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The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Joel D. Aberbach  and
Jack L. Walker
Joel D. Aberbach
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan
Jack L. Walker
Affiliation:
The University of Michigan
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Angry protests against racial discrimination were a prominent part of American public life during the 1960's. The decade opened with the sit-ins and freedom rides, continued through Birmingham, Selma, and the March on Washington, and closed with protests in hundreds of American cities, often punctuated by rioting and violence. During this troubled decade the rhetoric of protest became increasingly demanding, blanket charges of pervasive white racism and hostility were more common, and some blacks began to actively discourage whites from participating either in protest demonstrations or civil rights organizations. Nothing better symbolized the changing mood and style of black protest in America than recent changes in the movement's dominant symbols. Demonstrators who once shouted “freedom” as their rallying cry now were shouting “black power”—a much more provocative, challenging slogan.

The larger and more diverse a political movement's constituency, the more vague and imprecise its unifying symbols and rallying cries are likely to be. A slogan like black power has no sharply defined meaning; it may excite many different emotions and may motivate individuals to express their loyalty or take action for almost contradictory reasons. As soon as Adam Clayton Powell and Stokely Carmichael began to use the phrase in 1966 it set off an acrimonious debate among black leaders over its true meaning. Initially it was a blunt and threatening battle cry meant to symbolize a break with the past tactics of the civil rights movement.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , June 1970 , pp. 367 - 388
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1970

Footnotes

*

Thanks are due to the National Institute of Mental Health for the grant which made this study possible; to James D. Chesney, Katherine S. Luken, Douglas B. Neal and all our associates at the Institute of Public Policy Studies who assisted in the analysis of the data; to the coding section of the Survey Research Center for their exceptional patience and industry; and to our colleagues Ronald D. Brunner, Philip E. Converse, Steven L. Coombs, Robert D. Putnam and Herbert F. Weisberg who commented upon earlier versions of this paper.

References

1 Brink, William J. and Harris, Louis, Black and White (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 50Google Scholar.

2 New York Times, 07 6, 1966, p. 14Google Scholar.

3 Ibid, July 6, 1966, p. 15, and July 9, 1966, p. 8.

4 Baldwin, JamesNotes of a Native Son (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 122Google Scholar.

5 Cruse, for example, in his provocative series of essays, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New York: William Morrow, 1967), p. 557Google Scholar, says that “the radical wing of the Negro movement in America sorely needs a social theory based on the living ingredients of Afro-American history. Without such a theory all talk of Black Power is meaningless.”

6 Ibid., p. 545.

7 Hamilton, Charles, “An Advocate of Black Power Defines It,” New York Times Magazine, 04 14, 1968, pp. 22–23, 79–83Google Scholar, reprinted in full in Scott, Robert L. and Brockriede, Wayne, eds., The Rhetoric of Black Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 178–194Google Scholar. This statement is found on p. 179.

8 Carmichael, Stokely and Hamilton, Charles V., Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 44Google Scholar.

9 Hamilton, op. cit., p. 179. For a view of the concept from a broader perspective see, Edmondson, Locksley, “The Internationalization of Black Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives,” Mawazo (12, 1968), pp. 16–30Google Scholar.

10 Riot areas were defined by a location map of fires considered riot-related by the Detroit Fire Department.

11 See our discussion below of “nothing” as a response.

12 The correlation between interpretations of black power on the open-ended question in 1967 and interpretations in 1968 is (Gamma) .54 for blacks and .78 for whites. We will be gathering data from the same respondents once again in September, 1970, and will report our findings in detail after the third round is completed.

13 We will present our codings below. A more conservative coefficient for demonstrating the relationship between interpretations of black power on the open-ended question and approval or disapproval on the close-ended question would be Kendall's tau-beta. See Goodman, Leo A. and Kruskal, William H., “Measures of Association for Cross Classification,” Journal of the American Statistical Association (12, 1954)Google Scholar. The tau-beta correlations are .86 for blacks and .60 for whites. The lower coefficient in the white case reflects the relatively large percentage of whites who give favorable interpretations of black power but disapprove of the slogan. This will be discussed in more detail in the text.

