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More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

George Tsebelis
George Tsebelis*
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

Moser analyzes the cooperation procedure using a model that assumes (1) one dimension and (2) complete information. I show that because of these two restrictive assumptions and his misunderstanding of the strategic implications of Article 189a(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (an article also present in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Rome), Moser's conclusions are mistaken. In particular, his predicted outcomes are incorrect, and his major institutional prediction (that the European Parliament plays no role in decision making except in the second round of the cooperation procedure) is contradicted by thousands of parliamentary amendments, the major part of which are accepted in the first round.

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Forum
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 839 - 844
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

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