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Information, Power, and War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 December 2003

WILLIAM REED
WILLIAM REED
Affiliation:
Rice University
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Abstract

Ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed, the probability of conflict goes to zero. However, conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender's reservation value. I employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power-centric theories of world politics, balance of power, and power transition theory. The formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity, information asymmetries are greatest, thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict. Uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities. Recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power-centric explanations of world politics.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 97 , Issue 4 , November 2003 , pp. 633 - 641
Copyright
© 2003 by the American Political Science Association

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