legislative Council of Alaska, Dec. 7, 1954; Farrand L. Turner, Secretary of Hawaii, Dec. 6, 1954; Congressman A. L. Miller, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, Dec. 15, 1954; Stewart French, Counsel, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. Senate, Dec. 28, 1954.)

9 Multnomah County in Oregon, represented by seven senators, elects five one time, two the next. Denver's eight senators are elected four every two years; Salt Lake City's seven, four at one election, three the next; Indianapolis's five, four at one time, one the next. Vermont has two four-member districts, Maine one. In three-member elections three senators are chosen in Arkansas, 15 in Maine, six in Mississippi, three in Ohio, three in Utah, nine in Vermont, three in Virginia. All other multiply-elected senators are chosen in pairs.

10 These 12 states account for 1,276 of the 3,146 single-district state representatives. In other words, more than 40 per cent of all single-district state representatives are concentrated in just a dozen states. The distribution numerically is as follows: Arizona, 80; California, 80; Delaware, 35; Kansas, 125; Kentucky, 100; Missouri, 157; Nebraska, 43; New York, 150; Rhode Island, 100; Utah, 60; Vermont, 246; Wisconsin, 100. (In the absence of a second chamber in Nebraska, that state's 43 single-district unicameral legisators—officially styled “senators”—are counted here a second time. Without them, the overall proportion of single-district representatives would of course be somewhat less than here indicated, that of multiple-district representatives somewhat greater.)

11 The mammoth district had grown up under the protection of Article IV, Section 3, Michigan Constitution of 1850, later Article V, Section 3 of the 1908 Constitution providing that “no township or city shall be divided in the formation of a representative district. When any township or city shall contain a population which entitles it to more than one representative, then such township or city shall elect by general ticket the number of representatives to which it is entitled.” Faced with the further enlargement of Detroit's 21-member district, the legislature in 1952 secured the adoption of an amendment providing “that when such township or city shall be entitled to more than 5 representatives, then such township or city shall be divided into representative districts … with not less than 2 nor more than 3 representatives in any 1 district.” As a practical matter this amendment affects only Detroit.

In the 1954 general election the voters of Oregon adopted a constitutional amendment permitting the legislature to subdistrict the larger counties. Subsequently, during the 1955 legislative session, Multomah county was subdivided into four districts, each of which will choose four representatives at the 1956 general election.

In September, 1955, the voters of New Mexico approved an amendment which allows the legislature to number the seats in a multi-member district. This requires the candidate to specify the seat he is contesting and thus, in effect, sets up single-member elections.

12 Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform (London, 1910), pp. 1–3Google Scholar; Royal Commission, Minutes of Evidence (London, 1910), pp. 78, 91, 93Google Scholar; Sterne, Simon, Representative Government (Philadelphia, 1871), pp. 31–33Google Scholar; Seymour, Charles and Frary, Donald P., How the World Votes (Springfield, 1918), Vol. 1, p. 64Google Scholar; Gash, Norman, Politics in the Age of Peel (London, 1953)Google Scholar.

13 Except as otherwise indicated, the sources for this section are contained in The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America, 7 vols. (Washington, 1909), ed. Thorpe, Francis N.Google Scholar.

On the colonies, see also McKinley, Albert E., The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America (Philadelphia, 1905)Google Scholar; Griffith, Elmer C., The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander (Chicago, 1907)Google Scholar; Miller, Elmer I., The Legislature of the Province of Virginia (New York, 1907)Google Scholar; Fry, William H., New Hampshire as a Royal Province (New York, 1908)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tanner, Edwin P., The Province of New Jersey (New York, 1908)Google Scholar.

14 Seven Revolutionary constitutions—those of Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—provided for the election of all representatives in multi-member constituencies. Rhode Island, continuing government under its colonial charter, apparently elected all representatives on a multiple basis too. The five other original states elected most, in some cases nearly all, the same way.

15 According to Robert Luce, New York in 1846 was the first state to put its popular house on a single-member basis. See Legislative Principles (Boston, 1930), p. 381Google Scholar. However, this writer found a provision in the Vermont Constitution of 1793 (Ch. II, Section 7) requiring establishment of single-member districts for all members of the lower house. Checking further, he was informed of the following by Edward A. Hoyt, editor of the Vermont state papers, in a letter of Dec. 17, 1954: “The Journal of the General Assembly … under date 13 October 1785 makes it evident that only one member was chosen from each town for this session. As far as I am able to determine, only one member from each town was actually chosen from this time forward despite Constitutional provision apparently to the contrary.” The constitutional provision referred to first appears in the Constitution of 1777 authorizing all towns with at least 80 taxable inhabitants to choose two representatives each.

16 As of 1800, the seven states with single-district senates were Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. By 1848, with 30 states, the seven had been increased by Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. By 1870, with 37 states, North Carolina and Virginia had deserted this company; but the total was raised to 20 by the addition of Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and West Virginia. By 1912, with 48 states, these 20 had been joined by California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington. This number has been raised to 32 since 1912 by the addition of Nebraska and New Mexico.

17 Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and, probably, Rhode Island still had all representatives mending their fences in multiple constituencies. Virtually in the same class were South Carolina and Georgia which, respectively, named but one and two representatives in single-member districts. Rhode Island's new constitution that year, like some other state constitutions, warned explicitly that “no town or city shall be divided into districts for the choice of representatives.”