14 For the blacks, the riot area respondents gave a greater emphasis to black unity as opposed to fair share interpretations of black power, but the differences are not great. Non-riot area respondents actually were slightly more favorable to black power if we consider unity and fair share responses as indicators of positive feelings.

15 The quotes presented here are typical examples of black power definitions coded in each category. Respondents are identified by race, sex, age and educational attainment for the benefit of the reader. In cases where the respondent has some specialized training, he is coded with a “plus” after his grade level.

16 All of the few whites who interpreted black power as “nothing” in 1968 were negative about the slogan.

17 In a few cases (N = 20) respondents stressed black unity in order to achieve a fair share. We are considering first mentions here and in our analysis, but will probe this in detail when we have more time.

18 We will combine black unity definitions with the few racial pride references for purposes of analysis.

19 See footnote 17. About 20 percent of the black respondents mentioning racial unity saw it as a means of achieving equality. For example:

(black, male, 42, 12 grades) Negroes getting together and forcing whites to realize our importance—our worth to the United States. Gaining respect and equality.

The more articulate members of the black unity group are concerned with ends as well as means. See Carmichael and Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 46–47.

20 The best example of work in this area is Marx, Gary T., Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community (New York: Harper and Row, 1967)Google Scholar. Marx defined “conventional militancy” by the standards of civil rights activists and organizations at the time of his study (1964). All were (pp. 40–41) “urgently aware of the extensiveness of discrimination faced by the American black man. All called for an end to discrimination and segregation and demanded the admission of the Negro to the economic and political mainstream of American life. And they wanted these changes quickly—‘Freedom Now.’ In pursuit of this end, participation in peaceful demonstrations was encouraged.”

21 Riot research is widespread. See, especially, David O. Sears and John B. McConahay, “Riot Participation,” and Murphy, Raymond J. and Watson, James M., “The Structure of Discontent: Grievance and Support for the Los Angeles Riot,” Los Angeles Riot Study (Los Angeles: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, 1967)Google Scholar; Caplan, Nathan S. and Paige, Jefferey M., “A Study of Ghetto Rioters,” Scientific American (08, 1968), pp. 15–21Google Scholar, also reported in the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (The U. S. Riot Commission Report). Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968)Google Scholar; Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968)Google Scholar, especially Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities, Chapters 5–6 and Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hill, Who Riots: A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots; and Masotti, Louis H. and Bowen, Don R., eds., Riots and Rebellion: Civil Violence in the Urban Community (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1968)Google Scholar. Studies which emphasize aggregate data can be found in Gurr, Ted R. and Davis, Hugh D., eds., The History of Violence in America (New York: Bantam Press, 1969)Google Scholar.

22 Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning? A Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots (Los Angeles: McCone Commission Report, 1965)Google Scholar.

23 In the calculations which follow, unless otherwise noted, the black power variable is dichotomized with a favorable interpretation (“fair share” or “racial unity”) scored one and unfavorable interpretations scored zero. Respondents with “don't know” or “no answer” responses were not used in the analysis. In this association, for example, those with low educational achievement were slightly less likely to approve of black power (give the “fair share” or “racial unity” interpretations) than those with substantial educational achievement.

24 We do not think that this is simply because their higher level of education makes them more aware of the content of the actual debate over black power. Relative youth, education, and support of integration are all intertwined and each of these factors is related to a favorable interpretation of black power.

25 See Skolnick, Jerome H., The Politics of Protest (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 162Google Scholar, and The U. S. Riot Commission Report, op. cit., especially p. 93 where “a new mood among Negroes, particularly among the young” is described. “Self-esteem and enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission to ‘the system.’ Moreover, Negro youth, who make up over half of the ghetto population, share the growing sense of alienation felt by many white youth in our country. Thus, their role in recent civil disorders reflects not only a shared sense of deprivation and victimization by white society but also the rising incidence of disruptive conduct by a segment of American youth throughout the society.”

