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More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2006

Iris Bohnet ,
Bruno S. Frey  and
Steffen Huck
Iris Bohnet
Affiliation:
Iris Bohnet is Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]). Bruno S. Frey is Professor of Economics, Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zürich, Bluemlisalpstreet 10, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland ([email protected]). Steffen Huck is Senior Lecturer in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surry TW20 0EX, United Kingdom ([email protected]),,
Bruno S. Frey
Affiliation:
Iris Bohnet is Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]). Bruno S. Frey is Professor of Economics, Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zürich, Bluemlisalpstreet 10, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland ([email protected]). Steffen Huck is Senior Lecturer in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surry TW20 0EX, United Kingdom ([email protected]),,
Steffen Huck
Affiliation:
Iris Bohnet is Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]). Bruno S. Frey is Professor of Economics, Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zürich, Bluemlisalpstreet 10, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland ([email protected]). Steffen Huck is Senior Lecturer in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surry TW20 0EX, United Kingdom ([email protected]),,
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Abstract

Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. “More law,” it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. We examine a contractual relationship in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability affects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation and find that economic incentives have a nonmonotonic effect on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities: Trustworthiness is “crowded in” with weak and “crowded out” with medium enforcement. In a laboratory experiment we test our model’s implications and find support for the crowding prediction. Our finding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly Communist countries.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 95 , Issue 1 , March 2001 , pp. 131 - 144
Copyright
2001 by the American Political Science Association

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