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International Crises and Domestic Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Alastair Smith
Alastair Smith*
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Abstract

Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis. I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis behavior and the domestic reelection process. I assume that a leader's ability influences the outcome of a crisis. As such, voters use outcomes as a signal of their leaders' quality. Leaders have incentives to make statements that deter their enemies abroad, since these statements also enhance their standing at home. Yet, such “cheap talk” foreign policy declarations are only credible when leaders suffer domestically if they fail to fulfill their commitments. In equilibrium, false promises are only made by the least competent types of leaders. Leaders that break their promises suffer electorally. Because initial domestic conditions and institutional arrangements affect the vulnerability of leaders to these domestic costs, such factors influence the credibility of policy declarations and, therefore, the crisis outcome.

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Articles
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American Political Science Review , Volume 92 , Issue 3 , September 1998 , pp. 623 - 638
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1998

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