26 We have defined the South as the 11 states of the Confederacy (N = 255) and the border states of Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West Virginia (N = 49). Blacks born in border states were actually less likely to interpret black power in fail share or black unity terms than those born in the former states of the Confederacy, although the differences are small. One hundred and seven of our black respondents were born in Michigan (coded one). This accounts for only 412 respondents. Of those remaining, 43 were born in the United States, but outside of Michigan and the South, 1 in Canada, 1 in the West Indies and 1 in Puerto Rico. We lack information on 3 individuals. The 43 respondents born in the U.S., but not in Michigan or in the South, come from a wide variety of places. They are more favorably disposed toward black power than the Southerners but less so than the Michigan-born.

27 Other bodies of data and our own show that almost all riot participants are young and that age does have an impact on favorable attitudes toward violence, especially for young men. This is not surprising in light of the physical attributes helpful to a participant in a disturbance and the bravado of the young. However, age is unrelated to more general notions of whether riots helped or hurt the black cause (Murphy and Watson, op. cit., p. 82) as well as to attitudes toward black power. It is clear that age is an important variable in the study of our recent strife, but by itself it does not explain contemporary militancy or even sympathy for those who participate in civil disturbances.

28 See Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 280–283Google Scholar for a discussion of the potential for “political radicalism” of second generation slumdwellers. Claude Brown makes the same points in the graphic Foreword to his autobiography, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York: Macmillan, 1965)Google Scholar. We will make some distinctions between the effects of dissatisfaction on lower and upper status groups in the section on deprivation below.

29 The sample was divided into church (coded one), non-members (coded zero) and members of groups, usually action groups, connected with a church (not included in the analysis). People in the latter category (N = 25) chose to emphasize their group above their church affiliation in an-swering our open-ended question on membership in “church or church-connected groups.” They were about as likely as the non-members to approve of black power and should be the subject of intensive study because of their pivotal position in the black community.

For a detailed discussion of the similar influence of religion on conventional militancy among blacks, including consideration of denomination and religiosity, see: Marx, Gary T., “Religion: Opiate or Inspiration of Civil Rights Militancy Among Negroes,” American Sociological Review (1967), pp. 64–72Google Scholar.

30 The impact of region as a variable will surely diminish over time as the effects of national black leadership and the messages of the media and relatives are diffused throughout the nation. However, church affiliation is likely to remain important.

31 For example, see Brink, William and Harris, Louis, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 131 and 232–233Google Scholar on black attitudes towards various political institutions and figures.

32 See Lomax, Louis E., The Negro Revolt (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 250Google Scholar, and also Mydral, Gunnar, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Row, 1944), pp. 3–5, 880 and 1007Google Scholar on blacks as “exaggerated Americans.”

33 Stokes, Donald E., “Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment,” in Cleveland, Harlan and Lasswell, Harold D., (eds.), Ethics and Bigness (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 61–73Google Scholar and Aberbach, Joel D., Alienation and Race (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1967), pp. 119–126Google Scholar.

34 Rainwater's, Lee “Crucible of Identity—The Negro Lower-Class Family” in DAEDALUS (1966), especially pp. 204–205 and 215Google Scholar is very in-sightful on this point, but this distrust is not confined to lower class ghetto dwellers. See Aberbach, op. cit., pp. 104–114 for a detailed discussion.

35 For a detailed discussion of our findings and a critique of the existing literature on Political Trust see Aberbach, Joel D. and Walker, Jack L., “Political Trust and Racial Ideology,” a paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, especially pp. 2–7Google Scholar. A revised version will appear in this Review (December, 1970).

36 Political trust has complex roots. See ibid., pp. 7–13 for an analysis of its origins.

37 This is the famous Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale which indicates the discrepancy between an individual's definition of the “best possible life” for him and his past, present, or future situation. See Cantril, Hadley C., The Pattern of Human Concerns (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965)Google Scholar. Our respondents were given the following set of questions:

Now could you briefly tell me what would be the best possible life for you? In other words, how would you describe the life you would most like to lead, the most perfect life as you see it? (Show R card with a Ladder)

Now suppose that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you, the one you just described, and the bottom represents the worst possible life for you.

