Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The attainment of universal suffrage over various forms of voting restrictions has been one of the major accomplishments in the development of modern democratic institutions. Struggles for the vote have had to overcome restrictions based on factors such as sex, race and tenure of property. While gaps in the exercise of the franchise still remain, formal restrictions on voting in the United States have been largely removed.
However, an important question, largely uninvestigated, concerns the “costs” of the universal franchise in terms of the quality of government and its impact upon policy decisions. Do the disadvantages of universal suffrage offset advantages said to be gained, particularly in Western nations, such as increased legitimization of decisions and stability of regimes? Many of the past and present opponents of the extension of voting have argued that the poor results to be expected from the impact of universal suffrage far outweigh the advantages. Clearly, the problem of “costs” is important, for it is a crucial element in the argument over democracy and the vote.
We are particularly indebted to Professor Theodore J. Lowi of the University of Chicago for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
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7 Data obtained from New Orleans Board of Assessors.
8 While the literature on bond and tax referenda contains no comparative studies of popular and property voters, certain other findings are relevant for the general theory. Perhaps the most common finding is a curvilinear relationship between social status (variously defined as income, class, and size and nature of property holding) and support of bond referenda. Greatest support is found among low status groups and highest status groups while lowest support occurs among middle status groups. The most explicit investigation of the problem occurs in James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, “Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior,” this Review, 58 (December, 1964), 876–887, but see also: Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Black, “Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines,” this Review, 57 (September, 1963), 584–593; Norton, James A.. “Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area,” Western Political Quarterly, 16 (03, 1963), 195–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Boskoff, Alvin and Zeigler, Harmon, Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), ch. 3Google Scholar; Williams, Oliver P. and Adrian, Charles R., Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), ch. 5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 Assessment levels were derived by selecting the greatest amount of money voted in individual precincts in any of the elections. Precincts were divided into 26 assessment level categories. This form of estimation was required since no assessment figures are maintained by the city on a precinct basis.
10 Both popular and property voting exhibit curvilinear relationships with assessment level in that bond issues support is usually somewhat higher in both high and low assessment precincts than in middle range assessment precincts. In the 1960 school bond election the percentage of precincts in the 70 percent and above popular support category was: low assessment precincts, 73.2; high, 65.3; medium, 51.4 The relation is similar also for property voting. In both high and low assessment categories, 50 percent of the precincts were found in the 50 percent and above property vote support category in the 1963 Streets issue contrasted with only 40.4 percent of middle range precincts.
11 The importance of newspapers in local elections was suggested and analyzed early in Gosnell, Harold F., Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), ch. 8.Google Scholar In referenda involving issues such as the fluoridation controversy, opinion leadership such as newspaper endorsements are considered especially significant. See for example: Mueller, John E., “Politics of Fluoridation in Seven California Cities,” Western Political Quarterly 19 (03, 1966), 54–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The influence of other variables is suggested also in Glick, Henry Robert, “Patterns of Voting in New Orleans Bond Elections,” (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane University, 1965).Google Scholar
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