18 New York in 1846; Wisconsin, 1848; New Jersey, 1852; Kansas, 1858.

19 Complainant's brief, State v. Wrightson, 56 New Jersey Law Reports 126, p. 154Google Scholar.

20 “Possibly more” because Arkansas, Ohio, and Texas, not included in this generalization, may have had more multiple- than single-district representatives in 1912, but the writer does not have precise information for these states at that time.

21 Among the five states entering the all-single-member category between 1870 and 1912, Missouri did so after 1875, California in 1879, Kentucky in 1890, Delaware in 1897, Khode Island in 1909.

22 Complainant's brief, State v. Wrightson.

23 Robert Luce has observed aptly that “The most difficult and most controverted problem of apportionment concerns the number of members to be elected from a district.” See his Legislative Principles (Cambridge, 1930)Google Scholar, Ch. 17. Also: Buell, Raymond Leslie, “Political and Social Reconstruction in France,” this Review, Vol. 15, pp. 27–52 (Feb., 1921)Google Scholar; Carr, Phillip, “Electoral Systems and Reforms in France,” Contemporary Review, Vol. 129, pp. 325–33 (March, 1926)Google Scholar; Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (London, 1954), pp. 59–60, 356 ff.Google Scholar; James W. Garner, op. cit., pp. 629–36, and “Electoral Reform in France,” this Review, Vol. 7, pp. 610–38 (Nov., 1913)Google Scholar; Gooch, Robert K., “The Antiparliamentary Movement in France,” this Review, Vol. 21, pp. 552–73 (Aug., 1927)Google Scholar; Lowell, A. Lawrence, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe (Cambridge, 1896)Google Scholar; Vol. 1, pp. 157–61, 204 ff.; Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, Minutes of Evidence (London, 1910)Google Scholar.

24 Research Committee, American Political Science Association, Research in Political Science, ed. Griffith, Ernest S. (Chapel Hill, 1948), p. 37Google Scholar.

25 Ibid., p. 36.

26 Committee on Reapportionment of Congress, American Political Science Association, “The Reapportionment of Congress,” this Review, Vol. 45, pp. 153–58Google Scholar, at p. 154 (March, 1951). Though the Committee addressed itself to congressional elections, its language suggested a general endorsement of the single-member principle. The historic fact is, indeed, that the federal example has been responsible for encouraging the spread of single districts to state elections. Cf. Dodd, Walter F., State Government (New York, 1928), p. 153Google Scholar; Key, V. O., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 1952), p. 330Google Scholar.

27 Harvey, Lashley G., “Some Problems of Representation in State Legislatures,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 2, pp. 265–72 (June, 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walter, David O., “Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts,” Illinois Law Review, Vol. 37, pp. 20–43, (1942)Google Scholar.

28 Duverger, op. cit., and other references in footnote 23.

29 This type of argument has been part of the stock-in-trade of single-district advocates for more than a century, with examples to be found in the proceedings and debates of practically every state constitutional convention. See, for example, Debates and Proceedings in the New York Convention (Albany, 1846), especially pp. 291–332, 347–60Google Scholar; also Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844 (1942, Writers' Project ed.), pp. 282 ff.Google Scholar; State v. Wrightson, op. cit. esp. pp. 157–76; Luce, op. cit.; Garner, op. cit., pp. 632–35; Anderson, and Weidner, , American Government, pp. 510–11Google Scholar; Barnett, James D., “Unitary-Multiple Election Districts,” this Review, Vol. 39, pp. 65–68 (Feb., 1945)Google Scholar; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 18Google Scholar.

30 Bryce, James, The American Commonwealth (London, 1889), Vol. 1, pp. 463–64Google Scholar; Luce, op. cit., p. 392 and ch. 17 passim; Garner, op. cit., p. 635.

In New York, politicians of such diverse temperaments as Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley were agreed that the legislature, especially the senate, had sunk in the quality of its personnel since the adoption of the single-member system. A Pennsylvania governor, pleading with his state's constitutional convention in 1873 not to establish single districts, cited New York as proof that legislatures decline under the one-member system. This convention discussed the matter extensively.

31 Hyneman, Charles S., “Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel,” The Annals, Vol. 195, pp. 21–32, at p. 28 (Jan., 1938)Google Scholar. Hyneman pointed out that “the experience of Pennsylvania has been quite opposite.” States surveyed were California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See also the study by Hyneman, and Lay, Houston, “Tenure and Turnover in the Indiana General Assembly,” this Review, Vol. 32, pp. 51–67, 311–32 (Feb., Apr., 1938)Google Scholar, wherein the authors conclude that in Indiana during the period covered “neither transience nor permanence is peculiar to either type of district.” Ibid., p. 313. Robert Luce has written: “It is probable that on the whole the group system makes it easier to keep in office during a series of terms men especially qualified for work of lawmaking—one of the most important needs of our public life.” Legislative Principles (Cambridge, 1930), p. 393Google Scholar. Cf. also Blair, George S., “Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics,” South-western Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 34, pp. 3–19, esp. pp. 6–8 (March, 1954)Google Scholar.

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