“Present Life” A. Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time? “Past Life” B. Where on the ladder would you say you stood five years ago?

“Future Life” C. Where on the ladder do you think you will be five years from now?

38 In the black community sample, for example, level of education is correlated (Gamma) .06 with scores on the past life ladder, .09 with the present life ladder and .29 with the future life ladder. Education is, therefore, only important as a predictor of assessments of future prospects and even here other factors are obviously at work. Income and occupation work much the same way. It is clear that people's evaluations of their achievements vary more within than between objectively defined status groupings.

39 Reported experiences of discrimination are unrelated to education (Gamma = .01).

40 Aberbach and Walker, op. cit., (1969), especially pp. 11–16.

41 The correlations (Gamma) between church membership, place of birth and approval of black power are actually slightly higher in the upper education than in the lower education group:

42 Tomlinson, T. M., “The Development of a Riot Ideology Among Urban Negroes,” American Behavioral Scientist (1968), pp. 27–31Google Scholar.

43 The best single statement is Converse, Philip E., “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Apter, David E. (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–262Google Scholar. For a brief review of this literature see: Mibrath, Lester W., Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965)Google Scholar; and McClosky, Herbert, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics,” this Review (1964), 361–382Google Scholar. For some reecnt work see: Axelrod, Robert, “The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues,” Public Opinion Quarterly (1967), 49–60Google Scholar; and Luttbeg, Norman R., “The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public,” Public Opinion Quarterly (1968), 398–410Google Scholar.

44 Converse, op. cit., p. 255.

45 To judge the relative strength of these relationships, see a similar matrix for a national cross-section sample in Converse, op. cit., p. 228.

46 The two remaining questions in the matrix were close-ended and provided respondents with a set of alternative answers from which to choose. See the footnotes of Table 7 for their exact wording.

47 See Converse, op. cit.; and Bowles, Roy T. and Richardson, James T., “Sources of Consistency of Political Opinion,” American Journal of Sociology (1969), who argue on p. 683Google Scholar, that “interest in politics is a more powerful predictor of both ideological conceptualization and consistency of opinion than is ability to use abstract ideas.”

48 The issue of the nature of racial ideology among whites will be explored in Aberbach, Joel D. and Walker, Jack L., Race and the Urban Political Community (Boston: Little, Brown, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

49 Strong advocates of black power are almost uniformly in favor of social pluralism and reject cultural assimilation as resting on the demeaning “assumption that there is nothing of value in the black community.” (Carmichael and Hamilton, op. cit., p. 53). However, they do not endorse separatism holding that black power is “ultimately not separatist or isolationist.” (Hamilton, op. cit., p. 193). The basic idea is that after the black man develops “a sense of pride and self-respect … if integration comes, it will deal with people who are psychologically and mentally healthy, with people who have a sense of their history and of themselves as whole human beings.” (Hamilton, op. cit., p. 182) Detailed discussion on the meanings of assimilation can be found in Gordon, Milton M., Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

50 Converse discusses this possibility in a section called “Social Sources of Constraint.” Converse, op. cit., pp. 211–213. For other treatments of the origins of ideology, see Form, William H. and Rytina, Joan, “Ideological Beliefs on the Distribution of Power in the United States,” American Sociological Review (1969), pp. 19–30Google Scholar; Barnes, Samuel H., “Ideology and the Organization of Conflict,” Journal of Politics (1966), 513–530CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Merelman, Richard M., “The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization,” this Review (1969), 750–767Google Scholar; Ladd, Everett C. Jr., Ideology in America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). pp. 341–350Google Scholar; and Lane, Robert E., Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 213–439Google Scholar.

51 Lane, Robert E., Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 316Google Scholar.

52 Converse, op. cit., pp. 208–209.

53 Claude Brown, op. cit., p. 8.

54 Frazier, E. Franklin, Black Bourgeoisie (New York: Free Press, 1957)Google Scholar.

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